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

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CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HON.

WILLIAM WICKHAM

VOL. II.

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FIELD-MARSHAL SUWOROW.

From a copy made by permission for Mr Wickham from the original portrait presented by Field-Marshal Suworow to General John Ramsay.

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM WICKHAM

FROM THE YEAR 1794

EDITED, WITH NOTES, BY

HIS GRANDSON, WILLIAM WICKHAM, M.A.

TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

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

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DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

Portrait of Field-Marshal Suworow . . . . . *frontispiece.*

CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1797.

Mr. Wickham was now desirous of leaving Switzerland. His health had suffered from the incessant toil of the preceding two years. He felt that the time for insurrections in the interior of France had gone by. The insincerity of the Cabinet of Vienna, and the continued inaction of the Austrian Generals on the Rhine, prevented any expectation of adequate co-operation from that quarter, although the arrival of General Mack seemed, for a time, to afford some ground for hope. Mr. Wickham was wearied out by the hopeless duplicity of the Emigrants and the French Princes, their passion for intrigue, their signal want of discretion in the choice of the agents they employed, and their inveterate distrust of England, the only power which really helped them. A letter from Mons. Dandré to the Duc de la Vauguyon, written at the beginning of this year, of which I give a translation, shows Mr. Wickham's feelings on the subject.

'It is with great sorrow that I decide on giving you an account of a conversation which I have had with Mr. Wickham, and which has cut me to the heart, but I think I owe it to the interest of His Majesty. After

having made me read an article in the *Journal Général de France* of 10th December, 1796, in the foreign intelligence, which is a diatribe against the foreign powers, he added, with feeling: "If persons of high rank had not entertained and proclaimed such ideas, this royalist writer would not express himself thus. My Government has removed me from an important post to send me here, because my principles and myself being known to zealous partisans of the King, they had reason to hope that I should meet with entire confidence in my mission. But I have long since felt the contrary. People are more ready to believe what is spread abroad by subordinate agents, than what is said by an upright man influenced by honour alone. It is this which has induced me to ask for my recall, which I continue to do more urgently than ever. I have numerous proofs of the suspicions cast upon my Court, and consequently upon me. They have gone so far as to affirm in the most royalist of the newspapers, *La Quotidienne*, that Mr. Pitt was an accomplice in the assassination of the King. The army of Condé and the whole of France re-echo clamours of this sort. You know I have never had any concealment from you. I have always imparted to you my fears as well as my hopes. My openness and my integrity did not deserve such a return." Mr. Wickham also communicated to me two letters intercepted by Buonaparte, and inserted in *La Sentinelle*, No. 540, of the 19th December, 1796. He was greatly astonished to see that such letters, explaining themselves so clearly and not in cypher, should be entrusted to the common post, the more so as it is notorious that letters for Genoa are opened at Milan on their way; and it is not the first time that Mr. Wickham has heard, through other channels, of the same thing happening. It is certain, Monsieur, that discoveries of this kind give the Directory terrible weapons, and make the surveillance of the interior doubly strict, which makes the work more and more difficult and perilous. I combated

Mr. Wickham's impressions as much as I possibly could, but I could not convince him. However, in justice to his character, I am quite sure he will act consistently with the past. God grant he may not be recalled as he wishes!'

Even the Prince de Condé, although a man of high honour and sincerity, confided, from want of judgment, in persons like Montgaillard, by whom he was almost invariably betrayed.

In the month of March of this year the indiscretion of the French King's agents, the Abbé Brotier, Lavilleheurnois, and Duverne de Presle, in tampering with Colonel Malo, who affected to fall in with their views for the purpose of betraying them, afforded the Directory the opportunity of strengthening their position by proclaiming that they had discovered and defeated a royalist plot. All hopes that had ever been entertained from Pichegru, from Carnot or Barthélemy, were completely annihilated by the *coup d'état* known as the 18th Fructidor (September 4), which was contrived by three of the Directors, Barras, Rewbell, and Larevellière Lépeaux, carried into execution by General Augereau, and resulted in the transportation to French Guiana of Pichegru, Barthélemy, Willot and Brotier, Carnot escaping to Geneva.

The Jacobins were now supreme in France, and forthwith proceeded to their atrocious attack upon Switzerland. It was necessary for their purpose to procure the removal of the one man they feared in that country. Mengaud was accordingly despatched in October* with a note to the Government of Berne curtly insisting on their ordering Mr. Wickham to quit the country without delay.

* Not in July, as stated by Sir Archibald Alison in his 'History of Europe,' tenth ed. 1860, vol. iv. p. 449.

Mr. Wickham to General Pichegru.

(Translation of Draft.) 9 Jan. 1797.

I have sent you by Coco [Badouville] 2,000 Louis. You can have more if you wish. I only ask you to let me know the nature of the use that you wish to make of them, without entering too much into details. Le Major [Rousillon], to whom indeed I have said nothing as yet, will be our go-between for transmitting our correspondence and funds (he is less liable to suspicion than anyone else), always supposing that you have the same confidence in him that I have.

*Notice of Pichegru.**

(Translation.)

Pichegru was born at Arbois;† he is the son of a poor vine-dresser. Having shown in his childhood considerable aptitude for study, several persons interested themselves about him and made him go through a course of schooling. They afterwards enabled him to enter as a novice among the 'Minimes' of Arbois, whence he was sent to the military school established among the 'Minimes' of Brienne, in order to become a professor of mathematics. Later, being tired of this situation, he entered the artillery, where his knowledge of mathematics enabled him to rise to the rank of sergeant major, then to that of third lieutenant, which he had just reached at the time of the Revolution.

Pichegru has always shown gratitude to his benefactors. He was much beloved by the late Mons. Demont, late 'capitaine commandant' of the regiment of Enghien, with whom he always spent his holidays.

He is about forty years of age, and much better bred than would be imagined from his birth. Since his elevation to the rank of General he has been to Arbois, where he behaved remarkably well to all the good people who had

* It does not appear who was the author of this paper.

† Arbois, a small town in the province of Franche-Compté and department of the Jura, famous for its wine.

been of use to him. He has even employed his interest to prevent the district, then Jacobin, from molesting certain of them. He has never shown himself 'enragé;' and perhaps at that time it would have been easy to have turned him to account, at least many things he said in confidence would seem to indicate this. Pichegru has, at Arbois, only one sister named Toinette, who, after having had three children, unmarried, became nurse in the service of Mr. Doussière, honorary Councillor in the Parliament of Metz, at Arbois; she is now the wife of a poor journeyman of Arbois. Pichegru gave her some assistance, as well as to a girl who had been his mistress and by whom he had a child.

One may say that, except for his serving a detestable cause, Pichegru deserves to be distinguished by his talents, conduct, and humanity from the wretched blackguards who have made a momentary fortune under the tri-colour flag.

His first step in the revolutionary service was to be commandant of a battalion of volunteers, which was stationed for some months in 1792 in the Baillage of Pontarlier.

Pichegru lodged at Jougne with the citizen Vincent, a respectable inhabitant of that country and colonel of the National Guard of this canton: I had him yesterday to sup and sleep with me, on his way back from the fair at Morges. We drank to the health of General Pichegru, whom we have both of us always known as deserving the esteem of the good people to whom he dared to confide his opinions and his then way of thinking.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.) (In white ink.) Bern: 14th Jan^{y}. 1797.

I am informed that Mr. La Harpe, formerly Governor to the children of the present Emperor of Russia, is employed in an active correspondance with some persons of consequence in Russia. He is in constant communication

with La Croix, much more so than the affair of the Pays de Vaud can possibly make necessary. I am also informed that the agent employed to carry on his correspondance is a Mr. Berger, a Swiss married in Russia but now resident occasionally at Paris, occasionally at Lausanne. I do not write to Sir C. Whitworth upon this subject, both because I presume that your correspondance with him must be very regular, and because I am not sure that a correspondance from hence would be safe.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private and Confidential.) Cleveland Row: Jan^{y}. 27, 1797.

My dear Sir,—This will be delivered to you by Mr. Talbot, whom I beg to recommend very particularly to your friendship and protection. He was employed in the late Mission* at Paris and can give you much and very curious detail of the state of things there; and I trust you will find him intelligent and industrious. It was no longer possible for me to spare Mr. Flint from the Office, from which you will recollect I sent him when we both thought your residence in Swisserland would have been much shorter than it has been.

The issue of our negotiation* you will have seen. I cannot say that it surprized me, because I never thought that the Directory could bring themselves to wish for Peace, and much less venture to make it. The impression here has been everything that we could wish, and indeed affairs in general have taken a most favourable turn within these last four months. Still however much remains to be done before we can hope to see such a termination of this unexampled struggle as may leave the World some hope of at least a temporary quiet—an entire and radical Cure is hopeless. The evil was deeply rooted in the political state of the different nations of Europe, and it has acquired by the successes of France a degree

* Lord Malmesbury's mission to Paris at the end of 1796.

of strength and vigour which not even a complete Counter-revolution there would counterbalance. It must I fear be expected that the greatest part of the next century will be as much distracted by Wars of Constitution and Government, and by struggles between Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy, as former centuries have been by Wars of Religion or territorial aggrandisement.

Our business however is, without speculating so deeply, to employ ourselves with energy to combat the evil in its present tangible and material form, and to oppose to France the best resistance that the nature of the case will allow. We have for this purpose given largely into the plans lately proposed to us from Paris. It seemed that the state of things there gave openings which we ought not to neglect. I fear, as you do, that the persons concerned in those plans want many of the qualities most necessary for success; but they are the only instruments we have, and we must work with them. P[réçy] is gone back to you: if he had a field for action he is, I think, much more capable of it, but if that depends, as we have been used to hear, on *forward movements* by the Austrians, surely no reliance can be placed on that expectation. In truth I do not see how any such plan can be made practicable for them. Whatever is done must be done, as I think, by the efforts of the interior, unsupported by more than demonstrations at the best, and I have seen too much of what has passed to believe that this can be possible unless something new arises at Paris. It is, therefore, to that quarter that our efforts are directed. If you see openings nearer to you I know you will not omit to avail yourself of them, and you have confidence enough in me not to fear doing so. If this cannot be done you must content yourself with the keeping up intelligences, the transmitting information, and the giving, as far as possible, a right direction to the public opinion on the frontiers.

I cannot believe, as you seem to do, that the Directory can get through their financial difficulties without Revolu-

tionary measures; but we are very near the proof of this, when it will no longer be conjecture.

Ever most sincerely Yours,

GRENVILLE.

The Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

(Extract. Translation.) Mülheim: 9 February, 1797.

I am very grateful, Sir, for the proof you give me of your confidence, by communicating to me the letter you have written to Baptiste [Pichegru]; it is certainly very well calculated to remove all his doubts, if he still has any; as to the mistrust of which you complain, instead of taking to myself a reproach I should have so little deserved after the frankness, the integrity, and the confidence that I have shown you on every occasion, I will recall to you (and you must have both *seen it* and known it), that there is nothing in the world that I have not done to overcome it, this want of confidence.

I don't believe it exists to the extent you suppose, but you must feel that I can only answer for myself; it would consequently be thoroughly unjust (and I do not suspect you of it) to be annoyed with me on account of the misgivings of certain persons, and not to do justice to the *delicacy* of my position as well as of my sentiments; an enlightened Minister, *like you*, ought to feel the one, and a man of honour, *like you*, and one who knows me, surely does not suspect me of being wanting to the other.

I have been so far fortunate that my idea has coincided with yours; I have not ceased to ask Baptiste [Pichegru], and I have asked him again quite recently, by the person who has spoken to you, to send me a man, *all his own*, with whom I could talk directly, and without a third person coming between us; this is the only way of putting a stop to the reciprocal distrust—to the indiscretions, the levities, in which one has perhaps indulged, and by which I may find myself compromised without having given grounds for it.

This I confess has made me anxious that Coco [Badouville], in his journey, should have come on to me; and if the occasion presents itself a second time, as I hope it may after what you and I have both had said, I implore you to bring me this man, or to send him to me, for if my corps is to count for anything in the projects, it is of absolute necessity that I should be informed beforehand, so as to judge of the bases, promise the execution, and prepare the means.

It is with great sorrow that I hear from you that you have asked for your recall, I should have thought you more bent on finishing a work you have so well begun and the success of which would have immortalised you; but I do hope that your Government will treat you better than you treat yourself, that they will feel that there is only you who can bring to a happy end this important affair on which depends the safety of Europe, and of which you hold all the threads in your hand; do remember what you said to me yourself on the disgust that I felt at all the disappointments which we had to experience; you consolidated my courage by this one word: 'Our task would be too easy, if all went on of itself;' and yet you are discouraged! . . . . No, I cannot believe it; it is too noble to serve at once one's country, justice, and misfortune, to deprive one's self of such an honourable function, the greatest of enjoyments to a lofty soul, a feeling heart and an enlightened mind.

(No. 2.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft. Cypher.) Bern: 17 Feb^{y} 97.

My Lord,—In the mean time the funds which Mr. Preçy and Mr. Imbert demand, and which I have granted them, will have the same destination as those of last year, i.e. they will be employed by those gentlemen in keeping here a small number of good officers ready to act when the occasion shall offer, in giving small pecuniary succour to others actually in France who from despair would

otherwise throw themselves into the arms of the Directory, in keeping a communication constantly open with the leading persons in those Provinces, and in gaining some members in every municipality, as well as one or more officers in the different Regiments that have a temporary station either at Lyons or in the neighbourhood, a measure that has been hitherto found sufficient to protect the Royalists from taxation and from arrest, as they are regularly informed of every denunciation that is made against them as well as of the names of the denunciators, and the orders of the Directory in that respect, if executed at all, are executed in such a way as that they only serve to expose their own impotence.

Since my dispatch No. 111 of last year, I have been engaged in a long, direct, and very delicate correspondance with the person known by the name of Baptiste [Pichegru]. I say a delicate correspondance, because, though it has tended to clear up all my doubts respecting the whole conduct, views, and intentions of that person, and has been in that respect highly satisfactory, yet it has obliged me to call in question, in a very unpleasant manner, the fidelity of a report made to the Prince of Condé by a gentleman attached to his person, and to which his Serene Highness was disposed to have given implicit credit. The whole report of this business (much too long to be reduced to cypher without absolute necessity) shall be sent to your Lordship by Mr. Flint, together with copies of all the letters that have passed on the occasion.

Your Lordship will see in them a new proof that it is utterly impossible for any human prudence to guard against the indiscretion, mistrust, and jealousy of the French Princes and the persons in whom they place their confidence, and that the most unremitting vigilance and discretion on the part of his Majesty's Ministers abroad is not sufficient to prevent the name of his Majesty, or that of his Government, from being indiscreetly and wantonly committed.

I have hitherto delayed answering your Lordship's dispatch No. 26, by Mr. de Preçy, as I wished not to do it untill I should be able to communicate to your Lordship at the same time the result of the conversations I had had with that gentleman. Since his arrival our time has been constantly occupyd in receiving the reports of his different agents, in examining and comparing them with each other and with the information we had received from other quarters, and in sending to his friends instructions founded on the above information, calculated as well for the present moment as for any future emergency. I shall not fatigue your Lordship on this occasion with a long report, either of the nature of that information, or of the opinions we have formed upon it. Besides that it would contain little or nothing new, the whole of it may be summed up in a very few words:—

A marked hatred and contempt for the present rulers, and a secret wish for a change more or less effective in the present government; a general desire for peace at allmost any price; an established persuasion of the actual power and force of the Directory, showing remains of the effects of the system of terror, and a dread of hastening its return by any imprudent attempt to shake off the present yoke; and a firm resolution neither to undertake, nor suffer any enterprize to be undertaken to that effect, unless it be supported by a powerful foreign force, are, as they have long been, the marked characters of the opinion most generally prevalent in France. This opinion is accompanyd in the provinces adjoining to Lyons by a marked enthusiasm for the person of Mr. de Preçy, and an unshaken confidence in his prudence and discretion, founded in the persuasion, now justifyd by long experience, that he will never abuse that confidence by leading them into any enterprize without having a reasonable hope of being able to carry them through it with honour and safety.

I don't know whether your Lordship has been informed

that Mr. de Precy, notwithstanding his brilliant conduct during the siege of Lyons, and the wonderful resources which he displayed in the defence of that place, had given his opinion in the council of the magistrates of the town very decidedly against the enterprize, founded entirely on the insufficiency of the means provided for the defence of a place of that extent, and had strongly exhorted the principal Inhabitants not to defend themselves.

The Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Mülheim, 28 February, 1797.

I received yesterday evening a letter from 'la marquise' [King Louis XVIII.], who apparently did not then know all that had happened, as neither she nor her friends say a word of it to me; yet this letter is dated the 14th. At the place where she resides they are expecting an almost immediate insurrection in her own country, particularly in the capital; in consequence they desire me to do everything, so that la Mariée [General Moreau] *should be ready to declare herself, and make her family declare too.* As I have no connexion with this Mariée, as I am ignorant even where she is at this moment, there is only you who can procure me a common friend, and the *indispensable means* of getting to her; they send me besides all the promises necessary to determine her, and on that side it is all the family could wish. I implore you, therefore, Sir, to write me word directly what you *can do*, and in the event, as I venture to hope, of your being willing to take upon yourself *the means*, to send me this common friend, who might go and find La Mariée and remit to her what I am entrusted with for her; as I have written to 'la Marquise' [King Louis XVIII] that I could only do what she wishes *through you.* I do implore you, that I may not be accused of negligence, not to lose a moment in giving me an answer, of which I can render an account to La Marquise [King Louis XVIII.],

who will certainly expect it, with an impatience which you can easily imagine; I hope, Sir, there is no occasion to reiterate to you the assurances of all the sentiments of consideration, confidence, esteem and friendship, which I flatter myself you know I entertain towards you.

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: March 4th, 1797.

My dear Sir,—His Imperial Majesty having been pleased to appoint General Mack* to be Quarter Master General of the Army on the Rhine, the General purposes to set out on Monday next for that Army. He will be at the Prince of Condé's Head Quarters between the 17th and 20th Inst., when He would be happy to meet you if your engagements admit of it. As I think that much good might result from the interview, I lose no time in informing you of the General's motions. His wish is that if you arrive at Mulheim before him, you should allege some other Cause for your journey thither than your being to meet him, and that you should not even mention his being to come thither.

The happiest Union and Concert continue to prevail between this Court and Ours, and the most vigorous preparations are making for the Campaign. In Italy such reinforcements are arriving and such a Choice and Distribution of Officers made as will I trust give a different aspect to affairs in that Country.

Believe me to be ever, with great and unfeigned regard and attachment, My Dear Sir, Your most obedient and most Faithful Humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq.

* Charles Baron Mack de Leiberich, the Austrian General, too famous for his capitulation of Ulm in 1805; born 1752, died 1828.

(No. 3.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: 8 March, 1797.

My Lord,—In my despatch of the 17th ulto. No. 2, I communicated to your Lordship the points that seemed to me most strongly to mark the opinions that at present prevail in the greater part of France. Viz.—'a marked hatred and contempt for the present Rulers—a secret wish for a change *more or less* effective in the present Government—a general desire for peace—an established persuasion of the actual power and force of the Directory—strong remains of the effects of the system of terror—a dread of hastening its return by any attempt to shake off the present yoke, and a firm resolution neither to undertake nor suffer any enterprize to be undertaken to that effect unless supported by a powerful foreign force.'—I might have added, contradictory as it may appear with the last observation, 'a marked jealousy of all foreign interference, and a persuasion firmly rooted in the mind of almost every Frenchman that the powers now at war with France have no other object in view but the destruction or dismemberment of their country.'* Taking then the above statement, which I firmly believe to be correct, as a groundwork to which I shall constantly refer, taking also some other points and facts for granted which their internal evidence alone, or their notoriety, seems sufficiently to have sanctioned,—I shall venture to submit to your Lordship (with the utmost deference) the line of conduct which under all the circumstances of the moment appears to me most likely to enable his Majesty's Ministers to take some advantage of the present untoward state of things in the interior of France.

I am persuaded that the real strength of the Directory (I mean *that strength* on which its very existence depends) does not consist so much in its armies, its victories, and its influence in Europe as in the present situation of the public opinion such as I have above described it, and

in the singular address with which it continues to turn that opinion to its own advantage. Its armies may be beaten, but as long as the people, whether from choice, from mistaken calculation, or from the fear of a greater evil, shall be induced to give its confidence to the present government, new resources will be found, new armies will be created, and its influence in Europe speedily regained. But let the persuasion once become general *that the Government may be overthrown without danger to the publick*, and it is undone from that very moment, because being *in itself* obnoxious and unpopular it will then have no resource but in an union with its most implacable enemies the Jacobins, which *the Directory well knows to be absolutely impossible.* To show that I am not mistaken in this last opinion I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the Memoire on the state of the south of France, drawn up by order of the Directory, which I sent inclosed in my No. 91. of last year, where a full and most curious account of the present system and principles of the Jacobins is to be found; and as a proof that the Directory has paid the most serious attention to the facts and opinions contained in that Memoire, I will remind your Lordship that it has hitherto continued the command in the south of France to General Willot,* an avowed royalist,† that it has even proposed General Pichegru as his successor, and that not any *one* of the young men of Lyons has yet been punished, though four hundred

* General Amédée Willot, born 1757, died 1823, both a distinguished soldier and a man of honour, energy, and humanity. He was in the French army before the Revolution, and continued to serve during the various changes of government that took place till 1797, when he was chosen member of the Council of 500 for the Bouches-du-Rhône, and after the 18th Fructidor was transported, together with Pichegru and others, to Sinnamary, from which he escaped in the following year. He was afterwards employed by the English Government, and under Louis XVIII. was Governor of Corsica, where he won the affections of the inhabitants by his wise and temperate conduct.

† De Barante speaks of Willot as 'favorable aux royalistes' only. See his 'Histoire du Directoire,' Paris, 1855, vol. i. p. 282.

Jacobins at least have been put to death by them in the face of day and without any form of judgement or trial.

To take the thing in another point of view.—It is evident that the present Government is *in its nature* a Government of confidence and *most frequently* obliged to act as such.—Notwithstanding the extraordinary powers with which it is vested and the many acts of tyranny of which it has been guilty, its ministers *rarely* abandon the *forms* prescribed by the constitution without being called back to their duty by the strong voice of the publick, and those among their enemies who attack them *through those forms*, though not often successful, are yet sure to make the attempt with impunity; and your Lordship will not have failed to observe what is, above all, to be particularly attended to, that those extraordinary powers are never granted, and those acts of tyranny exercised, but in consequence of some imprudent, ill-managed, and *illegal* attack on the part of its enemies.

If this way of considering the thing be the right one, it is most evident that the power and force of the present Government can be weakened in no way so effectually as by influencing and correcting the publick opinion in those points in which it is hostile to the interests of the Allies, and consequently favourable to the Directory. Among those points, that one which at this moment seems to merit particular attention, is the persuasion 'that the Allies have in view the destruction of France, by exciting new troubles in the interior of the country.'

I am satisfyd that this *persuasion* has been the most powerfull instrument that the Directory has ever employd, and that it will continue so to be untill some more direct and effectual means shall be taken by the Allies to correct it.

I have never failed to hold this opinion from the first moment of my coming here, and your Lordship knows how frequently and how earnestly I have expressed it. Its importance, indeed, has been *hitherto* counterbalanced by

other views and other projects to which it was at the time right and reasonable to give a fair and full trial.

But *now*, under the present circumstances of the war, it seems to be the one great point to which the principal efforts ought to be directed, to which *great sacrifices ought to be made*, and from which alone any solid advantage may be expected.

With the force now employed, it is most evident to me that we never can succeed in *shaking the power of the Government* untill we shall have conquered the good will and good opinion of the people.

The gaining this point becomes of infinitely more importance since his Majesty has been graciously pleased to express his inclination towards an honourable peace with the Republick, because though the object *immediately in view* (I mean the ruining the Government) may fail, yet the attempt itself, *when made in this way*, tends directly to confirm and strengthen the hopes and wishes of the people in favour of peace, and to give them the means of compelling the Directory to conclude it.

I believe myself also, though this is a point I am not now prepared to treat, that the line of conduct I allude to will tend very essentially to check and weaken the dangerous consequences that may be apprehended for his Majesty's own dominions, from an open communication with France after a peace shall have been concluded.

It is possible that *the principles* I have here laid down will be *generally* admitted; the great difficulty will certainly consist in settling the extent to which they ought to be carried in practice.

If I might venture to give an opinion upon a point which I feel to be as delicate as it is important, I should not hesitate to say that it would be better, even for the royalists themselves, as well as for their unfortunate monarch *at this moment*, that the means of taking up arms *partially* should be neither furnished nor promised

them; that they should be strongly warned of the danger to which these partial attempts expose both themselves and their cause, and of the strength and means which they furnish to the Directory; and that they should be exhorted to conform their conduct for a time to the laws and customs of the Republick, which will furnish them with far better and safer means of attacking the government than any other they can procure or make use of. Could that monarch once be brought to sanction such instructions, and to assign as his reasons for so doing 'his own *temporary* inability to render any effectual assistance to his subjects, his affection for the people, and his indifference to his own rights and interests when compared with their tranquillity and happiness,' I am well satisfyd that it would not only prove his shortest way to regain the crown, but that it would most materially contribute to give to the throne, when re-established, a superior degree both of stability and splendour. It would, at the same time, contain nothing like a renunciation either of the crown itself or of any of its rights, but would on the contrary preserve that last great question untouched untill the true moment of treating it should be brought about by the wishes and wants of the people.

It might, and ought, also to be accompanyd with the assurance that should ever more fortunate circumstances offer themselves, or should the mass of the people be driven to take up arms from despair, the King would immediately share their fortunes in person, and that in that case assistance of every kind should be liberally furnished them.

The great objection of the French royalists to this line of conduct will be that it naturally tends to the establishment, *at least in the first instance*, of a constitutional monarchy, inasmuch as it necessarily implys that whatever change be made, it shall be brought about and perfected by the persons vested with the powers of the state under the now existing laws. And if the Court of

Blankenburg* continues still in the opinion that no form of constitutional government whatever is admissible, and that it were better that the King should lose his throne at once than submit to the establishment of one, the whole project must certainly be abandoned as far as they are concerned, and as far as their concurrence is necessary, to its execution.

But being myself persuaded that the Court of Blankenburg has formed that opinion in consequence of the many false and flattering reports it has received as to the situation of the interior and the affection of the people for their lawful sovereign and the antient government, I have no doubt but that opinion will change as the illusion on which it is founded shall vanish, and that the Count D'Avaray as well as the Duke de la Vauguyon will at length hear reason on that point, as they have on many others which for a long time they would not suffer to be named in the King's presence.

I am well aware, even should his Majesty's Ministers see the thing in the same point of view, that to mention the subject at all at Blankenburg might be a matter of great delicacy. And yet the system I would recommend is really the same *in principle* with that which I have constantly followed on this side of the country from the moment that I perceived that no effective assistance could be received from the Austrians; and I have never hesitated to lay down and support that principle in its full extent in all the conferences that I had in the course of last summer with the Duke de la Vauguyon, who as well as the King himself are, I know, persuaded of its truth, though, perhaps, neither the one nor the other have dared to act upon their own persuasion.

If there should be any difficulty in opening the matter *directly* at Blankenburg, it would be very easy for me in the course of my correspondance with the Duke de la

* Blankenburg, a small town of Brunswick, where King Louis XVIII. inhabited an old castle belonging to the Duke.

Vauguyon to do it in a manner that would appear perfectly natural. It would only, in fact, be giving a somewhat larger extent to the opinion I have constantly professed, and I might, *in the first instance*, still continue to speak of *my own opinion only*, and confine its effect and its proposed operation to that part of France with which I have a direct communication.

I am not at all apprehensive that a fair impartial communication of an opinion of this kind would either excite the displeasure or shock the delicacy of the illustrious and unfortunate person to whom it would be indirectly addressed; nor do I consider that it would in any way tend to affect the influence that his Majesty might be supposed to retain at the Court of Versailles in case a counter-revolution, in the extended sense of the word, should be hereafter effected.

In the communications that I have had with that unfortunate Prince, as well as with his Ministers, I have generally found that speaking the plain truth was the best mode of obtaining from them whatever object I had in view; and indeed I have ever been as anxious to avoid deceiving *them*, as I have been careful that they should not deceive *me*.

But even should it be impossible to bring the Court at Blankenburg to adopt these sentiments, I should still persist in thinking that the same line of conduct might be followed by the Allies with advantage to their own interests, and those of his Majesty in particular; and I give this opinion the more boldly because it is perfectly consistent with the *principles* laid down in those admirable instructions which I received from your Lordship for the regulation of my conduct in the beginning of last year. I have endeavoured in this dispatch to point out some of the most striking advantages of such a system, and on looking round on every side, I own I see nothing that can counterbalance them.

I see no force on any point capable of presenting a

powerful mass of resistance to the first efforts of the Directory—nothing like a real rising *of the country and of the people*; without which, it is my firm persuasion, that the efforts of any individuals will be more mischievous than usefull. In the infinite number of plans that have been presented to me, I have seen nothing solid, nothing practicable, *when taken by itself*—everything depending on points of which the framers of those plans allways allowed that they were not the masters, and on combinations which they admitted they were not able to direct. I have often seen many and excellent materials, but no means of employing them, and no talents capable of bringing them into any shape.

Unfortunately, too, the persons with whom we are necessarily obliged to act are not only essentially deficient in the two great qualities of discretion and secrecy, but their whole conduct, character, and principles are such as must ever render any joint operation impracticable.

I will not disguise from your Lordship that in attaching such infinite importance to the gaining the good opinion of the nation at large, I carry my views much farther than the present moment; and that I am very much influenced by the persuasion that, *on the one hand*, the revolution will not terminate without leaving a considerable share of the Government in the hands of the people, and, *on the other*, that the state of the continent may soon be such as that the friendship and hatred of that government cannot be considered as matters of indifference.

(No. 4.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: March 8, 97.

My Lord,—In my dispatch of the 28 Dec., No. 111, I mentioned to your Lordship that an interview had then taken place between a French officer named in that dispatch and the Generals Froelich and Wolfe, and that the officer in question having been desired by those Generals

to meet his Royal Highness the Archduke Charles at Offenburg, had refused to undertake that journey untill he should have obtained the opinion of the person known by the name of Baptiste [Pichegru] as to the utility and prudence of such a measure.

A few days after the date of that dispatch the officer in question, whom I shall distinguish by the name of Villars, waited on me here with a note from Baptiste [Pichegru], in Baptiste's [Pichegru's] own handwriting, which merely acknowledged the receipt of a letter of mine (the subject of which is mentioned in my dispatch of last year, No. 106), repeated to me the assurance of the general good intentions of the writer, and referred me to the bearer for further particulars.

Mr. Villars then informed me that Baptiste [Pichegru] had strongly advised him not to undertake the journey to Offenburg, but rather to come here (where, as in a neutral country, he might shew himself without danger) and communicate to me the opinion of Baptiste [Pichegru] on the present situation of things, which I might transmit with ease and safety to the Archduke, receive his Royal Highness's answer, and convey to Baptiste [Pichegru] any particular questions that the Austrian Generals might think proper to make to him.

He then added that Baptiste [Pichegru] had charged him to inform me that he continued still in the same opinion that he had always expressed, which was shortly this, *that there was but one certain way of putting an end to the war and the revolution, and that was by beating and fatiguing the republican armies, inasmuch as those armies constituted the whole strength and means of the Directory*; and that if that could not be done with spirit and constancy the revolution would over-run all Europe, and he knew no means of stopping it, as with their armies unbeaten *the Directory would be sure to find finances either within or without* their own territory. That he had most evident proofs of the fatigue and disgust that began

to prevail in the army, and had of late increased in a remarkable degree; that he never had and never would omit whatever might tend to increase it *without committing himself too far and without quitting the language of a republican*; and that if the army could by any possible means be kept employed during the winter, he had the greatest hopes that a very considerable portion of it would desert or even disband, and that the rest would be incapable of any real exertion in the spring. Whereas if the Austrians granted an armistice or took their winter quarters in such a manner as would not admit of their being assembled at a very short warning, half the republican army would be employed, as they were during the last winter, in bringing back the deserters, forcing the requisitions, and terrifying the well-disposed inhabitants in the interior, who would not venture in that case to attend the new elections; and that *besides very considerable detachments would certainly be made to Italy.*

I asked him if B[aptiste] as a military man had well considered all the difficulties that the Austrians would have in carrying on a winter campaign. He said, yes; he had considered them all, that he knew they must be very great, but that he proposed them as the lesser of two evils; and that if the campaign could be kept open till the new elections in March, that circumstance alone might decide the fate of France and of Europe. If it could not, which he feared was the case, he had only one council to give, which was that it might be opened again as soon as possible and before the armies should have had time to have done any great mischief in the interior, and *if possible before the detachments to Italy could have reached their destination.* He said that he had no particular project of his own, and that he could have none, being, to use his own expression, *l'esclave des circonstances*, of which, however, he was always ready to take advantage; that he would remain in Franche Compté as long as there remained any hopes of something favourable

happening in the army, which he should always consider possible as long as the campaign was open; and besides that, his presence was particularly useful there, as from its vicinity to the armies, he had an opportunity of knowing their real sentiments, and of encouraging those which were good. He was also able to receive many of the officers in his own house and converse with them at leisure. That he had never opened himself to any of them but Mr. Villars and one other officer, though he was satisfyd that the greater part of the generals in the army were fully persuaded of what he was about, and that the Directory was *most undoubtedly informed of it*,* and that this knowledge of theirs was the real and only cause of his having been dismissed from the command. That he was however indifferent as to the consequences, as he knew they had no proof against him, and that if ever they had he should be informed of it in time. That as soon as the campaign was closed he should go to Paris. That he was certain of being returned at the ensuing election, and that there was a large party disposed to name him to the place that would soon be vacant in the Directory; that he should not oppose that nomination in case the republican armies should continue to maintain their ground, as his efforts must in that case be directed to a new point. But that if those armies were soundly beaten, or if the desertion should continue in the way it had begun and become general, he should then prefer remaining where he was, in the hope of taking advantage of so favorable a situation of things as the state of

* This declaration of General Pichegru's is most important. De Barante, in his 'Histoire du Directoire,' vol. i. book 2, assumes that the Directors were entirely ignorant of Pichegru's views. The accounts received by Mr. Wickham of Pichegru's mode of life contradict the charge brought against him by De Barante, 'qu'il avait commencé à changer de mœurs. Il avait pris goût de luxe et aux jouissances; dans un temps où tous les généraux vivaient de privations sans murmure et n'avaient d'autre ambition que de défendre la patrie ou d'acquérir la gloire, on ne comprenait pas comment Pichegru pouvait suffire à tant de dépenses.'—Pp. 177-8.

France must then present. Villars added, *from himself*, that the present correspondance was most undoubtedly suspected by the whole army, for that many of the general and staff-officers had often thrown out hints and joked with him on the subject, as supposing him to be employed in it confidentially by Baptiste [Pichegru], and that he believed that many of them were not sorry to see a way kept open for future reconciliation without their being concerned in it.

(No. 5.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Berne: 8 March, 1797.

My Lord,—The imprudent conduct* of the King's agents at Paris, at the same time that it has proved their own ruin, has produced more mischief in more different ways to the cause those unfortunate persons meant to serve than I can attempt to describe.

Its consequences are felt, more or less, in every part of the kingdom, in none more so than in the Provinces in this neighbourhood. The elections in five different departments, viz. the Jura, the Doubs, the Ain, the Marne, and the Haute-Soane, had been, I believe, effectually secured in favour either of great proprietors or of persons of known good character and conduct. But now all is again afloat, and there is everything to fear from the intrigues of the commissaries of the Directory, who openly exert themselves everywhere in favour of such candidates only as are known to be purchasers of national property.

Among other mischiefs produced by the unfortunate affair above alluded to, is the allmost total privation of my correspondance with Paris. Since my No. 2 I have received no information from thence of any material consequence, though some of my correspondants, for whose safety I was seriously alarmed, have, at length, given me signs of life.

* The so-called royalist plot of Brotier, Duverne de Presle, Proli, and Lavilleheurnois.

In particular Mr. Berger [Dandré] has sent me a messenger on purpose to say that he is safe in the neighbourhood of Paris and united with his friends, who have not lost courage though they are fully sensible of the great addition of strength and confidence that the unfortunate affair above alluded to will give to the Directory; among other instances of the mischievous consequences of that event, he informs me that the committee of Mr. Dumas had been on the point of again uniting itself with the Directory, but that he had taken timely means to prevent them.

. . . . . .

I have lately had some very confidential communications with the Prince of Condé on the state of affairs at Blankenburg.

From that communication, as well as from some other private information that I have received, I can clearly collect the following particulars.

That the jealousy heretofore entertained both of Monsieur and the Prince of Condé has of late much augmented, notwithstanding strong professions to the contrary, and it is greatly aggravated by the liberal supplies that have been furnished by the Court of London to those Princes, whilst the King himself and his Court are said to be left in a situation unbecoming their rank and dignity. That this jealousy, however, does not extend to the children of Monsieur,* who are considered as in some sort adopted by the King. That both the King himself and all his Ministers were entirely persuaded that the blow meditated at Paris would succeed, and that in consequence of that opinion they had sent for their Royal Highnesses the Dukes of Angoulême and Berry to Blankenburg, that neither they nor the King might be found at the moment of the explosion in the hands of the

* The two sons of Monsieur, afterwards Charles X., the Duc D'Angouleme, who married the unfortunate daughter of Louis XVI., and died in 1844, and the Duc de Berry, murdered in 1820.

Allies. That the Prince of Condé is himself of opinion that a very perfidious blow was meditated against his Serene Highness personally, on this occasion by the King of France's Ministers, in which, however, he is firmly persuaded that the King himself had no part.

Mr. Wickham to the Comte D'Avaray.

(Draft.) Mulheim: 22nd March, 1797.

My dear Sir,—I have received your short note of the 2nd of March, and will do what I can for the bearer. I have forwarded the enclosed letter to Mr. D'Arletti [Comte de Précy].

I have to thank you also for a long letter that I received some time since (to the date of which I cannot now refer), in which you seem to cast some reflexions upon me for having spoken to others, rather than yourself, of *certain letters* that had been written by *certain persons*, in which my Court and its Ministers had not been treated with the respect they deserved. I will not now enter into the *subject* of those reflexions, because they are only fit to be treated in a private conversation; but I can assure you, my dear Sir, with great truth, that I have on no occasion whatever suffered a word to escape me that could in any way tend to make it believed, either that my friendship for you had abated, or that my confidence *in your assurances* had been weakened by the misconduct of others. Believe me, my dear Sir, I am sincere in what I say, and if any person whatever has holden to you a different language, he must have strangely misrepresented my conversation and my expressions. I think I have had reason to complain of certain persons having been sent to me, of whom it was well known that I had the very worst opinion; but as *I* am persuaded that *that* will never happen again, much as I may have suffered from it myself, *you may be persuaded*, my dear Sir, that the uneasiness I felt at the time is forgotten, and that I have long since found reasons to excuse what, in the first moment, I could not

prevent myself from blaming, and I am also well satisfyd that it was not by your councils that any of these persons were sent.

The Prince of Condé has spoken as well as written to me concerning certain propositions which you wish to be made to a person known by the name of *La Mariée* [General Moreau]. I cannot persuade myself that any propositions of the kind could *at this* moment be acceptable, and I know that persons *in her situation* dread nothing so much as *unseasonable* offers. I am, besides, fully and entirely persuaded that the lady in question is by no means mistress in her own family. I believe her also to be ambitious, and fully determined to do everything in her own way; besides that it would be no easy matter at this moment to make such an offer, much less so to find a person capable of making it with effect. Under these circumstances I should myself venture strongly to advise that the lady should be left to act by herself; the more so, as you know very well that some slight overtures had been made to her before she joined her family; and *that communication* is still open, though it must be used with great caution and circumspection at this moment. I am most firmly persuaded also, that *money alone* will do nothing with the lady in question, and that such an offer would be instantly rejected. His Majesty's intentions in other respects are already perfectly well known to her through the channel above alluded to.

I have been most sincerely affected by the misfortune that has befallen your agents at Paris. I cannot say that I could ever bring myself to approve of any attempt of the kind of that which was projected, because I allways thought that it must *necessarily* be discovered, as well from the number of persons to whom the secret must be intrusted, as from the facility with which false brethren might introduce themselves into the fraternity. I was also most strongly against any attempt whatever being made before the epoch of the elections. The power that

the Directory derives from that unfortunate business is stronger than is generally imagined, and the violent measures to which it will probably have recourse to influence the freedom of the elections, will be justifyd by the existence of a plot tending to the destruction of the Government. If anything can do it, that very business will probably prolong the existence of the Directory at least another year.

I am not satisfyd that the elections will pass without trouble or bloodshed. It is sincerely to be wished that they should be peaceable, as I am satisfyd, in that case, that the choice of new members will *in general* be good. Should any unexpected circumstance arise, that may admit of my rendering service in the cause in which we are all engaged, you may rely on my efforts to take full advantage of it.

I am sorry to see that there are quarrels and dissentions without end among the persons who hope to enjoy the confidence of His Majesty at Paris. It is on that account that I have declined entering into correspondance with any of them, untill His Majesty shall have decided with whom he would wish me to be in relation.

I remain, &c.

MR. LE COMTE D'AVARAY.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Morton Eden.

(Draft.) Bern: 25th March, 1797.

My dear Sir,—I had the pleasure of meeting General Mack at Mulheim on Monday last. Our interview was of course short, and much was left unsaid on both sides. I had settled with him some other *times and places* at which we might have seen each other more at leisure, but the situation of the interior of France, and particularly of Paris, becoming every day more interesting in consequence of the near approach of the elections, and the Directory having manifested a strong *desire* to influence them by other means than mere persuasion, I thought it not right

for me to remain so long from home; I therefore returned here, and shall content myself *for the present* with writing to the General very fully on every point in which I think I may possibly be usefull.

I cannot say to you how much I have been pleased and satisfyd with what I have seen of him, and how truly I rejoice to find him once again at the head of affairs.

I find the General enters most fully into the notions I have so long endeavoured to inculcate, of the infinite importance that ought to be attached *to this country and its neighbourhood*; but upon that point I shall write to you more fully by another occasion, as I find the matter is not very likely to press.

I send you enclosed an extract of a letter from Mr. Trevor to Lord Grenville, which I have copied as it passed through my hands. I add an extract of a letter that I have this moment received from Paris, from a very shrewd and accurate observer, not a Frenchman. You may communicate it, if you please, to Mr. Thugut.

No man living can presume to say what will or will not happen at the approaching elections. If they are not interrupted, they will be in general good. The Directory is persuaded of that fatal truth, and will leave nothing undone to influence them. I don't think, however, that they will succeed otherwise than by force of arms, in which case it is a question whether the people in general would be either able or willing to make any great resistance. I fear not, but as I can answer for nothing, it is right to be prepared for the worst, and I have ventured to press General Mack, in case anything serious should happen, to be so prepared as that he may be able to menace the frontiers, and prevent as many troops as possible from being detached to the interior. I am persuaded that you cannot press the point too earnestly on the Austrian Minister. You will perhaps find additional reasons for doing so in Mr. Trevor's dispatch. The proposal for an armistice in Italy has no other object in view but the

having the troops at their disposition, should any troubles take place in the interior.

Notwithstanding this obstinacy respecting the Low Countries, real or apparent, I am persuaded that the information I communicated to you on that point, in my letter of the 24th of December, was, *at the time*, correct. The expression of Mr. La Croix to Lord Malmesbury, '*que leurs meilleurs Publicistes pensèrent que les pays bas ne pouvaient pas être détachés, &c. &c.*,' proves clearly that there was even at that epoch some doubt remaining on the subject. I am, upon the whole, inclined to believe, that they have since become more peremptory upon that point.

I will thank you to forward the inclosed letter to Mr. Smith by the first opportunity. I congratulate you most sincerely on the intelligence it contains, though probably old to you.

You will oblige me very much by recommending to the protection of the Austrian Government a Mr. de la Tour, a French gentleman of my particular acquaintance. He has been persecuted here by the French mission, and obliged to retire to Constance, where he hopes that he may be permitted to reside. I had no means of saving him but by taking him into my house, which, under all the circumstances, I did not chuse to do.

I remain, &c.

SIR MORTON EDEN.

(No. 8.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Bern: Saturday, 1st April, 1797.

My Lord,—In consequence of a letter from Sir Morton Eden, I last week went to Mulheim in the hope of meeting General Mack, who, as I understood from Sir Morton Eden's letter, had expressed a wish to see me there.

I passed the whole evening of Monday the 20th with that officer, and at his desire had appointed several other times and places of meeting, at which we might have discussed much more fully than we were then able to do,

all the different points upon which he wished to have consulted me.

Unfortunately, the very critical situation of affairs in the interior of France, and certain letters that I had received from Paris, of which I shall give your Lordship an account elsewhere, obliged me to return suddenly to Bern.

I had the satisfaction of finding the General in a much better state of health than I had been taught to expect. As a proof of his being fully equal to the fatigues of the campaign, I should mention to your Lordship that the day I saw him he had been on horseback from five in the morning till six in the evening, during which time he had visited every post on the Rhine, from Rhinfelden to Mulheim, a distance of at least thirteen leagues, having an uncommon cold north-east wind in his face, and that he had not the least appearance of being fatigued, though he sat up afterwards with me to a very late hour in the night.

(*Cypher.*) The shortness of the time we passed together, and the information I was myself obliged to give to the General, prevented me from obtaining much from him. In the course of our conversation I was, however, enabled to collect the following particulars.

That with the utmost force that could be spared for the defence of Germany, it would be impossible to undertake any offensive operations. That should the enemy attempt to pass the Rhine, it was not so much the General's plan to make any effective resistance, either to the passage or to their future progress, as to keep his whole force collected ready to fall upon them in a mass, whenever a favourable opportunity should offer itself, leaving at the same time strong garrisons in Philippsburg, Manheim, Mentz, and Ehrenbreitstein. That to prevent him from advancing *too far*, and, at the same time, to secure a safe point of retreat, and to command the navigation of the Danube, he had directed the fortifications of Ulm to be put in repair, and that it was under

the protection of that place that he should make his principal stand.

That should the situation of affairs in Italy allow him to receive a reinforcement of 25,000 men, or should he be able to give the French a thorough defeat in Germany, he should immediately act on the offensive, and that, in that case, he was fully persuaded that no plan of operations would be so advantageous as that, which was originally proposed, of penetrating into France by the Upper Alsace and Franche Compté. On this point he expressly told me that he had taken, in the course of the day, a new survey of the principal points on which the passage of the Rhine might be effected, and had found them still more easy than he expected. He added, that nothing could have prevented the Austrian generals from passing the Rhine in the year 1795 but *a want of confidence in their own talents.*

On my mentioning to him the use that might be made of the army of the Prince of Condé on such an occasion, I found him as full of prejudices on that point, and on everything relating to it, as any other Austrian general whom I had seen in the course of these last two years, and, like them, decidedly adverse both to the augmenting the Condé army by new recruits, and to the reinforcing it by Austrian regiments; neither would he hear of the taking possession of any place in the French King's name, nor suffer the Prince of Condé to take possession of any, nor would he allow his S. H. to act at all *for himself*, as long as he should be within reach of the Austrian army, considering the Prince's Corps in no other light than that of a body of troops which might be usefully employed in making a diversion in favour of the Austrian operations.

I had no time to enter with him into any discussion of those points; besides, the moment was extremely unfavourable, as I found that he had been strongly prejudiced by the reports he had received, to the disadvantage

of the Condé army, that same morning from the Austrian officers at every post and cantonment that he had visited, many of which reports were, I fear, but too well founded.

General Mack attributed all the disasters that had befallen the Austrian armies to the intrigues and evil Counsels of the Prince of Waldeck and General Rollin. He seemed particularly anxious to justify himself in the opinion of His Majesty's Ministers from a charge that had been made against him, of having advised His Imperial Majesty to treat for peace early in the year 1795. He insisted that the proposals he had advised to be made to the enemy were not serious, but only intended to gain time for new reinforcements to arrive from the Upper Rhine, and new measures to be concerted before their arrival. He said that he had been induced to propose this measure, from the wretched counsels that were given to his Sovereign, the misconduct and incapacity of several of the generals then employed, and the insufficiency of the force then in Flanders, as well as from the artful insinuations of Mr. Rollin, who had never ceased exhorting him to propose this measure from the moment of the Emperor's arrival at the army.

I found him particularly desirous that his Court should give him leave to pass over the territory of Basle as the only means of surprizing Hunninguen; the necessity of providing a large quantity of pontons rendering an intended passage of the Rhine, at all times, *to a certain degree* a matter of public notoriety. Upon this point I gave him every information in my power, and explained to him very fully everything that related to the *real force* of the Swiss, the means of organizing and collecting that force in a point, the time that such a measure would require, and the degree of resistance that might be expected from them in almost every possible case.

I added, that it is not of *the passage* that the Swiss are

afraid, but of *the return*, and that such a measure could in no case be attempted *with safety*, unless the Austrians had a most respectable force on the Upper Rhine, capable at once of commanding respect and securing confidence; nor even could it be done with *an appearance of justice*, unless the Austrians should do what they ought, in sound policy, long since to have done (but which is now I fear too late), i.e. make a marked distinction between the other Cantons of Switzerland and that of Basle, giving every proof of real attachment and respect to the one, and of avowed ill-will, if not of hostility, to the other. If a conduct of this kind had been adopted, with judgement, early in the war, and constantly persevered in, I am persuaded that the other Cantons would have been easily induced to have separated their interests from those of Basle, and that they would never have put their own peace and tranquillity to the hazard, for the protection of a Canton to which none of the others are sincerely attached, and which by the imprudent and notoriously partial conduct of its chiefs has already most deeply committed, on more than one occasion, the interests and security of the whole Confederacy. Unfortunately, the whole conduct of the Court of Vienna towards these States has, on the one hand, been marked with a degree of indifference, as well as haughtiness, that has disgusted her warmest friends, on the other, has been so unsteady and feeble as to give courage and insolence to her enemies, and prevent all moderate and judicious persons from having any confidence either in her arms or her counsels.

I assured General Mack at the same time, that it would be impossible for me to take any part, direct or indirect, in such a measure, without having previously received His Majesty's commands for the regulation of my conduct. (*Cypher ends.*)

Notwithstanding the shortness of my conversation with General Mack, it was easy to perceive in him a man

greatly superior* to all that I had yet seen at the Austrian army, and I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship on his return to his station, at this moment of general alarm and danger. I am assured that his talents will soon be put to a severe trial, as the enemy is collecting a most powerful force on the Rhine, and seems determined to spare no expence that may contribute to put the army in a situation to undertake some great and decisive enterprize.

Notwithstanding that the principal preparations are making on the Lower Rhine, I am myself strongly of opinion that an effort will be made to effect a junction with the army in Italy by the Tyrol. I am sorry to say that I have observed for some time past a great enthusiasm for the service of that army, and that a number of young men, who had deserted from the armies of the Rhine, are daily joining it. This army, which at times had been reduced to such a state as to be on the eve of abandoning Italy, for want of numbers to maintain its numerous and extensive posts and positions, is now the most formidable in the service of the Republick, as well in numbers as in discipline and enthusiasm.

I am sorry also to observe that a kind of panick terror, which the arrival of General Mack has not allayd, again prevails throughout the whole of Swabia, where no effective measures have been taken to arm and discipline the Inhabitants. I am also persuaded that secret Overtures have again been made to the Directory by some of the Princes of that circle, particularly by the Prince Margrave of Baden and the Duke of Wirtemberg.

* Mr. Wickham was not alone in the high estimate he formed of General Mack's abilities: it was not in planning or explaining his plans, but in action, that the General was wanting.

(No. 10.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft. Cypher.) Bern: Wednesday, 13th April, 1797.

It is distressing under such circumstances to receive from Blankenburg a new manifest, avowing the existence of different agents in the interior of the Republick, and directing the particular attention of those agents to the approaching elections.

Though there is certainly in other respects much to approve in this piece, yet it is, for obvious reasons, most sincerely to be regretted that the above points had not been left untouched.

There is nothing that the well-disposed inhabitants, who have the restoration of royalty most sincerely at heart, dread so much, and with so much reason, as any interference on the part of the King and his agents, or any appearance whatever of concert or co-operation with the *avowed* royalists either within or without the kingdom. This is a point which, though obvious in its very nature, has never been at all understood at Blankenburg, and the extreme delicacy of the subject has rendered me more cautious in pressing it on the attention of the Count d'Avaray and the Duke de la Vauguyon than I ought perhaps to have been considering its great importance and the consequences to which it naturally leads. I have had, however, much serious conversation with the Duke de la Vauguyon upon many subjects immediately connected with it, and at one time (as I had then the honour to inform your Lordship) I had good reason to hope that the publick conduct of that nobleman would have been conformable to the principles I have here laid down, inasmuch as he had repeatedly assured me that his sentiments in that respect were exactly the same as my own. I had soon, however, the mortification to learn, as well from some of the Duke's letters that were intercepted and published by the enemy as from others that were communicated to me

in a secret and confidential manner, that his language on that occasion had been assumed with the intention of deceiving, and that the counsel I had given was represented to the King's agents, as well in as out of France, as a ground for mistrusting whatever came from the British Cabinet. Without meaning to attribute anything of the same duplicity to the Count d'Avaray, of the rectitude of whose intentions I have the highest opinion, I am persuaded that the mischief is and will be fundamentally the same.

It is a great publick calamity at a moment like this that there should be no one person about the French King at all acquainted with the real state of the interior and of the publick opinion in France, or with the secret springs and causes by which the revolution has been brought about and supported, or who has any clear notion of the nature of a popular assembly, or of a mixed government.

It is in vain talking with any of those persons upon any of those subjects; they really *do not and cannot comprehend them.*

This is the real cause of all the false measures that are taken; this is the reason why they neither advise nor understand those measures of prudence and precaution which necessity dictates, and why those who advise them become immediately the objects of jealousy and suspicion; this is also the reason why, instead of leading and directing the publick opinion, they are not only greatly behind it, but too often retarding its progress. . . . .

Mr. Montgaillard having attempted to enter into a direct correspondance with the person known by the name of Baptiste [Pichegru], the latter has sent his own confidential friend to inform me of the fact, and at the same time to take measures tending to prevent the mischief by which it might be followed.

Mr. Spencer Smith to Mr. Wickham.*

(Extract.) Constantinople: 7 May, 1797.

Dear Sir,—. . . Heaven avert that the contagion of pernicious principles do not produce some catastrophe of a different nature. Smyrna has just offered a melancholy spectacle from such a cause. The fermentation of the populace, which may date from the long stay of the enemy's first revolutionary squadron in that port from the commencement of the war till lately, has at length produced an explosion which I confess myself to watch the extent of with no small anxiety, as I consider the positive destruction and havoc, though enormous, as perhaps the least of the disaster, considered in a moral view. To sum the matter up, the whole maritime suburb of that flourishing city, with the exception of four European houses (of which two are English), has been consumed by fire, and exposed to the sack and pillage of a ferocious mob during 24 successive hours. The gross damage done is estimated at near a million and a half sterling, of which our portion approaches 100,000*l.*, for of our whole opulent factory nothing remains but the smoaking ruins and their naked families. The French claim near the same sum from the Porte, but I believe mean to indemnify themselves at the expence of the Venetians, the misconduct of whose vagabond subjects is stated as the prime cause of the misfortune, and against whom the Porte naturally and ingeniously endeavours to raise a hue and cry amongst the Corps diplomatique. The French, I believe, had not near that sum to lose throughout the Levant, and the Spaniards saved all. The Imperials have lost about 50,000*l.* sterling, and other

* John Spencer Smith, younger brother of Admiral Sir Sidney Smith. He held a commission in the Guards, and on quitting the army was engaged for many years in diplomacy; at this time he was British Minister at Constantinople. He afterwards represented England at Stutgard, a post which he quitted in 1804, from the same cause that obliged Mr. Drake to leave Munich; Mr. Smith died at Caen in 1840.

nations about as much each, the remainder having fallen chiefly upon the Ottoman tributary subjects, amongst whom the loss in life has been also the most considerable. Few Europeans having fallen in a deliberate massacre of upwards of 1,000 persons, during which every horror was committed that can be supposed incidental to the assault of a town by storm. The female sex exposed to the most brutal violence, and the children conveyed away and sold as slaves with inconceivable dexterity and dispatch. This matter, in fact, occupies the public here just at present as much almost as General Buonaparte. I have only just time and room left to assure you, in a hurry, of my being,

Dear Sir, your faithful humble Servant,

SPENCER SMITH.

(No. 12.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Bern: 24th May, 1797.

. . . . I have introduced the person known by the name of Baptiste [Pichegru] to M. Berger [Dandré], and as all their operations will now be concerted together, so their expenses and demands must be considered as the same. I have had the highest reason lately to be satisfyd with the conduct of that person, and have the best hopes that he will distinguish himself in the post to which he is now called, as much as he had done in that which he formerly filled with so much reputation.

(No. 12.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft. Private.)
(Most Secret and Confidential.) Bern: 27 June, 97.

(*Cypher.*)—M. Berger [Dandré] has seen Carnot frequently, and, upon the whole, is disposed to be satisfyd with him. He inclines to think he may be gained over by Barthélemy. He wishes to make his peace, but the blood of the King sits heavy upon his mind and renders

him at times quite desperate; he is, besides, constantly reminded by his colleagues that he had filled a place in the Committee of Public Safety under Robespierre, from which they draw the conclusion that even should the King pardon him the public never will.

Sir Morton Eden to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: June 28th, 1797.

My dear Sir,—(*Cypher*)—Conformably to what I told you in my letter of Saturday last, I have spoken with the Austrian Minister on the different points mentioned in yours of the 9th inst. He still professes not to give credit to the report, and solemnly declared that no proposal of alliance has been made by the French to this Government, nor any mention made, either before or since the signature of the preliminary treaty, of a project of invasion of His Majesty's electoral dominions and of Portugal. (*Cypher ends.*)

A report prevails here that General Buonaparte is desirous to obtain the Swiss Cantons' permission to conduct his army home through Switzerland. I trust, however, that the Government is too wise to grant it.

The system of spoliation is steadily pursuing in Italy. Believe me to be ever, with great and unfeigned regard, My dear Sir, your most faithful humble Servant,

MORTON EDEN.

(No. 19.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.)
(Most Secret and Confidential.) Bern: 7th July, 1797.

I have received a great deal of important intelligence from Paris in the course of this last week, most of which will be known to your Lordship by the public papers before it can reach you by this circuitous channel. All that is worth communicating may be reduced to the following heads:

1. An expedition to Ireland has been finally determined

on ; of this I can have no manner of doubt, as well because the two persons from whom I received opposite accounts of the destination of the Brest fleet last winter now agree in their reports, as because Mr. Berger [Dandré] (who has now an indirect communication with Mr. B[arthélemy] through the medium of the friend whom that Director consults on all confidential points) assures me that both Barras and Mr. B[arthélemy] have protested *in writing*, against the measure. I give the more credit to this latter information (of which, indeed, in other respects, I see no room to doubt), because I am assured from very good authority that Mr. Barras wrote to General Bonaparte about a month since, advising him not to accept *a dangerous mission* that would be offered him. It is only upon General Bonaparte's declining the offer (which my information supposes to relate to Ireland), that the command has been given to General Hoche. Another account, however, states (as I have elsewhere mentioned) that it was the expedition to Portugal that was offered to General Bonaparte. My information further states that the chiefs of the insurgents in Ireland have received directions to remain quiet untill the beginning of August.

2. A maritime expedition against Portugal is certainly to take place, if the vigilance of His Majesty's fleets can be defeated. There is an opinion in the office of the Minister of Marine that the Dutch fleet will have that destination, probably after having thrown an alarm on the coasts of Scotland and Ireland. I know not what credit is to be given to this part of the report, but that the expedition is intended and finally resolved on, should its execution be found possible, I cannot have a doubt.

3. Great temptations are now to be offered to the Court of Vienna, in the hope of obtaining the speedy conclusion of a definitive treaty which has hitherto met with greater obstacles than had been at all foreseen by the Directory or its agents. On the difficulties and delays that this negotiation may encounter will chiefly

depend the disposition of the French Government to treat fairly and honourably with His Majesty's Minister at Lisle, as well as the nature of the terms they mean to offer or accept. Their intentions very lately were to insist on the cession of all the conquests made on the Dutch, and an intimation to that effect (though in general terms) has been given to the Dutch Government. I am however positively assured from Paris, by a gentleman well acquainted with Mr. Maret, that that negotiator has separate powers to treat with Lord Malmesbury for the Cape of Good Hope in consideration of a sum of money.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Dropmore: Aug. 5. 1797.

My dear Sir,—I am to acknowledge your private letter of the 7th ult. on the subject of Mr. Talbot, and I have great satisfaction in the manner in which you speak of him. I really think that on the whole it will be much better for him to remain with you than to go to Lisle to join Lord Malmesbury, for which there is now a fresh opportunity by Mr. Wesley's destination for India: but I do not propose to him to avail himself of it, for the reason I have mentioned; and indeed at his distance from Lisle, added to the length of time which our communications require, it might very well happen to him not to arrive there till all was over one way or other.

As to the result of that discussion you know too much of the points on which it really turns, and of their great uncertainty from day to day, not to feel with me that nothing like a decided opinion can rationally be formed on the subject. There seems now to be some sort of compromise at Paris, the negotiations for which were, as we understand, carried on by the mediation of Pichegru. It is impossible but that the question of War or Peace with Austria and England separately and conjointly must have come under view in any solid settlement of

future measures if such has been made. But I think it more likely that the whole business has only been patched up to save present appearances (which both parties may think their interest) and that the seeds of disunion remain.

I am much afraid from some general expressions in some of your dispatches that you have limited your operations more than we should have wished. The moment that all idea of acting on the frontier or in the interior, by force avowedly directed to the restoration of Royalty, was abandoned, it became necessary for me to apprize you of it. But the reasons for that resolution do not apply to the operations in which *Berger* [Dandré] is concerned, and which seem likely to be more useful than the other plans have ever been: and as the nature of the subject does not admit of precise instructions, I can even now in my public dispatches only refer you to your own discretion, on which in truth you have every reason to rely, with as much confidence as we do. I wish only to add, that I have twice received very interesting communications *direct*, and that in the eternal delays and embarrassments of our continental correspondence it would be very acceptable to us if that mode were oftener employed.

(No. 28.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Extract from Draft.) Munzigen, near Bern: Tuesday, 10th Oct^{r}., 1797.

My Lord,—On Saturday last a Mr. Mengaud arrived here from Basle, and presented himself as a commissary of the French Directory to the reigning Advoyer, Mr. de Steigeur, to whom, without any credentials or other Introduction whatever, he delivered the two papers* of

* A translation of the note of the Directory will be found in the 'Annual Register' for 1797, State Papers, p. 266: but on account of its importance I repeat it.

'Paris, 29th Fructidor, 5th year of the French Republic, one and indivisible. The Executive Directory, convinced that the mission of Wickam to the Helvetic Cantons has no reference whatever to the respective interests of England and Switzerland; and that his sole object is to excite and encourage plots against the internal and external security of the French

which I send copies enclosed, A and B, *requiring*, in the name of the Directory, that I should receive immediate orders to quit the Swiss Territory.

Mr. Mengaud assigned no other reason for this extraordinary requisition than the *persuasion* of the Directory as expressed in the paper A. He candidly admitted that his mission was not a very reasonable one, but declared at the same time that the Directory would expect that its object should be strictly and immediately complyd with. Mr. de Steiguer, after hinting that the Directory seemed rather to have considered itself as writing to a French municipality than to a free and independent State, observed that it would be impossible for the Senate of Bern to give him any decisive answer, not only on account of the new and very extraordinary nature of his demand, which would make a convocation of the Sovereign Council absolutely necessary, but because Mr. Wickham's credentials being addressed to the 13 Cantons and their allies, no resolution could be taken that would in any way affect that Minister but by the whole body legally assembled. That, however, the whole should be communicated as well to the Sovereign Council as to the Senate, and that as soon as one or both of those Councils should have taken their decision, Mr. Mengaud should immediately be made acquainted with it. Upon this the commissary took his leave, saying that he should either wait for the answer at Zurich, or call for it on his way back to France.

King Louis XVIII. to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Blankenburg: October 11, 1797.

I have been thinking, Sir, that the best means of repairing the mischief just suffered by an enterprize to which

Republic, charge the Citizen Mengaud to invite and require the government of the Canton of Berne, and also the other Helvetic Cantons, if necessary, to give directions for Wickam's immediate departure from the territories of Switzerland.

'T. M. Revellière-Lepeaux.

'La Garde, Secrétaire Général.'

your Government has so powerfully contributed by its generous assistance, but still more by confiding to you the direction of its course, was to take counsel together anew with more unanimity than ever. I therefore charge M. de Cazalès, who will deliver this letter to you, to confer with you on the measures which ought to be taken at this juncture, and to communicate to you those which it seemed to me might be advantageously put into execution. My great and assuredly well-founded confidence in him, that which your Government has repeatedly shown him, and which I beg you to accord to him also, saves me from entering into much detail; it will be I myself who speak to you by his mouth, and I shall only lose the pleasure of conversing with you.

The event is cruel, but the resources are great, and I know too well the '*true British spirit*' by which you are animated to fear that your courage is cast down more than mine. We shall come with honour out of this difficult position, and the triumvirs who thought to compromise you by naming you so emphatically, will have only deferred for a short time your enjoyment of the glory that so noble a work, happily accomplished, ought to attach to your name.

Rest assured, Sir, of my esteem and of all my other sentiments for you. LOUIS.

(No. 29.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Munzigen: Friday, 13 Oct. 1797.

My Lord,—The Council of 200, which was assembled on Wednesday for the purpose mentioned in my dispatch No. 28, after a very long debate resolved—

1st. To refer Mr. Mengaud's demand to the Helvetic Body through the medium of the Canton of Zurich.

2ndly. To communicate this resolution to Mr. Mengaud, in the form of a note from the Senate.

3rdly. To send two deputies to Paris, with instructions to explain and justify the above resolution, and to say at

the same time, that neither the Canton of Bern, nor the Helvetic Body at large, can accede to the demand of the Directory, unless some of the charges should be made out, and some specific proof produced tending directly to criminate the British Minister.

4thly. To exhort the Helvetic Body to give the same answer.

The debate was conducted with a degree of dignity and temper that has been rarely seen in that assembly. The utmost consideration and respect was expressed for his Majesty's person, and there seemed a general disposition to repose an entire confidence in his wisdom, justice, and benevolence.

Though all parties seemed strongly penetrated with the intimate sense of their danger, six persons only could be found capable of supporting the demand of the Directory.

The sending deputies to Paris (a measure that it would have been desirable to have avoided) was considered necessary, not only because the demand was directly addressed to Bern, but because it is strongly suspected that Messrs. La Harpe and Benjamin Constant, the sworn enemies of this government and its constitution, are the real authors and contrivers of Mr. Mengaud's mission.

That gentleman remained at Bern until the Council separated, and appeared extremely impatient to know the decision. He has visited several of the magistrates, but has uniformly declined entering into any explanation on the subject of his mission, saying that with respect to their Canton, it was confined to the delivery of the two notes which he had given into the hands of the Advoyer, and to the receiving and transmitting the answer. Nobody here knows anything either of him or his connections but what they have learnt from himself, which is no more than *that he has lately returned from St. Petersburg, and that he had passed through Vienna.* I have however some reason to believe that he is a personal friend of Mr. La Harpe,

and that he has been already sent into this country as a secret emissary.

The decision of the Helvetic Body may be obtained in something less than a fortnight, nor can it well in any case be delayed beyond the term of three weeks, unless there should be a difference of opinion among the Cantons, which is hardly probable. There is no doubt that the Canton of Zurich will use all possible diligence to obtain a speedy answer, the more so as Mr. Mengaud is going to that place for the express purpose of hastening the decision. I have no doubt but that the opinion of the Canton of Bern will be unanimously adopted.

But I fear it must not be expected that any very rigorous proof should be required. I am persuaded that the leading Cantons would firmly resist any *direct* blow aimed at their independence; but whilst the French armies shall occupy their present position, and as long as any uncertainty shall prevail respecting the views and intention of the Cabinet of Vienna, the Governments of this country must necessarily yield to anything that the French Republick shall require provided the Directory furnish them wherewithall to save appearances. His Majesty's Ministers are alone able to say, on the one hand, *how far* it is desirable, either at home or abroad, that a publick discussion of this subject should be avoided; on the other, whether the consequences of yielding to the storm may not be more serious than any mischief that can arise from braving it.

(*Cypher.*) As to the proofs that the Directory can produce, I am afraid, and I feel it my duty to say at once that they are of a nature to give me very serious uneasiness. I have frequently mentioned to your Lordship my apprehension, not only of the indiscretion, but of the perfidy, of many of the persons with whom I have had unavoidable communication. To say nothing of many others, I will only observe that the declaration of Mr. Dumas is in no respect so fatal as in what regards this country, where he

most unfortunately resided for some time, *protected at my request by some of the first families of the State*, and receiving pecuniary supplies for General Charette through the hand of bankers, whom he has inevitably denounced, and who will as inevitably come forward as the only means of saving themselves and their correspondants at Paris from proscription. The papers of General Klinglin are also singularly important, and though the Directory has not yet discovered the key of the cypher (which I had the precaution to change on Mr. Montgaillard's return from Italy), yet I fear that it must at last fall into their hands, and in that case I should be to the last degree apprehensive, lest it should lead to a suspicion of the person through whom my most confidential correspondance with General Pichegru was carryd on, and who is now actually at Paris *on a mission from this state.*

Under these circumstances your Lordship will not be surprised to hear, that I have already been strongly pressed by the best friends of the British Government to withdraw from hence, as the only means of saving them and their country.

It is most painful to me at the same time to learn that all my own friends at Bern, and particularly the Advoyer de Steiguer, were persuaded that I should have taken that step immediately, in consideration of the multiplied marks of attention and attachment that I have received since my residence there. I have however stated to them most forcibly that the thing was absolutely impossible; that my own feelings must be sacrificed to my duty to my Sovereign, whose commands I must await; and that the utmost I could do would be to represent their fears and their wishes as speedily and as strongly as possible to his Majesty, should his Majesty be disposed to receive them favourably.

It seems to me that a publick discussion, which they so much dread, would best be avoided by founding my recall or leave of absence on his Majesty's affection for

the Helvetic Body and his wish to avoid committing them with a neighbour who knows neither faith, law, nor reason, allowing me at the same time to state this fully in a note or manifesto at my departure. A note of this kind might be so drawn as to augment the opinion (which the measure itself would certainly establish) of his Majesty's magnanimity and benevolence; to retort very severely on the French Government, and to elude every sort of accusation, without either expressly admitting or denying any charge whatever.

I am certain that by such a measure his Majesty's influence would be preserved untouched for better moments, and that his memory in this country would be ever revered by all ranks and descriptions of people.

I have no doubt myself that the French mean to attack Switzerland, and it is principally for this reason that it seems desirable to avoid as much as possible any *appearance* of his Majesty's Minister here having brought such a calamity on the country. I am strongly inclined to hope that it is yet time to save that appearance, and that the measure I venture to propose will fully answer that end.

Saturday, 8 A.M.

P.S.—The above was finished last night. Early this morning I have received a letter * from the reigning Advoyer Mr. de Steiguer, of which I send a copy enclosed, earnestly recommending every part of it to your Lordship's consideration, and humbly requesting that you will lay it before his Majesty, to whom at this period, it is, I trust, unnecessary to say anything of the transcendent merit of its author.

When a magistrate, whose conduct should have served as a model to the Ministers of far more powerful states

* The purport of this letter was to urge Mr. Wickham to procure his recall, as the only way of saving Switzerland. The arguments advanced by the Avoyer are given by Mr. Wickham in the next letter.

upon the Continent, sees such real ground for alarm, we may be sure that the danger is really imminent.

(No. 30.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Draft.) Munzigen: Saturday, October 21, 1797.

My Lord,—The situation of this country has become so extremely critical since my last, that I find myself under the necessity of despatching a messenger to your Lordship immediately.

I yesterday had a long, confidential, and very interesting conversation with the reigning Advoyer M. de Steiguer.

His Excellency began by apologizing for his letter of the 13th inst., and by repeating the protestation it contained that nothing but the imminent danger in which his country was involved could have induced him to have taken a step so repugnant at once to his own feelings, to the language and conduct he had constantly holden, and to what *he himself* considered as sound policy.

He then enlarged on all the leading topics of the letter, dwelling with particular force on the progress that the French agents and emissaries had evidently made in spreading jealousy and mistrust of their magistrates in the minds of the people, of which he produced to me strong and accumulated proof, and on the persuasion (natural enough since the affair of M. Dumas) that existed even among persons of a superior class, that the greater part of the emigrants who had been protected by the Magistrates here had denounced their protectors to the French Government in a manner that would in some sort authorize the punishment or at least the removal of many of the first persons of the State. He added that the intelligence received from Milan as well of the formidable state of the French army as of the pacific turn that the negotiations had taken at Udine, had not only thrown a sudden damp on the public mind, but had so deeply affected many of the persons on whose energy and courage he had the most

reliance, that he found himself left almost single and unsupported; that projects of reform and of sacrifice on the part of the Government, striking at the very root of their constitution, began already to be talked of, and that he feared that nothing but the special interference of Providence could save his country from the danger with which it was threatened, unless it were some sort of madness or folly, such as an open and *immediate* attack on the part of its enemies; for which he for one most fervently prayed. He added, what he had already declared to the Council of 200 in a most animated and impressive address, that until his head was laid upon the block, he would never despair of the safety of his country, nor cease to support its dignity and honour as well as its integrity and independance.

His Excellency then proceeded to state to me the substance of the information which the Government had lately received as to the hostile projects of the Directory. He said that those projects were of two kinds, and that the one or the other would be preferred according to the event of the negotiations at Udine. That should the war continue, all the efforts of the enemy would be directed to the dissolving the bands of union as well between the different Cantons as between the magistrates and the people in each particular state, and that menaces would only be employed *indirectly*, and as means of preventing either individual or single states from opposing or denouncing the project too openly.

That a plan to the above effect had been adopted after mature consideration; that the Government was informed not only of its nature but of the means intended to be employed in carrying it into execution, and of the persons who were expected to contribute most materially to its success. That it was concerted and combined with wonderful address, and that it was to the full as dangerous as it was wicked, the more so as it was conducted under the immediate protection of Messrs. Merlin and Rewbell

by a club of refugees who had connections and correspondance in every part of Switzerland, and who besides the enthusiasm which they derived from these revolutionary principles were animated with the hope of a speedy and triumphant return to their own country, of revenging what they call the *persecution* they have suffered, and of changing their present existence as proscribed criminals for that of statesmen and legislators.

That the plan of the Directory, in case the negotiations at Udine should be terminated by a definitive treaty, was to march a considerable force to the frontiers; and then to the means above pointed out to add those of insolent demands and open threats always addressed to one individual Canton or to some particular government or magistrate, at the same time that the most perfidious and flattering assurances and compliments should be paid to the rest. That this method was preferred to that of an open invasion, in consequence of the refugees having taken care to print in its true colours the formidable resistance that the country would present should the Governments remain firmly united among themselves and the people sincerely attached to their rulers; particularly should both one and the other be roused by any insolent and unprovoked aggression; that the mode *of demands and threats* was, however, not yet abandoned; that the Directory was disposed to try it in the beginning, notwithstanding the opinion and advice of the refugees, and that the demand made by Mr. Mengaud had principally for its object to determine (from the manner in which it should be received), how far the opinion of the Directors, in that respect, might or might not be followed with safety. His Excellency enlarged upon this particular point with great force of reasoning, explaining to me all the dangerous consequences by which an attempt of the kind must inevitably be followed in the present temper of the public, and then, as an unanswerable proof of the intention of the Directory to persevere in the same system,

he communicated to me a note he had just received from Mr. Bacher formally denouncing the Colonels Roland and Arpand and the Majors Rousillon and Pillichody (the commanders of the cordon on the frontiers), *comme des gens suspects à la République Françoise.* It is observable that these same officers are pointed out as obnoxious persons in a new publication of M. de la Harpe, which is circulated with uncommon industry in the Pays de Vaud.

Though the Advoyer did not mention to me the means by which he had acquired the greater part of the above information, I am, however, enabled to assure your Lordship that it was communicated to this Government (with proofs that admitted neither of denial nor doubt) by Mr. Marandet, the private secretary of Mr. Barthélemy, who was allowed to remain with that Minister at the Luxembourg untill the very last moment.

The papers relating to this business, which Mr. Marandet has brought with him, had been secured and put aside before the explosion took place at Paris, and Mr. Barthélemy, on the eve of his departure for Rochefort, desired Mr. Marandet to convey them to the Magistrates of Bern, with many verbal communications of still greater consequence, as the last testimony of his attachment to these states. This is also the place for me to inform your Lordship that two of the spies of the police of Paris have been discovered here, with passports as persons who had quitted France in consequence of the late decrees, and who came here to sollicit from hence that their names might be finally erased from the list of the emigrants.

M. de Steiguer then entered upon a subject which he said was no less painful to him than the rest, viz. that of the conduct of his confederates and allies. He informed me that the Magistrates of Zurich had just shown a degree of pusillanimity that could not fail to have the most fatal consequences. That far from *recommending* to the other Cantons the answer given by the Canton

of Bern, they had merely communicated to them Mr. Mengaud's correspondance, without giving any opinion of their own, either as to the answer that ought to be given, or as to the notice that ought to be taken of it. This conduct, he said, was in contradiction with the usage enacted and established in matters of such importance when a Diet was not convened, and it tended directly to disunite, if not to dissolve, the Confederacy He said that the measure was not in itself bad, and might even have been a wise one at any other moment, provided it had been previously concerted among the leading Cantons as a means of gaining time, *whilst vigorous preparations were making to resist the enemy*; but that it was notorious that this was not the case, that the measure had been adopted on due deliberation *from the fear of exposing the Government of the Canton to the resentment of the French Republick*, and that all the letters from Zurich agreed in that point, endeavouring only to excuse their Government from the danger to which they would have personally exposed themselves, had they been the first to deliver an opinion contrary to the wish of the Directory. The Advoyer spoke with much warmth upon this subject, upon which, however, whatever he says must allways be received with a certain degree of caution, as he is strongly impressed with the idea, that all the feeble and pusillanimous measures of the Confederacy have been adopted by the secret suggestions, if not the open counsels, of that Canton, and on that account he has preserved a deep resentment against many of its leading members.

The Advoyer then stated to me the information he had received from the other Cantons, which was conformable in every respect to what I had already learnt, and which in truth is of a nature to make the boldest tremble.

Without fatiguing your Lordship on that subject with a mass of detail that could only be rendered interesting or intelligible by a previous explanation of circumstances

merely local, and the history of a number of obscure individuals, I shall content myself with observing, that with an uncommon portion of individual worth, public spirit, and courage, distributed through the whole country, there exist insurmountable obstacles to the calling those virtues into action, arising from a combination of various causes, among which may be distinguished: the triumphant situation of the French armies; the indifference of the Court of Vienna to all that concerns this country; the timidity of the different governments thereof; their want of union among themselves; the ascendancy acquired by the commercial Cantons of Zurich and Basle; and, above all, the nature of this particular crisis, which the form of the Helvetic Confederacy is so ill calculated to encounter.

I am bound to add, in the language of the Advoyer, that it is my firm persuasion that nothing but an open and immediate attack on the part of the enemy can possibly save this country from destruction, unless, indeed, by the continuation of the continental war the Directory should be obliged to turn its whole attention to matters of still greater importance. After this matter had been thoroughly discussed, the Advoyer returned again to the subject of his letter, saying that it was certainly his intention to have carryd his request further, and to have submitted to me whether (having spoken openly to all my friends of my intention to pay a visit to Colonel Craufurd), I might not still undertake that journey without committing my public character, inasmuch as no official communication whatever had been made to me of the nature of M. Mengaud's mission.

That he had, however, said nothing to me on the subject, because he had been assured that it was my firm intention not to absent myself, even for a moment, without a renewed permission from his Majesty. But that so material a change had taken place in the public opinion within these last three days that he was determined to submit the idea to me confidentially, and to lay before

me the reasons why all the well-disposed members of the State were anxious that I should give it effect. He then entered very largely upon the subject, repeating to me the arguments which have lately been pressed upon me from every quarter; many of which arise naturally from the information he had just communicated to me, and others were strongly personal to some of the most estimable individuals of the State. I immediately answered him that I had that confidence in the judgement as well as in the good faith and loyalty of his Excellency, that if he would solemnly assure me that he saw any real utility that would arise to himself or his country in the present crisis from such a measure, I would at least take it into my most serious consideration.

His answer was clear and explicit, that if it did no possible good, it would at least prevent immediate and inevitable mischief; that this was his firm and decided opinion, and that nothing but an intimate persuasion of its truth could ever have induced him to have submitted it to me.

I then requested that he would explain to me in what particular point or for what particular purpose my immediate absence could be so eminently useful. He said that in the first place, the agitation of the public mind was so great that it was impossible for himself and other well-disposed persons to make any impression on it; that that agitation was evidently maintained and increased by my presence; that a proper explanation would be put upon my absence by the Government, and immediate advantage be taken of the favourable impression it would probably occasion, to instruct as well as to animate the people, to awaken them to a due sense of their danger, and to point out to them their only means of safety.

Secondly, that it would enable the Helvetic Body to give a dilatory answer, which might be concerted among the secret councils of the different States, and that probably many of the Cantons would give no answer at all

unless they should be summoned to do so by a new demand.

Lastly, that it would give the Government of this State a fair pretext to instruct their deputies at Paris to decline any explanation until it should be known whether his Majesty should be pleased to prolong my leave of absence or no, and that in the mean time preparations for defence might be made with secresy, and without alarming the public, for which purpose measures were now taking by the council of war.

Here our conversation ended by the Advoyer's expressing his earnest hope that his Majesty would not withdraw from them his protection, of which they might soon stand in need, and with his entreating me to throw a veil over the weakness of his countrymen, wherever it was possible for me to do so. To which he added that he had to request that I would consider the whole of what had passed as a private and not an official communication.

The impression made on my mind by the whole of the Advoyer's discourse is so strong, the applications to the same effect that I receive from other quarters are so frequent and so earnest, and the opinion of the persons most firmly attached to his Majesty's Government is so unanimous as to the necessity as well as the propriety of the measure required of me, that I find myself forced as it were to adopt it; and I shall this day give notice, both to Bern and Zurich, in the common forms, of my intention to pay a visit to Colonel Craufurd, at Francfort, leaving Mr. Talbot to take charge of His Majesty's affairs during my absence.

In adopting this resolution I do not disguise from myself that there exist many and very weighty objections to the measure, much less do I mean to shelter myself under the discretion with which his Majesty has been so lately pleased to honour me. Large as that discretion was, I am persuaded that it was not intended to apply to

a case like this, and I am most fully aware that I have taken upon myself a great and serious responsibility.

Your Lordship, however, will do me the justice to believe that my resolution is founded on an intimate knowledge of the present situation of the country, and the temper of the people; and that it has not been taken without a thorough consideration of the whole subject under all its points, nor without allowing its due weight to each of the many well-founded objections to which it is undoubtedly liable, and which I allow to be of a nature to be counterbalanced by nothing less than the strictest moral necessity.

Besides the reasons that I have already given to your Lordship, as well in my last despatch as in this, my resolution has been principally determined by the following considerations:—

1st. It is most evident, under the present circumstances, and whilst the present agitation shall continue, that I can be of no possible service to his Majesty, or his Allies, on this station. It is equally so, that my remaining here will tend to alienate the affections of this country, and to throw all its great resources, together with the first military position in Europe, into the hands of the enemy; which, in case of the continuation of the war, would, perhaps, be the most fatal blow that the House of Austria could possibly receive.

2nd. By yielding to the pressing sollicitations of the most respectable members of this State, I leave a strong party here firmly attached to his Majesty's interests, penetrated with a high sense of his goodness, and disposed to serve him with zeal and affection on some better occasion. I am also persuaded that such an occasion would speedily be found should hostilities once commence with the smallest appearance of success on the part of the Austrians.

3rd. The Directory has committed itself so far that it cannot recede, and it is scarcely possible for *me* to receive

his Majesty's commands before this government shall be called on to give a decisive answer. If, then, I were to wait for orders from home before I took any step that might give a reasonable pretext for delay, any authority that I might afterwards receive to that effect would arrive too late to avert the impending danger.

4th. It is certain that either myself, or the proscribed French deputies, together with some persons of still greater importance, must immediately quit the country. Those persons being only considered dangerous on account of their being in a situation to communicate with me. It is equally certain if I remain that the commanders of the frontiers will be displaced, and that all my means of correspondance will be discovered or defeated.

Now, with respect to myself, I can venture to assure your Lordship, after the fullest and most attentive consideration of the subject, that my temporary removal from this place, at this particular moment, far from being of any detriment to his Majesty's service, cannot but very materially facilitate and render more free from suspicion the sort of correspondance which my instructions have particularly directed me to cultivate. My measures are already taken in such a way that I think it scarcely possible that my expectations in that respect should be disappointed; but the success of these measures entirely depends on the total removal of every possible grounds of suspicion.

Lastly. By this measure, my whole conduct being open to a public disavowal, I only expose myself personally, without at all committing the dignity of his Majesty's name, which could not be the case were I to remain here, and suffer the question to be brought to an open decision. Besides, by the notification I have given of my departure, I do not know, strictly speaking, that I have even committed myself. It is in the common form, and in its nature supposes me to be entirely ignorant of Mr. Mengaud's mission, of which I have received no official com-

munication. I am bound to nothing—I am not only at liberty to return here from Francfort, when it shall be thought prudent for me so to do, but it is neither necessary that I should really leave this country, nor even certain (though probable) that I shall do so.

My resolution has been taken at the request of the leading persons of this State. It is in no case my intention to comply with it in less that ten days. Should those persons in the interval find reason to repent or be ashamed of what they have done, or should I perceive any favourable turn in the public opinion (of which I own that I have not much hope), it would be open to me, without assigning any reason, to say that I had changed my intention, and that my journey was deferred.

Should any fortunate circumstance produce a change of sentiments and of conduct here, I own that I am not yet prepared to say in what manner the best advantage might be taken of it; it is obvious that the conduct of the Ministers of the Allies must be entirely governed by the circumstances of the moment.

Should the war continue, everything must necessarily depend on, and be made subordinate to, the views and plans of the Cabinet of Vienna; and the whole must be regulated by an able and active minister on the spot.

In every such case an application will certainly be made to his Majesty for pecuniary succours.

Upon that point I have always been extremely reserved, and have never hitherto expressed myself to the full extent of the Instructions left to me by Lord R. Fitz-Gerald, merely saying that his Majesty would not see any unprovoked aggression of this country by the common enemy with indifference, and that the Helvetic Body would certainly experience the good effects of his Majesty's friendship and benevolence.

I shall not leave this country without paying a visit to Zurich, nor without depositing in the hands of the Advoyer de Steiguer a kind of protest against the

measure which I am now taking to satisfy their own fears and scruples.

The reasons against my immediate return are certainly strong, but it is far from my intention to say that they are unanswerable; the decision of that question must depend upon others that his Majesty alone can determine.

I shall remain at Francfort until your Lordship shall be pleased to convey to me his Majesty's commands. Mr. Talbot, who is now master of the whole subject, will of course remain here; and in the meantime no alteration whatever will be made in the appearance of my house or family.

P.S.—A whole week has now passed since the above was composed, owing in part to my having been taken ill before I had reduced the whole to writing, in part to my not having been able to find a confidential person to send as a messenger. I am now obliged to send it by estafette to Colonel Craufurd. What I have seen in the interval tends to satisfy me more and more that I have not acted unwisely in the steps I have taken, and unless some wholly unforeseen event should happen, I shall leave this place, first for Zurich and then for Francfort on Thursday next.

Nothing materially new has passed in the interval excepting that the progress of the negociations at Vienna has increased the general terror, and that the canton of Zurich has openly avowed its intention of leaving this Government to itself on the present occasion—a measure as mischievous and dangerous to the Confederacy as it is disgraceful to its authors.

(No. 6.) *Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.*

(Most Secret.) Downing Street: 3rd Novr. 1797.

Sir,—I have received your Dispatch No. 29, and have lost no time in laying it before His Majesty, in order that I might be enabled to transmit to you without delay such Instructions as His Majesty might judge proper to be given on the extraordinary occasion to which it refers.

The first duty which I feel it incumbent on me to discharge on this occasion, is that of expressing to you the full approbation with which His Majesty has been pleased to honour the judicious, temperate, and dignified conduct which you have held in this, as in every other instance of difficulty with which you have had to contend in the very arduous and critical post which you have filled so much to His Majesty's satisfaction and to the advantage of your country. It is I am persuaded unnecessary for me to assure you of the gratification which I derive from having to convey to you these expressions of His Majesty's gracious approbation.—I can say with the most perfect truth, that there is but one opinion among those who are acquainted with the details of your Conduct, which has fully justified all the expectations with which I was induced to submit your name to His Majesty for so critical and important a situation.

His Majesty's Servants have not hesitated to lay before His Majesty their humble advice in exact conformity to the opinion which you have expressed as to the line of conduct now to be adopted. It is certainly the resolution the most dignified and honourable to His Majesty, and the most consonant to His wishes for the tranquillity and peace of the Swiss Cantons, that He should not suffer the residence of His Minister there to be made the pretext for the execution of those projects of anarchy and subversion which the enemy is preparing to carry into execution there. And if this sentiment is to be acted upon, there can be no doubt that it should be distinctly expressed, and that instead of taking the indirect and evasive mode proposed in the letter which you inclose to me (that of giving you an ostensible leave of absence, and leaving Mr. Talbot at Bern) the most dignified line of conduct is to withdraw the Mission altogether, assigning for that resolution the true motives of regard for the interests of the Helvetick Body; of anxious solicitude for the peace and tranquillity of a

part of Europe, which has hitherto been free from the effects of the destructive system by which they are now almost surrounded, and of a determination to afford no pretext of injury and outrage towards a peaceful and happy nation, on the part of one which disregards all principles of publick laws, all rights of sovereignty and independence, and which seeks only an opportunity to extend to Swisserland that ruin which it has brought on so many surrounding countries.

In any other case I should have felt it proper to transmit to a Minister in your situation the draft and form of the note to be delivered for this purpose. But the terms in which you have in your dispatch expressed the idea now to be acted upon, are so consonant to the view which is entertained here of the subject, and you are so much better able to judge on the spot of those shades of expression in which the force and impression of such a paper must depend according to its application to local and temporary circumstances, that I have judged it better to leave it to you to express in such terms as you shall deem most suitable to the occasion the King's sentiments of benevolence to the Helvetick Body, and of anxious concern to prevent their tranquillity from being disturbed by any pretext, however ill-founded, which the enemy may draw from the residence of His Majesty's Minister in Swisserland intended as a mark of good-will and friendship to the Swiss Cantons.

You will of course in withdrawing yourself with Mr. Talbot from Swisserland, and in returning to England with all convenient speed, take such measures as may be most proper for keeping up your channels of intercourse with that country, and with those persons in France with whom you may still be enabled to maintain a Correspondence.

I am, with great truth and regard, Sir, Your most obedient humble Servant,

GRENVILLE.

Lord Grenville to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Cleveland Row: Nov. 3, 1797.

My dear Sir,—Although I have absolutely nothing to add to my dispatch, I write these few lines of private letter, merely to repeat to you in another form the sense which I entertain of your conduct, and the satisfaction with which I recommended you to H. Majesty to fill one of the most important situations that could be assigned to any public man. When you return to England I shall have the opportunity of expressing these sentiments to you more fully, and of assuring you how sincerely and faithfully I am, Dear Sir, Ever your most faithful servant,

GRENVILLE.

Mr. WICKHAM.

Mons. Mallet du Pan to Mr. Wickham.

(Extract. Translation.) Fribourg: 12 Nov., 1797.

. . . I congratulate you very sincerely on leaving Switzerland, if the time of year does not inconvenience Mrs. Wickham too much. That country seems to me ripe; the part they have taken with regard to you is one consequence of the mistake they have persistently made, in thinking that they will save themselves by submissiveness. When a state cannot maintain at home the law of nations it is no longer a state. They had sent me word to Zurich that personal accusations would come out against certain members of the Government of Berne, and especially against the Banneret F. What you had intimated to me on this subject proves that this rumour was not without foundation. But this project, like that of your removal, has been, I doubt not, conceived at Berne itself, and concerted by some intriguers with Paris. A little before my departure, I read the copy of a letter written by Colonel Weiss to Buonaparte in which he offered to sacrifice those magistrates who had been unfavourable to the Revolution.

However that may be, your conduct in this affair has been very honourable, and has won for you high esteem. M. de Gumeran and the Count de la Tour, to whom I have spoken of it here, charged me to make known to you their sentiments on this point.

The Avoyer de Steiguer to Mr. Wickham.

(Extract. Translation.) Berne: 18th Dec., 1797.

Sir,—It is with the greatest pain that I have heard the resolution of His Britannic Majesty to recall his legation for Switzerland.

I have, nevertheless, felt fully the force of the motives which have led to this measure, so afflicting to our country, and we acknowledge with the most respectful gratitude how much the interest which H. M. deigns to take in our tranquillity has led to it. But I cannot, Sir, conceal from you, that the recall of Mr. Talbot has renewed in me all those distressing feelings which your departure has excited. It seems to me very hard that Rewbells and Merlins should have been able to drive from Switzerland a British Minister dear to all the honourable men in the country and to the whole nation.

The benevolence with which H. M. deigns to assure my country of the continuation of his high protection, and the goodness with which, Sir, you promise me to continue the correspondence that circumstances require, can alone give us some consolation.

And never, Sir, was it more needed by us than at the present moment.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Draft.) Yarmouth: Dec. 29. 97.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's Dispatch No. 6, conveying to me his Majesty's commands to withdraw myself, together with Mr. Talbot, from Switzerland, was delivered to me on the 22nd ult. by the messenger Wagstaff at Francfort.

I detained Mr. Wagstaff at that place till the morning of the 26th when I despatched him to Bern, having employed the interval in making such arrangements and in framing such instructions for my different correspondents, as might best enable me to execute that part of your Lordship's commands by which I am directed to endeavour to keep up my channels of intercourse with Switzerland, as well as with France; all the measures that I had previously taken to that effect being necessarily deranged by the recall of Mr. Talbot.

In further compliance with my instructions, I forwarded at the same time a note* (of which I send a copy enclosed) to the Helvetic Body, communicating to them his Majesty's intention to withdraw his whole mission from Switzerland, together with the reasons on which that resolution was founded. I added, according to the established custom, a separate note to the Canton of Bern. I sent them both to Mr. Talbot, with a request that he would deliver them himself, accompanying them with a short note stating his intention of withdrawing himself immediately, in obedience to his Majesty's commands.

It is possible, however, that the new arrangements, that must necessarily be taken for keeping up the correspondance, may detain Mr. Talbot for some time longer, possibly not less than a month from the arrival of the messenger at Bern. However that may be, I am persuaded from my own experience, that whatever is entrusted to that gentleman will be executed with equal industry and discretion, and with the warmest zeal for his Majesty's service.

Your Lordship will observe that in framing my note to the Helvetic Body I have confined it as nearly as possible

* A translation of Mr. Wickham's note, and of the reply of the Helvetic Body, will be found in the *Annual Register* for 1797, 'State Papers,' pp. 267, 268. The Helvetic Body, on the 30th of December, addressed a Latin letter to King George III., in which they speak of Mr. Wickham in terms of the highest praise.

to a simple notification. The circumstances of the moment would not admit of anything more.

As soon as I had despatched the messenger I took immediate advantage of his Majesty's most gracious permission, and set out myself for England in the hope of being able to express to your Lordship in person what I found myself entirely incapable of doing by letter, how deeply I have been affected by his Majesty's goodness and by the indulgent consideration with which his Majesty's Ministers, and your Lordship in particular, have been pleased to estimate my conduct. Various accidents and delays have prevented my arrival here till late last night, and on my landing I received the intelligence of severe domestic affliction, that makes me wish to request your indulgence if I delay presenting myself to your Lordship a day longer than I should otherwise have hoped and indeed ought to have done.

HOME OFFICE.

1798, 1799.

Mr. Wickham, on his return from Switzerland, entered at once upon the duties of Under Secretary of State for the Home Department; an office which the Duke of Portland had kept open for him for two years and a half, by putting in Mr. Charles Greville, the Duke's son-in-law, as *locum tenens* for Mr. Wickham.

The year 1798 was one of great difficulty and danger to this country. In the month of May began the Great Irish Rebellion, and in August General Humbert landed at Killala. Lord Castlereagh had in March been appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland, at first as *locum tenens* for Lord Pelham. The state of affairs in that country greatly increased the toil and importance of the office held by Mr. Wickham, between whom and Lord Castlereagh a constant correspondence was carried on, of which the most interesting part has already appeared in the 'Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh,' where it occupies the greater part of the first two volumes; another portion of this correspondence has been published by Mr. Ross, in his 'Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis.'

Mr. Wickham also kept up his communications with French agents and correspondents.

The Comte d'Artois to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Edinburgh: 15th April, 1798.

Sir,—I gladly take advantage of the departure of the Baron de Roll to express to you myself all my gratitude,

for the care and zeal with which you have served the common cause, and that of the King, my brother, in particular, while on the important mission which your Government had confided to you. I regret exceedingly, on every account, that circumstances should have driven you for the moment from the affairs that you had managed with so much care; but I indulge the hope that you will be again associated with them, and I shall look upon this event as one of the happiest that can happen to us.

The Baron de Roll and the Chevalier de Lugeaud, who accompany my son, the Duke de Berri, to London, will inform you in detail respecting the request which I am now making on His Britannic Majesty and his Ministers. I solicit most earnestly, and in conjunction with my loyal fellow countrymen, that we may be allowed to fulfil a duty very dear to our hearts, being entirely dictated by a sense of gratitude.

If, as I venture to hope, our offer is accepted, the post that you occupy will certainly bring you into close contact with the affair which I have on hand at present, and I confidently ask you to bring your interest to bear, that it may succeed in the way most in accordance with my just wishes.

Receive, Sir, the sincere assurance of all my sentiments of esteem and personal affection.

MR. WICKAM. CHARLES-PHILIPPE.

Secret note sent to Mr. Nepean respecting the views of the Directory in Asia.*

30th June, 1798.

Early in the year 1798, the Abbé Beauchamp was sent on a mission to the Iman of Mascate. His principal in-

* Evan Nepean, created a baronet in 1802, at this time secretary of the Admiralty, an office he held till 1804, when he succeeded Mr. Wickham as Chief Secretary for Ireland, and was sworn of the Privy Council. In 1805 he was a Lord of the Admiralty; and Governor of Bombay from 1812 to 1819. He died in 1822.

structions were to secure the exclusive possession of that port for the French, and to establish an interest with the Arabian Chiefs and Turkish Bashaws on the different roads which our overland messengers usually take in going to or returning from India. I do not believe that he was entrusted with any further secret. His mission was delayed partly from want of money, partly from his own personal fears, having reason to know that the British Resident at Bassorah had been informed of his intended journey, and being apprehensive lest he should be arrested or murdered on his road.

At the same time several very able and intelligent agents were, to my certain knowledge, sent overland to India with secret instructions, with the general nature of which I am unacquainted, but from their being sent overland it is to be presumed that expedition was then a great object. One of these persons, the most able and dangerous of the whole, was put on board a company's ship at Bassorah, and sent off a prisoner to Bombay. The others were prevented from completing their journey by the extreme vigilance of Mr. Manesty, the British Resident. A fleet of frigates sailed at the same time from La Rochelle, which was intended to have arrived at Mascate at the same time with Mr. Beauchamp, and I believe did actually go to that Port to refit. I have the strongest reason to believe that this squadron was to have been followed by a fleet of line of battle ships, and that the Dutch fleet under Lucas was originally intended to have been much stronger, and to have co-operated with the French squadrons in some great operation in the East Indies.

At the same time instructions were sent to the Isles of France and Bourbon to send over some intelligent officers to Tippoo Saib, with several serjeants and corporals, and a considerable proportion of this description of persons was sent out on board the frigates from La Rochelle.

Mr. Leger, the late Intendant of Pondicherry, a very

able man and of great influence in the country, was applyd to to go out to India as Ambassador to the Nizam and to Tippoo Saib, expressly to negotiate an alliance with those powers, the object of which should be to drive the English out of the peninsula of India.

Aubert Dulayet had already received instructions to negotiate with the Turks the cession of Candia. The sources from which I derived the above intelligence are such as to leave me no doubt of its authenticity. I am less positive as to the destination of the Dutch fleet, but of the rest I cannot have the smallest doubt. I had at the time frequent communications with Mr. De Fresne, who was in direct correspondence with Mr. Leger, and I know that Leger declined the offer that was made him, because he saw no means of putting the plans of the Directory in execution. It certainly could not have been in contemplation *at that time* to send a large force by land or by the Red Sea from the Levant to India, because France had not then a man to spare from the continental war, nor do I believe that any person with whom I had any communication, direct or indirect, had any notion of such a project, but they were all persuaded that a blow might be struck at our Indian possessions, by an establishment formed in the Levant, and extending from thence slowly and progressively eastward, and they undoubtedly had at that time the project of making the Red Sea the channel of the Indian trade with Europe by an establishment formed at the entry of that sea from the Isles of France and Bourbon, and another on or near the Isthmus of Suez, from the Island of Candia, which was intended to have been their great depôt, and they were also of opinion that the communication with India overland might be easily secured, if Mascate, from which all our correspondance between India and Bassorah and the Persian Gulph could be easily interrupted, should once fall into their hands.

Whether the Directory really had formed at that time the gigantic plan of marching or sending a large army

overland or by the Red Sea to India, and had concealed it from its own agents, is more than I can pretend to say. The thing is certainly possible, but if such a plan really exists, I am more inclined to believe that it has been formed since the peace with Austria, and I cannot help still persuading myself that it is to be executed progressively, and that Buonaparte will begin his operations by seizing some extensive country in Asia, and establishing himself there before he attempts to proceed any further.

Mr. Wilberforce to Mr. Wickham.

Elmdon House, near Birmingham,
(Private.) Warwickshire, Sept. 12, 1798.

My dear Wickham,—You may probably remember my having had some little conversation with you a few months ago, respecting the Society of Methodists in the Island of Jersey. And that, partly because it was a business which in some sort belonged to the War Department, partly because Dundas was personally acquainted with the Governor or Lieutenant Governor (I knew not which) General Gordon, Dundas undertook the management of the affair. I would not unnecessarily bore you with a long story and much argument, and both it would require to make you thoroughly master of the business. I will therefore content myself with remarking that the Methodists have been treated with a harshness not more cruel than ill-timed; and this treatment is rendered the more galling, by their seeing their brethren in the neighbouring Islands of Guernsey, Alderney &c., gratified in the very instance in which they are resisted. It may be absurd in them to make a point of conscience of such a matter.—But surely it is more absurd, far more so, to incur the risk of alienating the minds, at present in general attached to you, of an immensely numerous and from its nature a most active body, throughout England and Ireland, rather than concede to them a point of not the smallest possible importance to Government. But I

had not intended to say so much to you on the merits of the business. What renders it necessary for me to trouble you now is, that I understand the States of the Island of Jersey are passing an Act to banish from the Island all who will not give way, by suffering themselves to be trained on a Sunday—(Lest you should be unacquainted with the matter, this, let me tell you, is the point in dispute—the Methodists desire to be exercised on a week-day, and offer to pay for the sergeant who is to drill them, declaring that when there is any danger of invasion, they will turn out the same on Sunday as on any other day, but saying they cannot in conscience consent to select Sunday for the drill, without an urgent necessity.—Many of them men of character, substance, &c., have been imprisoned). When passed, they mean *to send it to England to obtain his Majesty's consent.* If the affair can wait a little let it lie by, till at least Dundas's return from Scotland or my own to London, but if it be at all likely that anything will be done in it soon, be kind enough to give me a hint privately that I may write to the Duke of Portland on the subject without delay. I know that the acts of the provincial assemblies often lie a long time in the Secretary of State's Office, but as this engages much of the attention of the Court there, measures may be taken to push the business forward. Do at all events let me have a line before it goes any further. You will scarce believe that, as I am afraid, the Act would banish near 150 persons from their families and light up a flame for which 1,000 such Islands would not recompense us. I hope Mrs. Wickham has enjoyed the pure air of Tunbridge and received benefit from it. I did not think I should detain you so long, and will now release you, sending Mrs. Wilberforce's best respects and my own to yourself and your Lady, and assuring you that I am always, My dear Wickham,

Yours very sincerely,

W. WILBERFORCE.

P.S.—As I understand there are two members of the Society of Methodists in London who have come over to state their grievances to the body in London, I think it may be extremely well for you to see them; it may tend to prevent their being soured, and their imputing to the English Government what you will all regret, even if you should not be able to prevent it, at least with great difficulty. I will tell the correspondent in London with whom I communicate that perhaps you may send to see him; and he will wait on you with the Jersey people: his name and address are Mr. Porson, at the Chapel, City Road. I feel this business to be of such great importance, that I would far rather come up to London, though I could not do it now without real inconvenience, than that it should suffer from the want of any assistance I could give to it if I were on the spot. Do let me have one line without delay.

Mons. Malouet to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) 15 Spring Street, 20th Sept.

I know I owe you thanks for having spoken of me to the Duke of Portland, who, in spite of his prejudices, has sent me word by Mr. King that the Government would not abandon me, and would make me an allowance. God be praised and you also for the interest you bestow upon honest men. I am not tired of being of their number, although their profession has also its drawbacks.

Have you any news of our worthy youth? I am very uneasy about him, I have had no answers to the letters which he had taken charge of for my family. Will you grant me an interview to hear me upon the subject upon which I subjoin a sketch? If, as I think, something is to be done with Pichegru, care must be taken how he appears on the scene.

Enclosure in Mons. Malouet's Letter.

(Translation.)

The arrival in England of Pichegru and Willot is an event from which it is possible to reap some advantage, but it would

be still easier to nullify these two Generals for ever if England or Louis XVIII. were to employ them openly. They would soon be in the position of Dumourier, if they appeared to quit the line which they followed in the Assembly of last year.

If Louis XVIII. had an army I should wish that Pichegru, Willot, and all the 'Déportés' should only join it after having increased their party by all those who are discontented with the present Government: for if they have no party in France, if they only reckon as units, half a hundred or so of men more or less do not make any difference; but if they have a party, if they can form one, it would be expedient to make use of it against the common enemy; and the tyranny once destroyed or powerfully attacked, there would then be room and freedom of opinion for honest men, those who wish for a king might make themselves heard, and Pichegru, as well as the chiefs of his party, would not be the last to make their proposals. It would be wiser not to wait for them to give all the guarantees for assuring them all the advantages that they could desire; it is the only overture that it is of importance to make to them secretly, while leaving them full liberty of speech and action in the organization of their party.

I should wish, then, that these two men on their arrival in London should make a public act, a kind of address after the manner of Camille Jourdan, and that in demanding of the Government liberty to return to the Continent to be nearer to their fellowcountrymen and their colleagues, *they should declare that they expect to rally themselves at the national voice and to obey it.*

I should wish that after having deliberated with the other 'Déportés,' they should exert themselves to call together a certain number of Deputies from the interior; that they should hold themselves within reach of the Republican armies, so as to receive their deserters; that they should be enabled to employ means of seduction upon the chiefs and the military corps; that as soon as they have the germ of an army and of a national representation, protected by, but separated from foreign armies, they should confine themselves to demanding a free assembly and the punishment of the Directory.

I should wish that at this moment only Louis XVIII. should appear, preceded by all the assurances of safety which would have been resolved upon secretly, and which would then be

published—that then should be proclaimed a cessation of hostilities between France and the foreign Powers—that a new Congress should be announced for a general peace on an equitable basis—that an army raised in Switzerland should enter as auxiliary to Louis XVIII. under the command of Pichegru. . . . It is on these conditions alone that I hope to see the end of the Revolution, the re-establishment of the French monarchy and of public order in Europe—after a civil war, bloody probably, but of short duration.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

26th Sept. 1798.

Nothing could be more proper than the answer returned to Dutheil; and there can be as little doubt that we, and perhaps Pichegru* himself, must be, as we ought to be, the best and sole judges of the time and manner of his being rendered really usefull to the common cause; but I don't think it a very pleasant or easy task to persuade Monsieur or the French King to accede to that opinion; neither do I wonder or feel disposed to blame them for perverseness on that subject. I will keep the letters to show the King, and return them to you from Weymouth.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

(Extract.) Salisbury: 27th Sept. 1798.

I hope we may look for the completion of our wishes as well by *land* as by sea respecting Buonaparte's expedition,† nor shall I dislike the episode of the frigate *which is said* to be taken by the two Turkish brigs, because it will redound so much to the credit of this Invincible French Armada. I should have been glad to have heard that D'Ossonville and de la Rue wished to

* Pichegru having escaped from Sinnamary was at this time in England. A most interesting account of him whilst in this country is to be found in the 'Mémoires of Fauche Borel.' Paris, 1829.

† Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt.

accompany Rumel, who, I perfectly agree with you, must be set *in safety* upon the Continent; and as I have sent you some blank signatures, one of them may be applied to the letter you propose to write to the Admiralty on his behalf. I cannot doubt the propriety of your ideas respecting Pichegru; for himself, for us, for the cause of his countrymen—in short, upon all accounts, it is *necessary* that he should not receive any publick marks of attention or be made an object of publick curiosity during his stay here, and from what you tell me of him I am persuaded that *that* must be his opinion.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

The King most highly approves everything that has been and is intended to be done respecting Pichegru, and was disposed to have had all the letters inclosed detained till I could see you, but on my telling him that I did not purpose being in town before Wednesday he consented to the Duke de H.'s and Dutheil's Letters being returned *to them*, and suggested that as Pichegru seemed so right-headed, whether it would not be desirable that you should consult him on the delivery of the letter to him, and if you and he thought it better to enable him to say that he had not had any communication with the French Princes, that I should take upon myself to prevent its being delivered to him by saying that the general interest required it.

Weymouth: Friday, 28th Sept. 1798, 5 P. M.

I go to Longleat near Frome to-morrow morning, and shall be at Bulstode on Monday night.

The Duke of Portland to Mr. Wickham.

Speen Hill: Monday, 1st Oct., 1798.
½ p. 2 P.M.

I wish to believe most certainly, but no date of time or place will not suffer me to give the credit one should wish, and which I very strongly incline to believe, is due

to the report of Nelson's Victory.* I am more surprised, however, that we hear nothing of the Brest squadron, it will be a sad disappointment if it gets back sain et sauf. Many thanks for your intelligence about my Sons. I certainly am glad the 24th L. D. is so well thought of as to make a part of the main army, but they will have nothing to do—and as for the 29th I must get Charles out of it, as India is not a sphere in which I wish to see him unless Buonaparte should reach it, and then he might see what service was.

Pray cherish Pichegru, I need not desire you to do it, but I wish him to feel that it is the wish of this Government to treat him as a Gentleman and a man of *perfect honor.*

I send you the petition and will send you tomorrow an answer to Lord Holland.

You are perfectly right in your conjecture about my destination: I hope to eat my dinner at Bulstrode to-day.

I ought not to let this go without thanking you for the very interesting and well told history you refreshed my memory with, it would make a journey pass imperceptibly if one could always be supplied with such reading.

I don't want to see Humbert's letters to satisfy me that no such papers as Lord Castlereagh describes can make any difference in the treatment of him from that of other prisoners.

I am rejoiced at what you tell me of Pelham. I am ordered to write to him as soon as I get time. The King has a strong inclination that the appointment of the deputies should be made out.

The Lord Chancellor† to Mr. Wickham.

Weymouth: 2nd October, 1798.

Dear Sir—The Hamburg Mail has been very good

* Victory of the Nile, August 1, 1798.

† Alexander Wedderburn, born 1733, created Lord Loughborough 1780, and Earl of Rosslyn 1801; Chief Justice of Common Pleas from 1780 to 1793; and Lord High Chancellor from 1793 to 1801. He died without issue in 1805.

indeed to-day as well for the confirmation of Admiral Nelson's Victory and the probability there is of Buonaparte's loss in his advance to Cairo which will effectually check his farther projects, as for the very favourable event of the arrival of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea and the spirit it must give to the Turks.

His Majesty has expressed the highest satisfaction with your judicious conduct towards the French Deputies, and is particularly pleased with the discretion and temper of General Pichegru, who has gained a distinguished place in his esteem.

The weather is so very pleasant here, that I shall take a little more time than I intended, unless some part of the Irish business should require my more speedy return. Malta I trust will not remain in the hands of the French after they have consumed their present stock of provisions.

I am, My Dear Sir, Yours very Sincerely,

LOUGHBOROUGH.

General Pichegru to Mr. Wickham.*

Sheerness: 4th Oct.

(Translation.) (Received Dec. 19.)

I did not intend interrupting you so soon, but an incident which puts our discretion a little at fault puts me in this predicament. I arrived here at twelve o'clock. Having alighted at the inn, a sergeant came, by order of the Commandant, to take me to him. We met him on the rampart, and I immediately put my passport into his hands. Scarcely had he begun to read it when a naval officer of the fleet with which I had come, and who had seen me on board the 'Amiable,' came up to me in an affectionate manner; and, not content with calling me by my name, did me the attention of observing to the Commandant that he had come with me, &c. Imagine my embarrassment. But that is not all. The Com-

* General Pichegru was travelling incognito under the name of Major Perou.

mandant desired this officer to conduct me to the Admiral. I took care to inform him that I was there incognito and under another name; but, not understanding French, he went on addressing me by the same, and even thought proper to publish it both to the officers we met and to the Admiral himself. After this I expect my departure will soon be known, and I begin to think one ought to change one's features as well as one's name. It is an ill wind that blows nobody good, and at least this gives me an occasion for expressing anew all my esteem for you. Adieu. My respects, I beg, to your ladies.

As I ought to embark directly, I have taken the precaution of sending the letter to Mr. Graham by my servant, who at this instant brings me back Mr. Flint's, asking for an acknowledgement. Pray allow him to count this as such, with assurances of friendship. Adieu.

Memorandum dated Nov. 4, 1798, *and in the handwriting of Mr. Canning.*

The history of these four papers is as follows:

Fauche Borel was at Paris on the 4th Sept. and was hid on that day in the house of a man of the name of Monnier, a Jacobin, and an intimate friend of Barras.

He staid with Monnier for some time, and on leaving him Monnier asked 'how the King could be so foolish as to employ Agents to tamper with the Councils—had it never occurred to them that such a man as *Barras* would be better worth trying?' Fauche mentioned this circumstance to Wickham whom he found in Switzerland—but Wickham at that time did not think much of it. Fauche, however, wrote to Blankenburgh; and received an answer from there, authorizing him to invite Monnier out of France to learn from him what Barras had to offer.

He wrote to Monnier, to appoint a meeting with him at Hamburgh.

Since Fauche's arrival in England, Monnier, it seems, has come to Hamburgh.

Fauche's brother is a bookseller there, and has for partner a man of the name of Maisonforte, an Emigrant, who resided from the time of his emigration chiefly with the Duke of Brunswick, until the period at which he in common with the rest of the German Princes was obliged to dismiss all persons of that description, and then he came, with 4,000*l.* which the Duke lent him, to Hamburgh, and entered into the partnership with Fauche. He is well known in France by many writings since the Revolution.

To this man Monnier applied, not finding Fauche at Hamburgh according to his appointment.

These four letters are from Maisonforte to Fauche giving an account of what has passed.

Fauche has communicated them to Wickham notwithstanding the repeated injunctions to trust no Englishman —(which however made it very desirable, Wickham observes, that the utmost secresy should be preserved upon the subject) and Wickham wishes your Lordship to read them, and to give your opinion upon the propriety of letting Fauche go to Hamburgh, and ultimately perhaps letting Pichegru (who is mentioned frequently in the letters by his initial letter and under the designation of La Maitresse, and who is to be trusted exclusively by Fauche) go then to meet Monnier, and to form his judgment upon the practicability of what he may have to offer.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Private.) Duke Street: 9 Dec., 1798.

I send your Lordship a letter that I have just received from Fauche Borel, enclosing one from Count D'Avaray and the copy of another from Mittau, addressed to M. de Maisonforte on the subject of M. Monnier's journey to Hamburgh, together with the letter which Monnier left behind him at Hamburgh to be delivered to Fauche Borel on his arrival, and another from the same person written from Paris. It is evident from Monnier's letter that at

least *one object* of his journey was to obtain money, and it is equally clear that Fauche, contrary to the express instructions he had received, had expressed himself in such a manner to Monnier as to hold out a hope that money would be given.

Upon this part of the subject I should propose to your Lordship that I should immediately write to Fauche to scold him very severely for his indiscretion, and to declare peremptorily that not one halfpenny shall be given.

The imprudent way in which he has committed himself with the people* at Mittau, by promising to pay the expenses of this business from the profits of his trade, will convince your Lordship that he cannot be trusted with the employment of money.

I have put Pichegru on his guard on this point—He assured me that he should consider any demand of money as a proof of the insincerity of the offer, and that on any hint of the kind being given, he should immediately observe that he knew the *means* of the Directors much too well not to be persuaded that they could at any time find more than would be sufficient to pay the expense of a few journeys to Hamburgh.

It would, however, be expedient, I conceive, that I should write to him again on this subject in the strongest manner, declaring peremptorily that no money whatever would be given or furnished by this country to Monnier or his employers in any case or on any pretext whatever, unless some distinct offer should be made, of the advantage as well of the practicability of which this government might be enabled to judge, taking care that it should be understood that this government neither knows nor wishes to know anything of the negotiation, much less to take any part in it *as it now stands*.

* The Court of King Louis XVIII., who having been obliged to leave Blankenburg after the treaty of Campo-Formio, now resided at Mittau in Courland.

If Fauche were a person in whom greater confidence could be placed, it might be of use (persuaded though I am that this business will come to nothing) to furnish him with some money to keep the negotiation open and communicate all the particulars of it to your Lordship. But I really cannot in any case persuade myself that he ought to be trusted with such a discretionary power. Your Lordship is the only judge whether it may be given to Sir J. Craufurd. P. cannot reside at Hamburgh or the neighbourhood, and he has allways been decidedly adverse to have anything to do with the disposal of money.

Perhaps when your Lordship shall have turned the whole of this subject in your mind you will allow me to have some conversation upon it.

There are many reasons why it should not be entirely abandoned or neglected.

I thought it right and fair to inform Pichegru before he left England that this government might possibly be obliged to demand some of the Irish Traitors of the Town of Hamburgh, and that if the Magistrates should give them up it would of course be very unsafe for him to attempt to reside there, or even to pass through the place.

Memorandum in Lord Grenville's handwriting at the end of the preceding letter.

I ought to have answered this sooner, but it is of no consequence, for with this weather nothing that you had written would have got over. I quite agree in your view of this subject, persuaded that it will come to nothing except in the single case of things being by other means brought to such a situation as to leave to this man no other chance of safety, and then he may try to make a merit of his pretended assistance. Be this as it may nothing can be clearer in this case than the propriety of giving nothing beforehand.

Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Wickham.

My dear Sir,—I was truly sorry not to see you here, but trust you will fullfil your promise and give us that pleasure another time, I need not say how happy Lady Malmesbury will be to see Mrs. Wickham.

Many thanks for your news—I think the message of the Directory to the councils to urge a declaration of War on Naples and poor Sardinia looks more like a measure of fear and despair than one of system and confidence—You know my opinion of Thugut and how entirely it coincides with yours, yet is it possible that the Queen of Naples would have ventured an act of aggression (for so it will be construed) against France, if she was not sure of support from Vienna?—in the meanwhile we sweep the Mediterranean so very clean, that from the naval force of France Naples can have nothing to fear—do you believe in Buonaparte's death and the circumstances attending it?—but I am trespassing sadly on your time, and being idle myself forget you are not so.

Ever, my dear Sir, yours most truly and sincerely,

MALMESBURY.

P. place Decr. 21, 1798.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c.

Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Wickham.

Park place, Dec. 25, 1798.

My dear Sir,—I am afraid you will repent your having engaged in a correspondence with me, but the inclosed letter which I received this morning from M. Barthelemi, besides its being in some respect worthy your perusal, contains information which may be so interesting to General Pichegru that I could not avoid sending it to you as to the only person through whom I could convey it to him with a certainty of its getting safe. I wish you would be so good as to add my compliments, and that as I shall answer M. Barthelemi's letter very soon I will take charge of any commission he may give me or questions

he may wish to ask his fellow sufferer. On the paper from the Marquis St. Hermine I wish to know from you, whether anything can be done for him, and if it can by whom and through what department. I know the statement he sets forth to be strictly true and that he is strictly worthy of the publick benevolence.

I like much the taking of Minorca; it is a popular capture and will be well understood by the country at large—Malta will I trust follow and this, though less popular, will be to my mind much more important.

I scarce know how to construe the several articles of news brought over by the French paper of the 19th—Does the acceptance of the ultimatum by the dull Germans imply immediate peace between France and the Empire, or is it only the removal of some particular objections on which till now France had held out, leaving others for ultimate discussion? and supposing this not to be the case, are we to infer that peace with the Empire is a certain forerunner of peace with the Court of Vienna? I conceive that the success which the French say they have had near Civita Castellana may be quite independent of the Neapolitan army under Mack, and that if obtained at all, that it is over a separate corps that attempted to turn Rome from Abrucio on the capture of which Civita Castellana stands.

I join issue with you, my dear Sir, most perfectly with regard to the no confidence to be placed in Continental Courts, and I lament the errand on which my friend Tom*

* Right Hon. Thomas Grenville, elder brother of Lord Grenville, born 1755, at this time Ambassador to the Court of Berlin, having been sent thither to induce the King of Prussia to co-operate with the Allied Powers against the continued aggressions of the French. Mr. Grenville filled the office of President of the Board of Trade in his brother's administration, and after the death of Mr. Fox, that of First Lord of the Admiralty. He retired from Parliament in 1818. His name will ever be associated with the magnificent library which he formed with equal taste and judgment, and bequeathed to the British Museum. He died unmarried in 1846. A memoir of Mr. Grenville, written with singular grace and power, will be found in the 'Annual Register' for 1846, pp. 305—312.

Grenville is sent from my dread that it will be a fruitless one, and if fruitless give encouragement to our enemy in a greater proportion than we shall have done good if he prevails in bringing Prussia's sword half out of the scabbard, for that is as far (I will venture to affirm) as it will ever be drawn. The heterogeneous union of Russia and the Porte may produce good; two negatives make a strong affirmative.

Be so good as to return me Barthelemi's letter and Hermine's memorials, and once more receive my apologies for troubling you with them.

I am, with all the good wishes of the season to you and Mrs. Wickham, ever, my dear Sir, yours most truly and faithfully,

MALMESBURY.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c.

1799.

Mr. Marsden to Mr. Wickham.*

(Private.) Admiralty Office: Jan. 11th, 1799.

My dear Sir,—My Letter from Dublin of the 7th says 'the Publication of the scheme of the Union arrangements have set people talking of something else than the Principle, and so far the effect is beneficial. I think the fury upon the subject somewhat abates, and people begin to think it a Parliamentary, and not a Mob concern. If they will give us up this much, all will go on smoothly.'

I find on conversing with some Irish Peers they have strong objections to that part of the arrangement which places those of their body who shall not be among the Elect, on a different footing from the body of *Scotch* Peers, who are Peers of the Realm, though not of Parliament and entitled to all the Privileges which attach to that rank—whereas the Irish are to be Provincial Peers, with the privilege of being eligible to the House of Commons—as a douceur. This they say may suit certain Individuals, but will be thought a hardship by the Peerage in general, and especially by those whose property is in Ireland. They also object to another departure from the principle of the Scotch Union by which the power is reserved to the Crown of creating Irish (Provincial) Peers, whose numbers may be considerably encreased and consequently the *proportion* lost with respect to the number amongst them eligible to seats in the House of Peers, and their consequence in other respects diminished.

* Alexander Marsden, born 1761, died 1834, was Under Secretary for Ireland from 1801 to 1806, afterwards commissary judge in the slavery courts, then commissioner, and afterwards chairman of excise.

These topics are of course not new to you—but I just mention what I hear, without wishing to draw you into a discussion on the subject.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours sincerely,
W. MARSDEN.

Sir Sidney Smith to Mr. Wickham.

Pera, Constantinople: Jan. 16th, 1799.

My dear Sir,—If you have not received the flying sheet I sent from the Adriatic as I crossed the mouth of it from Malta, you will fancy me dead or dying considering the bad account I gave of my health at my sailing from Portsmouth; I hasten therefore to tell you that I am not only alive but well enough to undergo the fatiguing duties of my present situation, although the labour of working against the wind and current in the snowstorms which have been incessant this month past was rather trying for a convalescent and but a bad preparative for freezing at my writing desk in these paper houses, or wading through the snow between the Reis Effendi and the Dockyard, which are my two principal points of contact with the Dramatis personæ of this Theatre. I certainly gain flesh and strength every day: the best physician is a contented mind, and certainly I have every reason to be contented.

Having as it were flown hither on the wings of the wind to the arms of a Brother, and I need not tell you an affectionate one, who presents me an amiable sister-in-law, Baron Herbert's daughter, and finding public business in his hands brought to that degree of satisfactory perfection that I had nothing to do but to put the finishing stroke to the treaty by signing, and immediately to talk the language of an ally in military conference, I hope soon to be at liberty and entitled to execute what I propose to them, towards routing the enemy out of Egypt, first drawing off the disaffected part of his army by

means of my French friends, who have a clue to get at them, and are placed in this service partly with this view, the idea being adopted by this government; as indeed every proposition I have made to them is, as soon as their objections are answered and the matter is sufficiently illustrated by temperate discussion. There is no want of comprehension in these people; information alone is wanting. They are extremely eager after it, and sufficiently ready to adopt it in the execution of such plans as their *limited* and *disjointed* means of action will allow them to pursue. The cannon which your zeal in the cause enabled you to find the means of making over to my disposal have proved particularly acceptable—by the bye, do not omit to replace them at Morocco—and they have admitted my proposition of carrying them at once to the scene of action under the direction of *Colonel Perrin*, now the avowed Phelypaux,* *Major Bromley*, and *Captain Duroy*, rather than landing them here as ornaments to the gun wharf; where I see many more cannon than are of any use *there*, though none so fit for service as those we have brought and those that are coming with Khœler, being heavy masses of brass. The Sultan has in consequence contented himself with the sight of them, which I carried to him on board the flag-ship, the place he appointed for the reception of the naval plenipotentiary, to the no small astonishment of everybody here, considering the marked condescension evident in such an arrangement, and the omission of all humiliating forms prescribed and exacted by his ancestors and himself till this instance on the reception of infidels at the sublime

* Colonel Antoine Phelippeaux, born 1768, an artillery officer of great merit, and a strong royalist; he served in the army of Condé, and contrived the escape of Sir Sidney Smith from the Temple. He served under Sir Sidney at Acre, where he died of a fever, brought on by exposure to the sun in superintending the works. Phelippeaux had been the schoolfellow and constantly successful rival of Bonaparte, whose defeat in Syria he helped to bring about, though he did not live to see his retreat.

gate. He even began the complimentary speeches usual on such occasions, leaving me to answer; and, after having examined the presents on the quarter-deck and testified the interest he took in them by the attention he bestowed on them, he this day caused the cannon to be examined before him in the interior of the seraglio by our people, attended by ten of our marines, who went through the manual exercise with fixed bayonets; after which they and the artillerymen fired with powder for the entertainment of the fine black eyes that were no doubt peeping through the surrounding lattices, though I don't find that any of the pretty peepers were distinguishable, though my *travelling companions* took a sly look now and then in the middle of their evolutions to endeavour to catch a glimpse of them. The Sultan did not dismiss these naval inmates of the seraglio without testifying his satisfaction by causing them to be drawn up before him and a handful of sequins to be given to each, large or small, according to their several ranks. All these testimonials of confidence and approbation prove to the public here that we have completely supplanted our former rivals. The miserable remains of the domineering party now look up to us as the sole hope they have of not perishing in the dungeon of the Bagnos, to the door of which I went the day of the ship presentation scene to announce the promise I had just obtained of the transferment of forty-six *who call* themselves Lord Nelson's prisoners under my jurisdiction, a piece of information that was received with every heartfelt expression of rejoicing and gratitude for our interference. I cannot close this letter without thanking you for the kind manner in which you wrote to my brother about me when in the hands of these people's Tyrants, he having shown me your letters. . . .

Gratefully and faithfully yours,

W. S. S.

Wm. Wickham, Esq.

Mr. Huskisson to Mr. Wickham.*

(Secret.) Downing Street: Feb^{y}. 1799.

My dear Wickham,—If *Massoné's* Passports are come up from Gravesend I shall be obliged to you to send them here, as he wants them to ascertain some dates in the report he is now preparing.

I intended to have called upon you to mention generally what I have collected from conversation with him; but the weather is so bad, and, having some business that detains me here, I will endeavour to do it shortly in writing.

He has resided principally at Toulon since the departure of Buonaparte's Expedition. The preparations at that port appear to have been carried on upon a considerable scale for some time after the intelligence of *Brueys's* defeat was publickly known, but were afterwards discontinued. The only expedition that has since sailed was that for Corsica under General Vaubois, amounting to 1,700 men and two frigates. The remainder of the ships at that port are now in ordinary.

I had proceeded so far when the Duke of York called at the office, and staid till I was obliged to go to the House. Dr. *Lawrence* is now speaking, which leaves me at liberty to return to my subject. At the same time that the order was received for Vaubois to sail for Corsica the measures of requisition began, and all the troops then cantoned near Toulon and those on the Spanish frontier were marched to Italy. A great part of the army of the Rhine was also put in motion and sent to Swizzerland, or through that country towards Milan. These positions, thus weakened, are now filling up again by the requisi-

* William Huskisson, born 1770, the distinguished statesman, who in 1830 was killed on the railway at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester line; he was at this time Under Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. He was afterwards Secretary to the Treasury, President of the Board of Trade, Treasurer of the Navy, and Secretary of State for the Colonies.

tion, and the flower of the French army is consequently at present in Italy. From all that *Massoné* states I am afraid its numbers are very considerable. Whilst the above movements were taking place he went from Toulon to Milan, and all that he saw on his return confirms these apprehensions. On re-entering France he passed through Toulon and visited Narbonne, Perpignan, and Bayonne on his way to Rochefort. On the frontier of Spain he positively asserts there exists at present no large body of troops, nor are there any extensive preparations making in that quarter. From Rochefort, where he found 3,000 men of the force which was to have followed General *Hardy* to Ireland, he went to *Nantes*, but was not allowed to visit *Brest*. At the former place, however, he was met by an officer of the marines (Gerard de Coudraye) employed at Brest, who told him the present object was to man eight ships of the line for the next expedition to Ireland, and that they were then (beginning of January) not more than half ready. From Nantes he came to Paris, where he learnt that the Directory, though not without some hesitation and difficulty, had consented to risk 5,000 men more in an attempt upon Ireland, and that the Delegates at Paris, after frequent disappointments and rebukes, had received promises to this effect. On the 18th of Jan^{y}. he was told by one *Latairière*, aide-de-camp to General Championet, who brought from Italy some colours &c. taken from the Neapolitans (and who for this had been promoted) that he was to be employed in the expedition, and that he had received orders to hold himself in readiness—that 3,000 of the Troops would consist of those he saw at Rochefort, and the remainder be collected from departments on the coast and in Brittany. With this imperfect account he left Paris on the following day and travelled to Rotterdam, where he embarked. He represents the insurrection in the Low Countries as very formidable, and adds that it is still more so on the right bank of *the Meuse*, that the French Troops, from

inferiority of number, are compelled to remain on the defensive, many detachments having been lately defeated and cut off by the insurgents.

Orders have been given to the ports of the Ocean and the Mediterranean to build a number of frigates upon a new construction to carry 50 guns of heavy metal. This plan has been adopted with a view to enable them to provide for their safety in ports and harbours, where our two-deckers, from their draft of water, could not follow them. It was taken up after the battle of Aboukir.

The requisition, he assures me, is executed in the most rigorous manner, except in a few great towns. The men of the Southern and Western Departments are marched to the Rhine. Those of the North and East to Italy. He is convinced that it will (if it has not already) furnish the 200,000 men required by the Directory. In short, upon the whole it is evident that immediately after Lord Nelson's victory there would not have existed even a chance for the Directory had the Powers of Europe felt and acted as their duty, safety, and interest required, and that now, on the contrary, there is reason to apprehend the chances will soon be in its favour.

I remain, dear Wickham, yours ever faithfully,

W. HUSKISSON.

Mr. Canning to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Spring Gardens: Feb. 20, 1799.

My dear Wickham,—I return you Lord Castlereagh's letter and its inclosure, which are (in one sense) perfectly satisfactory as to the case of Mr. McDonnell. It is obvious that, under the circumstances there stated, nothing could properly or safely be done in his favour. Have the goodness to let Lord Castlereagh know, how much I feel myself obliged to him for his ready attention to the subject of my request, and for the expressions of civility contained in his letter.

I have stated to Mr. Pitt, and to Lord Grenville the

idea, which seemed to amuse you so much, of the Motion to be made in the Irish House of Commons in bar of the Speaker's Subscription:—and they both agree with me in thinking that it might be carried into effect with great advantage.

It is really too provoking and too absurd that Foster should be allowed to make a market of his Patriotism, in order that he may afterwards be enabled to raise his price upon Government, when he comes bound (as he must ultimately do) to favour the Union; and it strikes me that a very *serious* and *imposing* argument might be raised on the impropriety of any Member of the House of Commons, particularly the Speaker, (whose *purity*, *impartiality*, &c. &c., ought to be *above all suspicion*) receiving the wages of a Party out of doors, for his conduct on any particular question.

The motion might be worded, and introduced in a manner not only highly respectful to the Speaker, but such as to evince a particularly tender regard for his honour and his feelings. The mover would of course assure the House that what he had to offer was offered *without the concert*, or even the *knowledge*, of the Right Honourable Gentleman to whom it might seem more particularly to refer: but that as on the one hand it would have been extremely indelicate to implicate him in any degree in a proceeding which went to damp the generous, though mistaken, ardour of certain of his fellow-citizens, exerted, as it was, in his behalf—on the other hand, he (the Mover) felt that he was doing a substantial *kindness* to the Right Honourable Gentleman, and consulting in the best manner his *feelings, and sensibility*, by removing the possibility of such a proposal being made to him, as that which was understood to be in contemplation (the proposal of a pecuniary reward for the discharge of his public duty), which it was perfectly clear he *could not accept* consistently with his character and situation; but which, flowing as it would do from the well-meant kind-

ness of his friends, it might be *painful* to him to have to *decline*. A distinction might be taken between the subscription and Grattan's 50,000*l.*; the one granted by the House,—the other collected from the pockets of individuals. And to avoid seeming to point the motion too personally at the Speaker, and the Subscription then supposed to be actually on foot, it might be as well to generalize the words of the Resolution; as, 'that it is a High Breach of Privilege in any individual or body of men to offer to a Member of that House a pecuniary reward for his public conduct in that House;' or, 'that it would be highly unbecoming, and derogatory to the dignity of that House, for any Member thereof to receive from any individual or body of men whatever a pecuniary' &c.

Pray give this matter a thought, and a line (if you will) in the next private letter that you have occasion to write to Lord C.

Pitt has a notion that there could be found no member in the Irish House of Commons to execute so malicious a joke with sufficient gravity. But I am very much mistaken if there is not that in the style of at least half-a-dozen out of the twenty-seven speakers, whose speeches were reported on the first night of the Session, which would suit the idea exactly. Pray learn for me if Dr. Duigenan is for or against the Union.

Ever yours,

G. C.

King George III. to Mr. Wickham.

Queen's House: March 18th, 1799.

This is an introduction to Mr. Wickham of Mr. Ramy. Robinson Nephew to my Gardener at this place; He is also Over Seer of my Farm at Richmond; He has brought Me two dangerous weapons that were found in my Garden on Saturday, and had certainly been thrown over the Wall. It occurs to Me that they must have been in the possession of some of the dangerous persons

about this Town, and perhaps on being pursued by the Patrole to save themselves, may have thus got rid of them.

GEORGE R.

The Baron de Roll to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Edinburgh: 21st April, 1799.

My dear Wickham,—I must positively have a little talk with you, and I hope you will be able to give me a few moments' attention without my being tiresome.

I am, in the first place, charged to repeat to you from H. R. H. *Monsieur* what you know so well already, namely, his extreme desire to be actively employed. You can well imagine that the renewal of hostilities on the Continent has increased his impatience, and renders his position day by day more painful to him. But he hopes that the events which have just taken place will induce your Government to seize this moment to support the Royalist party vigorously. The letters that *Monsieur* receives from the interior, from the provinces of Brittany, Normandy, and La Vendée, all agree in eagerly urging and entreating that the present moment should be turned to account. It is almost the same from the Southern Provinces, and this state of feeling will naturally grow more and more excited, in proportion as the Republican armies meet with reverses on the Continent. If you thought you perceived that, under all these concurrent circumstances, the Ministry would be disposed to entertain some plan forthwith, relative to the Royalists in the interior, *Monsieur* hopes that you would interest yourself in making the Ministers appreciate all the advantage they would derive from his person, and all the confidence he deserves on their part. In short, my dear Wickham, as you are among the few persons in this country who have had it in their power to learn to know more particularly the character of this Prince, as you know all the advantages to be derived from it, as you know his position, and as

you can answer for his frankness and integrity in public affairs, we reckon on you to interest yourself in his behalf on every occasion, in every circumstance that may arise, reminding you that the greatest, the most signal service you can render to this Prince, is to aid in his being actively employed.

I flatter myself also, my dear Wickham, that you have not forgotten me, and that you will remember that the blood which runs in my veins is Swiss, good old Swiss. All my wishes and all my ambition tend at this moment towards my unhappy country; it is there where I even now long to be; but I cannot go as I wish, to be really of use there, except through you, and I always look to you to decide my fate in this matter.

The latest letters which I have had inform me that M. de Rovera is at the head of a Swiss corps, and that a M. de Courten, captain on half-pay in my regiment, is lieutenant-colonel of it. He is a young man of whom I have a high opinion. I do not know what can have become of General de Salis. You will give me great pleasure if you can tell me where he is, and if he is employed upon anything.

If you have not time to answer this, please let Mr. Flint write to me.

Adieu. Keep alive for me your recollection and your friendship, and believe me very sincerely, from my heart for life, your most devoted servant,

LE BARON DE ROLL.

P.S.—Pray remember me to Mrs. Wickham; give her my devoted homage. Poor Baron Castelnau is always asking me to say to you everything that is kind from him.

Mr. Dealtry to Mr. Wickham.

Crown Office: 3rd May, 1799.

Dear Sir,—The Court of King's Bench has committed Lord Thanet* and Mr. Fergusson to the custody of the Marshal, and directed Mr. Attorney-General and Mr. Erskine to consider before the next term whether the Court is not *bound* to pass the statute punishment of cutting off the right hand, perpetual imprisonment, and fine.

Mr. Horne Tooke has moved for an information against Wright, the bookseller in Piccadilly, for selling a book purporting to be a *Copy of the Report of the Secret Committee*, which contains libellous matter against him.

The Court has granted a rule to show cause, to give Wright an opportunity of stating whether it is a correct copy of the report, in which case they intimated a strong opinion that they ought not to interfere.

Yours truly,

HEN. DEALTRY.

WILLIAM WICKHAM, Esq.

Mr. Wickham to Major Perou [Pichegru].

(Translation.) London: 21st May, 1799.

My dear Major,—Your letter of the 23rd March reached me very punctually; but, unfortunately, it was only a week ago that I succeeded in deciphering it. The letter of your travelling companion to Mr. Dutheil, of the 20th

* O'Connor, an Irish rebel, was tried on the 21st of May, 1798, at Maidstone, for high treason and acquitted. Before the verdict was given, O'Connor was informed that a constable was in court with a warrant to apprehend him on another charge; nevertheless he attempted, as soon as the verdict was given, to go free. Sackville, ninth Earl of Thanet, one of his witnesses, and Mr. Fergusson, one of his counsel, attempted to aid his escape; for this offence they were tried at the King's Bench on the 25th of April, 1799, and though defended with great eloquence by Mr. Erskine, found guilty, and on the 1st of June sentenced — the Earl to a fine of 1,000*l.* and a year's imprisonment in the Tower—Mr. Fergusson to a fine of 100*l.* and a year's imprisonment in the King's Bench Prison.

of last month, encouraged me to try again, and at last I have been rewarded.

I cannot forgive myself for having been the involuntary cause of all the inconvenience which this delay must have occasioned you.

Your letter once read, my first care was to communicate it in the proper quarter. The somewhat enigmatical style which pervades it has prevented our divining your views and intentions, but we think we have found a clue to everything.

It is absolutely necessary that you should turn your eyes either towards Switzerland or the Low Countries. In either case you will find now on the Continent two persons both possessing the confidence of this Government, and both equally acquainted with the justice which is done you here, with the confidence shown you, and the desire felt here that your advice should be followed in all that relates to your unhappy country. They will both receive by this same courier the necessary instructions to confer with you on all that you may be able to communicate to them, or to propose to them.

This mode of correspondence with you has been adopted *to begin with*, because it has been found absolutely impossible to part with F. . . . even for a few days; also because, at this critical moment, any plan, however wisely framed in this country, might become impracticable before the courier charged to bring it you had landed at Cuxhaven.

In the event, then, of your views inclining to the Low Countries, you will go to Berlin, where you will find Mr. Grenville ready to receive you, after having communicated, if you think proper, with the person by whom you boast of having been so well received. If you think your presence more necessary on the side of Switzerland, Colonel R. Craufurd, who ought to be there by this time, and who knows you already, will be charmed to welcome you.

Wherever you go, reckon on meeting with the reception which you deserve on so many grounds.—I will not enter into idle discussions on the present state of things, and the deductions to be drawn from them. You are on the spot; you must know the means to be employed to profit by them, better than anybody. I must, however, in calling your attention to Switzerland, beg you to place yourself as soon as possible on a confidential footing with M. de Steiguer, the former Advoyer of Berne, whose reputation you know already. He is the only man who can give you well-founded and precise ideas on that interesting country, and at the same time give you practical help towards using your efforts on the frontier provinces with effect.

I have no need to tell you that the dissolution of the Swabian agency was only caused by intrigues which it was impossible to unravel from here. Colonel Craufurd's powers will enable him to do all the good that this agency might have done, without being exposed to the same drawbacks.

Believe, my dear Major, in my lifelong friendship and devoted attachment.

W. WICKHAM.

Mons. Miliaski [Comte de Prézy] to Mr. Wickham.

24th May, 1799.

(Translation.) (Received June 11.)

I received, Sir, the letter you so kindly addressed to me with the deepest interest. I never doubted your sentiments towards me, but the expression of them I now receive was essential to me, and does me good. I wished to answer your interesting letter at once, and hoped that Mr. Talbot might be the bearer of my reply; but I fear his departure may be again delayed, and I cannot postpone any longer once more assuring you of all my sentiments, and protesting that I can never forget your way of acting, that I guess perfectly to whom I owe the line of

conduct which your Government observes towards me, and the confidence which Colonel Craufurd, your friend, has shown me. Since his leaving London, events have been crowned with such a success that your presence here might, by reanimating all, terminate at this time, and in one moment, the misfortunes of my country. On this point it is not so much your friend speaking to you as the man guided by habits of experience and impartiality. I do not hesitate to tell you, Sir, that if your Government continue to interest themselves in the return of the King to France, they can only succeed by employing some one who, like you, unites in his own person the confidence of all, and who, being invested with the fullest powers, has also the habit of seizing the opportunities which are even now passing away if he does not know how to profit by them instantly. One commissary attached to the armies is not enough for the work of the interior, which ought to be attended to separately.

Pray be so kind as to remember me to Mrs. Wickham, and assure her of my respectful homage.

Adieu, Sir. Come to us, and you will crown the wishes of one who has vowed you a frank and sincere friendship, and who has the very highest sentiments towards you, and who will never cease to remind you of your great services to

MILIASKI [DE PRÉÇY].

King George III. to Mr. Wickham.

I cannot sufficiently express my approbation at the clearness with which Mr. Wickham has extracted the Substance of the French Papers that arrived this day, and at the Duke of Portland's attention in so early communicating them to me.

G. R.

Queen's House: May 29th, 1799, 5 minutes past 7 P.M.

Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Wickham.

(Private.) Park Place: June 2, 1799.

My dear Sir,—I feel much obliged to you for your kind attention in giving me such early notice of your being on the point of leaving England. You do me but justice in supposing me truly and sincerely interested in everything that can tend to your personal satisfaction and consideration. In the present instance the publick advantage is so closely connected with it, that although I shall regret your society, yet I cannot but rejoice at a nomination that will, I am confident, in the event so much contribute to it. I shall be in town almost as soon as this letter, but I did not chuse to postpone a moment thanking you for yours of the 31st May.

You have the most pleasing prospect opening to you of any person that lately has been sent to the Continent from this country, and I envy you the scenes of satisfaction you probably will be witness to in seeing Switzerland, and perhaps other countries, delivered from their savage oppressors. My son is arrived at Berlin, and under Mr. Grenville's immediate government. I should very much like his meeting you abroad; and as your stay there, though intended to be short, may be prolonged beyond your expectation, I do not despair of his having that pleasure. I hope to see you before you go, perhaps at least on the 4th.

Ever, my dear Sir, with great truth and esteem, your most obedient very faithful servant,

MALMESBURY.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

SECOND MISSION TO SWITZERLAND AND TO THE ALLIED ARMIES.

1799.

In June, 1799, Mr. Wickham was again sent abroad on a mission to Switzerland and to the Allied armies of Austria and Russia, the former commanded by the Archduke Charles. This mission, which was gradually enlarged into one of unusual extent, confidence and importance, seems to divide itself very naturally into two periods; the correspondence relating to the first of these only, comprising the battle of Zurich and its immediate consequences, is contained in the present volume, which ends with the close of the year 1799.

Mr. Wickham's instructions, signed by the King, and dated 6th June, 1799, ordered him on his arrival at the frontiers of Switzerland, in case he should find the country still occupied by the French, to collect all the intelligence he could relative to the state of Switzerland and of France, and to concert with the Avoyer de Steiguer, General Hotze, and Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd, the best and the speediest means of accomplishing the deliverance of Switzerland, and for securing its political independence and the integrity of its territory.

In case Mr. Wickham should find the enemy driven from the whole of Switzerland, or *any material part of it*, he was to proceed to Coire and Zurich, or such other place where the chief magistrates should be assembled, and deliver his credentials in the usual form and with the ceremonies anciently used on such occasions.

Mr. Wickham was to look upon the instructions

furnished to him during his former mission to Switzerland as valid, as far as they were not rendered impracticable or inexpedient by circumstances. In the speech or note he was to make on delivering his credentials, Mr. Wickham was to mention the interest taken by the King in the welfare of Switzerland and in the happy restoration of its ancient government and liberties, and of his disposition to contribute jointly with his allies for the maintenance and security of those blessings, and of his hope and expectation that the Swiss themselves would not be found wanting in the efforts they were then called upon to make for their own deliverance, nor in any respect unworthy of their ancient name and reputation, and of the sense he entertained of the resistance they had lately made against an enemy of such superior force, whose efforts would in all probability have proved of no avail, had there existed that spirit of union and mutual concord between the different states which alone could ensure their future existence and security. Whether Mr. Wickham found the country entirely or only in part liberated, he was to advise, encourage, and assist the members of the old Government of the different states to assemble according to their ancient form, and to take upon themselves and exercise the whole government of the country provisionally, in such manner as might best contribute to restore and maintain peace and order and an equal administration of justice throughout the country. Subject to these leading points, and paying due attention and deference to the opinions of the leading persons, and even to the prejudices of the people, Mr. Wickham was to exercise his discretion as to the manner in which this part of his instructions was put into execution. He was not however to fail whenever it chanced to be in his power to consult with the Ministers of Vienna or Petersburg, resident in the country, and with the nearest Generals of the Allied Powers, and to pay due attention to their opinions, except when they should appear to be

manifestly detrimental to the interests of the King, or to the instructions Mr. Wickham should have received.

Though the principal object of Mr. Wickham's mission was the bringing the resources of the country into action, and maintaining an effective force to be employed against the common enemy, yet on account of the great difficulty of determining at home the best mode of effecting this great object, he was to procure and transmit without delay all possible information on the subject, communicating at the same time his own opinion and those of other persons of weight in the country, with the arguments and reasons that might occur, or have been suggested to him in favour of any specific plan, and the objections that might have been made to it, and then to wait for final orders from home before anything permanent or definite should be concluded.

Whatever arrangement should be finally made, Mr. Wickham was in the meantime, in concert with Lieutenant-Colonel Craufurd, to use his utmost endeavours and exert all the influence he could by any means acquire in directing the resources of the country, and the energy, and warlike spirit of its inhabitants against the common enemy *in such manner as should be found most likely to serve the military operations and general plans of the King and his Allies.* Mr. Wickham was also to endeavour to act as much as possible according to the opinion, advice, or demand of the Generals of the Allied forces, not neglecting those advantages which he could not fail to derive from his communications with the military officers and ancient magistrates of the country, whose opinions, when they should appear really to rest on experience, observation, and local knowledge, he was at all times to communicate to the Ministers or general officers of the Allies. Mr. Wickham's conduct and language on the question raised by the Avoyer de Steiguer, whether it would be expedient to admit the subject states to any participation in the provisional government, was left to his

own discretion, as it was one of real difficulty, and one on which it was impossible to form any practical opinion except on the spot, and also because it was one of the first points that must be settled whenever the enemy should abandon the country; the only restraint laid on this discretion was, that he was in general to use the utmost care and caution in forming his opinion, and to hear and attend to all parties before he should suffer any resolution to be taken; he was however authorised to say safely, that the King would see with pleasure any extension of the privileges of the subject states, and any indulgence granted to them that should not interfere (particularly in the first instance) with the establishment of a firm and efficient government.

Mr. Wickham was to use his utmost influence in persuading the Helvetic Body without delay to send a mission to Petersburg, to solicit the Emperor of Russia to maintain a Minister in Switzerland.

Mr. Wickham was at the same time furnished with letters of credence to the Confederate States of the Swiss Cantons, to the Republic of the Grisons, to the Evangelic Cantons, and to the Canton at Berne, and a letter from Lord Grenville to the Avoyer de Steiguer, of which the following is a translation.

'London: 5th June, 1799.

'Sir,—I well know, Sir, with what pleasure you will see Mr. Wickham again. The King could not give your countrymen a better proof of his desire to do his part in re-establishing their ancient prosperity and happiness, than by furnishing with his powers to that effect one who has already gained their esteem by his conduct. He desires nothing more earnestly than to see you, knowing that you, better than any other person, can assist him in that glorious though difficult task; and I have requested him to be the interpreter of the sentiments of the highest and most sincere esteem with which your character has long inspired me, and which have naturally been much in-

creased by the whole of your conduct in the painful crisis in which you were placed.

'With such sentiments I shall ever be, Sir, &c.

'GRENVILLE.

'M. DE STEIGUER.'

As soon as Mr. Wickham had received his instruction he set off, accompanied by Mrs. Wickham, for Switzerland. The journey from London to Schaffhausen, which is now performed in thirty-five hours, then took three weeks, made moreover with great expedition. Holland being in the possession of the French, the nearest port on the continent open to the English was Cuxhaven. Mr. Wickham embarked at Yarmouth on board H.M.S. Kite, one of the best sailing vessels of the navy, on the 7th of June, and landed at Cuxhaven on the 13th. He travelled by Hanover, Cassel, and Ulm, not without difficulty; the wild moors in the north of the duchy of Hanover were then roadless, the track being marked only by deep ruts; at some places it was difficult to procure horses, and after leaving Hanover the postilions lost their road and went out of the way to Pyrmont. Mr. Wickham reached Schaffhausen on the 27th, where he found the Avoyer de Steiguer and other persons well acquainted with the whole of Switzerland.

At that time our Allies had everywhere been successful; the French had evacuated Germany, in Italy they were defeated on all sides by the Austrians and Russians, they had been driven out of a great part of Switzerland, Massena* however still maintained a strong position between the Reuss and the Limmat to the south of Zurich, Marshal Suworow was shortly to march with his victorious army from Italy to Switzerland, and Bonaparte was far off in the East.

Never since the beginning of the revolutionary war had the prospect of bringing the aggressive spirit of France

* André Massena, the great French General, afterwards Duke de Rivoli, Prince D'Essling, and Marshal of France; born 1758, died 1817.

within bounds been more favourable than at this time; and had the Allies acted in harmony and with vigour, there can be little doubt that they would not only have dislodged Massena and expelled the French from Switzerland, but have carried their own arms on to the soil of France itself.

The incapacity of the Russian commander Korsakoff, the jealousies that existed between the Austrians and Russians, the duplicity of Baron Thugut and his misunderstanding with the Archduke, caused this opportunity to be lost. Very different was the conduct of Massena: that consummate general watched for and eagerly seized his opportunity, defeated and drove the Russians from Zurich, regained the ground lost by the French, and established himself so firmly that Suworow arrived in Switzerland only to leave it again under circumstances of such difficulty that his retreat will always be famous, not only for the skill with which it was conducted, but even more for the losses and suffering it entailed. Thus the favourable prospects with which the campaign opened were lost, never to return, till Bonaparte began his retreat from Moscow.

Mr. Wickham's despatches give a full and clear narrative of the events of this campaign, and the unhappy results that followed the defeat of the Russians at Zurich.

The Comte de Precy to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Augsbourg: 17th June, 1799.

Sir,—I am truly glad to take advantage of the departure of Mr. Talbot to recall myself to your friendly recollection, and to assure you that the sentiments which I have expressed for you and also for Mrs. Wickham remain deeply engraved on my heart.

I think Mr. Talbot must confer with you on his work of this winter. I regret excessively that it should be stopped, for one might have reasonably expected the happiest results from it, and the manner in which it has been suppressed has cast discouragement and uneasiness

among those persons in the interior with whom relations had been established, and who I must say were well chosen both for their talents and morality.

My confidence in you and your friendship for me permit me to enter into detail and even to lay before you all the delicacy of my position, since my work must be done with the King through his agents, and the confidence with which your Government condescends to honour me in putting me in communication with Mr. Craufurd must draw down much cavilling upon me, the necessary consequence of envy and jealousy, which is no reason for me to abate my zeal in the service of the King, but rather that I should give myself with the strongest sense of security to every kind of work with the Ministers of a nation as noble as it is generous, whose proceedings and principles four years of experience have given me good reason to know. Mr. Talbot can satisfy you on every detail on which you desire to be informed.

I know, Sir, your important avocations, yet I must most earnestly hope that they may not deprive me entirely of your correspondence, which at this moment would be very useful to me. I shall always speak to you with the same fulness as when I was received by you with that friendship which assured my safety as well as my happiness, and which will always be a precious treasure to me. It is with these sentiments that I have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient and very devoted servant,

MILIASKI [DE PRÉÇY].

(No. 1.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen : 29th June, 1799.

I find that the passage of the Rhine and the subsequent operations in Switzerland were undertaken by the Archduke without any authority whatever from Vienna, and that H. R. H. not only has never yet been able to obtain the slightest mark of approbation from his Court, nor any instructions for the regulation of his conduct in the in-

terior of the country, but that he is, or affects to be, extremely uneasy on that account, and has peremptorily declined giving any encouragement, or even his sanction, to any measures for the re-establishment of the ancient governments in the conquered Cantons, lest what he should do or say on the occasion should be censured or disapproved at Vienna.

The Archduke himself has thrown out hints of this kind, and the persons most in his confidence have not scrupled to hold this language in its full extent to the Advoyer de Steiguer, attributing the whole to the jealousy entertained of H.R.H by M. de Thugut.

I find also by a short note that I have received from Colonel Craufurd that H. R. H. is very adverse to the Advoyer de Steiguer's taking any ostensible part in the arrangement of the Government of any but his own Canton.

A conduct so very different from that which the Austrians have followed in Italy, not only in the countries subject to the Emperor, but in Piedmont and the Roman States, has not failed to produce the very worst consequences, and at this moment presents an insuperable obstacle to my carrying his Majesty's commands into execution with promptitude and effect.

The Cantons of Zurich and Schaffhausen, which have always been devoted to the French interests, and the whole of the subject States of the Rheinthal, Turgovie, and Toggenburg, in which the Revolution had taken the deepest root, are left at this moment under the form of Government established at the Revolution, and their municipal administration is conducted by persons chosen and appointed under the same auspices.

To say nothing of the very dangerous example holden out to other countries and of the many future evils to be apprehended from the Revolutionary Government being thus suffered to exist, those which are already felt are the discouragement, and in many instances the actual depression, of the well-disposed inhabitants,—an opinion

prevalent in the Austrian army that the Swiss are ill disposed to the cause of the Allies,—the re-appearance of the avowed partizans of the French and the members of the Jacobin Clubs, who begin already to hold their insolent revolutionary language, to insult and threaten the well-disposed inhabitants, to magnify the bravery and means of resistance of the French, and to talk of their return before the close of the campaign as a certain event,—the propagating and exciting throughout the country doubts and suspicions of the conduct of the Allies, which among other evil consequences proves a material impediment to the raising of the new levies,—the renewal of the old correspondance between the Jacobins here and the Clubs in Swabia, and the conveying intelligence to the Enemy of all the motions of the Austrians.

I am sorry to add as another consequence of the present conduct of the Archduke, that a jealousy of the intentions of the Cabinet of Vienna which the Proclamation of H.R.H. had effectually removed, and a suspicion that the revolutionary Governments are only permitted to exist that the Austrians may have a better pretext for taking possession of the country, are becoming very prevalent.

Not having yet had an opportunity of seeing either the Archduke or Colonel Craufurd, I cannot say whether any hope may be entertained of H. R. H. adopting a different line of conduct.

Being assured that H. R. H., who is very weak in infantry, is particularly anxious that the new levies should be compleated as soon as possible, it is my present intention, after having made him acquainted with his Majesty's wishes for the re-establishment of the ancient Governments, to submit to his consideration how impossible it is that those levies should either be speedily compleated, or carried to any extent under the Governments now existing, the members of which have a direct interest in counteracting them, and how impossible it will be for me

to assist in their formation but through the medium of the ancient Governments, with which alone I am authorized to hold any communication or correspondance.

Should H.R.H. appear really to entertain the same opinion, though afraid or unwilling to act upon it, means may easily be found of making his sentiments publicly known, and in that case I should not fail to exert myself to the utmost to carry his Majesty's commands into execution.

But should H.R.H., from whatever motive, appear to be really and decidedly averse to the re-establishment of the ancient Governments, I conceive that it will be my duty, as long as the country shall be in possession of the Austrian army, to remain perfectly quiet, and to content myself with observing what passes and transmitting intelligence home, until I shall have received new instructions from your Lordship, or until I shall have been assured that the suspicions of the Swiss are ill-founded and that the Court of Vienna is really not adverse to the measure. Any premature interference on my part might do much mischief, but could not possibly do any good to the cause it is wished to serve.

In the meantime I shall write immediately to Sir Morton Eden to inform him of the state in which I have found the country, and to submit to him the necessity of his explaining to the Court of Vienna the reasons of the extreme importance which his Majesty attaches to the immediate restoration of the ancient Governments of Switzerland, and his making such further representations on the subject as he may consider most likely to secure the active and immediate assistance of that Court in obtaining this very desirable end.

I have learned with much satisfaction that the popular Cantons of Appenzell and Glarus have already holden their general assemblies, in which their ancient forms of government were restored by the unanimous consent of the people. The assemblies of Schweitz and Uri will also

meet immediately for the same purpose. Glarus has already sent to the Austrian army the contingent which it was bound to furnish to the Confederation, and Appenzell and Schweitz have each provided at their own expense (though nearly exhausted of every resource) a small body of chasseurs, which the Austrians find of considerable service in the sort of war which the corps under General Jellachich in particular are obliged to carry on in the mountains.

In general, the popular Cantons show as much zeal in the cause of the Allies, and of marked detestation of the French and of the principles of modern republicanism, and intrepidity in opposing the invasion of the Enemy; but their population is inconsiderable, their resources still less, and the flower of their young men has been destroyed by the horrible war which the French carried on in their country during the suspension of hostilities with the House of Austria, so that I much doubt whether any effective assistance can be obtained from them after the armies shall have been removed to any distance from their frontiers. It is my intention to visit them as soon as I shall have passed a few days at Zurich, and to deliver to each of them a copy of his Majesty's letter, accompanied with the strongest assurances of the satisfaction which his Majesty will derive from their present conduct; and as your Lordship informed me that a portion of the sum which his Majesty is pleased to grant, to enable the Helvetic Body to recover its ancient liberty and independence, might be given to any individual Canton where such a disposition of it might appear to me to be advantageous to the common cause and to his Majesty's service, I shall make an advance not exceeding 2000*l.* to each of the Cantons of Unterwalden, Uri, Glarus, Appenzell and Schweitz; to the three latter, to enable them to pay the first expenses of their contingent, to the two first, in the shape of a gratuity from his Majesty to assist the poor inhabitants in repairing the dreadful losses they have sustained from the ravages of the French, the

extent of which I am sorry to say had not been at all exaggerated in the different details which had reached England on the subject.

I delivered your Lordship's letter to the Advoyer de Steiguer, and have the honour to send his answer enclosed. I have the pleasure to add that I found this excellent magistrate in perfect health and, notwithstanding his advanced age, as zealous and active in the service of his country as I had ever known him.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, My Lord, &c., &c., WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

(No. 2.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 29 June, 1799.

My Lord,—From the information I have received here, I find that the Austrians have made no progress in Switzerland since the day they took possession of Zurich. General Massena has taken a strong position between the Limmat and the Reuss, along the chain of hills which runs from south-east to north-west, parallel to the northern part of the lake of Zurich and to the Limmat, and which may be considered as a prolongation of Mount Albis,—his right upon Mount Albis,—his left at Baden, near the junction of the Limmat and the Reus. He has some small camps in the plain between the mountain and the Limmat, and his vedettes are nearly within cannon-shot of the town of Zurich. His left is covered by the division of General Ferino, which extends from Coblentz along the Rhine to Basle, and his right by the corps of General Lacourbe, which, after having made a very difficult but able retreat through the Cantons of Uri and Schweitz, has been considerably reinforced, and now occupies the Cantons of Unterwalden, Lucerne, Zug, and that small corner of the Canton of Schweitz in which Kusnach is situated.

The French on the right of General Lacourbe have another very strong corps amounting to about 10,000 men (including some Swiss) in the Valais commanded by General Xaintrailles, a part of this corps is strongly entrenched in the valley of Leuch.

The Archduke occupies the chain of hills on the opposite side of the Limmat, being the very position from which Massena retired after the battle of the 4th,—his left behind Zurich,—his right opposite to Baden, with a detached corps extending along the lower Limmat, towards Kaiserstuhl and Zurzach, on the Rhine. Zurich is occupied by a strong garrison, and the suburb on the other side of the Limmat is surrounded by a modern fortification of sufficient strength to protect the town against a *coup-de-main*. There are besides 3,000 or 4,000 men encamped upon the little river without the walls of the place.

The Archduke has a corps in the Forest Towns opposite to the position of General Ferino, and his left is covered by General Jellachich, who occupies the whole of the Canton of Schweitz excepting the point of Kusnach, and by General Bay, who occupies the Canton of Uri; but these two corps united are not sufficiently strong to attack General Lacourbe.

In the Valais, Colonel Strauch, who had penetrated into that country from the St. Gothard with four battalions, is master of the Rhone only from Munster upwards to its source, though his patroles penetrate to Brigg, beyond which place the French are fearful of advancing lest they should be turned by the passage of the Simplon, to the summit of which a small corps of Austrians has penetrated from Domo D'Ossola. He has been joined by the remains of the insurgents of the Valais, commanded by Captain de Courten, an officer of the reduced battalion of his Majesty's regiment of Roll.

Colonel Strauch's corps formed the advanced guard of a much more considerable force under General Haddick, which was marching into the Valais when the General

was suddenly recalled by F.M. Suworow, in consequence of a report that the Brest fleet had landed 15,000 at Genoa. Upon the falsity of this report being discovered, he was ordered to return to the Valais, which he was again on the point of entering when he was recalled a second time, in consequence of the defeat of General Bellegarde, and it appears that the Archduke will not attempt any offensive operations against Massena until General Haddick shall return again, and have actually entered the Valais.

The respective positions of the Archduke and Massena are considered by military men as extremely strong and scarcely susceptible of being attacked in front. That of Massena could be easily turned if the corps of General Jellachich and Bay could by any means be strengthened.

The French army did not suffer materially in the late action before Zurich, and its retreat was made in perfect good order.

I find also that General Massena has received considerable reinforcements from the interior of France, so that his whole force, including the corps of Xaintrailles, is estimated at nearly 55,000 men, nor do I find that there is any considerable desertion in his army. On the other hand, the Swiss conscription is reduced by desertion to between 3,000 or 4,000 men.

The Austrian army is said to be in the highest order, and to be animated to a degree of enthusiasm by the presence of the Archduke, who is almost adored by the troops, and to whose personal exertions, from every information that I can collect, the late successes in Swabia were entirely due.

In the few corps which I have seen I can observe a manifest difference in the whole appearance and countenance of the officers, as well as of the men; instead of the discontented and dejected appearance which was but too visible among them during the campaign of 1796, they now appear chearful and animated, and look as if they were conscious of their own strength, and of the glory

and real superiority over the enemy which they have acquired.

It is impossible for those who had seen the Austrians at the former period not to observe and be struck with the difference.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

M. Imbert Colomès to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) (Received 8th.)

Sir,—When I wrote to you last May deploring the misfortune we had had in losing you, it did not even occur to me that our loss would be so promptly repaired. What a good omen, dear Sir, is your return to us! I hasten to express to you the joy it gives me. After all the trouble your first mission gave you, it is only fair that you should return to reap the fruit of your labours by being a witness to the deliverance of our unhappy country, for at present I firmly believe in it, but before yielding to so delightful a thought, permit me, Sir, to thank you for all you have done for my nephew. You have furnished him with the means of rejoining me, and I expect him in eight or nine days, but I hope you destine him to some occupation. You know that it is what he wishes, and at the first word from you, he will be at your orders. Pray continue you kindness to him. Before your return I had formed the plan of going to Piedmont to be nearer my fellow-countrymen. I should perhaps find there a means of corresponding with them which might be useful; and I should be at hand to enter with the army of ——, if, as I presume its design is to force its way in. Now that you are here I wish to do nothing without consulting you. I shall be obliged to you to give me an immediate answer to determine my proceedings. Meantime if between this and then I were to receive a message to come to you, I should do so at once; I am very impatient to have the pleasure of

seeing you. My friend M. D'Arletti [De Preçy] is also awaiting orders at Augsburg. I am with all respect, your Excellency's very obedient and humble servant,

DURAND [IMBERT COLOMÈS].

Nuremberg: 2nd July, 1799.

I don't know if Mrs. Wickham is with you, if so pray present to her my respectful homage.

M. Dandré to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) (Received 8th.)

Sir,—Of all things I could have wished, nothing could have been more agreeable to me than your letter of the 22nd May, which by some extraordinary accident was only forwarded to me from Zurich on the 26th of June, and only reached me last night. The amount of pleasure it gave me is only in proportion to the extreme value I set on your friendship, which is such that the mere vexation at having lost it was enough to make me commit what you call a piece of childishness.

If I had known exactly where you were, I should have started directly to express to you my lively gratitude. I shall await your orders, to come and thank you, and concert with you the means of repairing the harm which has been done by a misinterpretation of the orders of your Government and a multitude of misunderstandings one more inexplicable than the other.

You must however do me the justice not to attribute my satisfaction only to what you tell me of the state of affairs, but also to the return or rather the continuance of your friendship for me.

I hope, when I have the honour of seeing you I shall be able to convince you that we have done all that depended upon us to maintain the existence of all the establishments which we had organized (although some had suffered from the suspension which has prevailed for the last three months), and that I am always the same, entirely devoted to your orders, and ready to give you on every occasion

the most unquestionable proofs of my gratitude, and of the respectful attachment with which I am, Sir, your very humble and obedient servant,

A. MAYOR [DANDRÉ].

Augsburg: 3rd July, 1799.

(No. 3.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Zurich: 5th July, 1799.

My Lord,—I arrived at this place from Schaffhausen on Sunday the 30th ult°, and after having obtained from Colonel Craufurd and General Hotze all the information which it was in their power to give me on the different objects of my mission, I had the honour of a very long conference with the Archduke at H.R.H's head quarters at Klotten on Tuesday the 2nd inst.: in which H.R.H. was pleased to speak to me with great openness on his own situation, on the general prospect of the campaign, and on the present state of Switzerland.

He confirmed to me, what I had before learnt from others, that he had received no instructions whatever for the regulation of his conduct in Switzerland, and that he was totally ignorant of the intentions or wishes of his Court; adding that he had written for instructions but had received no answer whatever; on which account he was fully determined to take no part in the internal arrangement of the respective Governments of the country, excepting where he should find any such arrangement essentially interfere with the subsistence or well-being of his army.

I found at the same time with pain that H.R.H. had received the most unfavourable impressions of the old Government of Zurich. I had already learnt that he had been waited on by frequent deputations from villages on the banks of the lake where the principles of the Revolution had taken deeper root and made a greater progress than in any other part of Switzerland and where they still exist in their full force, whilst the well-disposed inhabit-

ants, discouraged as well by the presence of the republican army as by the insinuations and threats of the French party, and the silence of the Archduke and of the Court of Vienna, had taken no step whatever to contradict the artful misrepresentations of their antagonists; and I took this opportunity of explaining to H.R.H. the general situation of this part of the country and the state of the different parties and factions by which it had been agitated previous to the entry of the French into Switzerland, concerning all which he appeared to me to have received no information whatever, but through the medium of persons whose representations, were it only from the employments they filled under the protection of the French, ought to have been the object of suspicion and mistrust.

H.R.H. then related to me something of the difficulties of his present situation, considered only in a military point of view, which he said added very materially to those which the political situation of Switzerland, and the state of factions and parties in the country already presented: he pointed out the strength of Massena's position and the superiority of his army, assuring me in confidence that from the most accurate returns he was persuaded the French had at this moment in Switzerland 20,000 *infantry* more than the Austrians, whilst no means could be found of employing the cavalry of the latter to any advantage.

Under these circumstances he said it was not possible for him to undertake any offensive operations against Massena with any hope of success at all adequate to the risk and danger of the enterprize, until he should have received such considerable reinforcements from the army of Italy as should enable him to drive the enemy from the Valais and the Cantons of Unterwalden and Lucerne by throwing a formidable force on his right flank and rear. He said that his own position was a very excellent one, but that he had not more troops than were sufficient to guard it, so that he could not possibly reinforce his left wing in the mountains without weakening his centre and right, more

than would be prudent or safe in the presence of an active and energetic enemy posted so very near him, and that he could not draw any further reinforcement of infantry from Swäbia without exposing that country to a new invasion and endangering the safety of his own magazines.

He lamented the false step of the Court of Vienna in taking away 30,000 of his best infantry in the month of February last, of which he said (not without marked asperity) that General Bellegarde had actually delivered eighteen whole battalions to the enemy. He lamented still more at the present moment the retreat of General Haddick, which H.R.H. attributed to F. M. Suworow's having undertaken too many operations at a time.

On this occasion, although H.R.H. spoke with reserve and moderation, I could not help observing evident marks of that jealousy of F. M. Suworow, and that dissatisfaction which I am sorry to add, his appointment seems to have occasioned to the whole of the Austrian army; and I take this opportunity of mentioning that both at the Archduke's and General Hotze's table, as well in other places, I have heard very strong and unpleasant language openly holden on the subject, and that the letters from the army of Italy (which those who receive them make no scruple of showing) affect sometimes to treat him as a madman, at others, to throw a ridicule upon his whole conduct and specially to consider his military operations, notwithstanding the success with which they have been attended, as wild and extravagant projects, which nothing but the defeat and discouragement of the French army, occasioned, as they say, by the first successes on the Adige, could have enabled him to realise, and which, had they failed, would have occasioned the total destruction of the Austrian army.

The Archduke himself observed that Buonaparte, whom he considered (to use his own expression) as a great general, had never dared before he had taken Mantua to pursue the remains of the Austrian army,

though twice totally defeated and almost annihilated, and that he himself should never have dared to have marched towards Piedmont without that place.

Had General Haddick remained in the Valais, H.R.H. said that at this moment he should have been at least at Bern, and with the assistance of the eighteen battalions, *sacrificed* by General Bellegarde, he even had no doubt but that he should long since have driven the French entirely out of Switzerland. He added, that with the present troops he commanded, and in the present temper and spirit of the army, he thought it probable that he might, by a desperate attack, be able to drive Massena from his position, strong as it was, but that it would cost him the flower of the Austrian infantry, already too weak, and leave the army incapable of making any use of its victory. In the course of conversation on this subject, H.R.H. made some very strong and eloquent observations on the situation of the general of an army, whom, he said, every man presumed to judge, whilst the reasons of his conduct were known only to the general himself; who was even obliged to conceal those most carefully which, if published, would operate most in his justification. He said that this was precisely his own case at this moment; that he was not only teazed with plans and projects of attack, but that people (alluding to the Swiss emigrants) were every day pointing out to him the dangerous consequences of suffering the French to remain any longer in their present position, taking for granted that it was in his power to drive them away from it, whereas, added H.R.H., I am not only well aware of those consequences, but I could point out many still more dangerous to the common cause of which these persons had not an idea.

H.R.H. then entered on the subject of the new Swiss levies, which His Majesty has authorized Colonel Craufurd to raise, for the completion of which he appeared extremely anxious, and particularly desired that I would

go as soon as possible to the little Cantons, and use all the influence of His Majesty in encouraging those states to engage their people to enrol themselves without delay. He even added, that if, contrary to expectation, the imperial army in Italy should receive some severe check, he had no other hope of receiving a reinforcement until the arrival of the Russians, whilst Massena, if he chose to risk the leaving Alsace unprotected (which he might safely do), could at any time draw together from 10,000 to 15,000 men, for any sudden operation that he might choose to undertake.

I did not fail to take this opportunity of pointing out to H.R.H. the obstacles that were thrown in the way of these levies by the Government now existing in Zurich and Schaffhausen, and of informing H.R.H. that by his Majesty's express order I could have no communication or correspondance whatever but with the regular Governments of Switzerland; but H.R.H. immediately answered that he was well aware of the truth of all my observations, on which account it was that he had desired me to go there, where alone he was sensible that I could be at present of any real service, and that he was firmly determined to adhere to his original resolution, and not to interfere in any manner with the internal regulation of the country, but according to instructions he should receive from Vienna, whatever might be the consequence to Switzerland, to his own Court, or the common cause.

Finding H.R.H. so firm in his determination, I thought it my duty not to press the subject any further. I did not however leave the head-quarters without having obtained from H.R.H. the express assurance that if the ancient magistrates should take any steps towards recovering their authority, he would not only not counteract them, but that when the thing should be done, he would support them with the whole weight of his authority.

I am sorry to learn from the different conversations that I have had with officers in the confidence of H.R.H.,

particularly with General Hotze and Colonel Plunkett,* that H.R.H. considers himself as extremely ill used by his own Court,—that he has been left *from the beginning of the campaign* without any orders or instructions, and his conduct in every operation he has undertaken either directly disapproved or left wholly unnoticed,—that H.R.H. has been more than once on the point of resigning the command of the army, and that he has only retained it at the earnest solicitation of his officers,—that this army has neither received any gratification or promotion, or any public thanks or honour of any kind, all of which (they say) have been bestowed with prodigality on the army of Italy,—and that H.R.H.'s illness was occasioned much more by this neglect of his army, and by the harshness of the censure passed on his conduct in marching forward from the Leck, than by the fatigues he underwent on that occasion.

Though H.R.H. is extremely reserved on the occasion, yet his confidential friends, and the army in general, with what foundation I cannot pretend to say, do not scruple to attribute this conduct of the Court of Vienna to the personal jealousy entertained of H.R.H. by M. Thugut, arising as it is said from the friendship and confidence with which H.R.H. was honoured by the Emperor.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

(No. 5.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy. Extract.) Zurich: Sunday, 7 July, 1799.

Yesterday the Archduke received a messenger from F. M. Suworow, informing H.R.H. that in consequence of the total defeat of General Macdonald and the retreat of Moreau to the riviera of Genoa, he had ordered General

* Hon. William Plunkett, fourth son of the seventh Earl of Fingall, a colonel in the Austrian service; born 1770, died at Prague, 1806.

Haddick to return to the Valais, and to enter that country not by the St. Gothard and the Simplon as before, but by the valley of Aoste and the Great St. Bernard, by which road he will have the double advantage of entering the Valais at Martinack on the rear of the French position, and of threatening Montmelian by the Little St. Bernard, and the Isere; the valley of Aoste leading alike to those two points, though so very remote from each other.

General Haddick has written to General Hotze to request that Colonel Strauch may be reinforced by two battalions from General Bay's corps in the canton of Uri, which request has been complied with, so that it is hoped Colonel Strauch may be strong enough to attack the Enemy in front at the same time that General Haddick falls on their rear.

On the 26th ult. the force of the Enemy in the Valais was estimated at about 10,000 men, including the conscription of the lower Valais and the Pays de Vaud, and one weak battalion from the Canton of Bern, which had joined the army by the Gemmi. Their advanced posts were then at the bridge of Lemasse, a little beyond the village of Naters. They occupied on the left bank of the Rhone, Visp, and the whole valley in which that town is situated, Brigg, and the passage of the Simplon, as far as the convent (the Austrians being masters of the summit); their main army occupied the valley of Leuck, on the right bank of the Rhone, a very strong position with their retreat secured by the Gemmi, in case they should be turned from the Great St. Bernard. The road over the Gemmi had been destroyed by the peasants, but the French have found means to re-establish it. They were intrenching themselves in that position on every accessible point, and were well provided with artillery. On the side of the Great St. Bernard they occupied St. Pierre, or St. Petersburgh, and the Val de Bagne.

They commit every sort of excess and cruelty in the

villages round them, most of which have been abandoned by the young men, who join as Austrians.

On the 2nd instant their position was nearly the same, but they had received a reinforcement of from 3,000 to 4,000 men.

This day, accounts have been received from that country of so late a date as the 5th, which leave no room to doubt of the arrival of the Austrians in the valley of Aoste, or at least of the French being informed of their intention to occupy it, as on the 3rd, in the evening, three strong battalions suddenly retired from Brigg and Naters, under orders to march towards Geneva, probably to protect the Little St. Bernard. The French continued to burn the villages, which were successively abandoned by the young men, as the conscription was attempted to be enforced in any of them. General Hotze will set out to-morrow for the corps of General Jellachich, to take advantage of any success that may attend the operations in the Valais, and also to prevent Generals Massena and Lacourbe from detaching any considerable force to support General Xaintrailles.

Hitherto the Archduke has had little or no communication with F. M. Suworow, nor was he at all acquainted with the plan of the campaign in Italy.

A few days before my arrival here, H.R.H. had sent an officer attached to his person to the F. Marshall, to represent the situation of the two armies here, to state how impossible it would be for H.R.H. to undertake any offensive operation without reinforcements from Italy, and at the same time to propose to the F. Marshall to enter into a more close and confidential correspondance.

It was this officer who returned yesterday, and who brought the account of General Haddick's intended operations in the Valais.

The French, a few nights since, carried off two companies of Austrian infantry from the village of Wittiken, almost within musket-shot of the walls of Zurich.

On Wednesday last, having assembled a number of boats on the lake, they attacked and carried the position of Brunnen in the Canton of Schweitz, but were driven from it with loss on the same day. On this occasion the contingent of the Canton of Glarus particularly distinguished itself.

(No. 7.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy. Extract.) Zurich: 13 July, 1799.

My Lord,—I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the Canton of Schaffhausen has determined to resume its ancient form of government, abolishing at the same time the unjust commercial monopoly which that town enjoyed in common with Zurich, and granting to the people some further municipal privileges of no material importance, but with which the great majority of the inhabitants of the Canton appear to be entirely satisfied.

A deputation of the town having waited on me yesterday, to know if what they proposed to do would be agreeable to the Court of London, I did not hesitate to say that His Majesty would entirely approve of the whole, and that as soon as they should inform me officially that the change had actually taken place, I should not fail to give them such an assurance in writing, accompanied with the sincerest congratulations in his Majesty's name, on their complete delivery from the tyranny under which they had so long groaned.

M. Müller's* brother was one of the deputation, and I have some reason to believe that it was on a suggestion from Vienna that this important measure was adopted.

The Prince Abbé of St. Gall has also settled all his

* Jean Müller, the famous historian of Switzerland, a native of Schaffhausen. He was much in the confidence of M. de Thugut. Mr. Wickham greatly disapproved of his political principles, considering him to be mischievous, ambitious, and intriguing; he considered also that he had exerted a most hurtful and unfortunate influence at the time of the invasion of Switzerland by the French.

disputes with the inhabitants of the Toggenburg, who have acknowledged his authority, and everywhere re-established their ancient municipal administration.

A sort of provisional committee, which was established at Zurich, not for the purpose of re-establishing the ancient Government, as the Advoyer de Steiguer had wisely suggested, but merely for the civil administration of the town, sent a deputation to me yesterday, to say how sorry they were to find from the representation that had been made to them by Lieutenant-General Hotze, that their town and Canton were likely to incur the displeasure of his Britannic Majesty; and then, after stating to me at length all the difficulties they found in the way of re-establishing their ancient Government, they assured me that they were all not only willing but extremely anxious to accomplish this undertaking, that they would certainly attempt it themselves in the event of the French retreating from their position before the town, and that in the meantime, if either the Archduke or the Ministers of Vienna and London would say *officially* that they considered such measure necessary, there would be no difficulty in executing it immediately under such high authority.

The conduct of the Canton of Zurich has been very much influenced by the change which has taken place in the language and conduct of General Hotze since my arrival here. I have not hesitated to inform that officer very distinctly, that his Majesty in offering assistance to Switzerland had thought that he was coming forward in behalf of a people disposed to make great exertions for the recovery of its own liberty and independence, and that if I saw no resolution in the Governments themselves to assert their own rights, and to put down that spirit of insubordination and resistance which was but too prevalent in this Canton and the subject states, I should think it my duty to retire immediately, and represent humbly to my Court

the inutility of any efforts His Majesty could make to save this unhappy country.

P.S.—Accounts have just been received from Schweitz that the Enemy having assembled a number of vessels on the lake of Lucerne, had made an attack yesterday morning on the side of Fluellen and Altdorf, the result of which is not known. The cannonade was very heavy, and from its direction it was judged that the Austrians had lost ground.

If the Enemy has no greater object in view, it is probable that this attack is made in the hope of obliging General Bay to recall the two battalions he had sent into the Valais.

I am inclined to believe that dispatches from that General, as well as from F. M. Suworow, have been intercepted on the lake.

I fear that General Hotze, who still suffers from his wound, will not be able to reach the Canton of Uri, as the road from Schweitz by Morsack and Jessigen is extremely difficult, and scarcely, if at all, practicable on horseback.

(No. 8.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Glarus: 17th July, 1799.

My Lord,—Before I had visited the little Cantons, I could only have transmitted to your Lordship very imperfect information of the real state of the public mind in Switzerland, and I am sorry to say that what I have since seen and heard during this early part of my journey, renders it more difficult than ever for me to form any opinion on the measures that ought to be adopted for restoring peace and harmony to the country, and makes me foresee difficulties in the execution of my mission that at present I know not how to encounter.

In general I have the highest reason to be satisfied with the spirit as well as the whole conduct of this particular Canton.

On the first success of the Austrians on the Grisons many of the inhabitants retired into the mountains, and forming themselves into little parties on the rear and flank of the Enemy gave such serious alarm to the French generals that they suddenly abandoned the strong position in which they had entrenched their army on the south side of the lake of Wallenstadt (from which it is admitted that they could not have been forced), and thus left the entry of the Canton open to the Austrians.

As soon as the Enemy had retired towards Schweitz and Zurich and the Austrians under Colonel Gavisini (with scarcely three battalions) had entered the Canton (May 22nd), the people of Glarus instantly assembled their militia and sent (May 23) three battalions over the Clarida Alps into what is called the Schackenthal immediately on the rear of the French army then engaged in the Canton of Uri, by which measure they very materially contributed to the retreat of General Lacourbe, who had totally defeated Colonel St. Julien, taken twelve hundred prisoners (being the greater part of the regiment of Niegebauer), and was on the point of reconquering the valley of Urseren and the St. Gothard.

Whilst these battalions (being nearly the whole force) were engaged on the side of the Canton of Uri, the French suddenly re-entered the Canton of Glarus with a very superior force under General Chabran from the lake of Zurich by the road of Lachen and Urnen, threatening to destroy the whole country and exterminate the inhabitants; they had actually passed Neffels, when having imprudently engaged themselves (25th May) in a very narrow defile before they had secured the bridge of that village, they were attacked by Colonel Gavisini in flank from the village of Mollis, and by the Swiss legion under Colonel Roverea in front, and defeated with the loss of six hundred prisoners, and an equal number of killed and wounded, on the very spot on which the Glarnois destroyed the Austrian army in the year 1388.

The few inhabitants capable of bearing arms who had remained in the Canton rendered essential service on this occasion, acting with the Austrian army as chasseurs.

Previous to these events and immediately after the capture of Luciensteig, the French formed a very desperate plan for retaking Coire, turning the Austrians at Wallenstadt, getting possession of the whole of the upper Grisons, and penetrating from thence into the Canton of Uri on the right flank of the Austrian army in that Canton whilst General Lacourbe attacked it in front.

This plan was to have been executed from the Canton of Glarus by two passages over the highest Alps very little frequented, but which your Lordship will find marked in the best maps, one under the name of the Sernfthal which falls upon Flims—the other over the Pantenbruck which leads to Dissentis.

The troops were actually assembled, and there is every reason to believe the enterprize would have succeeded, had not the guides, after a plan concerted at Glarus, misled the columns and conducted them into places on the summit of the Alps where the snow was so deep as to be absolutely impracticable.

Of all these events which do the highest honour to this Canton, the Austrians have given little or no account; on all occasions carefully concealing their losses, and giving as little credit as possible to the services they have received from their allies. Even Colonel Craufurd had heard nothing of the defeat of Colonel St. Julien but from the French papers.

Immediately after the battle of Neffels the Landsgemeine or assembly of the people was holden as it were by common consent, there being no person legally authorized to call it together, the old Government was restored by *acclamation*, the magistrates from the Canton were chosen from among the most respectable persons of the country, the militia was ordered to be formed on its ancient establishment, the contingent of the Canton (four hundred

men) to be sent immediately to the Austrian army, and the Government being without funds, or means of procuring any of any kind whatever, a voluntary subscription was immediately entered into to defray the first expenses of all the necessary establishments.

All those who had *brought about* the Revolution having left the country, the greatest moderation was shown to the persons who had taken a part in it from weakness or ignorance. Those who had had a share in administering the finances of the country had a year given them to make up their accounts—all who had been present at the planting of the tree of liberty were obliged to assist in cutting it down—and the person who had harangued the public on planting it was obliged to pronounce its funeral oration.

I have found in every class of people a strong sense of his Majesty's goodness, an irreconcileable hatred to the French, and a firm determination to contribute to the utmost of their means in driving them out of the country, and if necessary in carrying the war beyond the frontiers.

But when I came to talk with them on what was the most pressing object of my journey, the raising of regular troops, I found them all ready to increase their contingent but unanimously determined not to serve in any other form. The lower order of the people had many prejudices of their own which with a little time and pains might easily be surmounted, but all classes agreed in declaring peremptorily that they would not serve under either General Bachmann* or Colonel Paravicini* unfortunately the only

* These two officers were members of the most ancient and distinguished families of the Canton of Glarus. The former had had a company in the Swiss guard of Louis XVI. with the rank of Major-general; in 1793 he had raised a regiment for the King of Sardinia with the rank of Lieutenant-general. After that monarch was dethroned, General Bachmann entered the service of France, but was shortly after dismissed with disgrace by the French Government; it was on account of his having entered the service of France that he was so unpopular in the Canton of Glarus. On the recommendation of General Hotze and the Avoyer de Steiguer, General Bachmann had been appointed by Colonel Craufurd In-

two persons as yet authorized to raise any new corps in his Majesty's service, and that they would not serve in any manner which could expose them to be inspected or reviewed by the General, who is Inspector-general of the Swiss levies.

In the meantime Colonel Craufurd has agreed to pay the contingent of this Canton on the same footing with the regular troops, and I have advanced the Government the sum of 1,000*l.* as a gratuity from his Majesty to assist them in paying the first expenses of the levy.

It was my intention to have proceeded from hence to the Canton of Uri, but the snow which has fallen these last two nights on the Clarida Alps has rendered them quite impassable on horseback and even dangerous on foot.

I am the more concerned at this disappointment as the presence of his Majesty's Minister in that Canton would be particularly acceptable at this moment, and the French are entirely masters of the lake of Lucerne, so that I have no possible means of reaching Altdorf.

The accounts I receive here of the situation of the whole Canton of Uri are most deplorable. Altdorf with many of the principal villages burned to the ground, and the inhabitants living in the wood—their cattle, their only resource, in a great measure destroyed—not a mouthful of bread in the whole country, and no means whatever of purchasing any—and the flower of their young men destroyed, either in the early part of the war, or in the different actions that took place with the French during General Bellegarde's unsuccessful attempt to drive the enemy from the Engadine.—Even the French themselves

spector-general of the Swiss levies, and also to raise a regiment in the King's service; at this time the levy of his regiment was going on with success, excepting in his own Canton, where he could not raise a man. The unpopularity of Colonel Paravicini, which was extended to his whole family, arose from his father General Paravicini having concluded the treaty with General Schawenburg, in 1798, which the French shamefully violated.

admit that the great road of the St. Gothard presented a picture of desolation, to which even the authors of all this misery were not insensible.

And yet these people have followed in every step the example of Glarus, and have even furnished their contingent without asking for any assistance to enable them to raise it. Colonel Craufurd has since agreed to pay two hundred of their troops, which are acting as chasseurs with the Austrian army, and I shall immediately transmit them 2,000*l.* towards the expenses of the levy.

I have in the meantime purchased for them as a benefaction from his Majesty one hundred sacks of corn, the whole which this Canton can possibly spare, and have lodged them at Linthal at the extremity of this valley, from whence they will be forwarded as soon as the weather will permit. I shall send an equal quantity from Zurich, and will have a provision made for Unterwalden against the moment that the French shall evacuate that Canton, the situation of which I expect to find, if possible, still more deplorable than that of Uri.

The Comte D'Artois to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Edinburgh: 18th July, 1799.

Sir,—I gladly profit by the departure of the Baron de Roll, to tell you of the great satisfaction I feel in seeing the moment come at last, in which, thanks to the interest shown by your Government, I find myself about to serve the united causes of his Britannic Majesty and my brother the King.

You are too well aware of my confidence in the Baron de Roll for it to be necessary for me to add anything here to the verbal messages with which I have charged him for you; I only wish to assure you that in accordance with the opinion which I have formed of the principles of your Government and of your personal character, I have recommended the Baron de Roll, above all things, to maintain an understanding, and act in concert, with you.

This step is one which I propose to follow myself, as soon as I have rejoined you.

You may believe, Sir, that it will be particularly agreeable to me to find myself in uninterrupted relations with you, and to be under great obligations to you.

It is with the same pleasure as ever that I again express to you, Sir, the assurance of the sentiments of high esteem and true affection with which you have inspired me for life.

CHARLES PHILIPPE.

Pray be so kind as to be the bearer of all my sentiments to Mrs. Wickam.

Monsieur WICKAM.

(No. 9.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schweitz: 20th July, 1799.

My Lord,—I arrived here yesterday, and should have passed some days in this Canton, but for the Austrian commander, who has just been with me for the second time to insist on the weakness of this position, and the probability that my presence here will induce the French to make an attack in the course of the night.

I leave the place with great regret, as I find the public mind in a state of agitation, which no one here can possibly remove.

The people to a man are so animated against the French, that the Austrian officers have been obliged to remove the contingent of the Canton from the advanced posts, lest they should fall upon the Enemy, and bring on a general action.

They talk of nothing but going in a mass into France, and revenging on the people of that country all that they have suffered from the Revolution.

They only desire to be commanded by foreigners, being determined not to serve under any Swiss gentleman, considering the whole body as dishonoured. Their contingent

is entirely commanded by peasants, who in the affair which they had with the French, a few days since, according to the testimony of the Austrians, showed as much real ability as courage. They gave no quarter, and they made it their boast, that in the short but bloody war of last year, the French did not make a single prisoner belonging to their Canton, and that they on their part did not spare the life of a single Frenchman. They boast also that one only of their peasants is enrolled in the revolutionary army, and that that man's house has been burned, and his wife and children obliged to quit the country.

On the other hand, the magistrates and ancient families are depressed and discouraged; they have not only entirely lost the public confidence and esteem, but they are become so much the object of hatred to the peasants, that were it not for the presence of the Austrians I am persuaded that many of them would be made an immediate sacrifice to the popular fury.

I have had a numerous deputation of the peasants with me, and have endeavoured, but in vain, to make any impression on them.

They were perfectly mad on the subject of their *gentlemen*. They talked of the British naval victories, of the firmness of his Majesty and his Ministers—and of the whole people of England, and concluded with saying, 'those are *gentlemen*, under the lowest of whom we should be glad to serve—send us only a British sergeant, and we will follow him to Paris. But our gentlemen, by treating with the French, and accepting places under them, have dishonoured themselves and us, and brought the name of a Swiss into lasting disgrace.'

They seemed particularly anxious that their principles of democracy should not be confounded with those of the French, and boasted that there was not a peasant in the Canton that had not in his cottage some testimonial of

the fidelity of himself or his family to some one of the different sovereigns of Europe.

They refused peremptorily to serve under General Bachmann or Colonel Paravicini, or to enter into any regular regiments that should be commanded by officers who had treated with the French or accepted any employment under them, but offered, to a man, to serve in the militia, under their own peasants or under foreign officers.

All that I could obtain from them at last was, they should follow me to Zurich, where I could talk with them more at leisure.

I found them violently angry with General Hotze for having maintained their municipality in place. They call him a peasant of the lake, which amongst them is the most odious of all terms.

The fact is that the General is really the son of a peasant of Richterschwyl, one of the very worst villages on the lake of Zurich, the inhabitants of which fell on the rear of the army of the little Cantons at the moment that they had defeated General Schawenburg, at a place called Schendelagi, where his whole army would have been destroyed but for this diversion.

They complain also of the General's having taken away from them the famous Paul Stiger, the Capucin friar, who always marched at their head on the day of battle, and who commanded the people of Unterwalden the day that Stanz was destroyed.

This man, who is quite adored by the people, entered Schweitz the day it was evacuated by the French, followed by an immense crowd of the inhabitants, rode into the great church dressed in the uniform of the Swiss legion, with a banner in his hand, and harangued the people *from his horse*, saying that all those were traitors to their country, and worse than Frenchmen, who, in times like those, wore shoes and stockings, instead of boots and spurs; alluding in such direct and pointed

terms to the gentlemen of the country, that a general massacre of that class might have been the consequence, if the Austrian officers had not protected them.

For this reason General Hotze ordered him away; nor can I blame the measure in itself, but it was done in an imprudent manner, and has only had the effect of irritating the people the more.

I am sorry to learn that the same animosity against the *gentlemen* prevails, though with less violence, both in the Cantons of Uri and Unterwalden.

In Uri, the people have re-chosen some of their ancient magistrates who had fought at their head, but they consider them only as an honourable exception from the rest of their class.

I have seen and talked with the principal *gentlemen* here, but I find them all so depressed and discouraged that I have had nearly as much difficulty in raising their spirits, and in engaging them to take some steps which their own safety required (such as exposing themselves with their own people at the advanced posts), as I have had in checking the violence of the peasants.

I do not wonder at those who have anything to lose being still alarmed, as the French are in very superior force, within a league of the town, and have it in their power to cut off the communication with General Jellachich whenever they please.

If your Lordship will examine the map of Meyer (the only one in which this country is correctly laid down), you will observe that the great road from the lake of Zurich to Schweitz passes through the villages of Sattel and Stein, along the lower part of the slope of a very steep hill, upon the ridge of which you will observe the village of Steineberg, at only a quarter of a league from Stein. This village the French occupy in force, and have besides their advanced posts half-way down the hill, nearly within musket shot of the road.

I have made no advance to this Canton, because the

municipality is still in place, though under the name of a provisional government, but their contingent receives pay from Colonel Craufurd like the regular troops.

I have the honour, &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

Sir Charles Whitworth to Mr. Wickham.*

St. Petersburg : July 28th, 1799.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge your favour of the 16th ult. from Walnerode, and to congratulate you on your appointment to a post to which you are called from a sense of former services, and where your presence may at this moment be expected to have the most decided effect.

You will on your arrival in Swisserland have already learned from General Korsakoff the orders which he has received from His Imperial Majesty to consult and co-operate with you on all points which concern the common interest. I trust that you will find him perfectly well disposed to give the fullest effect to those instructions; I can take upon myself to say that they are as positive as possible, and that they are founded on the most perfect confidence in your abilities and discretion.

I shall be happy to have the honour of receiving your commands on whatever may be deemed useful to His Majesty's service, and you may depend on my keeping you informed of whatever may be interesting or useful to you to know from hence. In my public capacity I shall be at all times happy to co-operate with you, and I shall be no less anxious on every other occasion to prove to you

* Sir Charles Whitworth, K.B., a very distinguished diplomatist, born 1752, English Minister at St. Petersburgh from 1788 to 1800, afterwards Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and created Earl Whitworth. He married the widow of the third Duke of Dorset, and died, S.P., 1825.

the high and sincere regard with which I have the honour to be,

Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,

CHAS. WHITWORTH.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

(No. 13.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Zurich: August 1, 1799.

Colonel Plunkett has been with me to say, that he had just left the head-quarters, where the Archduke had told him, that General Pichegru was coming here *at H.R.H.'s desire*, and wishing to know my opinion, whether I did not think him a proper man to command the Swiss army.

I asked him whether he was authorized by the Archduke to ask the question? He answered no,—but that he was persuaded, that the appointment would be agreeable to H.R.H., provided the General would consent to act under H.R.H.'s orders, and that he was certain that General Hotze would resign all his pretensions with pleasure in his favour.

He said that the Archduke had shown him a correspondance which he had carried on with the General on the subject of the campaign, and that it was at General Schmidt's desire, who was particularly struck with the General's ideas, that the Archduke had written to hasten the General's arrival.

I gave Colonel Plunkett an evasive answer, but the question certainly deserves much consideration.

I have had a letter from the General, informing me that he was coming here, but of course mentioning nothing of this correspondance with the Archduke, which is quite new to me, though I have been much struck by the warmth with which H.R.H. always spoke to me in his praise.

There certainly are objections to employing him in such a situation, but I think they would be counterbalanced by the advantages that his name and reputation,

as well as his real acknowledged talents, would give, particularly on this frontier.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.*

Vienna: 3rd August, 1799.

My dear Sir,—I arrived here the day before yesterday, and shall deliver my credentials on the 6th inst. I am in the first place to solicit, what I am sure you will readily grant, I mean the advantage of as full and frequent communications from you as you can spare me. On my part, nothing shall be wanting which I think likely to be useful or agreeable to you, and I believe you know my sentiments sufficiently to be easily persuaded of the great comfort and pleasure with which I look to the intercourse which our respective duties will necessarily establish between us.

I trouble you with a letter to Lord Mulgrave.† It is to acquaint him with a change that has taken place here respecting his appointment, since Baron Thugut suggested the propriety of making it. He now wishes that the consultation on military measures should be held here rather than at head-quarters, and that Lord Mulgrave would come to Vienna for that purpose. Lord Henley and I have both written to Lord Grenville on the subject, and I have suggested the propriety of sending instructions to Lord Mulgrave on this new proposal without delay. It must rest in the meanwhile with his Lordship to decide whether to adopt the new arrangement immediately, or wait for fresh orders from England. I am too little acquainted with the precise views entertained at home of his mission to offer any advice; but I cannot refrain from saying, that if he thinks he may with

* Sir Gilbert Elliot, 4th Bart. and 1st Baron Minto, a very distinguished diplomatist, born 1751, English Minister at Vienna from 1799 to 1801, afterwards Governor-General of Bengal, and created Earl of Minto in 1813. Died 1814.

† Henry 3rd Baron Mulgrave (Ireland), created Baron Mulgrave (Great Britain) 1794, and Earl of Mulgrave 1812. A General in the army; died 1831.

propriety come to Vienna, his presence here will afford me the greatest comfort and assistance. There is nobody of whose military and indeed general talents I think so highly, and I confess that feeling myself somewhat raw in every part of the duty on which I am just entering, I am yet more diffident of my own judgment on military questions.

May I beg my best respects to Mrs. Wickham, and that you will believe me ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and truly yours,

MINTO.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

(No. 17.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Winterthur: Wednesday, 14th August, 1799.

My Lord,—General Korsakoff having desired me to meet him at Schaffhausen, I should have arrived there this evening but for an action which took place at daybreak under the walls of Zurich and on General Jellachich's position, the result of which I wished to know before I set out.

Colonel Craufurd, who was in the field the whole time, and who was not returned when I left Zurich, will transmit to your Lordship a detailed account of the affair. I can only state at present what I had the means of observing myself, the Archduke, when I left H.R.H. between one and two o'clock this afternoon, having received no report either from General Hotze or Jellachich.

About five o'clock in the morning the French attacked the whole chain of Austrian outposts before Zurich, from the Limmat to the lake.

It was impossible for some hours, from the thickness of the fog, to see what passed, but it appeared by the firing that the enemy gained ground, some ground particularly on the side of the lake where the Swiss were quartered, and where the firing was for some time very warm.

It was evident, however, that the attack was only a diversion, as, notwithstanding the noise of the firing so very near the town, a heavy cannonade was distinctly heard in the Canton of Schweitz, extending along the whole line from the lake of Zurich to that of Lucerne, which I am sorry to say appeared to me very evidently to advance further and further into the Canton.

About six o'clock I had an opportunity of knowing that the Austrian outposts on the north-west point of their chain had been surprised, that the enemy's hussars had broken through the camp on the plain, and galloped along the high road almost to the gates of Zurich, where they suffered severely, and a captain and twenty men were taken prisoners and brought into the town. With what intention they pushed on so far I cannot conceive, as they were not followed by any strong column of infantry.

They were, however, certainly accompanied by some flying artillery, as three howitzer shells fell close to the gates of the town the moment after the men were taken.

About nine o'clock the fog began to clear up, and from that time the Enemy seemed to retreat on every point, and before twelve they had retired unmolested to their former position.

I am persuaded that this affair must have cost the Austrians at least 300 men in killed and wounded, nor is it possible, from the nature of the attack, that they should not have lost many prisoners.

I judge of the number of the killed and wounded from having observed, during the space of about two hours on the whole that I was at the gates of the town, three wounded officers and between thirty and forty common men brought in, all of them wounded with musket shot. Among the officers was the Prince of Neuwied.

When the action was nearly over I joined the Archduke at a house upon the banks of the Limmat from which he had observed the whole affair. I found H.R.H.

extremely uneasy on account of General Jellachich, whom he considered as in great danger, and much affected by the attack of the camp before Zurich, which he considered, as it really was, a very disgraceful sight for an army such as that which he commands to witness.

There is, besides, no doubt that, if the attack had been serious, the enemy would have surprised and carried the town.

Extract from Mr. Lullin's Recollections.

Meantime skirmishes and affairs of outposts were frequently taking place at the extremity of the position on the left where the Swiss battalion of Roverea had a share and displayed much courage and discipline for such new-raised levies. The inhabitants of Zurich had become familiarized with the presence of a large army, whose discipline and perfect bearing claims particular and most honourable mention; the advanced guard and outposts were under the command of General Baron de Hotze, an octogenarian and most venerable soldier, a native of the very canton of Zurich, who had from an humble beginning, through his bravery and military talents, displayed during the various campaigns where Austrian forces had borne a share for fifty years back, attained an elevated rank and position; the fires of the French bivouacs displayed their long and brilliant lines along the declivities of Mount Albis during the uninterrupted fine summer nights, and no engagements taking place, nothing but balls and amusements were thought of among the gallant officers of the Austrian forces; the usual concomitants of war seemed forgotten, the forms of courtesy were carried so far during this sort of truce, that French musicians were occasionally invited over to complete any deficiency there might

* Charles Lullin, a member of an ancient family of Geneva, who had been placed by Mr. Wickham in the Alien Office, in 1794. He had accompanied Mr. Wickham to Switzerland, and was acting, during leave of absence, as his secretary, and was an eye-witness of most of the events of this campaign up to the 3rd of September, on which day he was sent home with despatches by Mr. Wickham. After serving many years in the Alien Office, he returned to Geneva and exercised a generous hospitality towards the English visitors there; he died in 1856. In November, 1840, Mr. Lullin put on paper his recollections of Mr. Wickham, and from that paper the above extract is taken.

happen to be in the Austrian bands which enlivened the ball-room; the English circle, besides Mr. Wickham's own establishment, consisted of Colonel Craufurd and his two aides-de-camp, Lord Proby and Lieutenant Holland of the guards, the Honourable Colonel Stewart, son of the Earl of Galloway, a most distinguished and most amiable individual; Lord Camelford, a naval officer, whose eccentricities although they sometimes have attained painful notoriety, was then a most cheerful and enlivening companion; these, with two or three distinguished Austrian officers, among whom I must not omit to mention Colonel Plunkett, an Irishman by birth, formed altogether a most agreeable resource, and afforded a diversion to the dismal state of suspense and anxiety which unavoidably prevailed.

An apparently insignificant circumstance will serve to elucidate what I observed above, respecting the footing of courteous civility the Archduke took pleasure in keeping up. Colonel Plunkett, accompanied by a trumpeter and flag of truce, rode up one Saturday morning to the quarters in Zurich occupied by the British legation, and on coming into the rooms—'What do you think I am going to do?' said he: 'Why, I am going to the French outposts on the Albis, to beg they may not be disturbed (de ne pas se deranger) to-morrow morning on hearing a *feu-de-joie*, all along our lines, in celebration of the important news of the taking of Mantua by the allied Austrian and Russian forces—and in case they do not know the event, I am to make it known. I am also commissioned by his Royal Highness to beg your Excellency, and other English here, will attend in his tent to hear the Te Deum and Mass about to be sung on the joyful occasion.' We did attend, and a more splendid sight could hardly be conceived. We drove for several miles along the front of endless battalions and squadrons scattered along the hills wherever the nature of the ground allowed of their being drawn up, and heard beautiful music in the Archduke's tent, at the termination of which the artillery and musketry told their many repeated awful music re-echoed to endless peals by the rocks and mountains of that splendid scenery.

It may be observed, however, and with regret too, that the most favourite table-talk at the Austrian head-quarters was the humorous accounts of the various eccentricities and inconsistencies which Marshall Suworow loved to indulge in on many

public occasions, and many are the harmless and amusing anecdotes one might relate on the subject.

This state of inaction was, however, put an end to some few days after. The night of the 13th to 14th August proved a most boisterous and rainy one, after a succession of beautiful weather. We were roused about five in the morning by the reports of musketry at no great distance, and the increasing noise and bustle of troops retreating into the town, the French having availed themselves of the darkness and cheerless state of the elements to come down the hills, force the first Austrian outposts, and nearly taking possession of the gate of Zurich—a simultaneous attack having also taken place along the same side of the lake; but the alarm once spread, considerable reinforcements were poured through the town, and gradually drove the French back to their former ground. A heavy mist, which had prevailed until about eight o'clock, began to dispel, and enabled us, from rising grounds outside the town, to see the French retreating before the overwhelming force brought up from various posts between the town and the Archduke's head-quarters. It was an impressive sight to behold the waggon loads of wounded passing into the town from the advanced posts, while fresh battalions (Hungarians chiefly) marched out to supply the place of the retreating parties, and after taking up the positions assigned to them for the moment, piling their arms and laying their heads on their knapsacks to resume the slumbers which had been disturbed an hour or two before. The intense interest of the scene kept Mr. Wickham and some of us some time longer, until he decided that, considering the escape we had had that morning, being quartered in a part of the town close adjoining the gate the French had already taken possession of, it would be proper to secure the papers and heavy baggage by removing into the rear. The crowded state of the troops and waggons rendered this measure urgent, and Mrs. Wickham experienced some anxiety and delay in making her way in the travelling carriage through the town, and out at the opposite gate, where the road, after coasting the Limmat a short distance, branched off in two directions—one leading to Klotten, the other to Winterthur—which was the one necessarily adopted. But on passing before the court of a gentleman's seat, whence the view extended over the plains opposite, which the receding mists now bared to our

view, we found it crowded with men on horseback, the Archduke having just arrived with a numerous staff, and stopped for a time in so convenient a situation to see what was going on on the opposite bank, and to judge of the expediency of his proceeding in person to the scene of action.—And here a most interesting occurrence took place. The celebrated General Pichegru had of late resided in retirement at Brunswick, where he had received communications from his Majesty's Government, and had been confidentially sent for to be in the way of lending the powerful assistance of his talents and military experience in the progress of the present campaign, which had begun under such flattering auspices. This eminent individual had arrived over night at Mr. Wickham's quarters, and had hardly retired to his night's rest when the action above mentioned took place. He had accompanied us during our survey of what was going on, and afterwards, being in Mrs. Wickham's carriage, had been recognised, and the circumstance reaching the ears of the Archduke, a message came from H. R. H. to request a conference. They met, and remained an hour in close and earnest conversation, after which we proceeded on our journey, and the Archduke seeing the French retiring to their former positions, repaired to his own quarters too.

. . . . . The Archduke when he stated his objections to attempting the attack on the French position along the Albis, had written to procure a supply of pontoons, which arrived about this time; and partly to yield to Mr. Wickham's solicitations, but chiefly, it was believed at the time, to do something in return for the insult the Austrians had experienced a few days before in the French having forced their outposts and almost taken possession of Zurich, resolved to effect a passage over the Limmat, some distance below the town, and attack the left of the French position. Accordingly that part of the army which was not engaged in the protection of Zurich and the outposts in advance, had orders expeditiously to march to the banks of the river where the intended passage was to take place; a considerable force was there collected, and the pontoons brought in consequence; but, on attempting to form a bridge, the rapidity of the stream bid defiance to all hopes of accomplishing sufficiently safe fastenings. In vain did Lord Camelford (who like the other English made it a point to attend every engagement as an amateur) urge, in the true spirit

of a British sailor, the sacrifice of a few pieces of artillery to be sunk to afford the needful weight for an anchorage, the Austrians grew discouraged, on finding the French, who had had intelligence of the movement, and sent their best riflemen to occupy, though unseen, the opposite embankment, whence they were keeping up a destructive fire, and selecting the officers and engineers who were most conspicuous, while the Austrian artillery were pouring their balls and grapeshot to no purpose but the destruction of a few cottages on the French side, and after much noise and useless waste of ammunition, orders were given to retire, and the attempt was abandoned. The writer was not present, being then engaged in transcribing and making up the dispatches Mr. Wickham had prepared a few days before, to give an account of the French attack of the 14th, the Austrian official returns of which reported no less than 7,000 men as their loss in killed and wounded. But the whole forenoon of that day he could hear from his window at Schaffhausen, not less than eight leagues' distance, the booming and awful sounds from which a different result might well have been expected.

This discouraging failure gave the last blow to Mr. Wickham's hopes, and those of many others equally anxious in the cause, and all eyes and expectations were turned towards the arriving Russian army under General Korsakoff, whose advanced guard was about to reach the Rhine at Schaffhausen. Mr. Wickham repaired thither to give them the welcome, and had the pleasure to meet Colonel (now General) Ramsay and Colonel Clinton, who were invested with official characters, and who announced to him the speedy arrival of Lieutenant-General the Earl of Mulgrave, whom the British Cabinet were sending to the Archduke's head-quarters.

A few days elapsed during which the Russian army gradually arrived, and took up some positions which the Austrians evacuated, and a sort of anticipation began to prevail that the Austrian Cabinet had ordered a retreat instead of a co-operation with the newly arrived auxiliaries. It was known that a French army was preparing to cross the Rhine between Strasburgh and Basle, and on the evening of the day when Lord Mulgrave arrived, and was intending to proceed to the Archduke's head-quarters the following morning, intelligence was brought to Mr. Wickham at Schaffhausen that all the draught

horses, within a certain distance around, had been unexpectedly put in requisition by the Austrian commissariat, and ordered to be in readiness on an extensive piece of ground on the Zurich road at an early hour the following morning. This alarming intelligence induced Mr. Wickham and Lord Mulgrave to set out early, so as to reach that spot at the appointed time; but Captain Forster (Lord Mulgrave's aide-de-camp, who since lost his life in Egypt in the expedition under the command of Sir Ralph Abercrombie), and the writer having had the advantage of a few minutes' earlier rising, arrived on the ground, and beheld immense bodies of Austrian forces on their march extending to the right and left of the roads, among which were to be seen the Archduke's carriages. Not much time was left for deliberation, and during the short interval fresh horses were put to the carriages, baggage waggons, &c. I ventured to address the Archduke, stating that Mr. Wickham was on the road accompanied by the Earl of Mulgrave, whom he was anxious to have the honour of introducing to H. R. H. The Archduke looked grave, angry, and embarrassed, and after expressing, and desiring to be conveyed to Mr. Wickham, his regret that his orders were of such urgent nature as not to admit of any the least delay, beckoned to proceed; but a sign to Captain Forster, who stood at a short distance on a higher bank, whence he had a view of the road behind us, enabled him to telegraph, as it were, to Mr. Wickham and his companion, who were in an open carriage which just then came in sight; they cut across the field at right angles, and had the good fortune to present themselves before H. R. H.'s carriage just in time. We then saw from a distance the Archduke alighting and walking into the grounds of a gentleman's house, accompanied by Mr. Wickham and the Earl. Their interview lasted about half an hour, during which the troops remained still—when the Archduke re-entered his carriage, and the whole mass of troops proceeded on as before. We all went back immediately to Schaffhausen, where Mr. Wickham sat down to write dispatches, wherein was conveyed the intelligence of his unexpected and accidental meeting with the Archduke in full retreat, and of H. R. H. having consented to leave a body of troops amounting to 10,000 or 12,000 men under the command of General Hotze, to co-operate with the Russians....

A very few days elapsed in perfect tranquillity, which we had

reason to observe were not improved to advantage by the newly arrived auxiliaries, in making themselves acquainted with the nature of the country and positions; the officers of the staff remained in idle indifference, the men crowded the public houses, others broke into the vineyards, the produce of which was still unripe, and got the dysentery; in short, their want of discipline affording a sad contrast with the admirable conduct of the Austrians, completed the discouragement of the country occupied, and favoured gloomy anticipations of coming events.

(No. 18.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 15th August, 1799.

My Lord,—In one of my first dispatches I informed your Lordship that the Archduke had assured me that his own army was extremely feeble, and that General Massena had 20,000 infantry more than H.R.H. in Switzerland.

From this assertion I was led to suppose that H.R.H.'s army was really very weak.

Since my return from the little Cantons I have had the means of ascertaining its real force. I have visited the whole, battalion by battalion, and I can venture to assure your Lordship, what you will probably learn with surprise, that H.R.H. has not less than thirty-nine complete battalions of regular infantry and two battalions of Croats between Zurich and Coblentz, a small town at the junction of the Aar and the Rhine.

In this calculation the garrison of Zurich and the troops encamped before the town are not included. H.R.H. has besides under his immediate command a corps on the other side of the Rhine, in the forest towns, and the corps of Generals Jellachich and Bay, consisting of fifteen battalions.

I have not been able to learn the strength of the cavalry with the same accuracy, but H.R.H. himself admitted that it was very superior to that of the enemy.

I cannot obtain any accurate information of the enemy's

force, which has certainly been increased of late, but the highest calculations do not make it exceed 75,000 men from Basle to Geneva.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 19.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 15th August, 1799.

My Lord,—On Monday the 6th inst. I had the honour of a very long conversation with the Archduke on the subject of the Russian army, which H.R.H. assured me had arrived on the frontiers wholly unfurnished with many of those essential articles without which an army cannot possibly act, particularly a commissariat, hospitals, light artillery, and pontoons, and that no magazines whatever had been formed for its subsistence.

H.R.H. then observed that all these wants might be provided for from his own stores and magazines, but that there was another point which he considered as much more serious, meaning the spirit of pillage and plunder that prevailed among the Russian troops in general, of which he said that he had no idea until he had read the official reports on the subject from the army of Italy, which he said were really dreadful; that he was under the most serious apprehensions lest the example should prove fatal to his own army, the discipline of which is at this moment most admirable, and has gained the Austrians the entire affection of the people of this country.

I observed, in answer, that, though I feared there was too much reason to believe that the accounts from Italy were well founded, yet this army had a very different reputation, and that its conduct on the march had been exemplary; which H.R.H. admitted, but remarked at the same time that the troops had been everywhere well fed and taken care of on their march, but that the case would be very different when they came to live on their pay;

and that he was seriously alarmed at an expression of General Korsakoff, who, when he was questioned about his magazines, had answered that his Cossacks would always take care to keep them well furnished.

It should seem from this conversation that, on the 6th inst., H.R.H. had no notion that the Russian troops were intended to form a separate army, though, as I have before mentioned to your Lordship, the Count de Dietrichstein had already given a hint of what was intended to General Hotze.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 20.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 15th August, 1799.

For these last three weeks I have been frequently assured by persons who had the honour of the Austrian army and the personal glory of the Archduke much at heart, that the Archduke's inaction was owing to positive orders from the Court of Vienna, which absolutely forbad any forward movement of the army until the arrival of a person of confidence from Vienna, who would bring with him the final arrangement that would then have been made for the conduct of the campaign.

This language, which your Lordship will observe by no means agrees with that which the Archduke himself had holden to me on my arrival in this country, was probably occasioned by the certainty which those gentlemen had acquired of my having found means at last to inform myself of the real state and strength of the Austrian army. As long as the Archduke's effective force was supposed to be really inferior to that of the enemy, neither the Court nor the Archduke could be blamed for H.R.H.'s inaction, but from the moment it was discovered, as is really the case, that he was considerably superior to Massena, even in infantry, it became necessary for his

reputation that some reason should be assigned for his conduct, and I have been informed of late that the same language has been holden by the whole army, and that it was not only justified, but encouraged, by H.R.H.'s friends.

Whether or no these gentlemen were fully warranted in their assertions I cannot presume to say, but they now again hold another language, and the Court of London is brought forward to cover the irreparable fault which the Archduke was advised to commit in not attacking Massena immediately after the taking of Zurich, and suffering him to retire from his position before that place unmolested, and even unobserved.

On Wednesday the 17th inst. I was informed that the Count de Dietrichstein had arrived the preceding day at Klotten with the plan of the campaign, concerning the nature of which not a word transpired until the Sunday following, the 11th inst., when the Count came to Zurich and called on General Hotze, who the same day went over to the Archduke's head-quarters.

On Monday I called on the General, when to my great surprise I was received with such marked coldness and incivility that, though I was determined not to appear to notice it myself, yet I could not prevent its being observed by the persons who were present.

In the afternoon of the same day Colonel Plunkett waited on me to explain the reasons of this very unaccountable conduct on the part of the General, from whom I had hitherto received every outwark mark of civility and attention.

He began by informing me that the Count de Dietrichstein had brought positive orders to the Archduke not on any account whatever, or *under any circumstances*, to attack the enemy, or to make any forward movement, but to withdraw his army from Switzerland, and *not to leave a single Austrian soldier in the country*, which was immediately to be occupied by the Russians, who, with

30,000 men, reinforced by a column of 12,000 or 15,000 men from Italy, were to take the same positions which the Archduke now defends with an army of 80,000 men *at least*, and that M. de Dietrichstein had expressly informed H.R.H. that his Court was so sensible of the pain this measure would occasion him, that the Emperor would never have consented to it if the Courts of London and Petersburg, and *especially* the first, had not positively insisted on it as the condition on which alone his Imperial Majesty would obtain the assistance of the Russian army, now in the pay of Great Britain.

He then added that the Archduke was determined to obey *literally* the orders he had received, but that he was at the same time mortified and indignant to the last degree, and that all the generals and staff officers to whom M. de Dietrichstein's mission had been communicated in detail partook of the same sentiments, which in the course of a few days would become common to all the officers and soldiers of the army, from whom the cause of their retreat would certainly not be concealed.

Colonel Plunkett then began to point out to me all the fatal consequences of the measure, which, as they were all repeated to me by the Archduke, I shall mention to your Lordship in another part of this dispatch.

Amongst them, I could not help observing that he dwelt with particular satisfaction on the disorders that he said would be committed in Switzerland by the Russian army, and the results that such conduct would probably occasion in different parts of the country.

I did not think it became me to enter into any explanation on the subject with Colonel Plunkett, but determined to see the Archduke immediately. On Tuesday it was not in my power, General Korsakoff having been engaged in conferences at Klotten the whole day, but yesterday I had the honour of a long conversation with H.R.H., whom I found on my way to Klotten, in a

private house, of which he had taken possession to observe the affair before Zurich.

H.R.H. received me at first in a manner that was as unusual as it was unpleasant, but after I had talked with him some time on the subject of the action, and given him some details that I had observed at Zurich, his coolness wore off, and he took me aside and began himself to speak on the subject of the orders he had received from the Court of Vienna.

He told me that they were so positive and explicit that it was impossible for him not to comply with them without being guilty of direct disobedience to the orders of the Emperor. He was aware, he said, that I was about to observe that circumstances had happened which rendered the execution of those orders inexpedient, and even highly dangerous, particularly that the defence of the Rhine and of Swabia would be impossible if the Russians were defeated in Switzerland, and even that Italy might be again in danger; adding that he should not have hesitated, as he had frequently done before in similar cases, to have acted according to these new circumstances, *if the orders which he had received had been purely of a military nature*, but that it was expressly stated to him that this new destination of his army was founded *entirely on political expediency*, of the nature of which he had not been informed; so that, when meaning to do the greatest good according to his plain way of seeing the thing, he might possibly ruin all the political combinations of his own Court and those of the other great powers engaged in the war.

H.R.H. then dwelt on the state of the Russian army, repeating to me the observations which your Lordship will find detailed in my No. 19, and entering at large into the nature of the war in Switzerland, and all the difficulties which it presented; adding how utterly impossible it was that an army so ill-provided with everything, and particularly with the articles most essentially necessary

for a campaign in that country, could maintain itself in the position which he now occupied, much less attempt to advance into the inner parts of Switzerland. H.R.H. then pointed out many of the local difficulties, and dwelt particularly on the passage of the Limmat, the Reuss (?), and the Aar, each of which rivers the want of pontoons in the Russian army would render successively an effectual barrier to the French, and enable them to detach either to Italy or to Alsace with safety. He then dwelt on the situation of the inhabitants of the country, whether the French or the Russians should succeed, and concluded by expressing his astonishment that the Court of London, which must have been acquainted with the nature and circumstances of this country, could ever have formed so wild and rash a project.

As I found H.R.H. so firm, not to say violent, in his language, I knew that it would be useless to attempt to divert him from his resolution, and having at least five or six days before me (during which time it would be impossible for H.R.H. to make his retreat), I determined to proceed to this place, have a full conversation with M. de Korsakoff, and then return to Klotten, and endeavour to make H.R.H. feel the necessity of making a forward movement, were it only for his own honour and reputation.

I was the more inclined to take this step because I had the hope of finding Lord Mulgrave here, and of learning from his Lordship the real plan of the campaign, and being favoured with his advice and assistance, of which I stand in the utmost need. Besides, in point of fact, I not only have no mission to the Archduke, and consequently no right to speak to H.R.H. on such subjects, but the Austrian officers have taken care to let me understand that such is the light in which they consider my situation, my mission, as they say, never having been announced to them officially from Vienna; and your Lordship will have learnt before this reaches you that Lord Mulgrave him-

self will not be received in any public character here. I have, however, some reason to hope and believe that I did not leave the Archduke without having made some impression on his mind.

Far from attempting to contradict H.R.H., the more he deplored the evils that would follow this measure the more I lamented them, more particularly so on account of H.R.H. personally, and I exaggerated as much as possible the fatal consequences by which they would be followed, from the effects of some of which, I observed, that even H.R.H.'s great name and military reputation could not possibly preserve him. I only answered, with respect to the Court of London, that H.R.H., on a little further consideration, must be sensible that his Majesty's Government would have had no share in so wild, extravagant, and weak a plan as I admitted this to be, adding that I knew nothing myself of the real projects that had been formed for the campaign, but that I was certain, in the first instance, that whatever those projects might have been, it was never intended that they should not have been subject to circumstances, and that if the Courts of Petersburg and London had determined to keep the Russian army together, and to make it act on the left of H.R.H., they must always have supposed an army sufficiently strong and *furnished with everything necessary for such an undertaking*; they must have supposed, besides, judging from the first appearance of the campaign, that H.R.H.'s army would long before this have been masters of nearly the whole of Switzerland, and that General Hotze would have remained in Switzerland with a small corps of Austrians to have assisted in the levy and formation of the Swiss corps; that the situation of the country would have permitted before this time an effective Swiss force to have been levied, and that the re-establishment of the ancient Governments would have given us the assistance of the militia and of the landsturm. I added,

that I had been informed by Colonel Ramsay* that the Court of Vienna had promised to furnish the Russians on their arrival on these frontiers with everything they should want, but that, whether Colonel Ramsay had been rightly informed or no, the Court of Vienna could not have been ignorant of the real state of the army from the first beginning of its march through the Austrian frontiers, during the whole of which it had been accompanied by Austrian officers, and that H.R.H. himself had been informed now more than a month of the different objects of which it stood in need.

This communication was carried on for half an hour in a room in which were several other persons, who were attentive to all that passed, and who observed that H.R.H. spoke with unusual earnestness, and seemed much affected, and he took leave of me in a manner very different from that with which he had at first received me.

On my arrival here to-day I found M. de Korsakoff waiting for me with great impatience, having received a message from the Archduke to proceed *immediately* to Klotten upon an affair of considerable importance.

I had therefore scarcely time to see him for a quarter of an hour, during which time I learnt from him that the Archduke had holden to *him* nearly the same language which he had holden to *me*; that he had made the strongest remonstrances to H.R.H. on the subject, but all in vain; that he had offered either to attack with the Russians, provided the Archduke would remain and support him, or to give H.R.H. all the honour and glory of the enterprise, and that he, with his Russians, would act as a corps de réserve.

He said, however, that he had made no impression whatever, and all he had learnt at Klotten was, 'that the Archduke was a mere child in leading strings, and the

* Colonel, afterwards General, John Ramsay succeeded Colonel Craufurd as Commissary and Inspector-general of Swiss levies. He died in 1845.

Count de Dietrichstein a false, intriguing scoundrel' (coquin).

The remainder of the short time I passed with him was employed in endeavouring to calm him, and in entreating that he would take into consideration the Archduke's personal situation, and particularly the presence of M. de Dietrichstein, without whose authority H.R.H. could not act, and make every possible allowance for all that H.R.H. must suffer from this mortifying circumstance. He promised to make every sacrifice in his power of his own personal feelings; but that he owed it to himself, to his Sovereign, and to his brave troops, to oblige the Archduke to commit himself in such a manner, as that the honour of the Russian army should be preserved by H.R.H.'s direct refusal to act in either of the above cases, and that he would insist on receiving that refusal in writing; he said that he should then take the position of the Limmat (abandoning the Cantons of Schweitz and Glarus, which could not possibly be defended with so small a force), and then wait the worst, satisfied with having done his duty to the utmost of his means. What these means are Colonel Ramsay will explain to your Lordship. They are certainly wholly inadequate to the enterprise.

I asked both the Archduke and M. de Korsakoff whether it did not enter into the plan, that a part of the army of Italy should take the place of General Bay and Jellachich, and whether arrangements to that effect had not been made. The Archduke answered me in a doubtful manner on that point, saying that certainly some troops were to come from Italy, but he did not know how many, nor when they would march, and that his orders related only to the army of M. de Korsakoff, for which he must *immediately* make room. M. de Korsakoff himself said that he had heard nothing of any such arrangement.

It is unnecessary for me to say to your Lordship, that

the Austrians are perfectly right when they assert that M. de Korsakoff cannot possibly advance with his present force, wanting (as they say, and as Colonel Ramsay confirms to me) both light artillery, pontoons, magazines of every kind, and hospitals, and that it is equally impossible for that General alone to maintain himself on the Limmat. Your Lordship will also not fail to observe that M. de Korsakoff's notion of being able to defend the Limmat without the Cantons of Schweitz and Glarus is a very mistaken one, there being no point on which his left can rest; neither in fact would his line be shortened if he abandoned those Cantons, because it must extend along the whole lake of Zurich, and from thence to the extremity of the lake of Wallenstadt, before it could find any support at all, from the nature of the country.

In that case the line from Rapperschwyl to Wallenstadt would be full as long as that from the same place to Brunnen, and the Canton of Uri must be in both cases defended by a separate corps, as without the possession of that Canton no army could ever venture either to advance in the south-west of Switzerland, or to maintain itself anywhere in the north-east but by very superior numbers.

But even if (as I presume to be the real plan) a column of the Russian army from Italy is to enter the Canton of Uri, and leaving a sufficient force for the protection of that Canton, proceed from thence to Schweitz, this column must be very strong, certainly not less than 20,000 men, and even then it cannot remain there with any safety; for until M. de Korsakoff's army on the Limmat shall be provided with pontoons, General Massena has nothing to do but to destroy the bridge of Zurich (which it is admitted that he may do at any time), and he will have his whole army at liberty to march in a mass against the Canton of Schweitz, the position of which is so very extensive, that General Jellachich, with fifteen strong battalions and the contingents of the Cantons, owes

his safety only to the offensive position of the Archduke, who would throw bridges over the Limmat, and fall on the rear of the French the moment they should march in force towards Schweitz.

On the other hand, General Massena might at any time pass the Limmat (of the passage of which river he is master in three different places), and fall with his whole force on M. de Korsakoff, who could not possibly be supported in less than two days by the corps from the Canton of Schweitz.

I forbear to say anything of the dreadful consequences that will follow this premature retreat of the Archduke, when considered with respect to Switzerland itself. They will all, I am sure, be but too obvious to your Lordship.

How they are to be avoided is more than I can at present presume to say. I am not without a hope, from the temper in which I left the Archduke yesterday, that M. de Korsakoff may make some impression on him today. It is possible also that General Jellachich may have been so beaten as to oblige H.R.H. to make an attack on the main army of the French as the only means of saving that General and his corps from destruction.

I most earnestly hope that this may be the case, as I am entirely persuaded that nothing is to be obtained from the Court of Vienna.

The same mischievous counsels that have ruined the fairest hopes of Europe on so many other occasions are but too visible here, and from many concurrent circumstances I have reason to fear that all the fatal consequences that must necessarily follow the Archduke's premature retreat have been foreseen, and the whole mischief premeditated and contrived at that Court.

My reasons for forming this opinion I will have the honour of stating to your Lordship in detail on another occasion; at present I will only venture to remind your Lordship that during the whole course of my former mission, no measure tending either to give honour, sta-

bility, or security to Switzerland, or to bring forward any of the French Princes, or to restore royalty in France *in the person of the lawful claimant to the crown*, was ever proposed by his Majesty's Government to the Court of Vienna, that was not received with a certain quantity of fair words, and afterwards effectually counteracted, at the risk of committing the dearest interests of the House of Austria. I shall write to Lord Minto immediately on the subject of this dispatch; M. de Korsakoff will write at the same time to the Russian Minister, and I trust that between them they will find means of obliging the Austrian Minister either to furnish the Russian army with what is necessary for the great purposes for which it is destined, or to leave the Archduke in Switzerland till it shall be provided with these articles from some other quarter.

In the meantime nothing shall be neglected here that can persuade or force H.R.H. to maintain his position, notwithstanding M. de Dietrichstein.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 21.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 16th August, 1799.

My Lord,—In the course of last night M. de Korsakoff, who remained at Klotten, sent orders to all the Russians within reach of this place, about 7,000 men, to march after him to Eglisau, and this evening we learn, that in consequence of General Jellachich's defeat, which appears to have been total, the Archduke, as the only means of saving the rest of his corps from destruction, will pass the Aar between the Limmat and the Rhine in the course of this night, and fall on the rear of the enemy.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Private.) Schaffhausen: 17th Aug., 1799, 5 A.M.

My Dear Lord,—I know not how to thank your Lordship sufficiently for your two kind letters.

The enclosed will show your Lordship how I have been occupied and tormented of late, and I hope will sufficiently explain if not excuse my silence.

The cannon has been roaring on the side of the Aar ever since I woke this morning *i.e.* since three o'clock; how early it began I know not, but as the sound retires further from us and is at the same time much less frequent, I have no doubt but that the passage is effected.

It is to Moreau alone that we owe this enterprise, one of the greatest unquestionably of the whole war.

I leave to your Lordship's discretion to make what use you think proper of the enclosed dispatches.

It is only important that it should not be known at Vienna that the Archduke ever talks to me in confidence. I particularly wish you would burn the Drafts when you shall have read them.

I am setting out this instant for the Aar, from whence I have no doubt you will soon receive good tidings. I cannot however conclude without repeating to your Lordship my thanks for your very kind letters, and without assuring you of my anxious desire to merit a continuation of the friendship with which you have hitherto honoured me.

Mrs. Wickham desires to join with me in best compliments to your Lordship, and I remain with the highest regard, &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

P.S.—I have the last Cyphers with me, but I can seldom use them, as I dare not bring them near the Enemy.

Mr. Wickham to Field Marshal Suworow.*

(Translation.) Confidential. Zurich: 22nd August, 1799.

Monsieur le Maréchal,—The events which are taking place in this country are so extraordinary and so heart-rending, that I should consider I was wanting in duty if I did not inform your Excellency of them myself.

You cannot be ignorant that since the 6th of June to the 15th of this month, one of the finest armies that the House of Austria ever equipped for the field, commanded by the Archduke Charles in person, has remained within its lines at this place from whence I have the honour to write to your Excellency, without undertaking anything against the enemy's position. Your Excellency must even have heard with distress, if not with surprise, that on the 15th of this month, in sight of forty-six powerful battalions encamped between Zurich and the Rhine, the enemy has detached a very considerable force on our left, forced all the Austrian army into the little Cantons, and cut off all the communications with Italy, penetrated into the Grisons, where he maintains himself, and has even made himself master of the important and almost impregnable position of Mount St. Gothard.

The very day that this deplorable event happened, and while it was in part going on under our eyes, I hear for the first time, and from the Archduke's own mouth, that H.R.H. had just received positive orders to retire with his army from Switzerland, and not to leave a single Austrian in the country, the positions of which he was to leave to M. de Korsakoff. H.R.H. further assured me that he was resolved to obey literally and immediately the orders he had received.

I vainly represented 'that any plan whatever of a

* Memorandum endorsed on this despatch: 'This is the original letter returned to me by one of Marshall Suworow's Austrian staff officers *lest it should fall into the hands of the Austrian Cabinet.*— W. W.'

campaign ought to be made subordinate to the events of war, and that in demanding that the army of M. de Korsakoff should rest on that commanded by your Excellency, the Courts of Petersburg and London had always supposed that it would be strong enough to be able to act independently of all foreign aid, and that it would be provided with everything necessary to make war in a country intersected by high mountains and great rivers, which does not produce nearly enough to feed its own inhabitants.'

I reminded H.R.H., though without effect, 'that M. de Korsakoff not being able to maintain himself in Switzerland with 33,000,* the Austrian army would be obliged for that very reason to abandon the Rhine, and that the enemy would not fail to profit by this state of things to penetrate into the Tyrol, take the Milanese and Piedmont from the rear, check your army in its victorious career, and endanger the conquests which your Excellency has made for the House of Austria.'

M. de Korsakoff's representations being as fruitless as my own, all was made ready for the evacuation of Switzerland, when H.R.H., feeling all the danger of his position, and the terrible responsibility which weighed upon him, takes upon himself to check the enemy, preparations are made at once, the Russians make an almost incredible march to join the Austrians; but all ends in a fruitless attempt to establish a bridge over the Aar, the details of which affair your Excellency will, doubtless, hear from M. de Korsakoff or the Count de Tolstoi.

Affairs going from bad to worse in the little Cantons and the Grisons, a new attack on the Limmat was contemplated, when, to my very great astonishment, the Archduke sent me word, by a person of confidence, that the orders your Excellency had sent to M. de Korsakoff to send 10,000 more men into Italy had made any action on

* Only 28,000 Russians entered Switzerland under Korsakoff.—W.W.

the part of the Austrian army impossible, and that he was preparing to retire into Germany, throwing a force into the Tyrol capable of holding the passes, and leaving M. de Korsakoff with his 23,000 men to do what circumstances permitted in Switzerland.

To have put before H.R.H. a statement of his own forces would have been to make the most severe censure of his previous conduct, which it did not in any wise become me to do. I could, therefore, only deplore the fatal resolution which H.R.H. had taken.

I was urged later to make some attempt, in the *name of my Court*, to stop, or at least delay the departure of the Russian column which your Excellency had ordered; to which I answered, plainly enough, 'that being absolutely ignorant of the last arrangements of the two Courts, I could not venture to do anything of the kind, being besides inwardly certain that H.M. the Emperor of all the Russias would wish to do nothing contrary to his engagements, and that your Excellency would never have taken such a step without the sanction of his Sovereign.' But, alarmed at the terrible results which the retreat of the Austrians would bring, as well upon themselves, and on the unfortunate country in which I now am, as on the whole of Europe, and specially on the two august Sovereigns whom we have the honour to serve; knowing, moreover, the Austrians well enough to believe them capable of keeping their word and retiring in good earnest, I took upon myself to exhort M. de Korsakoff most strongly to make the reinforcement for your Excellency march as near as possible to Mount St. Gothard, where, while satisfying the demands of the Austrians, and thus depriving them of any pretext for retiring, he would be at hand to support the operations of H.R.H. in the little Cantons, to march direct to your Excellency by that mountain (the shortest way) in case of success, and to pass by the valley of the Rhine to the Lake of Como, if the

Austrians, after all their promises, refused to resume the offensive.

M. de Korsakoff finding this measure far preferable to the one he had at first thought he ought to take—viz., for his troops to make the *détour* of the Tyrol, I insisted to the Archduke, in the name of my Court, as an express condition, not only that H.R.H should attack the enemy at once, but also that he should attack with all his force; should force him from his position, pursue him in the event of success, and not desist till at least the first great passes into Italy, particularly that of the St. Gothard, were entirely free.

Such is the state of things here, where I am without any other means of fulfilling the orders of *my* Sovereign than abundance of zeal and good will. You, Monsieur le Maréchal, are fortunate to have in your hands the means of carrying *your* Sovereign's will into effect.

I need not point out to your Excellency how grievous will be our position if the Austrians fail to keep their word. I content myself with soliciting the honour of your counsels and orders, in case I can contribute anything by my feeble efforts to a better state of things.

I have the honour to be with all respect, Monsieur le Maréchal, your Excellency's very obedient and humble Servant,

WM. WICKHAM,
Minister Plenipotentiary of H.B.M. in Switzerland.

To His Excellency M. LE COMTE DE SUWOROW, &c., &c., &c.

Extract from a letter written by Mr. Wickham in 1838.

Whatever may have been its [*i.e.*, Mr. Wickham's dispatch to Marshal Suworow, of August 22, 1799,] importance, it is now only of value as setting right the purposely obscured history of the Archduke's retreat, and the part that we took in that transaction—a part that has been grossly and foully misrepresented; the gross lie of the Austrian Cabinet on that subject having been greedily seized and adopted by the French, and spread by them through various channels, till it has at last taken its place

as a matter of uncontroverted and supposed uncontrovertible history. There can be no doubt that a great part of the deep interest which Soult took in my two dispatches of the 9th and 10th September, arose from his extreme surprise at the uncompromising nature of my denunciation on the head of the advisers of that measure, and the consequences to which it led, in direct opposition to his received and fixed opinions on the subject of near forty years' standing. I am now sorry that I did not show him also this dispatch of the 22nd August.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 24th Aug., 1799.
(Received 29th Aug., 6 A.M.)

My Dear Sir,—I received your letter of the 17th with enclosures, yesterday at seven in the morning, your messenger having been but four days and a half on the road. I cannot sufficiently thank you for all the information the copies of your dispatches to Lord Grenville have afforded me. I feel more than ever the great importance of a frequent and confidential communication with you, for there are few points that either you may treat of separately at head quarters, or I at Vienna, the discussion of which will not be repeated with the other, and I feel extremely anxious that I should not by any possibility be counteracting you, or exposing our Government to the reproach of inconsistency. Another motive for this intercourse is the impossibility of my obtaining just views of anything in your quarter by other means, my only other source of information being M. de Thugut himself; and although I do not find him backward in giving me any information I desire, and I am unwilling to say or even suspect that he would change the *body* of the facts themselves, yet I know he uses his discretion as to the *colour*, which is, however, often as material towards a knowledge of the truth as the outline itself can be. He is certainly a great master of *colouring*, and there is the less wonder as he is perpetually exercising that talent. It is very observable in the representation he has

made to the Arch Duke of his motives for withdrawing him from Switzerland as soon as Korsikow's corps should arrive, by ascribing that measure to the positive demand of our Court. There is a small portion of truth at the bottom of this falsehood, for the plan of confiding Switzerland and the operations beyond Switzerland to the Russian army was undoubtedly conceived in London and pressed on this Court. But this plan was approved of on the supposition of the Russian force being such as to undertake separately the service in Switzerland with at least a possibility of success; in the next place that the Arch Duke's army should remain on their right on the upper Rhine, for the purpose of co-operating with the Russians when they advanced into France, and also of affording assistance in Switzerland itself if it should come to be wanted. Nothing could be less like the truth than the colour given to this transaction by M. de Thugut, that England insisted on the Arch Duke's evacuating Switzerland on the arrival of the Russians at all events and in all circumstances, and especially in the present circumstances; and yet more with a view as was but lately intended of marching the Arch Duke's army down to Mayence. The misrepresentation in the present instance approaches nearer to direct falsehood, as of late it has been directly contrary to the fact. You will see from the enclosed extract of my dispatch to Lord Grenville that the principal object of my *first* conference was to deprecate in the King's name the *perverse* execution of this plan in circumstances which rendered it so prejudicial, and to press for the *continuance of the Arch Duke in Switzerland* for the purpose of completing the deliverance of that country with the assistance of Korsikow. I am indeed happy to find that I was precisely seconding at Vienna all you was doing at Zurich. You will observe the reasons which led me to despair of success in this negotiation, and to say the truth, although I never once saw M. de Thugut without returning to the charge, and although he gave me, some

little time before the reverses which have lately been experienced in Switzerland, hopes of a more favourable disposition; and I may *now* acquaint you with a total adoption, for the present, of all we have been recommending, yet I must take no other merit than that of diligence and zeal, and I must acknowledge that I ascribe the change altogether to the nature of the late events, and to the negotiation of *Moreau* rather than to yours or mine. On the receipt of your dispatches I sent to the Russian Ambassador to desire to see him. I proposed to make a joint application to M. de Thugut, pressing him in the strongest terms, and on the strength of the late events, to obtain the Emperor's orders first for the Arch Duke's remaining in Switzerland in order to restore affairs in that country to the same state in which they were before the irruption of the Enemy into the Canton of Schweitz, and until the custody of what was already recovered, and the future operations for the entire expulsion of the French from the remainder of Switzerland might be committed, with real safety and with real advantage to the service, into other hands. In the next place, that directions should be given to supply the Russian army with the various articles of which they appear to be in want, so far as it is possible to do so, on the assurance that the Emperor of Russia will replace them, or account for their value.—The Comte de Rosamonsky entered perfectly into my views, and promised to support me in these demands, but thought it best to go separately instead of asking for a joint conference.—I was not appointed till late in the evening, which has prevented my dispatching your messenger till this morning. I found still worse news than you had sent me—M. de Thugut had received by Estaffette accounts of the Enemy having already penetrated into the Grisons, and caused considerable alarm in the Tirol—My negotiation on the first point was therefore not difficult. M. de Thugut gave me immediately the assurance, that orders would be sent without delay to the Arch Duke to

remain in Switzerland, and to take any measure that was necessary for retrieving the late disasters. In the next place, on my pressing him strongly and on a pretty full debate on the subject, he also promised that the Arch Duke should remain in that country until he could place it safely in the hands of the Russians, and that when he should retire from Switzerland, he should remain on the upper Rhine for the purpose of co-operation as formerly settled. But he desired very earnestly that I might not acquaint you with this last part of the arrangement—I mean the Arch Duke's remaining eventually in Switzerland to act with the Russian troops for a time, that is to say till they are in sufficient force for the service, and afterwards on the upper Rhine; as he was apprehensive of the Arch Duke's taking offence if he should learn these dispositions from any other quarter before they were communicated to him by the Emperor. I know, however, that with this caution I may safely confide the whole to you, observing only that it would be very prejudicial to the frankness of M. Thugut's communications with me, if it should appear that the matter has been disclosed contrary to his intention. The orders will be dispatched in a day or two at furthest.—With regard to furnishing pontoons and other articles to the Russian army, the answer was general, that they had little to spare, but they would do what they could. It is indeed the only answer that could be expected. He then expressed the greatest impatience for the speedy arrival of the Russian troops from Italy in Switzerland, as a measure absolutely necessary for preventing the greatest misfortunes, and I confess I feel the same wish on that subject. If any difficulty should arise on the part of Suwarow, and you should have an opportunity to throw in some support to this measure, I hope you will see no objection to doing so. I have presented a *note* to that effect; and the Emperor's orders must have been received by F. M. Suwarow ere now. —I think I can perceive some uneasiness in M. de Thugut

respecting the manner in which Suwarow may receive these orders, especially in the present career of victory. But in truth, though the Russian troops ought to march without a moment's delay, I should see no inconvenience in Suwarow himself remaining a week or two longer in Italy, since the Arch Duke is in Switzerland, as well as M. de Korsikow.

You will now be surprised to learn another change respecting Lord Mulgrave. I had never missed an opportunity of touching on this ungracious subject, and I renewed my instances last night, on the ground of the alteration made in the plan with respect to the Arch Duke's army. I represented that by the continuance of the Austrian army in Switzerland, and the arrival of the Russians, the very case existed which had at first suggested the propriety of military consultation and concert. I also dwelt with perfect sincerity on the inestimable advantage that might be expected from the intervention of a person of Lord Mulgrave's conciliating character and talents, in those differences which experience has taught us to expect between troops and commanders of different nations. I also remarked very strongly on the levity of this whole proceeding, and expressed my apprehension of the serious offence it might naturally give to His Majesty and his Government. I found M. de Thugut disposed to give way, and I am now authorized to say that Lord Mulgrave will be received with great pleasure, and that instructions will be sent to the Arch Duke to recognize his Lordship's publick character, and to consult and communicate confidentially with him on the operations of the armies under his command. The only qualification given to this measure now is that the subject of consultation shall be the operation of the troops in the field, and not the general plan of the campaign,—a point which the Emperor invariably reserves to his military council at Vienna.

May I beg you take every means in your power to forward a copy of this part of my letter to Lord Mulgrave,

as I am totally at a loss where to look for him, and am unwilling to detain your messenger longer, to write a separate letter to his Lordship.

I am most sensible of the kindness with which you are so good as to write to me, and I can safely say that I shall ever return you full measure of affection and regard. Believe me ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and truly yours, MINTO.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

(No. 22.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: Saturday, 24th August, 1799.

My Lord,—On the morning of Saturday last I wrote to your Lordship a hasty letter from Eglisau to say that the Austrians had not been able to throw a bridge over the Aar.

The failure of that attempt, and the successes of the enemy in the little Cantons (of which Colonel Craufurd will communicate to your Lordship the particulars) have given rise to the very important negotiation which I am about to state to your Lordship.

On the evening of the 17th instant, the Archduke returned to Klotten, having determined before he left the banks of the Aar to abandon altogether the attempt to force the passage of that river.

H.R.H. received at the same time the disastrous intelligence that the attack of the 14th had extended quite to the Valais, where the enemy had defeated, and almost entirely destroyed, the corps of Colonel Strauch—that the Austrians had been driven from the whole Canton of Uri—that the enemy had established himself on Mount St. Gothard, and even penetrated into the Grisons; and that General Simpchon, who had retired towards Coire, entertained the most serious apprehensions for that place, and even for Feldkirch.

On Sunday, the 18th August, General Hotze was detached with nine battalions to the little Cantons, and the

resolution was taken to make another attack, or at least a powerful diversion with the main army upon the Limmat. In the course of the Sunday General Korsakoff received a positive order from Field-Marshall Suworow in the name of the Emperor to detach to Italy immediately, and by the shortest road, some of the very finest regiments in the Russian army, making in the whole a corps of rather more than 10,000 men, which would have reduced his effective force to 20,000 rank and file. This order was at the same time communicated to the Archduke by Field-Marshall Suworow in a short letter expressed in terms which were considered at head-quarters as very disrespectful to H.R.H.

On the evening of Monday the 19th, Colonel Plunkett called on me with a message from the Archduke, by whom he was charged to state to me the above particulars, and to add that, under the present circumstances, particularly with the enemy at the gates of Coire and threatening even Feldkirch, he should feel himself under the necessity of retiring immediately towards the Leck, after throwing a strong force into the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, unless M. de Korsakoff would take upon himself to detain the 10,000 men which Marshall Suworow had demanded; that he had endeavoured in vain to persuade M. de Korsakoff to adopt this measure, and that he saw no means whatever of saving Switzerland unless Colonel Ramsay and myself would take upon ourselves to remonstrate in the name of our Court against Marshall Suworow's order, which H.R.H. considered as contrary to the subsidiary treaty which had been lately executed by the Courts of London and Petersburg.

I immediately dispatched an answer by Colonel Plunkett in nearly the following terms, which he transmitted to Klotten the same night.

I observed, 'that neither Colonel Ramsay nor myself could venture to remonstrate against Marshall Suworow's order, because, though it was expressly stipulated that

the troops furnished by Russia according to the subsidiary treaty should be at his Majesty's disposal, yet we could not take upon ourselves to say what were the latest engagements entered into between the two Courts, and being without instructions in that respect, it was natural for us to conclude that the Court of Petersburg would not have given to M. de Suworow the power to dispose of the whole or any part of the subsidiary army without the consent of the Court of London; but that, penetrated with the extreme danger of the present crisis, and fully aware of the fatal consequences that must ensue were Switzerland to be evacuated, we should not hesitate to use our utmost influence in engaging M. de Korsakoff to retain the 10,000 men, *provided that H.R.H. would solemnly engage that he would immediately make a general attack on the enemy, and not desist until he had opened the passages into Italy*, and that this engagement should be made the condition on which alone M. de Korsakoff should be asked to take upon himself to disobey Marshall Suworow's order.'

On Tuesday morning, after having communicated the above conversation to Colonel Ramsay, to whom M. de Korsakoff had *never mentioned the order he had received from M. de Suworow*, I called on M. de Korsakoff at Seebach, where I was informed that he was gone to the Archduke's. I immediately followed him to Klotten, and found him, together with the Count de Tolstoi (the Russian officer appointed to reside at the Austrian head-quarters), coming out of H.R.H.'s apartments. I walked with them for near an hour in the village, where they informed me of everything that had passed between them and the Archduke on the subject of the proposed plan of attack, of which they complained with great reason, inasmuch as it was proposed to them to attack *with the Russians only* the position before Zurich, which the Austrians themselves have hitherto taken pains to represent as quite impregnable, but neither of them having during

that whole time thought proper to say a single word of the order which had been transmitted to them by M. de Suworow, I determined to see the Archduke before I mentioned it to either of them myself.

I accordingly waited on H.R.H., who expressed himself much satisfied with the answer he had received from Colonel Plunkett, and assured me, in the most clear and positive manner, that he had no difficulty whatever in engaging to make a general attack on the enemy with his whole force, and to follow up his advantage, in case of success, until the enemy should be driven out of Switzerland, provided M. de Korsakoff would retain his 10,000 men; but that he had found him perfectly unmanageable—that he trembled when the thing was named to him, and looked as if he thought the certain consequence of his disobedience would be a journey to Siberia.

H.R.H. then pressed me to follow M. de Korsakoff home, and not to leave him until I had carried my point; adding that, if it was required, he would make the demand himself in writing in such strong terms as must completely justify the measure to the Court of Petersburg as well as to M. de Suworow, and that he authorized me to make this offer in his name to M. de Korsakoff.

In the meantime Colonel Ramsay, having found the General alone, had mentioned the subject to him, and had entirely succeeded, though not without difficulty, in engaging him to retain the 10,000 men *until the nearest passage into Italy should be opened*, upon the condition above mentioned, with this additional one, that I should myself write to Marshall Suworow to explain the situation of affairs here, and show the absolute necessity of the measure.

I readily agreed to this condition, and I have the honour to send your Lordship inclosed the copy of my letter. It was not an easy matter to justify M. de Korsakoff without admitting the right of the Court of Petersburg to employ the subsidiary troops wherever it pleased.

I trust, however, that your Lordship will be of opinion that my letter contains no assumption of that kind, and that the passage marked is a sufficient protest against the measure that the Marshall has thought proper to adopt. I have at the same time written to Sir Charles Whitworth, at M. de Korsakoff's particular request.

In consequence of the mutual engagements thus entered into by H.R.H. and M. de Korsakoff, a plan of operations against the enemy has been concerted, and will probably be put in execution on Monday or Tuesday.

I return to Zurich to-morrow, and will not fail to send off a messenger to your Lordship with the result of the attack as soon as it shall have taken place.

I most humbly hope his Majesty will not disapprove the measures I have taken without instructions, as well on this occasion as when I did the utmost to prevent the Archduke from leaving Switzerland in the manner stated in my No. 20.

No one can desire more earnestly than myself to see Switzerland occupied or protected by an army under his Majesty's immediate direction and influence, or be more thoroughly aware than I am that the Court of Vienna, by retaining possession of the country, will have defeated the wise and beneficent designs of his Majesty's Government, but it appeared to me most evident that this was not the moment to act upon such considerations only; that the danger was too imminent to be trifled with; that the Russian army was totally incompetent to the defence of this country; that M. de Suworow, instead of sending reinforcements here, was taking our best troops from us; that the loss of Switzerland carried with it inevitably the restoration of courage and confidence in France, the return of consideration and public opinion in favour of the republic in foreign countries, discouragement and an outcry for peace at Vienna, and if not the loss of Italy, at least the entire suspension of the victorious career of Marshall Suworow in that country.

It seems equally clear that all these evils can only be prevented, and the great objects of the campaign assured, by such a general and vigorous attack on the enemy as may send his army beaten and discouraged within his own frontier.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Charles Whitworth.

(Draft. Most secret and confidential.) Zurich: 25th August, 1799.

Sir,—Inclosed I have the honour to send you copies and extracts of those of my dispatches to Lord Grenville, dated respectively the 15th and 24th instant, together with the copy of a letter, which as you will learn from the last of those dispatches I have been under the necessity of writing to Field Marshall Suworow.

I venture earnestly to recommend to you to do every thing in your power to prevent any blame from attaching to Mons. de Korsakoff, for disobeying the Field Marshall's orders.

His Imperial Majesty will surely feel that had he not adopted this measure at our earnest intercession, the whole campaign would have been lost, and M. de Suworow's situation in Italy been rendered extremely critical.

I inclose at the same time a letter from the Advoyer de Steiguer, to the Emperor which that excellent Magistrate will thank you to deliver in whatever manner you shall judge most proper.

It has been long in my possession, but I was desired not to send it on any account by the common post. Its object is to obtain from H.I.M. the mission of a Russian Minister to this country, and I trust you will have the goodness to second this request with all your influence.

I have the honour, &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

(No. 23.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Zurich: Sunday, 25th August, 1799.

My Lord,—I am truly sorry to inform your Lordship that on my return here I have found affairs in a worse situation than ever.

Colonel Plunkett, who was authorized to speak to me by the Archduke, informs me that two different operations had been submitted to M. de Korsakoff.

According to the one, that General with the Russian troops was to attack the position before Zurich, whilst the Archduke was to cross the Limmat lower down, and General Hotze to make a false attack in the little Cantons. According to the other, M. de Korsakoff was to detach 6,000 or 7,000 Russians to the assistance of General Hotze, who thus reinforced was to make the real attack in the little Cantons, whilst the Archduke and the remainder of the Russians were to attack according to circumstances *with effect* on the Limmat.

That both these plans had been rejected by M. de Korsakoff; the *first* because he thought the most difficult part of the operation thrown in an unfair manner upon him, the *second*, because he would not on any account consent to separate his Russians; and that it was afterwards proposed to M. de Korsakoff, that he should march with the whole Russian force to the little Cantons, where a real attack should be made as *in the second place*, but that, in that case, H.R.H. should be at liberty to withdraw six battalions of the nine which he had sent to that country under General Hotze, as well because the remaining force was considered fully sufficient for the operation, as *in consideration of the preparations which the enemy was making* on the Rhine towards Kehl and Manheim.

That M. de Korsakoff had accepted this latter arrangement, and had actually marched with all the Russians,

amounting to near 20,000 men, to Uznach, where he had joined General Hotze, but that after reconnoitring the enemy's position, he had peremptorily refused to act, unless the 6,000 men were suffered to remain.

That General Hotze had taken upon himself to suspend their departure until he should have communicated this new resolution of M. de Korsakoff to H.R.H., who had this morning sent a peremptory order for their immediate return, saying that M. de Korsakoff might act as he thought proper.

This is the story which the Austrians tell; what the Russians have to say in answer to it I cannot at present know, as both Colonel Ramsay and Colonel Craufurd are with General Korsakoff at Uznach.

Colonel Plunkett added that as the Baron Roll was about to go to Uznach and wait on General Hotze, it would be particularly agreeable to the Archduke if I would desire the Baron to endeavour to engage M. de Korsakoff to act without the 6,000 men, adding that there was not a moment to lose, as intelligence had been received this morning that the French had crossed the Rhine in force,—that H.R.H. had already made a considerable detachment to that quarter, and would probably be obliged to march himself in a day or two, so that it would be then no longer in his power to make a *diversion* in favour of M. de Korsakoff.

I was struck with the word *diversion*, which Colonel Plunkett used, his language as well as that of the Archduke, when I left Zurich last, being that H.R.H. would make an effective attack in person, and that he would *co-operate powerfully* with M. de Korsakoff.

I see therefore with pain that this attack in the little Cantons can answer no end whatever, because it is most evident that the Archduke with the greater part of his army will follow General Moreau into Swabia, and in that case, should the attack succeed, Generals Hotze and Korsakoff united will be too feeble either to advance into

Switzerland, or to maintain themselves in the position now occupied by the enemy.

It seems, however, in justice, that this change of language and of intention cannot be reproached to the Archduke as a breach of the promise originally made by H.R.H. as reported in my No. 22, not only because the passage of the Rhine by the enemy was a circumstance not taken into consideration at that time, but because the promise related only to the two plans of attack then formed and submitted to M. de Korsakoff, both of which that General rejected, and by rejecting them certainly released the Archduke from his engagement.

I wish at the same time that I could persuade myself that the first plans of attack were not offered to M. de Korsakoff in the secret hope that they would be rejected.

Of what passed when the third plan was proposed and accepted I am entirely ignorant, but if it be true, as is stated to me, that the Archduke *then* insisted on withdrawing the 6,000 men *on account of the preparations of the enemy on the Lower Rhine*, I am confident that H.R.H. could not, under such circumstances, have really intended an *effective* co-operation; and, even if he had promised it, M. de Korsakoff, who has by this time learned something of Austrian policy, would have acted wisely in giving no credit whatever to the promise.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 24.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Zurich: Wednesday, 28th August, 1799, 8 A.M.

My Lord,—I am truly concerned to be obliged to inform your Lordship that all hope of offensive operations being resumed in this country by the allied armies is nearly at an end, and that there is every reason to fear the most fatal termination of this campaign, which opened with such very brilliant prospects.

The Archduke, with whom I had the honour of a very long conversation yesterday, informed me that he was to march immediately against Moreau, leaving General Hotze with twenty battalions on the side of the Grisons and the little Cantons; and the Russians, reinforced by about 2,000 cavalry and some artillery, to guard Zurich and the whole position from thence to the Rhine, which was occupied by H.R.H. with forty large Austrian battalions, exclusive of seven others that were in or before the town under General Hotze.

Not having yet seen either General Korsakoff, Colonel Craufurd, or Colonel Ramsay, all of whom are still at Uznach, I have written to the two latter to beg they would send immediately to your Lordship a full report of what has passed between the Russian and Austrian Generals, which I will send off as soon as I shall have received it by an extraordinary messenger, considering it of the last importance that his Majesty should receive early information of the real state of affairs.

For it cannot be disguised, if the enemy remains master of Switzerland at the beginning of the winter, not only that all the Italian conquests are in danger, but that the Austrians neither will nor can attempt to reconquer this country before the spring; consequently, that the enemy will be enabled to carry on a winter campaign by detachments made from hence and from the Rhine, either in Holland or the Low Countries, and to subdue and crush the royalists in every part of the kingdom.

. . . From General Hotze's report it appears that the army was to have assembled on the 25th at Lachen, and to have marched from that place early in the morning of the 26th to attack the enemy in three columns—one composed of Austrians, the other two of Russians, supported by some Austrian hussars and artillery, and conducted by Austrian staff officers. The first column was to have marched along the side of the lake, the second over Mount Etzel towards Einsiedeln, and the third up the

Wäggithal, and from thence over the mountains behind Einsiedeln, and between that place and Schweitz.

On the 24th the Austrian and Russian Generals reconnoitred the position, and the above plan of operations was proposed by General Hotze, who stated, *that the strength of each column being equal*, he wished the Russian General to choose his two points of attack.

General Korsakoff immediately chose the roads by the lake and Mount Etzel, leaving to the Austrians the attack by the Wäggithal, represented by them to be the most difficult of the three.

On the 25th the affair of the 6,000 men was mentioned for the first time—whether by General Hotze or by General Korsakoff I cannot distinctly make out; but being struck by the above expression of General Hotze's, '*that the strength of each column would be equal*,' I pressed this observation upon Colonel Plunkett so closely after I had left the Archduke, that he at last admitted that General Hotze, being extremely desirous that the attack should take place, and fearing new difficulties on the part of M. de Korsakoff, *being persuaded at the same time that* 4,000 *men were as competent to the attack by the Wäggithal as* 10,000, had wilfully concealed from the Russian Generals the Archduke's order, with which they were already acquainted, and had meant to have detached the 6,000 men only when the affair should have been fairly begun and all parties committed.

Whatever opinion M. de Korsakoff might have entertained of the Austrians, this trick of General Hotze's was well calculated to have given him the best grounded jealousy and mistrust. It cannot, besides, have escaped him, that though 4,000 men might have been sufficient for the attack by the Wäggithal—which, however, the Austrians had represented as the most difficult of the three—yet that either a column of that strength was totally inadequate to the other two attacks, either of which General Hotze had offered to undertake, or that

the Russians were to march on both these points with a much larger force than could possibly be necessary.

General Hotze, in his report, as far at least as it was communicated to me, says nothing of his having concealed the Archduke's order from M. de Korsakoff, and attributes the failure of the operation entirely to M. de Korsakoff's caprice and want of decision, adding that the other Russian generals, particularly Prince —— (Marshall Suworow's nephew), were decidedly in favour of an immediate attack, considering the force assembled as sufficient for the object, without the 6,000 men which the Archduke had required.

The Archduke spoke to me afterwards at much length of the fatal consequences of this march which he was about to undertake into Swabia—which, he said, he was no longer able to suspend,—and then told me for the first time that his own opinion had been from the very first in favour of attacking Switzerland; that he had proposed it to the Emperor when General Jourdan was driven back to the Rhine, but that he had been peremptorily ordered to abstain from the attempt, and that the same orders alone had prevented him from marching forwards after the capture of Zurich, and that the position which he now occupied had been pointed out to him as the best and shortest by which a communication could be kept up between Italy and the Rhine.

H.R.H. concluded by saying that if a larger discretion was not given him the next campaign, he certainly would resign the command of the army.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

General Hotze to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.)

Excellency,—The consequences of our retreat at Lachen, the causes of which I dare not penetrate, still less discuss, are so disastrous, that yesterday, the 29th, the enemy attacking the left wing of my position, entered the Canton of Glarus, and made himself master of the capital. A reinforcement which arrived just in time was fortunate enough to drive the enemy from Glarus, and force him into the gorges of Muttenthal, but it will be impossible for me to dislodge him from the heights, of which he is master, and which command the Canton—all the more so, that the detachment of Colonel Strauch at Bellinzona is too weak to co-operate with me.

This state of things increases the number of emigrants, and it is very distressing to meet numbers of these unhappy fathers, wives, and children on the road begging their bread. You have had the generosity to offer them help, and Colonel Count Plunkett has over and over again assured me of your noble sentiments towards these unfortunate people. I entreat your Excellency therefore to grant me some small sum of money for them, or to entrust it to the officer who is the bearer of this letter.

You have on every occasion deigned to protect Switzerland, and I flatter myself that your Excellency will pardon me for pleading the cause of an unfortunate class of persons—victims of a war which was completely foreign to them.

Present my respectful homage to Mrs. de Wyckham, and accept the high esteem and devotion of your Excellency's very humble and very obedient Servant,

HOTZE.

Schoenis: 30th August, 1799, 9 o'clock in the evening.

Field Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) (Received 8th September.)

Sir;—I am the more surprised at the intention, of which you have just informed me, of H.R.H. the Archduke Charles to withdraw the Imperial and Royal Army forthwith from Switzerland, overrun as it now is by the enemy, into Swabia, so as to abandon all the defence of the country to the inadequate forces of General Korsakoff, as I have deemed it indispensably necessary to defer for two months the execution of the order, which reached me at the same time, to repair to Switzerland with the Russian troops for the purpose of first taking the fortresses of Tortona and Cuneo, the only way likely to secure our happy progress hitherto made in Italy. The retreat of the Austrian troops from Switzerland is to my mind all the less feasible, as it would place in the way of the success of future operations obstacles then almost insurmountable.

In communicating the like sentiments to H.R.H., I have taken upon myself the task of making both his military knowledge and his goodness of heart alive to the urgency of his retaining his forces in Switzerland, and to the results that would follow from any diminution of them whatever.

Having since enjoined General Korsakoff not to send out of Switzerland the 10,000 men as demanded, I may hope to hear shortly that affairs have taken a more advantageous turn.

For the rest I have lost no time in bringing all this to the cognizance of the two Imperial Courts, being persuaded that the good cause will certainly be the gainer thereby with them.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the most distinguished consideration, Your very humble and very obedient Servant,

C. Alexandre Suworow Rymnikski.

Asti $\frac{19}{30}$ August.

To Mr. de Wickham, at Zurich.

Lord William Bentinck to Mr. Wickham.*

Head Quarters, Asti: Aug. 31st, 1799.

My dear Sir,—I had just set off for Turin when Colonel Clinton arrived here; as the letter to Suworow he knew to be of the greatest consequence he delivered it to one of the Marshall's aide-de-camps immediately upon his arrival. As you cannot know the Marshall, you could not have possibly conceived that the letter you wrote to him would have been opened by any other hands than his own, and least of all would you have desired that expressions unfavourable to the character of the Archduke should first be seen by an Austrian. This circumstance it was impossible you should have known—but the fact is that the Marshall reads nothing—whatever letters come for him are opened by some one of his adjutants, and the knowledge of their contents depends entirely upon the discretion of that adjutant. I arrived from Turin last night, and I was extremely surprised to hear this morning from the Adjutant-General of Melas who with all his staff are in direct hostility to Suworow, that such a letter had been received from you, and that such were the contents. The Marshall was extremely pleased with the letter, and it was not possible if you had lived with him constantly, that you could have composed a letter better corresponding with all his own ideas, with his own complaints of the Archduke's inaction, with his vanity—in short, better calculated to answer the object proposed. When the letter was read, he exclaimed, 'c'est un vrai *God damn!*' As I believe that General Melas, both to curry favor with the Archduke, and to do as much mis-

* Lord William Henry Cavendish Bentinck, second son of the third Duke of Portland, born 1774. In May, 1799, he was appointed to remain at the head quarters of Marshal Suworow's army in Italy. He was constantly employed in military, civil, and diplomatic affairs, and was Governor-general of India from 1827 to 1835. He died in 1839.

chief as possible to Suworow by interpreting the satisfaction he expressed at your letter into a dislike or jealousy for the Archduke, would have been too ready to have mentioned the circumstance to the Archduke, I begged in the most earnest manner his Adjt. General Radetzki to prevent its being made known. He said his only object in mentioning it to me was to desire I would caution those who corresponded with Suworow from making observations which might interrupt that harmony which it was so necessary should be kept up.

Colonel Clinton will give you every possible information about this army: his conversation with the Marshall is so interesting that I have begged him to communicate the whole both to my father and Lord Grenville.—I should be much obliged to you to buy for me the map of Switzerland by Meyer, which I understand can only be had at Zurich. If you could have it put upon canvass in squares for the pocket I should be much obliged to you.

My Brother desires his best compliments, and I remain,

Yours truly,

W. BENTINCK.

(No. 25.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 31st August, 1799.

My Lord,—Colonel Ramsay having sent me the inclosed dispatch, No. 9, under a flying seal, I take the liberty of adding the following observations to those which he has communicated to your Lordship on the subject of M. de Korsakoff's conduct, upon which I trust that my dispatches Nos. 23 and 24 will also throw some light.

The Archduke's intention of withdrawing the 6,000 men from General Hotze was certainly known to General Korsakoff at the time when he first undertook the operation, or at least when he reconnoitred the position of the enemy, and when the plan of attack in those columns

was proposed and accepted; but in point of fact he has not the less reason to complain of want of fairness in the Archduke, or at least he is fully entitled to say that H.R.H. did not sufficiently explain to him the real state of affairs in the country where he was going to act.

The Archduke always spoke of General Hotze as having twenty-eight battalions under his command (admitting, however, that some of them were weakened by the late affairs in the little Cantons), from which force six battalions might have been taken away, and the rest, had they been employed actively in offensive operations with the Russians, would have been probably sufficient to have driven the enemy from his position.

These were the hopes, as I have reason to believe, with which General Korsakoff marched to Uznach; but when he found that of these twenty-eight battalions only eleven at most were destined for offensive operations, *and that the six battalions which the Archduke demanded were all to be taken from these eleven*, it is not to be wondered at that he should have hesitated before he committed his army in an unknown and difficult country, with so slender a support from the Austrians, who on their part risked comparatively nothing in the affair.

Had they brought six battalions from their defensive position in the Grisons to replace the six taken away by the Archduke, it would have been a proof that they were in earnest. As it is, M. de Korsakoff seems satisfied in his opinion that they were only making a very hazardous experiment at the expense of the Russian army.

From what I have stated in my No. 24 of the progress of the French in Swabia, of the evident intention of the Archduke to leave Switzerland at all events, and of the change of language of the Austrians with respect to *their manner of co-operating* with Generals Korsakoff and Hotze, your Lordship will probably be of opinion that no permanent advantage would have been derived from this attack even if it had succeeded, and that these

Generals must have retired again to their former position.

For these reasons, independent of all others, I own I am myself strongly of opinion that General Korsakoff acted wisely in refusing to attack.

(No. 26.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 31st August, 1799.

My Lord,—I was on the point of sending off my dispatches No. 23, 24, and 25 yesterday, but was prevented by the arrival of Lord Mulgrave, who wished that my messenger might be detained until our return from the Archduke's head quarters, where I had intended to have presented his Lordship to H.R.H., in obedience to his Majesty's commands. Lord Mulgrave will himself explain the reasons which prevented us from seeing the Archduke at Klotten, and will at the same time state the substance of the conversation which took place when we met H.R.H. on his way to Donaueschingen.

On the same morning I received a dispatch from Lord Minto, of which I send an extract inclosed, after the perusal of which I feel that I should fail in my duty to his Majesty were I hereafter, in the course of my mission, to act upon the faith of any assertion whatever that the Austrian Minister may think proper to make.

I fear I am using a very strong expression on this occasion, but I am confident that I should receive your Lordship's pardon had you witnessed but a small part of the very painful scenes that have been passing here since I had last the honour of writing on the same subject.

I assure your Lordship that I do not describe the state of the country in too strong colours when I say, that the whole Austrian army is dejected and discontented, while the very name of an Englishman is become a word of reproach among them, that the confidence of the people of this country in his Majesty's Government is for the

moment entirely gone, and that the opinion is universally established that Switzerland has been sacrificed to some unknown political views and interests of the Court of London.

The Austrian officers on their departure from Zurich were indefatigable in their endeavours to attribute to the same causes the calamities with which the country is threatened; and when the distressed inhabitants of the Canton of Schweitz took refuge in the village on the lake of Zurich and at Glarus, the same persons, with General Hotze at their head, were saying to these poor people everything that was disrespectful of his Majesty's Government, and teaching them to curse the only hand that has afforded them protection in their misfortunes.

Painful as my situation has been, I have notwithstanding thought it my duty to take no *public* measure to contradict these insinuations and assertions, until I shall know his Majesty's pleasure on the subject, because the Austrian Minister has committed himself so directly and so openly, that it would be impossible for me to do anything without pointing at him personally as the willing author of the falsehood.

He has himself taken pains, through his known agents, to justify himself from the reproach of having sent the Archduke out of the country, and to throw the blame of the measure on the English.

It is known, at least to every staff officer of the army, that when the Archduke determined to attempt the passage of the Aar, the Count de Dietrichstein, who is considered as personally devoted to M. de Thugut, strongly opposed the measure, and that he told General Schmidt and the other officers who had advised it that they were taking a very serious responsibility on themselves, for that if H.R.H. remained any longer in Switzerland, it would involve the Courts of Vienna and London in a very serious dispute, the latter having insisted in the most

positive terms on the immediate evacuation of the country.

Besides, the Archduke himself has assured me more than once that the Emperor himself had written to him exactly to the same effect, asking me, if the thing were not well founded, whether I could imagine that his Imperial Majesty would ever have pledged himself to the truth of it by giving it under his own hand? And the fact of the Emperor's having written to his brother on that subject is known to the whole army.

Lord Mulgrave having written very fully on the other facts of Lord Minto's dispatch, I shall not add any further observations upon M. de Thugut's language and conduct.

The Archduke is still at Donaueschingen, and does not mean to march forward for two or three days. By the last accounts General Moreau was in the neighbourhood of Heilbron.

I expect every moment to hear that the enemy crossed the Rhine in force on the side of Brisach and Huninguen.

I am sorry to add that the French penetrated as far as Glarus on the 29th, and though they were driven out of the town, yet they remained in possession of the heights which command it, and of the passages leading from the Cantons of Schweitz and of Uri.

Nothing now can save this unfortunate country but the rapid march of a very considerable part of the combined forces now in Italy under Marshall Suworow to the side of Mount St. Gothard; but if this expedition be undertaken with anything less than *an army*, it cannot possibly succeed. The French, certain of not being attacked on this side, will be at liberty to carry their whole force southwards. They have the shortest and easiest communications between the different parts of their army, whilst the Allies can only communicate with safety by the circuitous road of the Tyrol. They have now acquired a most thorough knowledge of the whole country, and have nothing to fear from the inhabitants, who are

everywhere subdued, depressed, and disarmed, so as that, with all possible confidence in Marshall Suworow, I have not hesitated to press on Lord Mulgrave the absolute necessity of his engaging that officer to march with his whole force on this side, and make that sort of *great* effort which alone can give any hope of bringing this campaign to a favourable conclusion.

It is not necessary for me now to inform your Lordship that it is the unanimous opinion of military men that, while Switzerland is in the hands of an enemy, the possession of Italy and of Swabia can with difficulty be secured, even by very superior armies; but that no armies whatever can prevent a very inferior force from making such frequent and dangerous incursions into both those countries, as would effectually prevent any operations from being carried on from either of them against the frontiers of France.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to General Hotze.

(Translation of Draft.) Schaffhausen: 2nd September, 1799.

General,—I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me on the unhappy condition of the good people of Schweitz and Glarus. I hasten to transmit to you the sum of 300 Louis d'or by M. de Werdt, begging you to employ them, in the name of His Britannic Majesty, for the use of the unfortunate inhabitants of that country.

I authorize you, General, at the same time, to draw upon me for a like sum without writing again, if you find you want it. One cannot spend one's money on a better cause.

The departure of M. de Werdt prevents my adding

more than the assurance of high consideration and respectful attachment with which I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Mons. le Baron de HOTZE, Feld Mar^l^ Lieut^t^ de l'armée Imperiale et Royale, &c. &c.

Field-Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.)

(No date, but supposed to have been written on the 3rd September.)

Sir,—On the completion of the plan for future operations concerted between their Majesties the two Emperors and the King of Great Britain, it was enjoined on me by my Court to leave Italy forthwith, and to repair to Switzerland at the head of the Russian troops, which would there be joined by *a corps of Bavarian troops and the Swiss militia.* You know the state of things too well yourself, Sir, not to appreciate all the importance of the prompt appearance of these troops required by the urgency of the case; be so kind, therefore, Sir, as to accelerate *the arrival of the former and the enrolment and organization of the latter*, which ought to be pushed forward with the greatest activity, so as to swell their numbers as much as possible.

Immediately after the surrender of the citadel of Tortona, I hope, under God's blessing, to set forward the $\frac{\text{8th September,}}{\text{28th August,}}$ with the division of General Derfelden, as well as that of General Rosenberg; the two together amounting to 30,433 men. I hope the best measures will, without fail, be concerted with the different Cantons for providing the adequate supplies for the troops of my Sovereign, for which purpose I have addressed myself to the Commissary-General direct.

The troops under my orders will go through Casale, Vercelli, Novara, and Airolo to attack the enemy in his position on Mount St. Gothard, and having beaten him

and driven him back, will then effect their junction with the corps of Lieut.-General de Korsakow, and with that of General Hotze, while the Austrian General Haddeck will at the same time attack the enemy who occupies the position of the St. Bernard.

In imparting to you, Sir, a confidential outline of my plan of operations, I renew my most urgent entreaties to you to grant me your good offices in all cases of need, and thus contribute to the success of the common efforts of our respective Sovereigns.

I shall be charmed to make your personal acquaintance, and to assure you by word of mouth of the sentiments of the most perfect esteem, and of the very distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be, Sir, Your very humble and very obedient Servant,

CT. SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI.

Asti: 1799.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Draft)
(Confidential.) Schaffhausen: 4th September, 1799.

My dear Lord,—Your Lordship's very interesting letter of the 24th ulto., with the inclosed copy of your dispatch to Lord Grenville of the 9th, was delivered to me at 6 A.M. on the 29th.

I take the first moment to acknowledge its receipt and to thank your Lordship for the pains you have so kindly taken in making me so well acquainted with the real state of affairs at Vienna, which I could not possibly have learnt from any other quarter.

The inclosed copies of my correspondance with the office, will, together with Lord Mulgrave's letter, give your Lordship sufficient information of all that has passed here since my last, and will save me the painful task of writing again on the same subject. I really don't know that I have anything to add but observations and reflec-

tions, all of which have already presented themselves to your Lordship.

Don't, however, let me omit to inform your Lordship that M. Thugut has (I fear wilfully) misrepresented the late force of the Archduke in Switzerland, which I can state with confidence was (before the affair of the 14th ulto. in the little Cantons) nearly as follows:—

Infantry.		Battalions.
In or before Zurich	Regulars	6
	Croats	1
Between Zurich and the Rhine	Regulars	39
	Croats	1
Under-Generals Jellachich and Bay in the little Cantons	Regulars and Croats	19
		66

In the whole 66 battalions, which, at 900 men per battalion, amounts to near 60,000 Infantry, and at 700 to above 50,000. In this calculation the artillery is not included, and the Archduke himself told me his cavalry was superior to that of the French. Though I have not been able to ascertain its strength, yet I am inclined to think it must have exceeded 7,000 men.

The Archduke told General Korsakoff that he had under his command above 85,000 effective men; of these I am persuaded that not more than 20,000 or 25,000 were in Swabia.

Be that as it may, the whole force united and *commanded by his Royal Highness*, when supported by the 30,000 Russians under General Korsakoff, was more than sufficient to defeat the French army and take possession of the frontier of France, from Brisach to Geneva, before the winter. On this point I am confident you will not find two opinions among military men who have observed the events of the war, and who are acquainted with the nature and character of the troops of the several

belligerent powers. I am afraid that the same persons will be unanimous in their opinion that the same force parcelled into three portions will not only be wholly incapable of making any impression on any part of the French frontier, but be exposed to be beaten in detail by an intelligent and enterprizing enemy.

M. de Thugut must know the truth of what I am saying as well as anybody—what then is he about, what are his real views, and to what unknown object has he sacrificed those fair [prospects] that it was unquestionably in his power to have realized with honour to himself, glory and profit to his Royal Master, and probably with peace and security to all Europe?

I earnestly hope that Lord Mulgrave will succeed in his attempt to bring Marshall Suworow here, for seven days have now passed since the receipt of your Lordship's letter, and the last remains of the baggage of the Austrians are just passing my window, taking the road of Donaueschingen. If orders had been sent to the Archduke of the nature mentioned in your Lordship's letter, by M. de Thugut, surely something could have been done before now to give effect to them.

I trust, however, that Marshall Suworow will bring with him a strong reinforcement of Austrians, without which he had really better come round by the circuitous road of the Tyrol and join the troops here, as for the reasons stated in one of my dispatches to the Office, I am persuaded that nothing short of an army will be equal to the operation of forcing the passage from Italy *as long as the allied forces on this side shall be unwilling or unequal to act by themselves*; and the distance is too great, and the communications too circuitous, to admit of any combined operations.

I need hardly say that I mentioned nothing to the Archduke of what your Lordship wished me to conceal, though I had a strong temptation to speak when I heard

his Royal Highness censure in the most unqualified manner the proposed expedition to Mayence.

I am myself persuaded that M. de Thugut will never but in a case of urgent necessity give to this Prince an army with which he can undertake anything of importance without restraining him by positive orders from making any use of it.

I can collect from his Royal Highness's conversation, and I am told *so directly* by his friends, that the breach is too wide ever to be closed.

Your Lordship will learn from Lord Mulgrave's letter in what a state the Archduke left the Russian army at Zurich. I am sorry to say here again that the mutual dissatisfaction is such as to leave no hope whatever of reconciliation.

The more I consider the matter the more I am persuaded that M. Korsakoff was right in delaying the attack in the little Cantons.

As experience has taught me that courage and veracity are not among the first of M. Thugut's virtues, I own I feel for your Lordship who will have at all times most unpleasant materials to work on. I trust however with confidence in your Lordship's persevering zeal for your Country's service, and I certainly shall not abandon the hopes with which I left England, as long as I see you firm at your post in Vienna.

I have the Honour to be, &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Wickham to Field Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Draft.) Schaffhausen: 9th September, 1799.

Monsieur le Maréchal,—The letter which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me of the 3rd instant, in which you announce your intention of coming into this country, after having attacked the enemy and forced him from his position on Mount St. Gothard, has only been delivered to me to-day.

Your Excellency may be assured that I shall do all that depends on me to contribute to the success of the common efforts of our two Sovereigns. But I should think myself wanting in duty if I did not at once lay before your Excellency the true picture of the resources of this country. Your Excellency will find it dreary and sterile, but it is essential that you should know exactly on what you may reckon.

Of the thirteen Cantons which together constituted the Helvetic Body, two only are entirely occupied by the Allies. Ten are in the hands of the enemy, and the thirteenth (Zurich) is shared by the two belligerent armies.

The two Cantons which we hold (Appenzell and Schaffhausen) are among the smallest and weakest of the Confederation: Zurich, with more resources, is for the most part ill-disposed.

The Allies occupy in addition some small countries allied or subject to the Cantons, such as Thurgovia and the Toggenburg: the temper of these is also rather bad.

All the resources of Switzerland, whether of men or public spirit, are to be found in the Cantons occupied by the enemy, and especially in that of Berne.

The inaction of the Austrian army having deprived us of access to these Cantons, we have only been able to recruit in the parts of Switzerland where there was least hope of success; so that the levies, after the losses they have undergone lately, are reduced to nearly 2,000 men, of whom the greater part are not sufficiently disciplined or instructed to be able to make war effectually with the troops of your Excellency.

The little Cantons of Schweitz, Uri, and Glarus, when they found themselves occupied by the Austrians, seeing the enemy at their gates, refused to serve with regular troops. Their population moreover is very insignificant, and the flower of their young men has perished in the cruel war that the French waged with them, and in the

many fruitless attempts which they made this spring to shake off the yoke before the arrival of the Austrians.

The militia of these Cantons are however in great part with General Hotze, to the number perhaps of 1,000 men, and might perhaps be of some use as scouts, or to act as chasseurs.

As, for the regular troops, being persuaded that your Excellency does not confine your views to the present campaign, I venture boldly to advise that you should entirely give up any idea of employing them before the spring. They can only be of little service at the present time, but they may be regarded as the nucleus of a considerable corps. Let them only be kept in the background this winter, and I venture to promise your Excellency that we shall have a corps of from ten to twelve thousand infantry, well formed and well disciplined, before the opening of the campaign, *provided that Berne is taken possession of in the course of the autumn.*

I have sent to Colonel de Wymmer, Commissary-General, the letter which your Excellency enclosed to me for him; I will not fail to see him to-morrow, and discuss matters with him, and will help him as far as I can in finding means of providing for the wants of the army in a country absolutely devoid of everything. For I must not conceal from your Excellency that in the matter of provisions the country offers no resources whatever.* In the best times it did not suffice for the nourishment of its own inhabitants; and whatever power has possession of it this winter, it can only produce hunger and misery.

† With regard to the Bavarian troops I am writing at once to Munich, to learn in what state they are. But I am

* He only had enough for some days with him. The true purport and force of this passage did not escape Marshall Soult.—W.W.

† Marshall Suworow thought I had already *engaged* a Bavarian Corps, while I was still without instructions for entering into negotiation with the Court of Munich on this subject.—W.W.

sorry to tell your Excellency that till now I have received no instructions from my Court on this point, and that neither from London or Munich have I had any announcement of their arrival. I am truly sorry to have such a wretched account to send to your Excellency. Fortunately you are accustomed to struggle with difficulties and to overcome them.

As for myself, Monsieur le Maréchal, I am very much flattered that you allow me to communicate to you my ideas on the plan of the proposed campaign. You may be persuaded that I shall neglect nothing to merit your confidence and your esteem.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

To his Excellency Marshall
Count de SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI, &c., &c., &c.

Translation of a Memorandum written by Mr. Wickham on the margin of the preceding draft.

N.B. Marshall Soult said to me, after having read this dispatch, and that more than once, with undivided (I should rather say concentrated) attention, 'that Marshall Suworow could not possibly have been mistaken as to its real object, the less so that General Korsakoff on entering Switzerland and establishing him there in the room of the Archduke Charles, had only 30,000 men with him.' In fact he had only 28,000, and these to occupy a position the defence of which, according to the Archduke, demanded 50,000 men at least, with all the accessories necessary to constitute *an army*, and with which each of the two Russian armies was equally unprovided. I ought to have spoken to Marshall Suworoff of this comparative weakness, and should have done so a little later, but I did not wish at the beginning of our correspondance to overload my picture by a fact of which he could not be ignorant, and which I could not put before a mind as penetrating and subtle as his, without appearing to wish to convey a reproach to the Court of St. Petersburg, for having failed in its engagements by sending *such a force* into Switzerland, instead of an army of 45,000 men, *with all that was necessary for the effective service of such an army.* The state of destitution in which the corps of Korsakoff arrived at Schaffhausen, is to be found in full detail in my official dispatches.

Mr. Wickham to Field-Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Draft.) Schaffhausen: 10th September, 1799.

Monsieur le Maréchal,—Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton has delivered to me the letter which your Excellency did me the honour of writing to me dated Aug. 30th. He also gave me an account of the interesting conversation with which your Excellency honoured him.

Your Excellency will have since learnt, that the project of attack of which I informed you in my letter of the 22nd ult. had not been put into execution for reasons which it requires an experienced military man to appreciate, and that the Archduke Charles has retired from Switzerland with all his army, abandoning the defence of the Limmat and the Aar to the Russians, and leaving General Hotze with nearly twenty battalions in a position evidently chosen to protect the Grisons and the Vorarlberg, rather than to co-operate with M. de Korsakoff.

For the rest, with the most entire confidence in your Excellency's powers, I am persuaded that your laudable attempt to appeal to H.R.H.'s military knowledge and his good heart for the preservation of this unhappy country, would have in no wise changed the determination he had made to abandon it.

The heart of H.R.H. had already suffered enough on account of the evils which must necessarily follow on his retreat; and in the different conversations which I have had with H.R.H. on this subject, he has never failed to dwell on the fatal effects which this measure must have on the operations of the campaign in Italy as well as in Germany, and equally on the reputation and honour of the Imperial arms.

But I owe it to the confidence which reigns between our two august Sovereigns, as well as to that with which your Excellency has honoured me, to tell you that since I have had the honour of writing to you, I have been

positively assured that H.R.H. had the most stringent orders to retire as soon as the Russians arrived, and that for a long time back he had not been free to act on the offensive in Switzerland.

I am the more anxious to communicate this fact to your Excellency, as you might perhaps think from some passages of my letter of the 22nd, that I wished to insinuate that it was to H.R.H. himself that one must ascribe the inaction of his army, which was the last thing I wished to do. All the military men of experience with whom I have had the advantage of conversing, appear to me to have no doubt that H.R.H.'s army, supported by 30,000 Russians, would have sufficed at least to conquer Switzerland, and establish themselves on the borders of France before the winter, and I am persuaded that H.R.H. was burning to put some such project into execution.

I am ignorant of the object for which these fair hopes have been sacrificed; I do not know who gave the counsel to retire; but whoever it may have been, it is not less true that without wishing it, he has revived the courage and hopes of the enemy, and placed not only Italy and Switzerland, but the whole of Europe, in danger anew. I might add, that he has done the most cruel wrong to the reputation of the Austrian army, and to the personal glory of the Archduke.

Under these unfortunate circumstances, I grieve to perceive that it is not yet possible for your Excellency to come to our aid, though I cannot but approve the step you have taken.* I ought to confess that while the strength and the position of the belligerent armies in this country remain the same, I should not wish to see your Excellency entangle himself in the Alps with less *than an army.*†

* Namely, to remain at the foot of the Alps (some days longer at least) to discern more clearly the intention of the Austrians as to the support they meant to give his expedition.—W.W.

† He only had *with him* 18,000 men to enter Switzerland, no

I do not enter into greater details respecting our position to your Excellency, as Major-General Lord Musgrave, who is specially accredited by my Court to concert with your Excellency the operations of the campaign, will by this time have had the honour of explaining it to you verbally. I therefore only commend myself to the remembrance of your Excellency, and beg you to accept the assurance of the high consideration and respectful devotion with which I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

To S. E. Monsieur le Maréchal de
SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI, &c. &c.

Memorandum written by Mr. Wickham on the preceding draft.

I am in possession of a letter from Lord Grenville thanking me for having undeceived him as to the real state and numbers of the Russian armies, and their fitness to take the field against the French without aid from the Austrians *of various kinds*, especially including, which did not then exist, sincere and cordial co-operation. But that letter had not yet reached me when I wrote these two dispatches of Sept. 9th and 10th. I wrote them, therefore, in uncertainty as to the manner in which my communications on these important subjects had been received at home, where I knew that they must necessarily have given great pain, as they put an end to the hopes, till then entertained, of a favourable if not a triumphant termination of the campaign. I was also well aware that the uniting the two Russian armies in Switzerland was the favourite project of the Emperor Paul, as well as of the Marshall, and that it had been deliberately adopted by the two Courts. But I was quite confident that my facts were true and my views right. I also knew when the project was adopted by the Court of London, it was on the supposition that the Archduke Charles would have cleared the way for the passage of Marshall Suworow over the Alps, before delivering up Switzerland to the Russians, a task to

cannon, except a very few mountain guns transported on mule-back, in fact only his soldiers and their muskets. The cavalry and artillery made the détour by the Grisons, while the infantry alone marched on Bellinzona.—W.W.

which he was unquestionably competent after the arrival of M. de Korsakoff, if not before.

I determined, therefore, to write these two dispatches to the Marshall, suppressing several facts which I had communicated to my own Court respecting the Russian army, but with not one of which I was not perfectly sure that the Marshall himself was fully acquainted. The opinion which I ventured to give at the end of the dispatch of the 10th is certainly expressed in terms not very explicit or conclusive; but as Marshal Soult truly observed, it was impossible for any military man to mistake the conclusion to which I intended that Marshall Suworow should arrive. I had at last the satisfaction to have the soundness of my opinion admitted by the highest authority. After some days of idle boasting and shuffling, the inefficiency of the two Russian armies, *when left to themselves*, was fairly and fully admitted to me by the Marshall himself, and admitted with tears in his eyes.

WM. WICKHAM.

(No. 28.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: 12th Sept., 1799.

My Lord,—My confidential letter of the 22nd ult. was delivered to Field Marshall Suworow, at his head-quarters at Asti, by Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton,* to whom I had entrusted it.

As soon as the Field Marshall had read the letter he sent for Colonel Clinton, and after informing him that he approved entirely of the measure that had been taken under the then existing circumstances of retaining the 10,000 men in Switzerland, notwithstanding his positive

* Henry Clinton, a very distinguished officer, second son of General Sir Henry Clinton, and great-grandson of the sixth Earl of Lincoln; he entered the navy, but suffered so severely from sea-sickness that he left that service and entered the army in 1789. He served continuously and always with credit for twenty-six years, and became a Lieutenant-General, G.C.B., G.C.H., and Colonel of the 3rd Regiment; at Waterloo his active military career closed. In May, 1816, he received the thanks of the House of Commons. He married Lady Susan Charteris, and died without issue December 1829, in his 58th year.

orders to the contrary, and declaring that he agreed entirely with me in every principle that I had advanced, and particularly in every consequence I had drawn as to the result of the campaign in case Switzerland should be abandoned, he desired him to sit down and listen with attention and not interrupt, and he would give him a full and confidential account of all that had passed with the Court of Vienna since he had taken the command of the army, and of his own views and plans for the future conduct of the campaign, all of which he said he would repeat to him slowly and distinctly, that he might retain the whole and communicate it faithfully to me in answer to my letter.

He then sat down, shut his eyes, never opening them but from time to time to observe whether the Lieutenant-Colonel was attentive, and spoke to him for near two hours without interruption, very slowly, but with the greatest order, clearness, and precision, and often with animation and energy. The substance of what he said may be reduced to the following points:—

That he had been taken from the plough like Cincinnatus to take a principal share in a war the object of which was nearest his heart, and prepared to conduct it on principles both military and political which he entirely approved; but this expectation had been cruelly disappointed on both these points.

That the Council of War at Vienna had sent him to Italy with a plan for the conduct of the campaign by which he was directed to confine himself to the defence of the Adda, until Mantua should be taken, the conquest of which fortress he was to consider as the primary object of his campaign.

That, having made it a rule through the whole course of his life to act in the manner he himself thought beneficial to the service of his Sovereign, and being persuaded that the instructions he had received, far from being beneficial, could not but be very hurtful to both

their Imperial Majesties, and to the cause in which they were engaged, he took upon himself to disobey them, crossed the Adda, attacked and defeated the enemy, and soon afterwards, in consequence of this measure, found himself in possession of the whole of the Milanese, and particularly of Milan and its castle, in which he found artillery and ammunition sufficient to give him the means of undertaking further offensive operations without impeding the siege of Mantua.

That he immediately took advantage of this favourable and fortunate circumstance and of the disordered state of the enemy to push forward into Piedmont and undertake the conquest of that country and of all its powerful fortresses.

That the siege of the citadel of Turin was then undertaken with this artillery (the town being surrendered by capitulation).

That in Piedmont he found the whole country ready and eager to receive him—the Piedmontese troops deserting from the French almost by regiments, and everywhere active in aiding the progress of the Allies; that 10,000 Piedmontese soldiers might easily have been raised and added to the army, and that being dispersed in regiments among the Russians and the Austrians, their good conduct and fidelity would have been ensured; that the proclamation he had issued on entering the country had been so favourably received that he had every reason to believe that its good effects had been felt at the gates of Lyons; that he had made a full representation of the state of the country to Vienna, in which he had strongly recommended the immediate recall of the King and of the Royal family, and the re-establishment of the ancient Government, not only as a measure just and right of itself, but as likely to produce the best effects to the common cause; that this opinion was at first adopted, and that his Sardinian Majesty had in consequence been invited to return to his capital, and H.R.H.

the Duke of Aosta, who had reached Alexandria in his way to Turin, was ordered to remain in the former city; that Piedmont is now governed as a conquered country by an Austrian commissary established at Turin, and that the whole of this conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna had evidently produced the worst effect in the country, and would probably be attended with very bad consequences to the cause of the Allies, and to the interests of the House of Austria in Italy in particular.

That whilst these things were going on and whilst the Marshall was covering the siege of Turin and making preparations for those of Alexandria and Tortona, he was suddenly called to his left by the approach of Macdonald; that without dwelling on the circumstance of that affair, and of the battle of the Trebbia by which it was followed (in which he said the French had more than 30,000 men in the field and fought most *ably* and obstinately), he should proceed to mention that on the field of battle he received a positive order from Vienna to abandon the siege of the citadel of Turin, and confine himself to the defence of the Po; that he was fortunately saved from a new act of disobedience by a courier bringing an account of the actual surrender of the citadel; that in that fortress he had found a prodigious artillery, which enabled him immediately to convert the blockade of Alexandria, Serravalle, and Tortona into regular sieges; that in consequence of these decisive vigorous measures, the two former places had fallen into his hands, and that he was pushing the operations against Tortona, and at the same time preparing for a forward movement into the mountains to attack the French, when he was himself anticipated by the enemy and obliged to fight the battle, which terminated in the victory of Novi; that he was taking measures for following up this victory by marching against Genoa on the 17th, but was prevented by the slowness of the Austrians; that the original plan of marching to the Col de Tende and investing Coni (by

which the position of the French would have been turned and their communication with France cut off) was again resumed, and after the preparations necessary for carrying on an offensive war in the mountains were made, he was on the point of setting out when he received the news of Colonel Strauch's defeat, and of the loss of the little Cantons; that the critical situation in which the Milanese was left by this misfortune (the natural consequence of the inaction of the Archduke's army) obliged him not only to suspend his march, but to detach General Kray with 10,000 men for the protection of that country; that General Kray having found on his road that Colonel Strauch had been able to take a very strong position at the foot of the St. Gothard, and that the enemy did not appear to be in sufficient force to attack the Colonel and descend into the plain, had immediately returned with his troops, and that the plan of marching against the Col de Tende was again to be resumed and about to be put into execution, when a positive order arrived from the Emperor of Germany (dated 17th August) for him to proceed immediately with all his Russians to Switzerland to take the command of the whole Russian force, and leave the defence of Italy to the Austrians, *which must be considered as secure* now that all its fortresses were taken; that though he had not thought it right so far to disobey this order, as to proceed on his intended expedition, particularly under the circumstances which he had learnt of the intention of the Archduke to abandon Switzerland without waiting for the arrival of the reinforcements for Italy, yet that he had delayed carrying into execution that part of it which directed him to proceed *immediately* to Switzerland, and that he had written a very strong letter on the subject to the Emperor, a copy of which he ordered to be sent to me, but which the Austrian staff officers have taken care I should not receive; that in this letter (which was dated the 28th of August) he had represented very fully the true

state of affairs, and the danger of the measures about to be adopted; that, amongst other things, he insisted that Italy could not be considered as secure, until Tortona, Coni, and Nice should be taken; that were he to obey his orders at the present moment, not only the two latter places must be left in the hands of the enemy, but there was even the greatest risk of the siege of Tortona being raised, the enemy (whose resources seemed to multiply with defeat) having been reinforced since the battle of Novi, and having nearly 50,000 on the whole opposed to him, though dispersed in three different points; that the whole Russian force he could take with him amounted to scarcely 15,000 men unprovided with any requisite for a war in the mountains; that he was of opinion, that two months would be sufficient to enable him to preserve Italy from danger on that side by the capture of Coni and Nice; that at the expiration of that period the Russian troops might be employed in Switzerland; but till this service was performed it would be risking everything were he to execute the order he had received; and that if at the expiration of the period he mentioned, his Imperial Majesty still persisted in that plan, the army to be employed in Switzerland must be supported with reserve artillery, ammunition, pontoons, and a number of other articles of which it was in absolute want, and without which the troops would not be equal to the services required of them.

The Marshall then observed—that with respect to the campaign, the security of Italy and the driving the French out of Switzerland by whoever it was to be performed was the utmost that could be expected; that he should not now enter into the plans of the next, but should only say that to enable him to carry it into execution, he must have 90,000 or 100,000 men of good troops, that the whole Russian force at the beginning of the winter could scarcely exceed more than 45,000 men, and that the necessity of having 20,000 more troops of that nation

to join him in Switzerland for the opening of the campaign ought to be represented to the Courts of London and Petersburg. He dwelt on this point for some time, repeating over and over again what he had said, and concluded by affirming, that with 90,000 or 100,000 good men he should feel equal to the executing of the grand plan, which he understood had been determined on.

The above is the substance of what Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton has reported, adding, however, that on each point the Marshall entered into more details than it is in his power to repeat in their order.

(No. 29.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Schaffhausen: Sept. 12, 1799.

My Lord,—Your Lordship will probably learn from Lord William Bentinck, that owing to his Lordship's absence from head-quarters at the time of Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton's arrival, and to the circumstance of the Marshall having all his letters whatever opened for him and read to him by his Austrian secretary, my letter to Marshall Suworow, though marked confidential, was first read by the Austrian staff for whose eye it was by no means calculated.

It was not written, however, without as much consideration as the time would allow, or without foreseeing a possibility of its falling into their hands. But the circumstances under which I was called upon to act were such as to leave me only the choice of two evils—*either* of failing in the object which my letter was intended to obtain, *or* of writing in such a manner that might do harm should it be known to the Austrians that I had so written.

My object was to keep the 10,000 men, and to justify M. de Korsakoff who had detained them contrary to express orders. I owed to M. de Korsakoff, as well as to the public service which was deeply interested in the event, to obtain these points at any price.

I knew that I could only obtain them by gaining the confidence of the Field-Marshall, and I was enough acquainted with the personal character and way of thinking of that officer to know, that I could not hope to acquire it, but by showing him that I had observed and formed a right judgment of what was passing around me, and by speaking the fair truth in all that respected the conduct of the Austrians, against whom, and even to a certain degree against the Archduke, I know him to be with reason so strongly irritated, that to attempt to act the part of a mediator and apologist for their faults would be considered as directly flying in his face.

I have reason to believe from the report of Lord William Bentinck and Colonel Clinton that I have succeeded beyond my expectation in gaining all that I wanted of the Marshall; it only therefore remains to be considered whether I might not have done so without speaking in terms so strong of the Austrians. If I could, I have certainly done wrong. In that case, all that I can say in my excuse is, that I thought that I could not at the time when I wrote the letter, and that upon reading it over again, and duly considering the whole subject, I am inclined to attribute the favourable manner in which it was received to the very circumstance of my having spoken my mind so freely upon every point.

It is, however, very essential that, as far as possible, I should give an explanation to my letter, which will prevent it from being supposed that any part of its contents were meant to reflect on the Archduke. I trust that I have made a sufficient disavowal of any such intention, without going at all out of my way, in the enclosed letter to Marshall Suworow of the 9th inst.

Among other things I fortunately have it in my power to remind the Archduke, that when H.R.H. wished to dictate to me the manner in which I should write to the Marshall, I distinctly answered H.R.H. that I thought I could undertake to carry the point about which

we were all so anxious, but that I must be allowed to attempt it in my own way.

I have the honour to be &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 14th Sept. 1799.

My dear Sir,—I received your messenger on the 9th, and the letters and enclosures which he brought afforded me in one sense great satisfaction, though God knows, the matter was in other senses far from agreeable. But the information you sent me perfectly settled my mind on the object I ought to aim at here, and I had the satisfaction of finding the intentions I had already conceived, confirmed by the views which I derived from you and Lord Mulgrave. This has been a very busy and hurried day, as I had an E. India packet to dispatch, and to write to Lord Grenville with less leisure than the importance and extent of the subject required; but in order not to retain your messenger longer, I must beg you to accept a copy of my dispatch to Lord Grenville as a compendious mode of conveying to you the same information such as it is. I am happy to add that dispatches which I received from Lord Grenville while I was closing mine have furnished me with instructions and powers from the execution of which I trust much good may be expected. His dispatch was written at a period when the intentions of this Government were yet less favourable than they have since become, and when it professed a determination to carry the Arch Duke's army down to Mayence. Much has been gained since that period, and now that the junction of all the Russian troops under Suwarow in Swisserland seems certain, and is, indeed, I trust, nearly effected at this moment, I trust that what we have to ask of Austria may be obtained without great difficulty, especially armed as I am with powerful means of enforcing

our just expectations. I shall avail myself of these powers without delay, and shall not lose a moment in transmitting to you the result by messenger. In the mean while I feel anxious to say that I wished only to comply with Thugut's desire in not communicating *through us* the Emperor's intentions to the Arch Duke before he should receive an intimation of them more directly from the Emperor himself, but that I was far from wishing to suppress the fact of my having uniformly negotiated for the Arch Duke's remaining in Swisserland, and should have been happy to be quoted for as direct a contradiction to that falsehood as possible. I must confess that I still believe the orders which Thugut promised me were really intended, and that the irruption of the French was the real motive rather than the pretext of the Arch Duke's march of that particular moment. I will also confess very fairly what I conceive to have been the real and operating motive in Thugut's mind for the calamitous, and perhaps irretrievable fault he has committed in arresting the progress of the Arch Duke since the first occupation of Zurich. The reason he gives appears to me so bad that I think he would not avow it so distinctly as he does, if it were not true. His grand policy in war is to spare his army. This is a sort of policy which seems to me perfectly to defeat itself, for the army which does not conquer the enemy is in the mean while destroying and conquering its own master. But this is really his system in all parts of the war, and I do assure you he has seen the progress of Suwarow with more apparent terror than he has ever discovered at that of the enemy. He argues very openly on that point, and tells you of the difficulties he has to encounter in forming this army—of the 80,000 recruits he must now provide for it—of this being the seventh campaign of the Austrian war—of Prussia's recovering herself fresh and green to profit of her weakness, and of the necessity to preserve a force for such occasions. In his disposition to

indulge this sort of œconomy in war, he saw before him in Swisserland a campaign which must cost many men. He expected the arrival of the Russian army. He thought it would come sooner and be more numerous than it has proved, and he satisfied his ill-understood policy by lying by for the unhandsome advantage of throwing the loss and the hazard of the campaign on the troops of another nation. This is I am persuaded the real account of the matter. It is true he found no obstacle to this system in anything like zeal for the independence of Swisserland, or in any wise or general policy respecting France. To both of which objects he certainly feels great indifference. But having said and contended for all this ill of him, I really do not think he has been governed by any other more sinister motives, nor by his personal jealousy of the Arch Duke, though that quality is by no means wanting either. I venture to give you the trouble of reading all this though I hardly know that it leads to any practical consequences; but I wish you to know as correctly as we can discover it, what sort of person the whole business of this empire hangs upon. For it is with him and through him that all the good, bad, or indifferent we can look for from Austria, and all its power, must be accomplished. By Lord Grenville's dispatch, I flatter myself that Lord Mulgrave's arrival here is pretty certain. I wish to God he may come. I am confident it will do good, at least I am so much interested in thinking so, that I cannot persuade myself to doubt it. Pray continue to communicate with me, and to afford me that assistance which any man chained to the same sort of oar would I think require.

I wish you a thousand joys of the surrender of the Dutch fleet, and all that Mr. Grenville no doubt tells you.

I wish you joy too of the conquest of Mysore. It is one of the fruits of Buonaparte's expedition. Believe me ever,

My Dear Sir, most faithfully and affectionately yours,

MINTO.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Field Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Russian troops of the army of Italy are collected at this moment, part at Bellinzona, and part at Taverni; we have been here since the 15th, and operations would have already begun, if there had not been so many difficulties with regard to mules necessary for the transport of provisions; we have been expecting them from day to day, and no sooner had a part of them arrived than one half deserted; such are the circumstances in which I have been placed, and in order not to delay any longer beginning operations, which naturally became more urgent from day to day, both on account of provisions, and of the length of time afforded to the enemy to make his preparations, I have been obliged to make use of the horses of the Cossacks to carry on the provisions, so as by this expedient to be in a position to recommence operations to-morrow the 21st.

Such is the state of things that I have the pleasure of communicating to your Excellency.

I have the honour to be, your Excellency, with the highest consideration, your very humble and obedient servant,

PRINCE ITALIQUE COMTE ALEXANDRE SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI.

Taverni: 20th September, 1799.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

(Extract.) Vienna: 23rd Sept., 1799.

. . . . I must in candour own that when I last wrote to you I did not do justice to the *profound* merits of Baron Thugut's *policy*, in ascribing the backwardness of the Austrian operations in Swisserland merely to his desire to save the troops. I am now furnished with strong evidence that his views in the war require time to

mature them, and that he wishes to procrastinate; but that above all he is desirous of retarding the proposed attack on the territories of France; being adverse to that object even in the end, but decidedly so at present.—He is going to attempt the conversion of the Emperor of Russia on that point, over whom also he will endeavour to establish an Austrian influence, at the expense of that which he supposes or asserts England to exercise at present over the counsels of that Prince. But I cannot imagine that there is the slightest chance of his either duping or seducing Paul the 1st from the line of honour and true wisdom which he is at present pursuing. And if the intrigue which is on the point of being attempted at St. Petersburgh should fail, as it must be expected to do, I should conceive that the union of England and Russia in the same views, and the influence which those powers united may exercise over the mind and counsels of the Emperor, both from what he has to fear, and what he has to hope, may enable us to secure during the winter, and during the season of negotiation, a concurrence in our views and a real and effective co-operation in the next campaign.

Sir Charles Whitworth to Mr. Wickham.

St. Petersburg: Sept. 23, 1799.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter from Schaffhausen, of the 15th August, inclosing Extracts from your Dispatches to Lord Grenville of the 14th and 24th of same month, and also the copy of a Letter which you had written to Marshall Suworow.

Fully sensible of the anxiety which General Korsakoff will naturally feel at the degree of responsibility which he has, at your so urgent request, taken upon himself upon this occasion, I lose not a moment in forwarding to you by messenger, for his satisfaction and for your own, the fullest assurance that every thing which has been done has met with his Imperial Majesty's entire approba-

tion. I beg therefore you will immediately set General Korsakoff entirely at ease as to the opinion which the Emperor entertains of his conduct, and that you will yourself be assured that such is his Imperial Majesty's confidence in your judgment, discretion and local knowledge of the country where you are accredited, that he is under no kind of anxiety, and is fully prepared to approve whatever you may think proper to recommend.—As much will be signified to General Korsakoff, through Count Stackelberg, to whom you will have the goodness to convey the inclosed letter.

Your letter to Marshall Suworow has been fully approved of by the Emperor, as it must be by the Marshall himself. But the Emperor cannot but feel the utmost surprise at the precipitation with which H.R.H. the Archduke was preparing to quit his positions in Swisserland on the arrival of the Russian army, and on pretence that the orders of his Court, signified to him by Count Dietrichstein, were positive. These orders were, I conclude, founded on the adoption of the plan of operations suggested by his Majesty to the two Imperial Courts; but the Austrian Cabinet appears to have totally forgotten that it never was, nor could have been the intention, either of his Majesty or of this Court, that such a plan should be attempted, untill, as was expressly declared, the deliverance of Italy and Swisserland should be entirely effected. How far that was the case when the Archduke threatened to carry the orders of his Court into effect, your statement of facts fully proves; and there can be no doubt that had his Royal Highness persisted, the whole country would have been lost, and the Russian army in all probability annihilated. It is by your strenuous and indefatigable exertions that this misfortune has been avoided, and I have the highest satisfaction in assuring you that the service you have thereby rendered the common cause is justly appreciated by the Emperor.

Whenever Swisserland shall be evacuated, or at least

whenever the force of the enemy shall be no longer so much beyond all proportion as it now is to that of the Russians, then his Imperial Majesty will be content that his troops shall take charge of that country, leaving the Archduke to extend his line along the Rhine, provided always that the intermediate corps to be entrusted to the command of the Prince of Wurtemberg shall in no case be composed of less than 45,000 men, and that it shall be *in immediate contact* with the right of the Russian army under the command of Marshall Suworow, who as you probably know is to leave Italy as soon as Tortona shall have surrendered to the allies. Renewed instructions to this effect are now sent to Count Rosamoffsky, and I sincerely hope he may be induced to make use of them at last, to their full extent; it is certain that nothing more can be done by the Emperor of Russia, unless recourse be had to measures of absolute coercion, which God forbid!

The Emperor of Russia is not at a loss to account for the haste with which the Austrian Cabinet would draw the Archduke's army from Swisserland towards the Lower Rhine. He understands clearly that it is to the success which may fairly be expected in the expedition against Holland, and in that event to the possibility of an English and Russian army penetrating into the Low Countries before an Austrian force shall arrive there, that it is to be ascribed; at all events, allowing the Archduke to hasten towards the Low Countries, (where it is probable however that he will now come too late) his Imperial Majesty conceives that the Russian army in Swisserland, which with General Rosenberg's corps, that of General Rh—— (lately taken into the pay of his Majesty, to make up the deficiency in the corps of General Korsakoff which from henceforward is to be paid for at the rate of 35,000 men), the Swiss, should they determine to act out of their own country, and the Wurtembergers, will amount to upwards of 80,000 men, would be sufficient,

with the 45,000 men then under the Prince of Wurtemberg, within such a distance as to cover completely its right flank, and to co-operate with it, to penetrate into Franche Compté, and carry into effect the important plan from which such decisive advantages may be fairly expected.

The arrival long ere this of Count Stackelberg in Swisserland, will shew you in what manner the wishes of the worthy Avoyer de Steigeur have been anticipated. It was at Lord Grenville's desire that I mentioned to his Imperial Majesty's Ministers the propriety of such a mission, and it was immediately adopted. I venture to recommend my friend Count Stackelberg to your friendship and confidence; I am confident you will find him worthy of both. It may perhaps be sometimes necessary to allay the apprehensions he may feel, as must naturally be the case with every one intrusted with a responsibility by this Court, at going beyond the strict letter of his instructions. I am persuaded he will never incur blame in following your suggestions, and I hope and trust we shall on all future occasions be as successful as we have on this, in reconciling his Imperial Majesty.

I beg leave to inclose a Letter from Monsr. Vauvilieres. Between ourselves, he has been for some time past a heavy charge upon me. If he has any claims, it would be rendering him, and me, an essential service, in enabling him to assert them.

I trust you will have the goodness to excuse the haste and inaccuracy with which this is written. I fear you will find my writing scarcely legible, but I did not choose to employ any other.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble Servant,

CHAS. WHITWORTH.

* Jean François Vauvilliers, a distinguished scholar; born 1739, died at St. Petersburg 1801. He took part in the earlier events of the Revolution, but resisted its excesses; he was one of the victims of the 18th Fructidor.

For your further satisfaction I inclose you a letter I have this moment received from Count Rosbopian. Count Stackelberg will explain to you the degree of confidence and credit which he enjoys.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton to Mr. Wickham.*

Mutten: 28th Sept.

My dear Sir,—As I am sure you must be very anxious to hear of this army, I take the earliest opportunity, that the hope of the communication being open furnishes me with, to inform you that the two columns of Field-Marshall Suworow's army formed a junction at Urseren in the evening of the 24th. The first, commanded by the Marshall himself, having forced the passage of Mount St. Gothard, which was defended by a detachment of about 1,800 of the enemy; the second, under Lieutenant-General Rosenberg, which had marched by Dissentis and Tavetsch, attacked and defeated three battalions of the enemy in the little plain of Urseren, part of which retired by Hospital before the arrival of the first column, the rest by the Pont de Diable. On the 25th, owing to the resistance a few companies made at the Pont de Diable, and to the roads having been rendered impassable, the army only reached Wasen, and it was not possible to join Major-General Auffenberg, who had marched from Dissentis upon Amsteg, and had been engaged with the enemy the greater part of the day.

On the 26th, after burning the bridge at Amsteg, the enemy, under Le Combe, and from the report of prisoners about 2,500 men strong, retreated to Altorf, and from thence part to Fluelen, the remainder across the Reuss toward the Engelberg.

Yesterday the army marched at four o'clock in the morning, but the road was so difficult across the high

* Lieut.-Col. Clinton was at this time, by direction of Lord Mulgrave, accompanying the army of Suworow on its march over the Alps.

mountain which separates the valley of Shacken from that of Mutten, that the advanced guard did not reach this place till seven in the evening, when they made prisoners about ninety men, which had been sent from Schweitz. From the report of General Linken, that he had beaten the enemy near Glaris on the 25th and 26th, the army will proceed to execute the remainder of the operations as formerly concerted.

I am, my dear Sir, with sincere regard, your faithfull and obedient Servant,

H. CLINTON.

The Marshall has applied to me to procure him some English ale; he says it is what keeps him alive. As you are likely to be stationary—at least, I hope so—will you have the goodness to direct some dozen to be sent to your address.

Major-General Titof to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.)

Sir,—The troops which I have brought back from Uznach, after having fought there, being destitute of provisions, and this object, joined with other wants they are likely to have, absolutely requiring funds, I beg your Excellency to be so good as to advance me the sum of two hundred louis, which our General Commandant will repay to you as soon as possible. This attention on your part will be, under present circumstances, of the greatest value to me.

I have the honour to be, with very profound respect, the very humble and very obedient servant of your Excellency,

MAJOR-GENERAL TITOF.

Constance: 29th Sept., 1799.

(No. 30.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy. Most confidential.) Ravenspurg: Sunday, 30th Sept., 1799, 6 A.M.

My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I reached this place last night, after having been

obliged to abandon successively Zurich, Winterthur, Frauenfeld, Constance, and Moerspurg. The enemy entered Constance yesterday at 10 A.M., and before I left Moerspurg had repaired the bridge of Petershausen, passed over into the peninsula between the two small lakes and secured a number of boats that had been left at Stadt, to carry away the Russian army and Austrian magazines.

On Tuesday, the 24th inst., the Russian force, under General Korsakoff, was stationed nearly as follows :—

On the side of Baden, or rather below that place, seven or eight battalions.

At the Camp of Seebach either eight or nine battalions.

In and before Zurich from six to seven thousand men.

At Rapperschwyl two battalions which had been detached to cover General Hotze's right.

At Eglisau and Schaffhausen a small reserve.

The Cavalry was distributed among these different corps, but in what proportion I do not exactly know.

The Camp at Seebach was at the distance of about three miles from Zurich to the left of the road from that place to Klotten. From this point the whole force of the camp might easily have been carried in two or three hours to any part of the Limmat above Baden, where the French should have attempted an attack.

According to the plan of operations proposed by General Hotze, and approved by Field-Marshall Suworow, six battalions were detached from the camp at Seebach about nine o'clock of the night of Tuesday, the 24th, towards Rapperschwyl.

These battalions had not left the place above an hour when intelligence (false and fabricated for the purpose) was received, that the enemy meditated an attack on Zurich during the night; in consequence of which General Korsakoff ordered, I believe, two battalions from the camp of Seebach to march to Zurich, so that the whole line from Baden to Zurich was left to the pro-

tection of the three battalions dispersed along the Limmat.

Not knowing the exact number of the battalions in the camp of Seebach on the 24th, I cannot say with certainty whether any force whatever remained in it on the morning of the 25th. But there probably could not be more than a single battalion.

About four in the morning a heavy cannonade was heard on the side of Höng, a village about a league below Zurich on the road which leads from that place to Baden, along the right bank of the Limmat. Being lodged in a country-house about a mile from the town, and being unable to learn anything from Zurich, I mounted my horse at half-past six and rode towards Höng. At the distance of about half a mile on this side of the village, I overtook General Korsakoff riding very slowly forwards.

At this time there was a thick mist on the river on the other side of Höng, but the plain before Zurich, the Albis, and the whole of the French position on the hills was clearly to be seen, and there was not the least appearance of any extraordinary movement in any part of their line, excepting that a regiment of dragoons had left the camp and was drawn up on the left bank of the Limmat opposite to the village of Höng. The hill on the right was also perfectly distinguishable almost as far as Baden, and certainly at that moment no troops of either army had taken any position on the heights on this side the river.

Below the village there was a very heavy cannonade and a weak fire of musketry. I could distinctly see the flash of every gun and hear the ball pass so as to judge of its direction; and I am perfectly confident the enemy had not at a quarter before seven one single piece of cannon in battery on this side the river. I could learn nothing from General Korsakoff, who appeared, not so much alarmed as confused and uncertain what measures to

take, nor can I say, at this moment, whether he had then received any information of what was going on or no.

In a few minutes we were met by Colonel Lambert, a French officer in the Russian service, who informed the General that the enemy was not in force; that with his regiment of dragoons alone he had attacked and driven them back to the point where they had crossed; but that having received a reinforcement, they had returned to the charge, and forced him to retire after he had had his horse killed under him, and had been wounded in the leg. He added, that he did not doubt but that the enemy would be easily driven over the river as soon as any reinforcement should arrive.

To my utter astonishment General Korsakoff neither questioned Colonel Lambert as to any particulars of the enemy's force, of that which was assembled to oppose them, or of the manner in which they had passed the river.

At the entrance of the village of Höng we met General Hiller, of whom, though returning from the side of the enemy and acknowledged to be an excellent officer, M. de Korsakoff neither asked information or advice, but continued riding forwards after the common salutations had passed between them.

I immediately rode up to General Hiller and begged he would give me his real opinion of the state of things.

He said, that he had been very near the enemy, and that he was persuaded they were not in force; but that he saw nothing to oppose them; that he was afraid the battalions dispersed along the river had been either surprised or defeated as they came up in small bodies, and that it was probable that the enemy had passed in greater force somewhere below; that in either case the place where we were was unsafe, as the hill above us was not occupied by the Russians, and the enemy might cross it, get into the Klotten road, and cut off our retreat to Zurich, adding that he himself was returning to town to

send off an express to General Hotze for the six battalions that had been detached in the evening, with which a position might be taken on the Zurich-Berg to cover the town.

I returned with General Hiller to Zurich, and on our road we observed a column of the enemy about half-past seven attack the Russian position at Wollishof, between Mount Albis and the lake; though the fire in that quarter became immediately very violent, yet it was evident that it was only a false attack. Unfortunately M. de Korsakoff thought otherwise, left the real point, rode through Zurich without asking the opinion of anybody, and took up his station in the neighbourhood of Wollishof, from whence nothing could remove him till two in the afternoon, when he went to the gate of Klotten, and remained there till the enemy was actually firing into the ditch of the town of Zurich from the glacis and covered way of which they were in possession.

At ten o'clock, being informed that General Saacken, who commanded the Russians on this side of Höng, had been driven back into that village—that he had sent successively four aides-de-camp and the Honourable Captain Proby to bring M. de Korsakoff back, or at least to obtain some succours from the left bank of the Limmat —and that Colonel Ramsay and the Baron de Roll had also gone on the same errand, but without success, I determined to go with General Hiller in search of him in the hope that our joint representations might have a better effect.

I believe I have omitted to mention to your Lordship that General Hiller is the officer appointed to reside at the Russian head-quarters by the Archduke Charles. When we arrived about half-past eleven o'clock on the hill a little beyond Wollishof, we saw the Russians who had repulsed the French attack actually at the foot of Mount Albis, on the great road leading from Zurich to Lucerne, their chasseurs half-way up the mountain attacking the French camp which seemed nearly aban-

doned, and a French battalion under arms on the top of the hill ready to receive the Russians. We could see nothing, however, of General Korsakoff, and had no hope of finding him, as he had entered the thick wood which runs from the point where we were standing to the oot of the Albis.

The hedges and vineyards all about the villages were full of wounded and dead Russians, though I do not recollect having seen five dead Frenchmen on the whole ground. This is easily accounted for from the nature of the country, which is particularly well calculated for the French manner of fighting, and from the mode of attack of the Russians who appear to trust only to the bayonet, against which the French never attempt to stand.

The firing in our rear having become by this time very serious, and approaching very near to the town, we found it necessary, for our own safety, to return without loss of time, after General Hiller had sent another officer in search of M. de Korsakoff.

Before we entered the town we rode, however, for a few minutes into the plain before Zurich, in front of the Russian camp, *which was still standing*, and were there witness to a sight, which I will endeavour to describe while it is yet fresh in my recollection. Certainly nothing like it was ever seen before.

The Russian camp, as I said before, was standing, the whole greatly within the range of the French cannon in their entrenchments on the mountains, from which, however, not a shot was fired, evidently that they might not risk bringing back the Russians, who were running on the road to Lucerne and up the Albis, until the town of Zurich should be carried from the other side.

Before the camp a very fine regiment of hussars, a battalion of infantry and a corps of Cossacks, with eight or ten pieces of artillery, were drawn up in a line of battle, *with no enemy in front*, the French batteries on the mountains ready to take them on their left flank whenever it

should be thought advisable, and the enemy on the opposite side advancing almost on a line with their right flank. Behind us, at the distance of about six miles, were the Russians running like madmen up Mount Albis, actually in possession of the French camp, and apparently inattentive to everything that was passing behind them.

On the opposite side of the river was a battalion and some detached companies of Russians, supported by a regiment of dragoons and some Cossacks retiring slowly before the French, and already within about a mile and a half of Zurich. They were firing without knowing at what, and charging with the bayonet, though they could not see the enemy.

In the vines and hedges before them were two battalions of French chasseurs, dispersed in such a manner that you could not see two of them together, and never showing themselves but at the moment when they fired.

Behind them, along the great road, marched a very strong battalion, formed in a very close column, towards which the chasseurs retreated when the Russians charged into the vineyards with the bayonet.

The regiment of Russian dragoons attempted to charge once or twice, but before they had gone forty yards, they were exposed to so severe a fire from the chasseurs in the vines and on each side of the road, that it was impossible for them to get on.

There was every appearance that the Russians whom we thus saw engaged were all that remained of the camp at Seebach, and of the three battalions stationed on the Limmat.

The troops on the side of Baden were completely cut off. They appeared besides to be occupied in their own defence, as we heard a very heavy cannonade from that side.

On the Zurich-Berg and the ramparts of the town there was not a man to be seen, so that there was every appearance that the town would be carried in half-an-

hour by assault. At this moment I observed a regiment of French chasseurs, some squadrons of hussars, and a piece of artillery turn the top of the hill, about a mile from the village of Höng, and almost on the flank of the Russians. This gun, which was the only one I had yet seen over the water, was immediately unlimbered, and began to fire with astonishing quickness, whilst the chasseurs and the hussars, leaving only a small detachment for the protection of the gun, descended the hill on the other side by a narrow path that leads into the road from Klotten to Zurich.

The fire from this cannon having obliged the Russians to fall still further back, and to come lower down the hill, three pieces of artillery were run down by the French to the banks of the Limmat on the left side of the river, within five hundred yards of the point where we were standing, close behind the line of Russian and French videttes which your Lordship will find described in the little plan I sent in one of my earliest dispatches. They immediately opened across the river a very heavy fire on the left flank of the Russians, and obliged them to fall back almost to the gates of Zurich, and within the protection of their own line of videttes on our side of the water.

Had the Russians and Cossacks on the left bank charged this artillery, they must inevitably have taken all the three pieces, but they were under positive orders not to quit their position.

It was now evident that the French were not yet in force before the town, or they would have risked an immediate attack on Zurich.

It was equally so that they had detached their whole strength over the water within the last two hours, and that it would be in a very short time before Zurich, or they would not have sent these three pieces of cannon unguarded in front of a regiment of hussars and a battalion of infantry. I left things in this situation at one

o'clock, rode through the town, and went out at the Winterthur gate, where I found the hussars and chasseurs who had turned the hill *actually on the Klotten road*, skirmishing with the regiment of dragoons, which I had left retiring along the banks of the Limmat.

The two roads are separated only by a common field, not five hundred yards over, so that the enemy would unquestionably have been in the town before I left it, had not this regiment marched to the Klotten road; for the gate of Winterthur was open, not a piece of cannon near it, and guarded only by some militia of the town.

It was to the judicious conduct of the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart that the town owed its safety at that moment. The Russian officers having entirely lost the faculty of observing what was passing round them, Colonel Stewart took upon him to conduct the regiment, with General Saacken's consent, and to place it in a position where it covered the town effectually till the arrival of some of the regiments from Rapperschwyl.

I have been thus full in stating to your Lordship what I observed myself, not only because from some of the facts I have related your Lordship may learn the nature and causes of the calamity that has befallen us, but because a number of detailed and contradictory accounts will reach England, as well as all parts of the world. This day being certainly one of the most extraordinary and memorable of which we have any accounts in history.

What passed after two o'clock I cannot speak to with any certainty. I believe the whole was one general scene of disorder.

The regiments as they came in from Rapperschwyl and from the Albis, instead of being made to take a position on the Zurich-Berg with their artillery (in which case the enemy would never have dared to enter Zurich), were

led successively through the town against the French, who were hourly receiving reinforcements and bringing up artillery, and sacrificed one by one in attacks which were fruitless only because they were made with insufficient force. Without having seen it, it is not possible to have an idea of the manner in which the Russian infantry behaved. In the course of the morning I had an opportunity of conversing with military men of different services, who all agreed in saying that nothing they had ever seen was at all to be compared to it either for steadiness under fire, or boldness and rapidity of attack.

It was a melancholy thing for those who could understand them to hear the poor soldiers on every side repeating the name of Suworow, and calling on him to come to their assistance. They really expected every moment that he would have appeared on the top of the Albis, on which side they knew he was approaching. About nine in the evening all the surviving troops were shut up in the town with the baggage and the wounded in a state of the most horrible confusion and disorder.

In the morning the French having brought up some heavy artillery began firing on the place.

About eleven or twelve o'clock all that remained of the Russians forced their way out of the town and retreated towards Eglisau, but under what circumstances and with what loss I have not yet been able to learn, nor do we know what has happened to the town, and its unfortunate inhabitants.

At the same time that the enemy crossed the Limmat another body of troops passed the Linth at the head of the lake of Zurich, surprised a part of General Hotze's corps and penetrated to the General's head-quarters, where the Austrians having rallied and being supported by two Russian battalions from Rapperschwyl, the enemy was repulsed and finally driven back over the river.

But General Hotze and Colonel Plunkett having fallen in the early part of the action, and the enemy having

effected another passage near Wesen, the Austrians retired in considerable disorder, and by the latest accounts had actually passed the Rhine at Rheineck.

The Russian corps at Baden appears to have effected its retreat to Eglisau, and to have formed a junction with the troops which escaped from Zurich.

General Nauendorff and the [Prince of] Condé are also in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen to-day, and the Archduke is expected in person.

I have also learned by an express from General Hiller that Field Marshall Suworow had reached Schweitz after having carried the St. Gothard; unfortunately all his magazines were formed at Rapperschwyl, so that I fear unless he can take some of those belonging to the French, that he will be obliged to retreat for want of subsistence.

Nothing is yet lost, and if the Archduke would take upon himself to act with becoming spirit and vigour, this business may yet turn to the disadvantage of the French.

I am afraid however that the loss of the Russians cannot be estimated at less than 10,000 men, so that reinforcements must be obtained from some quarter or other.

Upon this subject I have already written to Lord Mulgrave and Lord Minto.

I humbly trust his Majesty will excuse me if I have sent your Lordship nothing but this hasty and imperfect report. I had hoped to have obtained a moment of leisure (the first since I have left Zurich), but General Hiller has sent a second express to me to beg most earnestly that I would join him immediately at Lindau, from whence he is in hopes to be able to march forward upon St. Gall.

All the English who were in Zurich are safe, and have joined me. Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay is gone to Eglisau to see M. de Korsakoff, and I shall proceed myself to Field Marshall Suworow's head-quarters, after having seen General Hiller.

Your Lordship's dispatches by Basset the messenger were

delivered to me on the 24th. I shall pay due obedience to the commands they contain, and will write to your Lordship fully on their important contents by the first messenger.

The Advoyer de Steiguer was saved, but not without great difficulty. He refused for a long time to leave Zurich, nor would he stir till the greater part of the Swiss Hospital had been removed.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

P.S. 10 A.M.—I have just learned that Constance has been retaken this morning by the dragoons of the Archduke Ferdinand.

Mr. Wickham's notes on the battle of Zurich.*

You ask me two questions with respect to Zurich: first, why I did not send your mother off sooner? secondly, when it was I first ascertained that the French had crossed in force? I will answer them both together by the following short narrative. It was between four and five A.M. that I was waked by firing from the lower Limmat. I instantly dressed, mounted my horse, and galloped along the road to Höng; having first desired your mother, whom I left under the care of St. George,† to get off as fast as she could; passing through the town, and taking the road to Winterthur (observe that I *knew* that the E. battalions, from Regensberg, had been detached, leaving an incompetent force on the river; this rendered me mistrustful). When I left home some streaks of light were visible in the east, but it was still so dark that as I approached Höng I distinctly saw the light of the fusees of howitzer shells crossing the river *from the French side*, so that I had,

* These notes are contained in two letters from Mr. Wickham to his son, written after a visit to Zurich in June 1838. The date of the first is lost, the second is dated Coppet, Saturday, June 30, 1838.

† The Count of St. George, a Swiss gentleman of the Pays de Vaud, at this time private secretary to Mr. Wickham.

even then, no doubt about a passage—whether it was a real one, or a diversion was the object of my expedition; all was quiet about Zurich, and considerably lower down the Limmat than Höng. My adventures on the road, my overtaking first General Hiller, then General Korsakoff, and meeting Colonel Lambert returning from the scene of action wounded, are all detailed in my dispatch. After meeting with Colonel Lambert, neither Hiller nor myself had any doubt about the attack being a real one. Whilst conversing with Korsakoff and Lambert *on the other side* of Höng, about half a league, I observed to the General that the Colonel was wounded, on which he sent him off '*pour se faire pauser*,' having hardly asked him a question; the information collected from him was obtained by questions from Hiller. He had left us only two or three minutes when we heard a tremendous firing on the side of Wollishof, where a Russian corps was stationed. Wollishof is a village on the lake, a good cannon-shot from the extremity of the south-east rampart of Zurich; all was quiet, however, at Zurich and along the river, but the daylight enabled us to see that the French force on the plain, a part of Roger's regiment among them, was very considerably reinforced. The instant the firing began at Wollishof, Korsakoff turned his horse round, and, without a word to either of us, set off full gallop for Zurich, through which he passed without giving any orders, and put himself at the head of the corps at Wollishof, instead of withdrawing that corps and the troops forming the camp in the Sihlfeld through the town, and occupying the Zurichberg. Hiller and myself, having no doubt of the reality of the attack, then returned to the town, but slowly because Hiller was unable to bear either trot or gallop of a horse, having been badly wounded at the first battle of Zurich. On passing in front of the Beckenhof, I entered the house to take leave of my kind friend and landlord M. Hess, and inform him of his perilous situation, General Hiller proceeding to Zurich, from whence he took on himself to send orders to recall the six battalions that had been fatally detached, not from the Geisberg as you suppose, but from Regensdorf, a village behind the chain of hills parallel to the Limmat, of which the Höngberg makes a part. On entering the house, I found my carriages, baggage-waggon, &c., in the courtyard, and your mother fast asleep on her bed, but dressed, and everything ready for an immediate start; she had decided

that the attack was a false one, as she saw that the tents of the Russian camp in the Sihlfeldt were not struck—St. George, also was unhappily of the same opinion: we entered the town together, when I was immediately so pressed to go and try to bring the Russian General back that I could not refuse; and Hiller and I went together on this most decided fool's errand, of which you know the result. I left your mother with bag, baggage, and all about, to mount the Winterthur road—delays happened which I have not room to explain; and on my return, I found her sitting in the carriage with Victor Fischer, the Avoyer's uncle, who had been wounded at Wollishof—and there was a want of horses. I sacrificed my *calêche*, of which the French made a great boast,* and sent my baggage-waggon by cross roads where it escaped by miracle. I then escorted your mother through the perils with which you are acquainted; there was then no other carriage road but that over the Zurichberg to Winterthur, Constance, or St. Gall, along which our travelling carriages could have passed. You know the result. Happily having seen the Russian dragoons in the suburb round the Beckenhof, the idea came into my mind to engage the brave Stewart to try and make them of service. Luckily, on going out of the suburb, he could not see Roger's dragoons, or neither he, instinctively bold as he was, nor the Russian Colonel, would have attempted the charge that saved us. The six battalions at Regensdorf were specially extended to oppose a passage at Dietikon, the only dangerous point, from which they were distant only three quarters of an hour.

I have reserved this cover for the remainder of my late supplementary letter, which will be devoted to Zurich. The first important doubtful point that I cleared up was the following. When with General Hiller in the Sihlfeldt, we observed the French detach from the village of Höng, which they had only just then passed, a battalion at least, probably more, of infantry and two pieces of cannon up a mountain road leading apparently to the top of the Höngberg. It seems however that it branches off to the right among the woods long before it

* The French boasted of the capture not only of the carriage but of Mrs. Wickham also. The Paris papers of the 8th of October contain an announcement that 'l'épouse de Wickham, ministre Anglais, a été prise à Zurich.'

reaches the top, and has its *debouché* just above the road from Zurich *to Schaffhausen*, about a mile from Zurich, exactly opposite to that portion of the road *to Winterthur*, along the Zurichberg (or Geisberg, as it is named in most of the modern maps), of which I found the French in possession. It was the sight of this detachment—he little thought that it would be beforehand with me—that induced Hiller strongly to press my *immediate departure* by the road of Winterhur (as your mother, he supposed, had already taken that road), and not to accompany him along the lake. I have never seen him since, but I have no doubt that he was well acquainted with the short cut through the woods of the Höngberg above mentioned, and knew all the danger which it threatened, viz., the cutting off in a very short time all retreat from Zurich, as well by the Winterthur as the Schaffhausen road. Höng is a little more than a league from Zurich by the upper Baden road, along which the main body of the French was advancing, and probably something nearer to the *debouché* from the woods. Be that as it may, the detachment had made so much diligence that when Stewart's charge had partially cleared my way, I saw the two guns unlimbered in front of the *debouché*, rather a commanding position, with three or four companies of infantry in advance, and actually on the Schaffhausen road, and others mounting the hills between the two roads, whilst the remainder of the detachment, *i.e.* the advanced guard, were not only in possession of a portion of the Winterthur road before us, but that that part of them which was on their right, *i.e.* nearest to Zurich, had actually crossed the road and was skirmishing with the Russians in the woods; so that when we passed under the protection of the astonishment and alarm caused by Stewart's charge, we had for a short space the French on both sides of us and close to us. A little to the left of the two guns was the regiment of chasseurs à cheval, of which General Roger (you remember my conversation with him at Bagneres de Luchon) made a part; 200 or 300 of them were in line on the Schaffhausen road, others were continually following each other out of the wood. This cavalry, till the other day, had always puzzled me, for not only we saw none detached from Höng, but the main advancing army had none with them, at least none in sight. The upper road from Baden along which it advanced is narrow, stony and bad, with vineyards bounded by stone walls on each side over which the French infantry

leaped, as we distinctly saw from the Sihlfeldt, when the Russian dragoons who were retreating before them faced about and charged them, '*à pure perte.*' On this last excursion I distinctly saw that the cavalry had come by a different road from the infantry and the guns, viz., by Regensdorf (not Regensberg), the very spot where the Archduke always had his great reserve—fifteen or sixteen battalions, and from which the Russian reserve of six battalions had been fatally detached at nightfall the preceding evening. It was no wonder that the detachment from Höng should have reached the Winterthur road two hours before the advanced guard of the main body reached the Beckenhof, as the latter was obliged to fight its way, whilst neither the infantry and artillery of the detachment, nor the cavalry from Regensdorf met a single enemy on the road till they had gained the flank of the Geisberg. Secondly, I found a very intelligent Bourgeois in the Winterthur suburb who was sixteen at the time of the battle, and who seems to have observed well all that he could observe without danger; from him I learned that the French chasseurs à cheval had suddenly trotted off to their right, *i.e.* towards Zurich along the Schaffhausen road. He knew nothing however of Stewart's charge, but it is pretty clear that they moved in that direction to cut off his retreat and caused his speedy return to the Beckenhof. Thirdly, I found on the lefthand side of the road and extending along it a considerable distance from the last house of the Winterthur suburb a very extensive orchard the existence of which I had forgotten. It was into this orchard that the French who were on the road suddenly ran for shelter, the cause of which sudden retreat the Bourgeois never suspected before. There were several French on the road when we passed—whether wounded or not I cannot say, but they were evidently more afraid of us than we of them, for we were eight or nine in number going full gallop, with our swords drawn whilst the carriage with four horses puffing and snorting, in full gallop also, made a tremendous cloud. . . . . I rather think that the few French whom we surprised on the road connected us with Stewart's cavalry and were ready to surrender, being cut off by us from the orchard.

(No. 31.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Lindau: 2nd October, 1799.

My Lord,—In addition to what I had the honour of writing to your Lordship on the 30th ult., from Ravenspurg, I have been able to collect the following details of the proceedings of the different armies between the 20th and 28th ult.

Besides the passage effected at Schmerikon at the head of the lake of Zurich, the French passed the Linth in two different places, one near Grinau, the other near Wesen.

On one of these points they were preceded by a party of volunteers who swam across the river naked, having their sabres tied to their necks. These men landed without being observed, about three of the clock on the morning of the 25th, put to death the first Austrian picquet and spiked the cannon of a battery which bore on the point where their main force intended to pass. As soon as these men were landed, they dragged after them some small light rafts composed only of deal planks tied together with cords, on which it is thought that a whole battalion had passed before the alarm was given, and I have been assured by an officer attached to General Hotze's head-quarters, that before the Austrians were in a situation to act with effect the enemy had ten battalions over the water.

The firing began and the alarm was given about half after three.

The night was extremely dark and the whole valley covered with a thick fog till late in the day—a circumstance particularly favourable to the operations of the enemy.

General Hotze, whose head-quarters were at Kalterbrun, got on horseback a little before four and rode immediately to Schennis. At the entrance of the village he peremptorily forbade his officers to go any further, and went

forwards himself accompanied or rather followed only by two dragoons, one of whom he sent back immediately with a message to Colonel Plunkett to bring up the 60th regiment of infantry (the colonel's own regiment) as fast as possible.

In the course of a few minutes a discharge of musketry was heard on the side of the village where the General was gone, and immediately the General's horse returned without its rider. The dragoon who was with him returned also and said that he had seen the General fall, and the enemy rush forward to seize him. Two fruitless attempts were made to rescue his body,—one by Colonel Plunkett, in which that officer fell at the head of his regiment, the other by the Grantz hussars, who also lost their colonel in the attack.

As the news of General Hotze's death became public, the whole army appeared seized with a panic terror that rendered it at the moment incapable of any exertion. This state of things was rendered the more calamitous by the opinion generally entertained in the army of the incapacity of General Petrasch who succeeded to the command; a man in every respect unequal to his situation, and who by his pusillanimous conduct on this occasion has, I fear, rendered the situation of Marshall Suworow (of which I had still a good opinion when I wrote to your Lordship from Ravenspurg) so desperate, that nothing but his own great and vigorous mind, under the blessing of Providence, can possibly save him and his whole army from destruction.

Though the enemy was certainly superior in force, and had already gained some considerable advantages, yet his progress was checked by the defeat of the corps that had passed at Schmerikon; he was not in a situation to have pushed his advantage any further on account of the approach of Marshall Suworow and of Generals Jellachich and Lincken on his rear.

There were besides three excellent positions that

might have been taken successively by the Austrians between Uznach and Rheineck.

The General however from the moment that he saw himself forced to retreat from Uznach determined to abandon them all, and sent orders to the Russians on the side of Rapperschwyl, and to the Swiss who were cantoned along the lake, to retreat *as fast as possible* by Grüningen, Wyl, and St. Gall to Rheineck, *for that he himself should stop nowhere*, and therefore their retreat might be cut off if they did not make it in haste, as the enemy would find nothing to oppose him at Lichtensteig.

The retreat was accordingly made on all sides in a most disorderly and disgraceful manner.

The Austrians retired by Lichtensteig, having their march covered and protected by the feeble remains of the contingents of Schweitz, Uri, and Glarus.

The Russians from Rapperschwyl and the rest of the Swiss retired to St. Gall, where they separated—the Russians marching to Constance, and the Swiss to Rheineck.

The legion of Roverea which covered the march from Wyl reached Rheineck with the loss of only three men, who were massacred together with some Russians by the peasants of the lake, whom no solicitation could ever induce the Archduke to disarm.

Under such very trying circumstances not a single man deserted from this brave corps, or expressed a wish to remain behind.

On this occasion, as on every other since their first formation, they have shown themselves worthy of the cause in which they are engaged, and of his Majesty's favour and protection.

The regiment of Bachmann was charged in a narrow lane by a regiment of Russian hussars flying from Zurich and completely dispersed.

400 men raised in the north-east parts of Switzerland took this opportunity of deserting their colours, to which

the soldiers from the little Cantons alone remained faithful in this regiment.

At Winterthur I found the depôt of the regiment of Bachmann and about 400 recruits, all of whom I brought away with me to Constance, and from thence to this place. In the general confusion they had been left without orders or instructions of any kind.

Colonel Williams was obliged to destroy all his boats, and leave his artillery behind him, and retreat with the legion of Roverea.

Not an enemy, except a few hussars, interrupted or harassed the retreat on any one road. I staid at Winterthur myself very quietly till the evening of the 26th, at which time not a Frenchman had passed the Glatt, and even the party which pushed on to Constance on the 29th consisted only of 250 hussars and chasseurs and two pieces of horse artillery.

The two Russian battalions under General Titof, which had behaved so well at Schmerikon, had arrived at Constance on the 28th and were in possession of the place. Nothing, however, could induce them to maintain it on the appearance of this small party of French before the gates.

They not only left the place in the most disgraceful manner, but they abandoned also the defence of Petershausen; thus leaving open to the enemy, who fortunately was not strong enough to take advantage of it, one of the most important passages in the heart of Germany.

Near Zell they met a squadron of Austrian hussars, the commander of which engaged them to return with him to Constance, and on their approach the French abandoned the place.

As to what passed on the side of Zurich, I have learnt many circumstances that give great room to regret the untimely absence of Lord Mulgrave, and the intrigue which drove his Lordship from the armies.

Had there been a military man of any talents in Zurich

authorized to speak in his Majesty's name, everything might have been retrieved, the position of Zurich maintained, and the enemy driven back over the river in the course of the night of the 25th, or even at twelve o'clock on the following day, notwithstanding the disaster that had befallen General Hotze and the shameful retreat of General Petrasch.

Even on the 27th and 28th it was yet time to have marched forwards from Eglisau, and to have saved Marshal Suworow from the necessity of retreating.

About two o'clock on the afternoon of the 25th, General Korsakoff returned to Zurich, from which time till night, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my dispatch from Ravenspurg, he was employed in leading the battalions one by one as they arrived in succession from the side of Rapperschwyl and from the Albis against the enemy who occupied the houses, hedges, and vineyards opposite the gate of Klotten, so close to the town that it was not possible for more than a single Russian battalion to form in any one spot.

That your Lordship may form some notion of the ground on which this strange action passed, and be able to satisfy yourself at the same time how utterly ignorant the Russian generals are of the first military principles, I have added to this dispatch a sketch of the ground round Zurich. Your Lordship will observe that the gate leading to Klotten is in a bottom, nearly on a level with the river, from whence the fortifications of the town rise rapidly to the gate of Winterthur, which is on the slope of the Zurichberg, the ascent to it from the centre of the town being very steep.

Before the gates of Winterthur there is a little plain of twenty or thirty yards wide extending to the right and left of the gate about two hundred yards each way, beyond which the Zurichberg rises very rapidly and entirely commands the whole town.

The Zurichberg immediately above the town is covered

with vineyards, orchards, and very small inclosures, and higher up with very thick wood.

The road to Winterthur rises from the space of about half a mile from the gate, it then runs along the western side of the Zurichberg almost parallel to the Klotten road, which it commands at the distance of from five to six hundred yards, descending gradually by the village of Schwamendingen to the Glatt.

The road to Klotten, after having passed for a quarter of a mile in the bottom parallel to the Limmat, turns short round to the right, mounts the hill to a point rather above the level of the gate of Winterthur, and then runs nearly parallel with the Winterthur road, but on a lower level and descending gradually to the Glatt by the village of Oerlikon.

The two roads are separated near to Zurich by vineyards, country-houses, and orchards, and further on by some large open fields, across which was the chain of French redoubts when the Archduke attacked General Massena on the 4th of June.

The Klotten road is commanded on the left by the hill called the Höngberg, which runs towards Zurich from the village of Höng, between the Limmat and the Glatt, and along which the French marched on the 25th.

This hill is entirely commanded by the Zurichberg. The two roads are united at the distance of about a mile and a half from the town by a sort of hollow way leading from Oerlikon towards Schwamendingen.

The battalion of Russian grenadiers which I had left on the 25th retiring from Höng towards Zurich was soon after pushed down quite into the road to Baden, between the village of Wipkingen and Zurich, and from thence successively to the point where the roads to Klotten and Baden separate.

It was in the narrow road between this point and Zurich, and to a space of ground of about two or three hundred yards from the same point extending along the

road to Klotten and Baden, that the efforts of the whole Russian army, with some very few exceptions, were confined from this time till night, shut in between vineyards, orchards, and country-houses.

The French immediately got possession of the Beckenhof, a very fine country-house, which together with its gardens and dependencies fills up the angles between the two roads, from which the Russians were never able to dislodge them.

They then pushed their chasseurs over the Klotten road, among the country-houses and vineyards, quite up to the fortifications, and from thence to the Winterthur gate and on to the Zurichberg, where, however, they never established themselves in force.

Twice in the course of the day the General was persuaded by some Swiss officers to send a small force out at the Winterthur gate and occupy the Zurichberg; but he sent each time a number of men quite inadequate to the object, and instead of gaining the heights, the troops kept fighting before the gate and charging the enemy with the bayonet among the vines and hedges, in a ground which did not admit of such an operation.

As soon as the French had advanced so near to Zurich that the three pieces of cannon which they had planted on the left bank of the Limmat could be of no further service, this artillery was turned immediately against the troops in the plain, and two or three battalions brought forward to support this attack, in the hopes of engaging the attention of the regiments that were returning from Mount Albis and preventing them from entering the town.

Here the Russians suffered themselves to be deceived by their enemies and continued fighting before the walls of the town till after sunset.

It seems generally admitted that two Russian battalions, with the Austrian artillery and the Zurich militia (which behaved remarkably well the whole day), would have

been more than sufficient to have protected the suburbs on the left bank of the river, which are tolerably well fortified, from a coup-de-main, and to have defended them against any force of the enemy for two or three days.

If then the remainder of the force from the left bank of the Limmat had been brought upon the Zurichberg and reinforced by the 6,000 men from Rapperschwyl, who might have been led to that position without passing through the town, there does not seem a doubt among military men but that the enemy must at least have desisted from his enterprize unless he had received large reinforcement, which it was impossible for him to obtain as long as M. de Suworow should be on his rear. But as it now appears, it was not necessary to the safety of the place that this measure should have been taken, for in the course of the night the enemy having received information that M. de Suworow had carried the St. Gothard, detached immediately the half of his force towards Lucerne, withdrew his posts from the Zurichberg, *left the road to Winterthur entirely open*, evidently with the intention of tempting the Russians to escape, and took position on the Höngberg, having his advanced posts at the Beckenhof, and some chasseurs dispersed among the vines and orchards close to the town.

A single patrole was sufficient to have discovered this manœuvre, and in fact the General was informed of it at two o'clock in the morning, but he does not seem to have made any disposition in consequence of it.

A sort of council of war was holden about ten at night, at which the General said he should give battle if the enemy opposed his retreat, and if not, that he should retire to Eglisau, the only road which he ought not to have taken.

The general officers went away with the idea that they were to retire the next day to Eglisau, but without any plan for their retreat, nor was any person of the country sent for to give any information as to the road by which

different columns might pass, nor any Swiss officers consulted on any point.

I have seen some persons who talked with several of the Russian generals individually in the course of the night, all of whom declared that they would take no responsibility on themselves, nor act at all without orders from their chief.

Most unfortunately, General Hiller, in consequence of the general confusion and disorder that reigned at Zurich, had thought it necessary to retire in the course of the evening and abandon the town with the Russian army to its fate, from which, at the moment when he went away, he had certainly no reason to hope that any exertions of his could have saved it.

In the course of the morning of the 26th, a column of troops, *preceded by the General*, went very quietly out at the Winterthur gate without any opposition, and turning off somewhere or other reached Eglisau in the course of the day.

Another column gained Winterthur and marched from thence to Eglisau; a third reached Schaffhausen by the Winterthur road; a fourth, followed by the greater part of the baggage, including the military chest and a very fine service of plate belonging to General Korsakoff, turned so suddenly out of the road of Winterthur into that of Klotten, that the French really thought it was marching to attack them, and accordingly fell upon the escort, routed it, and took the whole of the baggage.

I believe that the loss has been much less than was at first apprehended, and may be reduced to 4,000 or 5,000 men. The greater part of the troops arrived safe at Eglisau unmolested by the French, who were very glad to see them march away.

At Eglisau they found the corps from Baden, which seeing itself cut off from Zurich, had retired very quietly to Eglisau, as the only place in the country of which the officers had any knowledge.

I firmly believe that the whole army went there for the same reason.

When the whole was assembled, General Korsakoff burnt the bridge over the Rhine, and retired very quietly to Schaffhausen, nor could any persuasion or exhortation, not even the danger to which he was assured that his retreat would expose Marshall Suworow, induce him to remain on the other side of the river, much less to march and take the position behind the Thur, which was perfectly tenable with his force and which he ought never to have abandoned but at the last extremity.

Colonel Ramsay, who is gone to join General Korsakoff, will no doubt inform your Lordship of what has passed in that quarter since the 29th, as well as of the promises of assistance which the Archduke has given.

I understand that nothing can exceed the confusion and dismay that reigns in the whole Russian army.

I am sorry to add that the Russians behaved extremely ill to a French officer who was sent with a trumpet into the town on the afternoon of the 25th; and that when General Korsakoff made his retreat, he had two officers treating with the French General for the evacuation of the place, both of whom were left without the gates on the side of the Sihl; one of them being a Swiss emigrant was desired by the French General Oudinot to make his escape—the other was sent back under an escort to Schaffhausen.

I must not omit to mention, that the French sent an officer to Schaffhausen to know whether the Russian prisoners were to be maintained at the expense of the Emperor of Russia or of his Majesty, to which General Korsakoff answered at the expense of Great Britain.

I have seen several private accounts from Zurich, all of which agree in doing justice to the French General, who on entering the town protected the inhabitants from pillage and from the insults of the Jacobin party, and connived at the escape of several Swiss officers, who were left behind on the precipitate retreat of the Russians.

The Russians, on the contrary, committed several disorders in the town before they retired, and pillaged the villages through which they passed on the road. They were selling half-worked plate in the streets of Schaffhausen at all prices, from sixpence to four shillings an ounce.

This contrast in the conduct of the two armies is perhaps the most unpleasant and fatal circumstance attending this disastrous affair.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

P.S.—It is with real concern that I inform your Lordship that the whole of M. de Korsakoff's correspondance and papers of every kind have fallen into the hands of the enemy; amongst them is the most material part of M. Dandré and General Pichegru's communications and the whole history of the intrigue of the Director Barras, all of which had been sent to M. de Korsakoff, in part from Mittau, in part from St. Petersburg.

(No. 33.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Wangen: 6th October, 1799.

My Lord,—I have infinite satisfaction in informing your Lordship that favourable accounts have at last reached us from F. M. Suworow.

General Linken received a letter from him on the morning of the 4th, dated Glarus the 2nd inst., in which he says it is his intention to penetrate into the road from Urseren to Coire by a mountain path very little frequented, that leads from the head of the Linththal over the Clarida Alps to Ilanz, by a village (marked only in Meyer's map) called Panix.

The Marshall does not say by what road he had reached Glarus, nor does he seem to apprehend any difficulties in his way.

He merely says that he shall be at Ilanz the 6th, and

at Coire the 7th inst. He does not speak of his having sustained any loss, nor judging from the orders he has given to the army commissaries can his army have been much diminished.

I shall proceed to-morrow to join the Marshall—in the meantime I feel it my duty to send off a messenger with this interesting intelligence, the more so as I have it in my power to inform your Lordship that the Russians marched to-day to take possession of Thur, and that the Archduke will make a forward movement to Zurich to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

P.S., October 7, 1799.—I detained the messenger till to-day in the hope to be able to send your Lordship some satisfactory account of Marshall Suworow. Nothing has yet reached me from that quarter; but on the other hand I learn that the Archduke has given up his project of attack, on learning Marshall Suworow's intention of retiring into the Grisons.

I am the less surprized at this determination, as the principal if not only object of H.R.H. was to relieve Marshall Suworow from the dangerous situation in which he had been left in the little Cantons.

Besides, on the Marshall's retreat H.R.H. would have had the whole French force brought against him, which, with a general as M. de Korsakoff, and none but beaten dispirited troops to cover his left, he would really not have been able to have contended with.

I trust that it is still the intention of H.R.H. to make a general attack on the enemy in concert with Field-Marshall Suworow; but upon that point I hope I shall be better able to inform your Lordship.

(No. 34.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy). Wangen: 7th October, 1799. 7 P.M.

My Lord,—I was on the point of sending off the messenger with my dispatches Nos. 31, 32, and 33, when I received about half an hour since an official account from Marshall Suworow's army, brought by a Swiss officer, whom at General Hotze's desire I had sent to the Marshall to assist in conducting his army over the St. Gothard. I learn from this officer the following details: on the 26th ult. the vanguard of the army passed from Altdorf into the Muttenthal without opposition.

On the 27th the main body and the rearguard performed the same march, not without the utmost difficulty.

On the 28th Marshall Suworow received a full confirmation of the death of General Hotze, and of the defeat of M. de Korsakoff. On the same day the resolution was taken to retreat by the canton of Glarus and the Grisons.

On the 29th General Auffenbourg, who commanded the vanguard of the army, forced the passage of the Pragel, a high mountain which separates the Canton of Glarus from that of Schweitz, of which the French had taken possession in great force after the retreat of General Linken from Glarus.

On the 30th General Auffenbourg forced the enemy to abandon the passages of the Klönthal and to retire to Nettstall.

On the 1st instant he repulsed them quite to Mollis, of which village he took possession, but was driven out of it in the evening and retired to Nettstall, covering the entrance of the Klönthal, out of which the whole army had not defiled till late on the 2nd instant.

On the 2nd General Auffenbourg, with the vanguard only, left Nettstall and Glarus and arrived by the Sernfthal at Elm or Elmis, the main body of the army remaining still at Glarus. On the 3rd, he crossed the glaciers

that separate the Canton of Glarus from the Grisons and arrived at the village called Panis or Panix, the main body being still at Glarus; on the 4th he arrived at Ilanz, and on the 5th at Coire. On the 4th the Marshall was still at Glarus. On the 5th General Linken set out for Ilanz to protect the Marshall's retreat, which at the best must be made with infinite danger and difficulty, the last passage being by far the most hazardous of any that is known in the Swiss Alps. On the same day General Linken received a letter from the Marshall saying, that he should not arrive at Ilanz before the 8th. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Marshall was persuaded to leave the Muttenthal, and there is reason to apprehend that after General Auffenbourg's departure he has taken the resolution to remain at Glarus on some unknown project or speculation of his own.

Lord William Bentinck was not with the Marshall, but General Auffenbourg speaks in the highest terms of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Clinton, without whose assistance, he says, it would have been impossible to have engaged the Marshall to take the measures by which alone the army could have been saved from total destruction. I believe there is no example of a march that can be compared to this in the history of the world, the high Alps having been crossed four times in the space of fourteen days.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Copy.) Donaueschingen: 9 Oct. 1799.

To the Marshal Prince Suworow,—I am informed at this very moment, by a notice from Lieutenant-General Petrasch, that Monsieur le Maréchal is occupying with his troops the position between Coire and Mayenfeld. I am therefore under the necessity of putting before the Prince the situation of the Russian troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Count Korsakoff and the Prince of Condé. These troops have entirely abandoned the left bank of the Rhine, those of the Prince of

Condé, without being forced, have even evacuated the Abbey of Petershausen, in front of Constance, so that I have been obliged to occupy this important post with my own troops, and to detach from them 7 battalions and 12 squadrons, under the command of Lieutenant-General Count Nauendorf.

The troops under the orders of Lieutenant-General Count Korsakoff occupy the ground from Eglisau to Stein; and according to my dispositions of to-day, the corps of Condé should occupy that of the Lake of Constance from Hernadingen to Buchhorn.

After this explanation of the state of affairs, Monsieur le Maréchal will be better able to judge which of the two corps will be most useful for his operations, and I pray him therefore to furnish me with his instructions through the medium of my 'Adjudant d'Aile,' Count Bubna, the more so as I pledge myself anew to use every means in my power to facilitate this enterprise against Switzerland, and it is for this reason that I wish to be informed of his projects.

With regard to the provisions and munitions of war of which your Excellency requires an advance, I have already given orders to Lieutenant-General Baron Petrasch to employ all his means for that object, and an order has equally been given to my commissariat. As to the ammunition, the Lieutenant-General has orders to furnish from his magazine at Bregenz as much as the weight of the guns will render practicable.

Lastly, I find myself obliged to urge upon Monsieur le Maréchal, the strict defence of the Upper Grisons, as that outlet not only endangers the passes leading to the Tyrol, the Hereditary States, and Italy, but also threatens the position of the two armies, the more so that according to the manner in which the enemy carries on war, it will not have escaped your Excellency's discernment that in the midst of the principal operation, he knows how to profit by the smallest facilities one gives him.

Field-Marshal Suworow to the Archduke Charles.

(Translation of Copy delivered to Mr. Wickham by the Field-Marshal himself at Feldkirch.) Balzers: 11th October, 1799.

To H.R.H. the Archduke Charles,—The letter of your Royal Highness of the date of the 9th instant, which has been delivered to me by Count Bubna, has entirely reassured me as to the announcement of yesterday of the loss of Constance. H.R.H. while receiving my thanks, receives at the same time, in the conviction of having laboured for the general good, the finest recompense for the measures he has taken for the defence and the preservation of Petershausen.

Being informed by your last despatch of the position of the corps of Korsakoff and of the Prince of Condé, and being fully persuaded that H.R.H. will have the kindness to assist these two corps with his advice and support, I have decided to act as soon as possible on the offensive, to force my way through St. Gall, Wyl, the river Töss, and to effect my junction with the corps of Korsakoff and of Condé.

I do not conceal from your Royal Highness that I hope by this measure to cover the Grisons and the Vorarlberg more than by extending my line on the defensive. As it is of absolute necessity to employ all my forces on the offensive, my opinion would be to leave nothing behind, because those troops not only become useless, but also weaken the acting corps.

The enemy being already master of Dissentis and Ravis, in spite of the posts that had been established to cover those places, I think it will be necessary for the moment to fetter the enemy on the right bank of the Rhine, by the manœuvre on St. Gall, the demolition of the bridges of Feldberg and Zollbrücke, finally by the occupation of the entrenchments on the left bank of the Ill near to Feldkirch; up to the moment when the battle on the left bank of the Rhine having been gained, our

approach by the river Töss will force these desperadoes to retire.

By leaving 3,000 men near Feldkirch, there remains to us 16,000 Austrian troops, who, added to the Russians, form a corps of 25,000 men, whom we necessarily require up to the moment of our junction at the river.

As I expect to reach Feldkirch to-morrow, I shall settle the rest with Lieutenant-General Baron Petrasch; as to the passage of the Rhine, it can only be effected on the 15th at soonest, considering the time that is required for collecting the Austrian troops. While reserving to myself to determine the plan and the day of attack, of which I will inform H.R.H later, I find myself obliged to ask him to allow to these two corps, in due time, officers from his own staff, and to provide them with a sufficient support of Austrian troops.

H.R.H.'s manner of thinking for the good cause, as well as his sagacity, will enable him to perceive that the proposed plan of operations should not only carry with it the complete deliverance of Switzerland, but its success will also give great facility to the operations which will be eventually undertaken in the Empire, so that I hope that H.R.H. will use on his side all the means in his power to make it entirely successful.*

* (Translation.) The Archduke Charles not only accepted the offer of M. de Suworow to resume the offensive, but he sent his adjutant, Colloredo, to Feldkirch to concert a plan of operations based on the passage of the Rhine by way of Constance, and of Schaffhausen by the whole Austrian army that had arrived from Manheim. The conduct of Marshal Suworow on this occasion seemed as extraordinary (to use no stronger expression) as that of M. de Korsakoff at Zurich. The secret causes of this behaviour are known to me, having acted as the medium of communication between him and the Archduke. It suffices here to say that the Archduke behaved on this occasion with frankness and integrity, lending himself to all the tergiversations and caprices of the Marshal, furnishing him, moreover, with all the pontoons, heavy artillery, staff officers of which he was in want, &c. &c. &c., and that it is to the Marshal only that we must attribute the failure of that operation. —W. WICKHAM.

(No. 35.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy). Feldkirch: 11th October, 1799.

My Lord,—Knowing that Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Clinton has transmitted to your Lordship a detailed account of the march of the Russian army across the Alps, and of the arrival of Marshall Suworow at Coire, I shall not attempt to add anything to what that officer has written on the subject.

I informed your Lordship that the Archduke had abandoned all idea of offensive operations as soon as he was informed that Marshall Suworow had effected his retreat to Glarus, and was preparing to retire to Coire.

When H.R.H.'s determination was known, M. de Korsakoff's army took the following position.

The Prince of Condé with his own corps and the regiments of Bauir and Titof occupied Constance and Petershausen.

Colonel Engelhardt with three battalions defended the bridge of Stein.

General Weinow with 4,000 men occupied Diessenhofen. Three battalions were placed in the tête de pont of Büsingen, a new and very fine work built by the Austrians since their entry into Switzerland, about a league above Schaffhausen.

On the 6th the enemy reconnoitred the whole line.

On the 7th inst. the enemy, who had nothing further to fear on the side of Marshall Suworow, having received considerable reinforcements from the Cantons of Schweitz and Glarus, attacked the whole line in great force; according to the best accounts, not less than 25,000 men.

At Constance he was completely successful, having surprized the town, and very nearly cut off the Prince of Condé with his troops. H.S.H., after having cut down the bridge, retired with precipitation towards Zell, having reason to fear from the heavy fire he had heard on his

right, he should be cut off in the peninsula between the two lakes.

Colonel Englehardt was beaten at Stein, and obliged to destroy the bridge.

At Diessenhofen General Weinow obtained a slight advantage, took some prisoners, and a piece of cannon; but was afterwards obliged to retire, and cut down the bridge in consequence of the successes of the enemy on the left.

At Büsingen, where General Korsakoff commanded in person, the enemy was compleatly beaten, and driven in disorder as far as Trullikon.

Here the Russians ought to have stopped, instead of which they pushed on as far as the Thur, where they met a strong column of the enemy, that had just passed the bridge of Andelfingen.

The retreat was immediately commanded and effected without difficulty to the tête de pont, which the French attempted to carry by storm, but were repulsed with great loss, notwithstanding which General Korsakoff abandoned the fortification in the course of the night, and took up the pontoon of which the bridge was composed, thus leaving the enemy entirely master of Switzerland, and depriving the Allies of the only passage that remained open into that country.

I cannot omit mentioning on this occasion that the first thing the Russians did on taking possession of the tête de pont was to tear up the pallisades and make fires with them.

Constance has since been abandoned by the French, but was taken again by them on the 13th inst.

The conduct of M. de Korsakoff in abandoning the tête de pont of Büsingen gave rise to a very unpleasant correspondance between that General and the Archduke, in which H.R.H. made use of some very strong and severe expressions reflecting on the behaviour of the Russian generals since their arrival in Switzerland, and pointing

out how impossible it would be for H.R.H. to place any further confidence in any co-operation on their part.

The disorderly conduct of M. de Korsakoff's army is such, and the spirit of pillage and plunder carried to such an extent, as to excite the general indignation of the whole country. Already some individuals of the army have been put to death, and it seems scarcely possible, unless some remedy be found for this dreadful evil, that there should not be a general insurrection of the peasants in the parts of Swabia which I have just left.

I am most truly sorry to have to add that the conduct of the Italian army is still worse, and the pillage carried on with infinitely more audacity. The Cossacks not only steal whatever they can lay their hands on, but they stop passengers on the road, and enter the peasants' houses and force them to give them both provisions and money.

I met the army on its march to-day, every soldier loaded with the plunder of the poor inhabitants of Uri, Schweitz, and Glarus by whom they had been received as friends and deliverers, and who had rendered them the most essential services on their whole march. They were preceded by the Cossacks and by the vanguard, which was already encamped in the plain between this town and Hohen Ems, where they had turned their horses loose into the finest fields of Indian corn, of which they were plucking up large quantities by the roots to make roofs for the huts they were erecting for the army, though within ten minutes' march of a wood that would have furnished them in abundance with far better materials.

The inhabitants of the country, who are all armed, were standing by and looking at the scene with a degree of patience that astonished me, and could only be explained by the certainty in which they were that the army would move forward immediately.

Though I only arrived here this morning, I have already been waited on by a deputation of the town to represent

the dreadful state of the country, and to entreat my interference with the generals that some consideration may be paid to the peasants, many of whom have lost the whole of their winter's provisions.

I find the same complaint from the Grisons, particularly from the neighbourhood of Coire and Mayenfeld, where the whole vintage has been nearly destroyed; the Russian soldiers boiling the grapes in their soup. And it is with pain that I add that Marshall Suworow, far from checking these disorders, will not suffer any person to speak to him on the subject, and the subaltern officers in general are parties to the plunder of the soldiers.

I learnt from Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton, that the evil was nearly as great in Italy, though the army was supplied with rations from the Austrian magazines. Here, where they have nothing but what the country can furnish them with, and their pay, which to a common soldier is only three farthings a day, it is impossible to expect that they should live like other troops, or that the country should not be devoured by them wherever they go. It is the common language of the people that the French mode of laying contributions on the country at large, which fell equally on every man according to his faculties, was mercy when compared with the conduct of the Russians.

I have not yet had the honour of seeing Marshall Suworow, but I feel it my duty to mention the subject to him, however disagreeable it may be, and I trust that I shall be able to make him sensible of the danger as well as the impracticability of his present system, if he is to remain with his army in this part of Europe, where such things are quite unknown and will certainly not be tolerated.

(No. 36.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Feldkirch: 12th October, 1799.

My Lord,—On my arrival here I find that in consequence of a letter from the Archduke recommending

to Marshall Suworow to make a forward movement which H.R.H. promises to assist with a respectable force, a plan of operations has been prepared by Colonel Weyrother, and adopted by the Marshall.

It will be forwarded to the Archduke this night for H.R.H.'s approbation. According to the plan proposed a bridge will be thrown over the Rhine at Abstettin, on the night of the 17th and 18th inst., over which the Marshall's army (which I am sorry to say does not exceed 11,000 or at the very utmost 12,000 infantry), supported by from 12,000 to 14,000 Austrians, will march into the Rheinthal.

A column from 4,000 to 5,000 men composed of Austrians alone, will turn immediately to the left, and after having secured the pass of Hirschensprung, will march through the mountains as far as Gais towards St. Gall. The Marshall will march the same day to Rheineck. On his arrival at that place a second bridge will be thrown over the Rhine in the rear of his army, and on the 19th both corps will move forwards to St. Gall.

On the same day General Nauendorf, with the Condé army and 4,000 or 5,000 Austrians, will march to Pfyn, upon the Thur. General Korsakoff will advance with his whole army to the same river, and the Archduke will pass the Rhine with 15,000 men on the left of M. de Korsakoff.

The whole is to be united between Wyl and Winterthur, that is between the Thur and the Töss.

It is there to be determined what further operations should be undertaken.

As the two armies will be very much intermixed, as the Russians will everywhere have their flanks covered by the Austrians, so that they cannot very well be either turned or surprised, and as all their columns will be conducted by Austrian staff officers, I trust that there is every probability of the whole army reaching the point of reunion; probably not without having gained some signal success over the enemy, to which it is certainly very

competent as well in numbers as in composition of troops. What is to be done afterwards must necessarily depend, as well on the circumstances that shall have happened during the march, as upon the number of Austrian troops that the Archduke will leave behind him in Switzerland.

Most certainly the Russian army alone is wholly incompetent in every respect to maintain itself in that country.

Colonel Ramsay will have informed your Lordship of the deplorable state in which he found General Korsakoff's army. I believe however from what I have learnt here, that he was not acquainted with the weakness of its numbers.

I am sorry to say from the returns transmitted to Marshall Suworow that its effective force in infantry does not exceed 17,000 men the Condé army included. I have already told your Lordship that the Marshall has not 12,000 infantry under his orders.

The disorderly conduct of the troops and the spirit of pillage and plunder, which seems from everything I can learn to be reduced almost to a regular system in the Marshall's army, will necessarily exhaust the resources of every country where it shall be established for any length of time, and make officers and men equally odious to the inhabitants.

The general and field officers are, with few exceptions, ignorant of everything but mere regimental duty, and the whole army, from Marshall Suworow downwards, not only unskilled in the sort of war that must be carried on in a mountainous country, but since their last disasters entirely averse to engaging themselves again in Switzerland. I have just had some conversation with some of the principal officers particularly Prince Gortschakoff and Prince Bagration,* when I found them expressing their astonishment that the Marshall should have approved of Colonel Weyrother's plan, and speaking of the army as

* Prince Peter Bagration, the distinguished Russian general, was born in 1762 and killed in 1812.

unequal to any operation whatever and fit only for winter quarters.

The army is without magazines of any kind, and its internal formation is in that respect so vicious that in its present system it never can form any to the extent that would be required were the troops either to be cantoned along the Aar or the Jura, or to push their operations further where every pound of bread and every ration of hay and corn must be transported from Swabia.

In this state of things I think the inevitable consequence of the army advancing in Switzerland by itself or with a feeble corps of Austrian auxiliaries, without a better arrangement for its subsistence and without being under the absolute direction of an Austrian staff, would be a speedy and total defeat, and a general insurrection of the inhabitants on the first disaster that should befall the army, whose retreat would be absolutely impossible were the people of the country to break up the roads and cut down the bridges on the Reus, the Limmat, the Glatt, the Töss or the Thur, which, from the experience they had of the conduct of a Russian army in retreat after the affair of Zurich, I think they would unquestionably do.

Your Lordship may be entirely persuaded that there is no exaggeration whatever in the statement I have made either of the condition of the Russian army or of the consequences by which its entry into Switzerland must be followed.

On the other hand, I am persuaded that there is nothing of which these troops would not be capable were they commanded by able and intelligent officers, and were there any internal administration and economy in the army.

Amidst all the difficulties and disadvantages under which they labour, they show a degree of bravery and intrepidity in the field, of patience under sufferings, of docility and of attention and submission to their leaders, that is without example in modern times; and notwithstanding their late disasters, I am confident that they are still terrible to the enemy, who will never meet them but

with arms which these poor people have not yet been taught to encounter.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

General Korsakoff to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.)

Monsieur,—I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter dated the 8th, from Wangen, together with a note from the States of the Circle of Swabia on the subject of payment for the transport of munitions from the laboratory of Moersbourg to Memingen and Pfullendorf for the Russian troops. I am of opinion, your Excellency, that this demand of the States of the Circle of Swabia is very just. They certainly ought to receive compensation for the difficulty and the trouble, with at least some small sums of money. But I do not yet know if this expense falls upon me, for according to the arrangement between the two Imperial Courts I ought to receive the munitions of war all complete, and give receipts for what I received, but if this first arrangement has undergone any changes, and I ought now to go into the expenses of transport from the laboratory, I will at once send some money to satisfy the claim urged by the Circle of Swabia for the waggons employed for that purpose.

I beg your Excellency to let me know if Colonel Ramsay is with you at Wangen or if he is elsewhere, for I shall have occasion to write to him respecting money matters, and you will oblige me, Sir, by presenting my compliments to him.

Accept the homage of the very distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your Excellency's very humble and very obedient servant,

RIMSKOY KORSAKOFF.

13th Oct., 1799.—From the camp near the village of Benzingen.
To His Excellency M. DE WICKHAM.

The Archduke Charles to General Korsakoff.

(Translation of Copy.) Donaueschingen: 14th October, 1799.

I understand from a letter of the Marshall Prince Suworow which has reached me this morning by a courier, that there is a pressing need, for the general welfare, of sending a considerable support to Feldkirch.

As I have not a sufficient number of Austrian troops in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen and Singen to provide the reinforcement I should wish, and as the infantry of the Lieutenant-General cannot be divided, I can find no other means than that of proposing to you, to march with the whole of your corps and the Palatinate troops to Marshall Suworow and to direct your march in the following manner. To-morrow, the 15th October, to Stockach; the 16th to Sallmannsweiler; the 17th to Buchhorn; the 18th to Lindau, at Lindau the Marshall will give you the other necessary instructions.

The corps can, to-morrow, provide itself at Stockach from the imperial magazine with hay and oats for three days, and also with bread for three days if possible, if not for two.

The troops should carry their provisions with them, and it is not permitted to any one, on any pretext whatever, to take the peasants' carriages, because to do so would render impossible the transport of provisions for the army.

The corps can again at Lindau have forage and bread for three days from the imperial magazine.

It is of the utmost necessity that every one who cannot be of use before the enemy, should be relegated to the baggage, because they increase the difficulty of providing for the army.

I doubt the Marshal being in want of more cavalry than he already has with him, for his operations, I think

therefore that it would be better for you to send the whole of yours into the neighbourhood of the Danube between Riedlingen, Mengen, &c., where their subsistence will be provided for, and from whence, after Marshal Suworow shall have penetrated into Switzerland, it will be easy to recall them. If you wish to take your cavalry with you as far as Lindau, you can do so, only you must leave it between Lindau and Buchhorn, because in addition to my being assured that the Marshal is not in want of such a force of cavalry for his operations, I am persuaded that one must not even think it possible to support it in the Vorarlberg.

It is only necessary that the Lieutenant-General should inform me at once from which of these two points he prefers sending his cavalry.

This is what I have to propose to you for the good of the service, and I request you to put it into execution without making any difficulty.

To the Russian General RIMSKOY KORSAKOFF.

The Archduke Charles to Field Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Copy.) Donaueschingen: 14th October, 1799.

I have this morning received, by Captain Mayer, the letter which Monsieur le Maréchal has addressed to me of the date of the 12th instant.

I see by the dispositions which you have the goodness to communicate to me, the manner in which the Prince proposes to make the projected attack, and I have resolved, in consequence, to give you my remarks on the said dispositions.

The enemy, according to all accounts, has at this moment an army of about 30,000 men in the environs of St. Gall and the lake of Wallenstadt; he has divided the remainder of his forces, and appointed one part to cover his left flank from Constance to Basle, and the other he

has brought into the Canton of Uri and the country of the Valais to threaten the left wing of the combined army in Switzerland, as well as the rear of the army of Italy.

The enemy occupies Sargans, and the left bank of the Rhine from thence to the sea.

From my point of view, this position of the enemy renders any passage of the Rhine in that part very difficult, and gives him time to muster at the most favourable points, so as to meet the column with advantage.

Our troops abandoning Coire, Ragatz, and Mayenfeld, there is no doubt that the enemy will occupy those places, and at once repair all the wooden bridges.

All this might well happen before you began your operations, and would bring with it the disastrous result that the same day on which the Prince undertook to force the passage of the Rhine, the enemy would push forward from Sargans and Grabs on the side of Hirschensprung and Altstätten, and by this manœuvre occasion great difficulties for the troops who had already passed the Rhine to surmount, in order to maintain themselves on the left bank.

To all this it is necessary to add that not only ought the enemy to be driven from Switzerland by your operations, but also that the Vorarlberg and the hereditary States of H.M. the Emperor and King should be preserved, from the first moment, in the case of an unforeseen disaster, from an irruption of the enemy.

I think then, that to combine these two important objects, and to be able to put them into execution at the same time, it is of importance that M. le Prince should have the goodness to commence operations by attacking the enemy near Sargans, and while one part of our troops pursued him towards Wallenstadt, the other should push forward in the direction of Grabs, at the same time he should be threatened with a passage of the Rhine lower

down, till the favourable moment for effecting the real passage should arrive.

According to my opinion, that is the only way in which M. le Maréchal could undertake his operations on St. Gall with any certainty.

I find also, as M. le Maréchal has had the goodness to point out to me in his letter from Balzers, that you have too few troops for an enterprise of this importance; for this very reason I shall make it the most sacred duty to put every means into execution to reinforce him.

I should have wished to send you this reinforcement entirely of Austrian troops, but their distance, without losing an infinitude of time, renders the accomplishment of this wish impossible. In consequence I have this day begged Lieutenant-General Korsakoff to put his corps in motion to rejoin you. Monsieur le Maréchal will see by my enclosure what I have written to him on this subject, as well as the way in which his marches are distributed, and his troops provisioned.

I am fully persuaded of the necessity for us all to employ every means to drive the enemy out of Switzerland, and the Prince may be assured I will do all in my power for the execution of this project.

I have for this reason begged the Prince of Condé to remain at Petershausen with his corps. The corps is so weak in infantry, that I have judged it more *à propos* to leave it where it is now.

I am very sorry that owing to circumstances M. le Maréchal should be obliged to postpone the commencement of his operations till after the 20th instant. Although the smallest time lost may be very injurious, I think it necessary to make the sacrifice of this delay for the safety of our operations.

As soon as M. le Maréchal has informed me of the day on which he will undertake his operations, I shall do all on my side to detach a considerable corps beyond the Rhine—whether on the side of Biessingen or lower, so as

to give the enemy all the uneasiness possible respecting his rear. The Prince of Condé will only be able to join the Prince when he has reached the environs of Wyl, and pushed forward a column against Pfyn.

I shall take care that M. le Maréchal wants neither pontoons, nor flying bridges, nor munitions until the Prince finds himself in a position to provide himself with them.

The Austrian General Baron Hiller accompanies the corps of the Russian army. He is a man of talent and knows the country thoroughly as far as Zurich. I recommend him to you as a very honourable man, and as a very well-informed one; he will be able to be of great service to M. le Maréchal if he has the goodness to employ him.

To Monsieur le Maréchal Prince SUWORROW.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Copy.) Donaueschingen: 15 October, 1799.

I have this instant received the Prince's letter dated the 14th inst. in which I see with great surprise the sudden change of your plan, as well as your design of marching through Swabia with the corps of the Russian army, to rejoin General Korsakow.

This movement is the most prejudicial of all as regards operations, as it will oblige me on my side to abandon the Empire, and it will put you in the position of not being able in any wise to find subsistence for the Russian army, nor to provide yourself with the most necessary things, of which you are in very great want.

I still hope, that Monsieur le Maréchal will give the most mature reflexion to the movement which he has planned, as from his resolution the greatest disasters may result.

In the event of your not finding practicable the sug-

gestion I had the honour to make to you in my former letter, I urge you to remain with your army in the Vorarlberg, until I have sent the necessary troops to Lieutenant-General Baron Petrasch, for the defence of this country.

I beg Monsieur le Prince to let me have his answer as soon as possible, so that I may take my measures accordingly.

To Monsieur Le Mareschal Prince Italisky
Comte SUWORROW RIMNIKSKY.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow.

(Translation.) Donaueschingen: 18th October, 1799.

I have this instant received, by my 'adjudant d'aile' Major Count Bubna, the letter which your Excellency addressed to me yesterday, by which I see that your Excellency is entirely persuaded that the Russian army is absolutely unable to continue operations, and are therefore obliged to give it the necessary time for recovering itself; that you will, notwithstanding, place your infantry and hold it in readiness between Lindau and Hohen Ems, your cavalry between Lindau and Buchhorn. I cannot but regard these dispositions, however necessary they may be, as very prejudicial for the future.

I must then beg your Excellency to watch with his army over the safety and the most rigorous defence of the country between Lindau and Hohen Ems, in order that Lieutenant-General Baron de Petrasch may be in a position to detach some troops from his right wing on the side of the Grisons, so as to defend the whole country in front of Feldkirch, because not only the Grisons and the Vorarlberg and your Position would be threatened, but also I should be forced to abandon the territory which I occupy, in order to retire—which would cause

* The original letter was delivered to Mr. Wickham and is now in the Editor's possession.

the loss of all the fruits of the campaign and would have the most disastrous effect on the operations in Italy.

All this is of such great importance for the general good, that I should wish to have the honour of speaking in person to your Excellency on the subject. Stockach seems to be the most suitable place for this interview. I therefore beg your Excellency, if you are of the same opinion, to inform me on what day you will be there, so that I may be in readiness.

CARL.

To Monsieur Le Mareschal Prince SUWORROW.

(No. 37.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Wangen: 17th October, 1799.

My Lord,—On the evening of the 12th, after writing my dispatches, No. 35 and No. 36, and in the course of the 13th and 14th, I had several conferences with Marshall Suworow, of which I shall endeavour to give your Lordship a particular account, as in the course of them I have collected some information as to the Marshall's character, opinions, and present views, which if it furnishes but little hope of deriving any further service from the Russian army during the campaign (which I much fear will be the case), may perhaps be found materially useful in forming a decision as to the manner in which it can hereafter be employed to the best advantage.

I am truly sorry to say that the statement I shall have to make to your Lordship will in many respects be a most unsatisfactory and a most unpleasant one.

When I waited on the Marshall for the first time about eight o'clock in the evening of the 12th inst, I found him holding a council of war for the purpose of discussing the plan of Colonel Weyrother, of which I have given a particular account in my No. 36.

There were present the Marshall, Colonel Weyrother, three Russian generals (amongst whom were neither

General Derfelden, nor Rosenberg, the only two of any reputation in the whole army), and an Austrian staff officer, who had been sent to the Marshall by the Archduke.

The Marshall immediately directed that I should be called in, and desired me to sit down and listen to the plan, saying that he might have occasion to ask me some questions about the part of the country in which it was intended that the operations should be carried on.

Colonel Weyrother had only just begun to read the plan, so that I had an opportunity of hearing the whole of it.

I observed that the Marshall listened to the whole with the greatest attention, asking many questions as to the distances from place to place, and the roads by which the enemy could march, and those by which the different corps of the Allies were to communicate with each other, but making few or rather no objections, and finding no difficulties in any part of the project, which he seemed to approve so much, that he was averse to delaying its execution until an answer should be received from the Archduke.

He very soon, however, gave up this point, and a letter to H.R.H. inclosing a copy of the plan and pressing for H.R.H.'s support and co-operation *as to a plan entirely approved by the Marshall and adopted as his own*, was prepared immediately by Colonel Weyrother and signed by the Marshall, and dispatched in the course of the night by the Austrian staff officer, who was expected to return with the answer this morning.

After the Council was separated, the Marshall told me that he had a courier to dispatch to Petersburg, which would prevent his talking with me much upon business himself, but that knowing I was coming, he had told the greater part of what he had to say, and given all the letters which he wished to show me, to his nephew Prince

Gortschakoff, with whom he desired me to communicate in the most confidential manner on all subjects.

The Prince, who is a young man of two or three and twenty, apparently of very moderate abilities and of still less information, showed me the whole of the Marshall's correspondance with the King of Sardinia and his Ministers, and related to me what had passed between the Marshall and the Court of Vienna, nearly in the same manner as the Marshall himself had done to Lieutenant-Colonel H. Clinton.

During my conversation, the Marshall frequently came out to us repeating much of what Prince Gortschakoff had said, particularly dwelling on the hard fate of the King of Sardinia and repeating his fears lest M. de Thugut should succeed in his intrigues at the Court of Petersburg, where, he said, that he had offered to make H.R.H. the Palatine of Hungary immediately on his marriage a sovereign Prince in Italy entirely independent of the head of the House of Austria. He complained severely of the Court of Vienna in interrupting the course of his conquests, and in sending the Russian army into Switzerland, declaring that if before he had left Tortona he had received my letter of the 10th of September, stating the difficulties of the enterprise, he certainly would not have undertaken it.

On the 13th I dined with the Marshall, at eight o'clock in the morning, when his whole behaviour was so extraordinary, that though I had been apprised of it beforehand, yet, had I not had myself such evident proofs of the strength of his mind, I should certainly have taken him for a madman whose understanding was gone:—his knees were bent as if from old age; which was not the case when I saw him on business the night before—he walked about the room with his hands and his head hanging like those of an idiot, talking nonsense to everybody, mixed occasionally with shrewd and sensible

remarks on all kinds of subjects, and occasionally very severe on the Austrians and the Cabinet of Vienna.

The dinner, the whole manner of serving it, and above all the servants who attended, were so very dirty and disgusting that General Jellachich, though a Croat, could not bring himself to eat a single mouthful, at which the Marshall either was, or affected to be, much offended.

After dinner, which lasted three hours, he went immediately to bed, and did not get up till four, nor see anybody till five in the afternoon; and it is in this manner that the best part of the day is constantly lost.

In the evening H.I.H. the Grand Duke Constantine arrived from Hohen-Ems and had a conference with the Marshall of several hours, at which the Russian generals only were present.

Early the next morning he sent for me, as he said, upon particular business.

"Whilst I was waiting in the ante-chamber I learnt that the Marshall had seen a vision in the night which would prevent his undertaking the projected enterprise. I had previously learnt that the Grand Duke had absolutely insisted on his abandoning it.

When I entered his room he laid a map of Switzerland on the table, and after saying that the army was in so dreadful a state that it was incapable of undertaking any offensive operation, he pointed out to me the position of Schaffhausen on the map, said, that he should march there immediately, effect a junction with General Korsakoff, and then propose a general attack on Switzerland to the Archduke on the condition that H.R.H. would take his full share in the operation; that if he would not, he would immediately lead his army into winter quarters either in Germany or *perhaps in Italy*.

He pronounced this last word very low, and immediately changing the subject, evidently with the intention that he might not be questioned on it, he began a long discourse on the present state of affairs which lasted

nearly two hours, in the course of which he spoke of the principles and the nature of the French Revolution, the composition of the enemy's army, the manner of making war against the French, the necessity of not entering the country without a proclamation tending to tranquillize the inhabitants, in a manner which showed he had deeply studied his subject. He then spoke of the Austrian army, its virtues and defects, in a manner that surprised me, and showed that he had considered this subject also with equal attention, and he had formed his judgment without the smallest degree of prejudice.

He spoke in the warmest terms of the troops and of the formation and internal economy of the army, said many handsome things of the generals and officers, with whose conduct on almost every occasion he said he had the highest reason to be satisfied, adding that when the troops were well commanded they had all the good points of the Russians without their faults, and that were it not for the folly and wickedness of the Austrian Cabinet their army would before this have conquered the world.

This led him to talk of the history of Piedmont, which is what dwells the most deeply on his mind, repeating the scandalous history of General Zag's conference with the Count de St. André which your Lordship will find detailed in Mr. Jackson's dispatches, and he concluded by earnestly desiring that I would recommend my Court to protect the King of Sardinia from what he called the most abominable oppression and tyranny that a Christian King had ever suffered.

Through the whole of this discourse he gave the most evident proofs of a strong and vigorous mind and of a clear and sound understanding as little impaired as it could have been in the very prime of his life.

As soon as he had done he thanked me for not interrupting him, and then told me I was at liberty to say anything that I had to communicate to him or to make any observations on what I had heard.

I began by observing that I presumed he would not march from Feldkirch, or finally determine to abandon an operation which he himself had proposed to the Archduke, until he had received an answer from H.R.H.

Upon my making this observation he began repeating a great deal of what he had said before on the subject of Piedmont, but in a very disorderly manner, and a tone of voice such as he generally uses in public and which makes him sometimes quite unintelligible. When he had done I repeated my observation again, upon which he sent immediately for the Count de Stakelberg, desiring me not to go until the Count came, that I might not have the trouble of repeating twice the same thing.

I believe I have not hitherto mentioned to your Lordship that Count de Stakelberg, who was intended to be the Russian Minister in Switzerland, arrived at Zurich a few days before that place was taken.

As soon as the Count had entered the room I resumed the subject, repeating the same observation, and adding that I was particularly interested in knowing what were his real intentions, as I had received instructions from home (the nature of which I communicated to him in the manner pointed out to me by your Lordship) to negotiate the levy of 10,000 Bavarians to be joined to the Russian army, and that I should proceed in the negotiation with more or less expedition according to the use that he might wish to make of so powerful a reinforcement and to the time when he should be able to employ it to any good purpose.

I repeated this to him again at least three times as clearly and distinctly as it was in my power to do; each time he either answered me in an evasive manner, or affected not to understand me.

At last, finding that I was determined not to leave him till I had obtained an answer, he sent for his nephew Prince Gortschakoff and dictated to him, and afterwards

delivered to me the strange note, of which I send your Lordship the original inclosed, marked A.

Excepting the spelling, for which the Marshall is certainly not responsible, the note is nearly word for word as it was dictated, some expressions that appear confused having been made very intelligble by his distinct manner of pronouncing them.

When I had received the note, I asked him if I was not to understand one of four things :—

1st. That to enter Franche Comté he would require an army of at least 80,000 men.

2nd. That such an army could not be procured before the winter, therefore that that project must be abandoned for this campaign.

3rd. That if the Archduke would act immediately with his whole force against the enemy in Switzerland the Russians would second him.

4th. That if the Archduke would not act with his whole force the Russians would go into winter quarters.

He said I had understood him rightly, and that he should march the next day towards Schaffhausen to obtain the Archduke's answer to the plan he should there propose to him.

I was under the necessity of leaving the Marshall here, as it was half after twelve and his dinner had been waiting for him from eight in the morning, but I spoke in the strongest terms to Prince Gortschakoff on the unpleasant consequences which must necessarily follow the very unjustifiable step the Marshall was about to take, representing it to him as a direct personal affront to the Archduke, and as exposing the Marshall to the most severe and merited reproach.

I returned to the Marshall again at night, when he received me with the greatest attention and kindness, but not till after he had been assured by Prince Gortschakoff that I would not say anything against his marching the

next day, though he should not have received the Archduke's answer.

As soon as I was alone with the Marshall, after thanking him for the information he had given me in the morning, I told him there were yet two points which he had left unanswered upon which it was absolutely necessary that I should receive some information before I could write to my Court.

The first was the question of the Bavarian troops.

The second, what he had mentioned of the possibility of his taking up his winter quarters in Italy.

He immediately began telling some strange stories, and trying every possible means to evade giving me a direct answer. At last, after I had spoken to him very seriously of the critical and dangerous state to which the affairs of the Allies had been reduced in this country, adding that I could neither form an opinion myself on what ought to be done, nor enable my Court to form one, unless he would speak out more plainly, he laughed very heartily and said with great good humour, 'Don't you perceive, that by answering your two questions fairly, I should put you in possession of my whole secret? however, as I see you are determined to have an answer, I will give you one which though short shall be full and explicit.

'1st. I wish to have nothing to do with either your Swiss or your Bavarians, give them both to the Archduke; what I want is, that which I had this year, of which I made such good use, and of which I have been so unjustly deprived, I mean an Austro-Russian army; without it I can do nothing, for my Russians, though in many respects the best troops in the world, are not fit to act by themselves, and my officers are all so ignorant that I can do nothing with them; I have derived such comfort from the skill and military knowledge of the Austrian staff officers, and I know so well that I can find nothing of the kind among either the Swiss or Bavarians, that I cannot bring myself to think of acting with any

auxiliary corps and of being abandoned by the Austrians, whilst there is a possibility of resuming my old station. If your Court can bring this about it will be making me most happy and rendering an essential service to the common cause.

'2nd. I wish to go back to Italy, *because neither my troops nor officers are fit for this war in Switzerland.* I have written to the Emperor to ask leave to lead my army there, do you write to your Court and Sir Charles Whitworth to second my request.

'I wish to penetrate into France by way of Dauphiné; let the Archduke, supported by your Swiss and Bavarians, second me in Switzerland and Franche Compté.'

I then attempted to mention his march to Schaffhausen; but I soon found that he would not bear to hear it named, any more than the subject of the pillage and plunder committed by his troops, which I am now sure, from what I have seen and heard since I have been here, is tolerated if not encouraged by him on the principle that his indulgence in this respect gains him the love of his troops and induces them to sacrifice themselves for him on every occasion however desperate where he wants their services.

In the course of the night I received from the Marshall the inclosed note (B), which I send your Lordship as a proof how bent he is upon this Italian scheme, and at the same time as a curious specimen of his manner of doing business. It was brought to me open by his aide-de-camp in waiting.

The next morning, two hours before daybreak, the Marshall had set out on his march to Schaffhausen. I am truly concerned to add that the Archduke had approved of the principles of Colonel Weyrother's plan—had sent M. de Korsakoff with his whole corps to reinforce the Marshall, undertaking the whole of the operation to the westward of the Lake of Constance himself, and proposing that it should be attempted immediately.

The staff officer charged with the commission found the Marshall yesterday morning already arrived at Lindau on his road to Schaffhausen.

I am proceeding myself with all haste to see the Archduke and endeavour to prevent as much mischief as possible; but as I have every reason to fear that the Russians will not in any case enter Switzerland this campaign, I have stopped at this place to write to your Lordship, and will send my dispatch immediately by a messenger, considering it as of the highest importance on account of the operations in Holland that your Lordship should receive the earliest possible information of the real state of things here and of the very feeble hope that is now left of carrying on any operations from hence during the remainder of the autumn.

I shall write to your Lordship again as soon as I shall have seen the Archduke, and I shall take this opportunity, the first which I have been able to find since the late unfortunate event, of putting into H.R.H.'s hands the note which I am directed to deliver to him by your Lordship's dispatch of the 6th ult., No. 6.

It has always appeared to me very desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that I should deliver the note to H.R.H. in person.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

Enclosure in Mr. Wickham's Despatch.
Enclosure A.

(Copy.)

Franche-conté: 10,000 bavarois, 20,000 suisses, au moins 50,000 russes: et le plus sur parti seroit 100,000 en tout.	Avant Berne les suisses ne peuvent êtres levés, les bavarois sont au dela de 2,000 hommes: les nouvelles levées sont soldats dans deux mois et il est facile de s'y prendre.

1. A chafhaouzen l'armée russe manquent de tout, delabrée et fatiguée, ne peut rien opperér en offensive, pour la défensive il faut plus de monde.

2. Il faut de l'archiduc coopère avec toutes ses forces dès le moment: c'est deja l'affaire de Vithaim Excellence —ce que là je declareroit fermement au nettè.

3. Si non, je suis sitôt au quartiers d'hyver, proche, loin sans vouloir soumettre à aucun affront, jusqu'a la future campagne.

Ainsi si on agira avec sincerité dans le grand enssembre, je repond de la suisse dans un mois ou plutôt, et je tiendrai mon parole.

A cela les mesures appartiennent à la sagésse de Vitham Excellence.

Enclosure B.

Italie 77 il faudroit que votre Courl'insiste a S. P. B., ou s'il se peut d'ici par Witword.

(No. 38.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Wangen: 17th October, 1799.

My Lord,—In addition to what I have stated in my No. 37, I beg leave to communicate to your Lordship some further observations on the character and conduct of F. M. Suworow and on the state of the Russian army.

I had an opportunity of conversing a great deal with the officers who are mostly at the Marshall's headquarters. Those whom the Marshall most favours are his nephew Prince Gortschakoff, Prince Bagration, a young

Georgian nobleman who commands the vanguard of the army, and General Zweikowsky, an officer of some standing, whom I recollect to have seen in Switzerland in the year 1785.

This gentleman from his former residence there had acquired some general notion of the country. All the others without exception with whom I talked upon this subject were as ignorant of its points and bearings as if they had been all the time in Persia. They had not even the least notion of the nature and value of the respective positions which the enemy had occupied during their march. In one word, they seemed to me to have left all these matters to their guides, and to the Swiss and Austrian officers who accompanied them, as beneath the attention of a Russian general.

I found them one and all insisting on the necessity of their going immediately into *safe* winter quarters, and every observation that I made, that tended to counteract that favourite idea, was received with evident dissatisfaction.

I found them not insensible of the disorderly state of the army, but making use of it as an additional reason for going immediately into winter quarters. All agreeing, however, that the conduct of the troops was a subject which the Marshall could not endure to hear named by anybody.

I have already mentioned to your Lordship that I was surprised at not seeing either Generals Derfelden or Rosenberg present at the Council of War. I have now to add that during the three days I was at Feldkirch I neither saw one nor the other of these officers at the headquarters. This seems the more extraordinary as they are both very old soldiers, have seen a great deal of active service, and both, particularly General Derfelden, had a great share in all the Marshall's principal victories.

General Rosenberg is said to be a very brave man of no extraordinary talents or information, but thoroughly

acquainted with the general outline of his profession. His conduct in the Muttenthal was certainly very honourable to himself, and showed him to be a man who possessed great presence of mind in a moment of imminent danger.

General Derfelden has, even among the Austrian officers, the reputation of an excellent officer; he is particularly acquainted with that branch of his profession of which the Russians in general are totally ignorant—I mean the internal regulation and economy of an army.

General Hotze, who was thoroughly acquainted with the Russian army where he had served himself for many years, has frequently told me that excepting General Fersen and Lacy (neither of whom are here), General Derfelden was the only man who could really be called an officer in the whole service.

I have endeavoured to learn the reason why he has been set aside, and find that it was principally owing to his attempts to establish discipline and order, and to prevent pillage and plunder in the division of the army which he commands,—a system in direct opposition to that of the Marshall, and which has rendered him extremely unpopular among the troops. The young men also fear him, and do everything in their power to keep him out of the way. The Marshall had at first ordered him to take the command of M. de Korsakoff's army, but he was afterwards induced to change his opinion. Prince Gortschakoff told me himself that this nomination would be an insult to his brother, who had particularly distinguished himself at the head of M. de Korsakoff's advanced guard on the 25th ult., before Zurich, and expressed his surprise that the Marshall should pay so little attention to the interests of his own nephew.

After this conversation I was not at all surprised when I heard that the appointment of General Derfelden had not taken place.

In Italy, as long as the two armies were together, the

Marshall never consulted his Russian generals at all, making no scruple of saying to them openly before the Austrians, if ever they came to offer their opinion, that they were too ignorant to be consulted upon anything. It is only since his leaving Italy that he has had any communication with them on military matters, and now he has entirely left out of his councils the only two men who were capable of giving him sound advice.

I have not seen General Derfelden myself, but he has spoken very openly to Count Stakelberg and has given him the most deplorable picture of the state of the army, complaining severely of the conduct of the Marshall in suffering these disorders, adding that he himself should retire immediately from the army, which, now that it was left to itself, must soon be exposed to some serious affront, and its honour and reputation lost.

It was on this account, though he had not been consulted on the subject, that he was most decidedly of opinion that the army ought to go immediately into winter quarters, considering it as wholly unfit for active service, and that its total ruin would be the consequence if it were left to itself in the face of a vigilant and enterprising enemy.

I believe that the Count Stakelberg has communicated the subject of this conversation confidentially to the Count of Woronzow.

From the opportunities I had of observing the Marshall myself I am persuaded that much of his present conduct is to be attributed to a sense of his own inability to do what he knows is expedient to be done, a situation in which under the Russian Government he must have frequently found himself from his youth upwards.

The very strong terms of approbation in which he spoke to me of the order and economy that reigned in the Austrian armies leave me no room to doubt that he would wish to see the Russian troops on the same establishment, and his impatience when the subject is

mentioned is probably owing to his persuasion that the thing is impossible.

May it not also fairly be presumed that his permitting the troops to live at discretion in the country is solely owing to his conviction that with the small pay they receive and the want of order and economy in the army, they would not be able to exist without it?

With other materials to act upon I believe his conduct would have been very different, and from his natural character I have no doubt but that with an army differently constituted he would have shown himself a severe and rigid supporter of good order and discipline.

He was certainly sensible that he was doing wrong when he determined to march to Schaffhausen, and his unwillingness to hear me speak on the subject showed itself in a manner that left me no room to doubt of his being thoroughly ashamed of himself and sorry that I should have been a witness to his weakness.

His faculties are certainly as yet unimpaired, but his conduct on this occasion gives strong reason to fear that his late disappointments have made a strong impression on his mind and weakened its energy. I understand that in the Muttenthal his firmness quite failed him and he gave himself up as a lost man.

On his arrival at Glarus his natural retreat was by Wallenstadt to Sargans, and nothing was omitted by General Auffenbourg to induce him to attack the enemy at Mollis and force the passage, to which his army was in every respect fully competent, but he preferred the difficult and dangerous passage by Panix (where the whole army would have perished had the snow fallen one day more) because there was no enemy to encounter.

His conduct on this occasion was directly contrary to his own better judgment, as well as to the repeated advice of the Austrian staff, of Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton, and of the Swiss officers who were with him, but the Grand Duke and the Russian general officers insisted

upon it so strongly that the Marshall was not able to resist.

His custom of dining so early, and sleeping so long after dinner, is absolutely incompatible with the conduct of military operations in the field or on a march, and in point of fact he never yet since he first joined the Italian army has either visited a post or reconnoitered a position. All the plans of attack and march are settled by the Austrian staff officers and submitted to his approbation the night before, he himself seldom being present at, and never interfering with, their execution, and seldom or never showing himself to the army.

I consider this as the most unfortunate part of his conduct, because it gives so very fair a pretext to the Austrian generals to remonstrate against his being reappointed to command them, and in this point at least the Austrian Minister will certainly be supported by the whole army, which I have no doubt would have done greater things under the orders of M. de Suworow with all his faults than when commanded by the Archduke himself.

In the communication I have made to your Lordship on this important subject, which I could easily have extended to a much greater length, I have endeavoured to confine myself as much as possible to facts that have fallen within my observation, leaving to your Lordship to draw your own conclusions, and to the wisdom of his Majesty's Councils to suggest the best remedies for the evil, which is undoubtedly very great. I cannot refrain however from humbly offering my own decided opinion (though well aware of all the consequences to which it leads, and particularly that it will be absolutely throwing everything into the hands of the Court of Vienna), that every hope of acting against France on any point with a Russian army must be abandoned.

In fact the elements of which the Russian troops are composed are such as that when put together they cannot

be called an *army* in any respect but the number of men.

There are a number of firm intrepid soldiers and of well-instructed regiments as far as regimental duty goes, but nothing more. These regiments, serving as auxiliary troops in the Austrian army and used principally on those occasions where Austrian troops are less willing to act, would make the whole as superior to the French as the French from their military skill and science have shown themselves to be superior to the Russians when acting alone.

If the Emperor of Russia has sufficient penetration to see the necessity of adopting this measure, and the wisdom and magnanimity necessary to put it in execution, notwithstanding the clamour and opposition it will meet with, there is nothing that may not be hoped for on this side the country during the next campaign. If he has not, I see nothing before us but defeat and disappointment, and in the end an ignominious Austrian peace.

I had once hoped by increasing the pay of the troops, adding a number of foreign officers to the different departments, and establishing an entirely new arrangement for the magazines and the commissariat, that enough might have been done to have placed this army on a respectable footing; but from what I have seen within these last ten days I am persuaded that the whole system is so fundamentally defective and vicious, the composition of the officers throughout so very bad, and so much intrigue at the head-quarters, that every hope of the kind must in the present emergency be abandoned; besides there is now no time for any such operation, as whilst it were carrying on the enemy would be enabled to detach to Holland and Flanders with impunity.

I shall transmit to-day by the messenger Herslet the whole of this information to Lord Minto and Sir Charles Whitworth, leaving it to their discretion to make the use

of it they may think most proper and most advantageous to his Majesty's interest; and I shall send these dispatches to your Lordship by the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, who was himself on the field the whole day of the 25th ult. with General Korsakoff, where as long as his counsels were listened to he rendered some essential service.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.

(Copy.) Wangen: 18th October, 1799.

My Lord,—Under the circumstances mentioned in my dispatches Nos. 35, 36, 37, and 38, it is my intention, after seeing the Archduke and having learnt from H.R.H. whether he has received any new powers from his Court authorising him to enter into Switzerland in force, to return to Marshall Suworow and insist in his Majesty's name on this project of taking early winter quarters being at once abandoned, or at least deferred until answers shall have been received from the Courts of Petersburg and London. I will leave nothing undone at the same time that may induce the Marshall to join in any offensive operations that the Archduke shall propose, provided that they are really fair and reasonable.

H.R.H. knows very well that he must be obliged to provide for the subsistence of the Russian army, whether he takes it with him into Switzerland, or whether it remains anywhere on the frontiers; for otherwise it will be let loose to live at discretion on the country.

I am persuaded therefore if things were conducted in any reasonable manner at the Russian head-quarters that all difficulties of that kind might be settled in a few hours' conversation. I cannot bring myself to believe that the

Marshall will be so insensible to the interests and honour of his Sovereign and his own personal reputation as not to yield to the remonstrances that will be made and the arguments that will be laid before him.

I am sorry however to say that he was yesterday persuaded to write to the Archduke to ask H.R.H. to appoint him winter quarters *in the second line*, where he could retire with his army without being exposed to any affront from the enemy.

Unless my own efforts should be unsuccessful, I shall dispatch Herslet the messenger to-day to Vienna to Lord Mulgrave, earnestly to entreat his Lordship to come here immediately, that I may be supported by the weight of his authority.

In the meantime I trust that I can answer for engaging the Marshall to maintain his present position till his Lordship's arrival; and as long as the Russians shall remain within a reasonable distance of the frontiers of Switzerland the enemy will certainly not venture to detach any considerable force to the side of the Low Countries.

I am well aware that the Russian army is not in a state to act by itself *as an army*, but it may still furnish a number of excellent troops sufficient to enable H.R.H. to strike a great blow, if not to undertake the absolute conquest of Switzerland.

With respect to Marshall Suworow's plan of taking up his winter quarters in Italy, particularly should he choose Verona and the Adige, as appears to be his present intention, it carries with it nothing less than the totally abandoning at once every idea of offensive operations along the whole of the enemy's line from Genoa to Dusseldorf. The Austrian armies both in Italy and Germany being, without their Russian auxiliaries, not only incapable of acting offensively against the enemy, but in my humble opinion wholly inadequate to the defence of the country they now respectively occupy.

I do not mean to say that the Archduke is not at pre-

sent in sufficient force to defend a great part of Swabia. But the Court of Vienna, whose principal object always has been and ever will be Italy, but who will never learn the true mode of defending it, will immediately order large detachments from the Grisons and the Vorarlberg into the Milanese, which the Archduke will be ordered to replace with the troops that are in Swabia. The first consequence of which must be that the Archduke will be obliged to fall back upon the Leck, leaving the entrance into the Vorarlberg by the way of Bregentz quite open, that the chain of posts in the long line from Bregentz to Chiavenna will be forced, the enemy will penetrate from all the points of the Alps of Switzerland into the Grisons and into the valleys of Piedmont and the Milanese, and by the Valteline and the Engadine into the Tyrol, to which the Archduke will be obliged again to detach a considerable force, and in all probability the Court of Vienna will be obliged to make a separate peace or a great part of Italy will be reconquered during the winter.

If this operation be conducted on the part of the French with vigour and skill, and, which I very much doubt, if they have magazines sufficient for such an enterprise, so much of it may be effected during the march of the Russian troops towards the Tyrol on their passage to Italy, as that a great part of the Austrian army will have been already defeated and dispersed before they can arrive at any point where they can be of any service, and they will find, after all, that, instead of getting into comfortable winter quarters, they will be engaged in severer service than ever under disadvantages which all the zeal of the Marshall will be unable to encounter.

If however it were certain that the negotiations between Austria and France were so far advanced as to make it probable that a peace or even a truce would be speedily concluded, I should then think that Italy would be the most advantageous quarters for the Russian army, as those from which it might be more easily conveyed to any part of his

Majesty's dominions, or to any point upon the Continent where it might co-operate with his Majesty's forces. But though I have no manner of doubt that a negotiation is actually carrying on, yet I trust things are not so far advanced as to make it necessary or advisable to act as if there was a certainty of peace being speedily concluded. It will however be prudent not to lose sight of this point, *that France will never make peace without insisting on the evacuation of the hereditary dominions and the Empire by the Russian troops.*

I am myself firmly persuaded that some notion of an Italian league, independent of and perhaps under certain circumstances hostile to Austria, supported by Russian troops and English subsidies, has materially contributed to determine the Marshall to take his winter quarters in Italy.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 40.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Wangen: 18th October, 1799.

My Lord,—Your Lordship's dispatch of the 29th ult., No. 8, on the subject of the offer made by H.S.H. the Elector* of Bavaria to furnish a body of 10,000 or 12,000 men, to be subsidized by his Majesty for the opertions now carrying on against the common enemy, was delivered to me on the 13th inst. at Feldkirch.

. . . . After the language holden by Marshall Suworow on the subject of the Bavarian troops as stated in my No. 39, I shall not think myself warranted under my present instructions in proceeding with the negotiations, unless the Marshall shall be induced to act offensively in Switzerland and shall express an opinion that

* Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria 1799; King in 1805; died 1825.

those troops will be necessary to the success of his operations.

But as new circumstances may possibly arise which may render the levy of these troops highly expedient, and as their services, if required at all, may probably be required on some unexpected emergency, I shall endeavour to keep the way to negotiation open, and if I can do it without committing myself on any point I shall not object to discuss the principal articles of the treaty provisionally with such person as H.S.H. may appoint for that purpose.

If after I shall have seen the Archduke I shall find that any hopes remain of carrying on the campaign during the winter, I shall then, notwithstanding Marshall Suworow's opinion, write to Munich to the above effect, stating at the same time very distinctly that the late unfortunate events have made it impossible for me to engage in any regular negotiation without new instructions.

One of the cases to which I principally look as rendering the services of such a corps desirable is the employment of part only of the Russian infantry offensively with the Archduke whilst the rest shall go into winter quarters, in which case the absence of the latter might be supplied by the Bavarians; and I have to request that your Lordship will be pleased to transmit me his Majesty's commands for the regulation of my conduct in this or any similar case, where it shall appear to me evident that by adding such a corps either to the army of the Archduke or of Marshall Suworow offensive operations may be really resumed, or at least such a superiority of strength given to our defensive position as that the enemy cannot with safety make any material detachment to Holland or Flanders, lest by so doing he should tempt H.R.H. to resume the offensive.

It may also perhaps be worthy his Majesty's consideration whether it may not be expedient to add this

corps to the Archduke's army if in consideration of such a reinforcement H.R.H. will engage to make no truce with the enemy during the winter. I mention the Archduke on this occasion rather than Marshall Suworow because, upon the most full and attentive consideration of the subject in all its points and under all its probable consequences, I am now thoroughly persuaded that the Russian troops cannot possibly be kept together in the shape of an army, and that if the Court of Vienna will not give the Marshall, as before, the command of an Austro-Russian army (an event most earnestly to be wished), he must inevitably retire from the service.

I have presumed to mention these points to your Lordship as subjects for his Majesty's consideration, because since the happy disembarkation of his Majesty's troops in Holland (on which I beg leave most sincerely to congratulate your Lordship) the object of the war in Germany, as far as it respects directly his Majesty's interests, seems to have materially changed; the great, perhaps since our late misfortunes the only, point now to be looked to being the engaging as much as possible of the enemy's force in constant action on this side of the country.

If the Archduke should consent to keep his army in a defensive position without undertaking any immediate operations, and Marshall Suworow engages not to put his troops into winter quarters until answers shall have been received from the Courts of London and Petersburg, I shall in that case go to Munich myself for a few days. I have written to Lord Mulgrave to meet me there, and I will return with his Lordship to the Russian head-quarters.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Charles Whitworth.

(Draft.) Wangen: 18th Oct^r., 1799.

Sir,—My Lord Mulgrave will have forwarded to you my letter to his Lordship of the 29th ult. from Moerspurg, containing a hasty account of the defeat of General Korsakoff and the capture of Zurich.

I now send you inclosed a copy of my dispatch to the Office No. 31, containing some further details relating to that most unfortunate affair, leaving it entirely to your discretion to make the use you shall think most proper and most advantageous to his Majesty's interests as well of this communication as of the inclosed copies of my several dispatches to the Office Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40.

I wish only to suggest that you would commit me *as little as possible*, and that, unless you should find it necessary so to do, you would avoid taking any measures founded upon these several communications until you shall hear from Lord Grenville on the subject.

I take the liberty of submitting these two points to your consideration because it is extremely important, as long as I continue in my present station, that I should be as well as possible in the opinion of the Russian officers; and though we have certainly no time to lose in making the necessary reforms in the Russian army, yet it is of no less consequence that the same language should be holden at Petersburg, at London, and at Vienna with respect to that very important question, and that what is to be said and done on the occasion should be well considered and concerted, and have the full sanction of his Majesty's Government. The more so as the whole must necessarily depend on the manner in which his Majesty shall wish to employ the Russian subsidiary troops in the ensuing campaign, and on the extent of the pecuniary assistance he may be disposed to grant to the Court of Petersburg.

It seems however very possible that the different letters that will have reached Petersburg from the Russian and Austrian armies, and the necessity of preventing improper and injudicious measures from being taken, may oblige you both to speak out more fully than you would otherwise have done, and to press immediately the adoption of such measures as shall appear to you under all the circumstances most advantageous for the common cause.

It is on this account that I send these dispatches open to Lord Mulgrave and Lord Minto, that you may have the full advantage of their opinions, and receive at the same time the information they will respectively have collected as to the wishes and intentions of the Court of Vienna, and the impression which these late events will have made on the Emperor and his Ministers.

My own opinion such as it is (being necessarily formed on very imperfect materials) you will collect from my different dispatches to the Office. I have preferred that mode of conveying information to you, to writing to you at length, because it may be an additional satisfaction to you to know not only the real state of things here, but the exact manner in which they have been represented at home.

The great question seems to be how, by whom, and to what extent these unpleasant truths can be told to the Emperor, with the best hope of doing the most good, and preventing the most mischief.

Of that you must of course be the best judge.

All that I can say is, that if they are not communicated to him faithfully, and if he does not act upon them with spirit and promptitude, either this army will be destroyed, or it must be sent home, as not only unnecessary, but an absolute nuisance to the country, to the Allies, and to the cause it is intended to serve.

I find from the copy of a dispatch from Count Woronzow to the Emperor which his Imperial Majesty

transmitted to Marshall Suworow and which the Marshall showed to me, that the Count is in the habit of sending to the Emperor the few short private notes I have written to him from hence. I shall on that account write to him by the next messenger an ostensible letter (a copy of which I will send to you by the first courier from Marshall Suworow, so that you may if you think proper make use of its contents without loss of time), in which I shall state to him all the defects of the army in the plainest terms, and in their full colours, taking care only to speak with equal force of its virtues and excellencies. I shall then point out to him the fatal consequences that will ensue to his master, to Europe, and to the common cause, if immediate remedy be not applied to the evil, and on the other hand the glory that the Emperor will acquire now, and the stability and weight that he will secure to himself in Europe, if he will make the temporary sacrifices that will be necessary to put his army in a situation to contend with success, with the other great powers of the Continent.

It is certainly of very great importance to his Majesty's interests, considered not merely with a reference to France and the French Revolution, but to the general politicks of Europe, that the Russian army should be placed as speedily as possible in the situation I have just described, and I trust we may flatter ourselves there exist in the hands of the Emperor the means of doing so.

The general ignorance of the superior officers, and the total want of an able staff, is now since the affair of Zurich no longer a problem, and will be notorious to all Europe. There is no remedy for this evil (because able officers cannot be formed at once) but a selection to be immediately made of foreigners, of which the French emigrant nobility, and perhaps even the Austrian staff, will furnish a sufficient number. There are among the Austrians at this moment many excellent officers who are highly discontented, and who might easily be tempted to

pass into any other service, by offers of permanent rank and an assurance of the authority, confidence, and support due to their talents and the situations in which they would be respectively placed.

It must not however be disguised that the repugnance to entering into the Russian army is very great amongst all the Austrian officers, and that the idea that they might be deprived at once of all their employments at the pleasure of the Emperor will be a strong obstacle to their quitting their present establishment for that of Russia.

I can readily conceive that the nature and extent of the Russian dominions require that a larger army should be maintained than the finances of the country can possibly support with the pay and the appointments that it would be desirable to give to the whole, and with a commissariat and an administration upon the Austrian system. I have no doubt also but that an army paid and supported on the present system may be fully sufficient to overcome the enemies with whom Russia has principally to contend and to make and secure for the Empire the most useful and splendid conquests. But against the great powers of Europe, though it may be capable of making predatory excursions, or even occasionally of gaining a great and decisive victory, yet it cannot possibly maintain a long and successful war.

It seems therefore absolutely necessary that either a portion at least of the Russian army, destined for European operations, should be placed permanently on a different system, or that an increased pay and a regular administration should be given to such parts of it as shall be at any time employed in Italy, Germany, the Low Countries or France, where the inhabitants, from the economy, excellent internal administration, and good conduct of the Austrian armies, now scarcely look upon the residence of an army among them as a calamity.

But all this will be a work of some time, and whilst it is carrying on, I can see nothing to be done but what I

have suggested to Lord Grenville—that large Russian corps should be attached to each of the Austrian armies as auxiliaries.

'This will be the outline of what I shall write to Count Woronzow, taking care to accompany it with the necessary compliments to the present Sovereign, to the general merits of his armies and to the Russian character. It will be for him to determine whether he will make any use of it.

What I shall principally aim at now, if M. de Suworow obstinately persists in his intention of going into winter quarters, will be to obtain 8,000 or 10,000 infantry from the army of M. de Korsakoff as a reinforcement to the Archduke.

It is really a circumstance too disgraceful to the honour of the Russian army, and to that of its Sovereign, and proves beyond every thing the defective system of the administration of the army, that because this corps has received a severe check and lost 4,000 or 5,000 men with a part of its tents and baggage, it is therefore to be considered as incapable of carrying on the campaign in the month of October, and necessarily obliged to go into winter quarters, whilst the enemy keeps the field without a tent in his whole army.

What is to be done with Marshall Suworow God alone knows, but of this you may be entirely persuaded that his remaining at the head of an army composed entirely of Russians, or of Russians and Russian auxiliaries, will be the greatest calamity that can befall us.

Nothing can be more just than his own way of seeing things, but he is no longer the master, and we have lately abundant proof that his resolution and firmness is no longer unshaken as it used to be. Under his command, besides, it would be impossible to work any reform

This is a subject which I fear I dare not mention in the army.

to Count Woronzow, at least certainly not in an ostensible letter. I have no doubt however that Lord Grenville will make the proper use of the information he has received, and I have reason to hope that Count Stakelberg will write fully on the subject to some one at Petersburg.

I will write again to you after my conference with the Archduke. In the meantime I will thank you to return all my drafts by the messenger, as I have no other copies of my dispatches.

I shall be truly happy to hear from you, and you may be assured that any light you can furnish me with for the guidance of my conduct here will be most thankfully received, and all your advice and direction faithfully attended to.

I have the honour to be, with the highest regard, Sir, &c., &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH.

Field-Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Lindau: $\frac{9}{20}$ October, 1799.

Sir,—The enrolment of the Swiss militia, of which there is only one battalion here, and the arrival of the 10,000 Bavarians, being objects which I have deeply at heart, I take the liberty, Sir, of reiterating to you my entreaties to bring both of them to pass. Your indefatigable zeal, which I well know, Sir, for the common cause, is my best guarantee for your working without intermission. In the pleasing hope of seeing you again soon, as also Count Stakelberg, I beg you to accept the assurances of my attachment and of the distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be,

Your very humble servant and sincere friend,

Prince ITALIISKI, COMTE ALEXANDRE SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton to Mr. Wickham.

Lindau: 6 o'clock, 20th Oct^r.

'My dear Sir,—I was very much surprized and no less hurt to hear on my arrival at this place that the Marshall had refused to meet the Arch Duke at Stochach, and the more so, as the Arch Duke had repeated his invitation in the most obliging terms, in a second letter which was brought this morning by his Adjutant General the Count Colloredo. The Marshall at first positively refused to see him, but having been prevailed upon to receive him, after embracing him, he told him that he might tell his Arch Duke in the name of his Emperor, &c., &c., that he would undertake nothing, that he was a conqueror and not here to defend, and that sooner than employ his army so, he would retire into winter quarters. He entered into a general and gross abuse of the Austrians, and ended by saying he was ill and could not meet the Arch Duke; then turning to Weyrother, with whom hitherto he has generally observed decency, he forbad him to make any further proposals, and repeated his resolutions. I immediately called upon Count Stakelberg, whom I found very much hurt with the change he has observed in the Marshall's conduct towards the Austrians within these two last days, and he says he is convinced some one employed to sow dissension between the armies has been at work. He thinks with me that it is of the first consequence to prevent this unjustifiable conduct of the Marshall from being publick, and if possible to prevail upon him to meet the Arch Duke on every consideration. He desired me to tell you that he should himself have written to you if he had not been employed in finishing his dispatches for Petersburgh.

All the Cavalry, with the exception of 400 Cossacks, march tomorrow for Dillingen on the Danube.

Faithfully yours,

H. CLINTON.

Ramsay is here.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton to Mr. Wickham.

Lindau: 22nd Oct^r., 1799.

My dear Sir,—I received your letter of the 20th yesterday morning, and took the earliest opportunity of speaking to the Marshall upon the subject you recommended in it. When I first addressed him, before dinner, he referred me as usual to General Schweikowski, but added, that if I was not perfectly satisfied with his explanation, he would see me himself after his repose. Upon my lamenting that he had been prevented meeting the Arch Duke he exclaimed with much childish impatience, 'l'archeduc peut-être le fils d'un Empereur, et à la cour je suis son très humble Serviteur, mais je suis plus ancien General que lui, et je n'irai pas un pas pour le chercher.' Without giving me time to answer, he ran on in abuse of the Austrians with a degree of bitterness that I have never before seen in him; he however told me again he would see me after his rest. After dinner I attempted to learn something of General Schweikowski in vain: that man has not common sense, and through intrigue is now the Marshall's first favourite and man of business.

In the evening he sent for me, but he had no intention of giving me a private interview. General Schweikowski was with him, and Prince Gorchakow and the privy Councillor Tréfort had orders to attend me. The Marshall began the history of the whole campaign, introducing several traits of perfidy in the Cabinet of Vienna, and with great precision brought it down to the present moment, and then desired me to speak. I began by observing that the several instances of perfidy which he had cited in the conduct of the Court of Vienna, certainly justified his precautions, but that they appeared to me to be quite unnecessary towards the Arch Duke, from his general character, and the more so as his Royal Highness and his army had themselves been the victims. I observed how essential it was that the most perfect in-

telligence should subsist between the chiefs of combined armies; at which having all along testified great impatience, he burst into a violent fit of laughter, and began to play the fool. I gave him his time, and after apologizing for having interrupted me, he desired me to proceed. He had so strongly expressed his resolution not to meet the Arch Duke that I thought it advisable to give up the point, and took advantage of his having represented his Italian army to stand in need of repose, from the fatigues it had suffered, to presume that that of Korsakow might still continue in front, and in conjunction with the Bavarians, take part in any offensive operation which might be undertaken, while his army was in quarters of repose; before I could finish this sentence he had interrupted me repeatedly; 1st to say, there was no such corps as the army of Korsakow, that the whole was now amalgamated. 2ndly, that owing to the treachery of the Austrians, they were no more in a state to serve than the rest, having lost their tents and baggage even to their very *purses*. All this time he was extremely intemperate, telling me how surprized he was to hear such a proposition from me, that he concluded I had been gained by the Arch Duke, that Mulgrave and Wickham had never held language so degrading to him. With great difficulty I appeased him, and as he dwelt much upon his being a Conqueror, and at the head of a Victorious army, and how much surprized he was to have it proposed to him to throw himself into a Garrison, to defend the Grisons, &c., &c., I assured him that I had not explained myself if he had understood that I proposed his acting upon the defensive. I fancy he did not distinctly hear me, for at the word defensive, he began to spit and show symptoms of anger very little short of madness. I had by this time acquainted him with what had induced me to address myself to him as I had done, namely the conversation I had had with you, and the letter I had since received, so that you partook of his resentment; he

told me that I was the first who had ever dared to hold such language to him, that I had forgot he had just completed the conquest of Italy, and the services he had rendered to Europe; that now he was convinced you had converted me, and that you had been gained by the Arch Duke; that because he had been in good humour when you had seen him, he supposed you had taken him for a child, and added, 'I observed that he spoke to me in a different tone from Mulgrave, and seemed to think he could lead me by the nose as he pleased.' He told me he should certainly complain of me to the King and in the height of his rage desired me to inform you, he should not hesitate to make a similar complaint of you, if you should repeat such proposals. It was some time before he became sufficiently calm to understand that he had been made so violently angry by something which he only supposed I had said. After this I explained myself to him very fully, exposing to him the only motive we could have for desiring that the corps of Mr. Korsakow should not retire into quarters of repose with the rest, namely, that by moving so large a body from the frontier, the Enemy would be able to detach an equal force to employ in suppressing the insurrections in the interior, from which, if they were not smothered in their infancy, the greatest advantages to the common cause might be hoped. He heard all this with no more patience than the rest, conducting himself the whole time with no temper; in short, I was at last under the necessity of giving the point up. I then asked him how long he supposed it would require to recover his troops, so that they might again resume offensive operations; he answered that in less than a month he would attack, though the winter should be completely set in; he told me to remind you that our Court had promised him 20,000 Swiss and 10,000 Bavarians, and with that force in addition to his Russians, who would by that time have received their recruits, he would conquer Switzerland and enter France. I told him I feared from

the late misfortunes in Switzerland it would not be possible to increase that corps to 20,000 men, to which he replied that œconomy might be misplaced, but he was then talking carelessly. Finding him once more rational, I asked him if he would attack the Enemy in case he should penetrate into the Grisons. He said, 'C'est l'affaire des Autrichiens;' but I said, if the Enemy should penetrate so as to turn the flank of your army and endanger your quarters, 'C'est mon affaire:' in short, he endeavoured not to explain himself on this head, but at last he said, 'Si l'ennemi m'incomode je le bâttrai.' He dismissed me with kindness, charged me to send for you immediately and to say he hoped you would recover your virtue, which you had lost for a short time, and had deprived me of mine. I hope this interview has done no harm, but I cannot flatter myself that it has been of any service. I think you had better accept his invitation and come without loss of time.

Yours very sincerely,

H. CLINTON.

He has just sent to desire me to dine with him, and sent, for my perusal, his resolutions and ideas, like what he dictated for you. I will endeavour to get a copy for you.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton to Mr. Wickham.

Lindau: 29th Oct^r., 1799.

My dear Sir,—The Arch Duke has written again to the Marshall protesting in the strongest manner possible, against his intended *retrograde* move, pointing out to him all the misfortunes which will be the necessary consequences, and declaring that he alone will be responsible for them. The Marshall, I understand, without in any thing changing his resolution, returned a very moderate answer. He has been entirely reconciled to Weyrother again by his having proposed to place the army in more convenient quarters, as well as more military, than those

fixed upon by the Russian Staff. The army is now to be cantoned between the Lech and Iller, its right at Kirchberg, and left at Kempten. Weyrother proposed that the headquarters should be at Mindelheim, which the Marshall in reasoning with his counsellors observed was more military than Augsbourg, which the latter had influence sufficient to engage him to prefer. The 30th is the day at present fixed for the march; the Corps of Roverea has already received orders to march to within a league of Augsbourg. It having struck Prince Gortchakow that magazines might be necessary, he wrote to General Hiller to desire that some might be prepared in the different towns which he named; Hiller returned for answer that it was not in his power, or some other evasion, and that he had received the orders of the Arch Duke to protest again in the name of H.R.H. against the move, repeating the words which the Arch Duke had made use of. I think it right that you should be informed of an occurrence that passed the other day as it proves how essential it is to remove the Grand Duke from the army, as long as there is the most distant hope of a continuation or rather a renewal of the alliance. The young Suworow gave a ball to which he invited, in common with the rest, some Austrian officers, who were told in the assembly by a Russian officer that he was ordered by the Grand Duke to inform them that the fête was intended for the Russians and not for the Austrians, and that therefore they were required to leave the place. Soon afterwards they were followed by another Russian officer who made every apology, declared the other had been guilty of what they termed a sottise; that the Grand Duke had not authorized him to do so, and pressed them to return; General Baur himself came, expressed himself excessively shocked at the indignity that had been offered, begged them in the name of the whole assembly to return, and added that they should have every reparation they could require and that the unfortunate officer was in arrest; there

were some conditions respecting the Grand Duke's conduct entered into, to which General Baur agreed but which H.R.H. did not think himself bound to accede to; and here the affair ended, a faithfull relation of which has been sent this day to the Arch Duke. If it had not been for the interference of so respectable a man as General Baur, the whole of the Austrian Staff had determined to discontinue their service with this Army.

Ever sincerely yours,

H. CLINTON.

Have you seen the Emperor Paul's proclamation of the 15th September? it is in the Augsbourg Gazette of the 25th or 26th.

I have just received a letter from Bentinck of the 23rd. The army had advanced on the 13th to a position nearly in a line between Mondovi and Coni; there had been two affairs at Beinette, in one the Austrians have gained what Melas calls a victory; he took about 400 prisoners. It appears that his sole object is to oblige the enemy to give up all hopes of winter quarters in Piémont. Bentinck says they have collected a large force at Vico, and he thinks menace an attack, as the present position of the Austrians is a bad one, and certainly not improved by a corps of the enemy in its flank. Bentinck expects that of Trinita will be reoccupied by the Austrians.

I am just returned from the Marshall's Levée; he is more pleased than I have seen him for some time, with the present the Emperor has sent him by Prince Esterhazy of the grand Croix de Marie Thérêse; he had already decorated himself with the ribband, over the old white waistcoat, though he had not yet put on his boots. The order was accompanied with a most gracious letter, the Grand Duke has received the same honour, and Prince Barkrattion is a commander. Six lesser ones have been sent for the Marshall's distribution: what a sneaking trait at this moment. However the Russians seem to

think matters by such means may be made up. Weyrother is restored to full confidence, as a proof he was called upon to say grace; to be sure, he succeeded so ill that the Marshall pronounced him a Carmagnole; he however sung out Vivat l'Empereur, and said Wickham Excellency was proud he had left him without taking leave. The 1st Column marches to-morrow to Wangen from thence to Leutkirch, Memmingen, to its cantonments. The Marshall will be at Augsbourg on the 3d.; the 2d. Column follows on the 1st. General Stakelberg has recovered all his property; his servant was the thief. By the way, one of yours took by mistake my pistols from Wangen; the maid saw them put into the carriage; pray keep them for me. If you should receive any letters for me I shall be obliged to you to take care of them, and if you leave Augsbourg before I have the pleasure to see you, trust them to your Banker.

H. CLINTON.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton to Mr. Wickham.

Lindau: 30th Oct^{r}., 1799.

My dear Sir,—The arrival of Prince Esterhazy and the Ribbands has already had a very good effect towards a reconciliation. The Grand Duke, who is the principal cause of the present misunderstanding between the Austrians and Russians (Count Stakelberg assures me), has been the first to alter his tone in speaking of the former; not to be at enmity with a man who had just done him so great a favour as to confer on him his first military order, he now confines all his resentments to the person of Weyrother, of whom he has spoken in the most injurious and unjustifiable terms.

It seems to have been part of the object of Prince Esterhazy's Mission to have stopped the retreat, but here the Marshall was not to be moved, and he has already marched with his first Column.

Prince Esterhazy assured Count Stakelberg that he had brought orders the most positive from the Emperor, that the Arch Duke should confer with, and heartily *co-operate* with the Marshall. Count Stakelberg complained of the want of faith in general in the Austrian Cabinet, to which Prince Esterhazy replied, that he might rest assured that his Court would have no reason to complain in future. He expressed his apprehensions that the Enemy would take advantage of the absence of the Russians, and penetrate into Swabia; upon which Count Stakelberg took upon himself to assure him that, in that event, the Marshall would fall upon them with his whole army; he repeated this conversation to the Marshall, who found no fault with the assurance he had made to Prince Esterhazy.

In short, the orders of Marie Thérêse have operated miracles. Count Stakelberg says this change in the conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna has been caused by the breaking off the negociation with F, it seems probable. They now find that their only chance of salvation is to cement as strongly as possible the alliance with Russia. This may be a favourable opportunity to make them explain their meaning of the words Arrondissement and Indemnité, &c., &c., as well as to bind them to just engagements.

A courier was dispatched in the night for Petersburgh, and I hope this will arrive in time for yours. As an officer has undertaken to deliver it himself, I have ventured to speak out.

I shall be at Augsbourg about Monday.

Ever sincerely yours,

H. CLINTON.

(No. 41.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.) Augsburg: 31st October, 1799.

My Lord,—I wish to take the earliest opportunity of correcting a mistake in my dispatch of the 17th inst.,

from Wagen, No. 37, in which I informed your Lordship that the Archduke had approved of the principle of the plan of operations against the enemy in Switzerland which had been proposed by Colonel Weyrother at Feldkirch on the 12th, and adopted by Marshall Suworow, and that H.R.H had sent M. de Korsakoff with his whole corps to reinforce the Marshall, '*undertaking all the operations to the westward of the lake of Constance himself, and proposing that it should be attempted immediately.*'

Having since obtained communication of H.R.H.'s letter I am sorry to find, though the above statement is perfectly correct as far as it goes, that I had been very materially deceived as to the real nature of H.R.H.'s offer of co-operation, which was qualified by these words, 'and H.R.H. will make such a demonstration of attack and give so much jealousy to the enemy as to keep him fully employed on his left.'

It was evident, not only from this passage but from the whole letter (in which there was nowhere to be found any distinct and positive engagement on the part of the Archduke to cross the Rhine at all), that the object of sending M. de Korsakoff's corps to reinforce the Marshall was the engaging the whole Russian army in Switzerland without any risk to the Austrians, and the last dispatches which I have received from Lord Minto put it beyond a doubt that in point of fact H.R.H. had it not in his power to engage his army in Switzerland or to offer anything more than a demonstration of attack.

I had distinctly stated to Marshall Suworow, in the conference which I had with him at Feldkirch on the 13th inst., my firm persuasion that this would be the case, and that the Archduke neither would nor could take that part in the operations which Colonel Weyrother proposed. I also stated it as my opinion that H.R.H.'s staff officers, from mere jealousy of Colonel Weyrother, would certainly make such alterations in the plan as would justify the Marshall in rejecting the whole, and I pressed both these

points on the Marshall's consideration as reasons to induce him to suspend his departure from Feldkirch until he should receive the Archduke's answer, in the assurance that it would be such as that he would have no reason to repent his having taken the measure I advised.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances there can be no question (for the reasons stated in my dispatches by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart), that Marshall Suworow acted very wisely in rejecting H.R.H.'s offer, but it is not the less true that his conduct in marching from Feldkirch without waiting for H.R.H.'s answer cannot in any respect be justified, and I am sorry to add, that, provoked and irritated at the constant tendency of the Austrians to deceive him, and feeling in its full extent all the unpleasantness of the situation to which he has been reduced by their means, he no longer attempts to keep up even the appearance of any concert with them, and that his whole conduct in his communications with the Archduke is as injudicious and extravagant as his language is intemperate.

[Here follows the description of F. M. Suworow's conduct, already given in Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton's letter.]

Besides the proofs of the extreme warmth of his temper which I have just given, and those which I shall mention in another dispatch (No. 42.), I have collected from the persons immediately about him, that he is beyond measure violent in his passions, that he cannot suffer the least contradiction or opposition to his opinions, and that the extravagant conduct which he constantly affects in public, and not unfrequently in private, is considered by them as assumed with the intention of preventing his being thrown off his guard by the warmth of his temper, which would not fail to be the case were he to engage in any serious conversation in a company where other persons were at liberty to give their opinions as well as himself.

I must not omit to mention here that my instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton, which I am persuaded were literally followed, only suggested to him to take a

proper opportunity of informing the Marshall of my visit to the Archduke, and of the object of it, and to request that he would at least leave a part of M. de Korsakoff's army in its present position, until I should return to him (which I promised to do without delay) with the result of my conference with H.R.H.

Notwithstanding the extreme violence of the Marshall's temper, yet those who are in the habit of seeing him do not appear at all apprehensive of its effects, as his anger seldom lasts, and he is afterwards more than usually kind to the persons upon whom it has fallen.

He is very much beloved by the persons immediately about him, and I have observed him on many occasions extremely attentive to them, taking opportunities of pointing out their good qualities, and expressing his thankfulness for the manner in which they served him, and the attachment they showed to his person.

He is certainly at this moment, whatever his adherents may say to the contrary, most extremely afraid of the French, and I observe that when talking seriously he never attempts to undervalue them. This is the real history of his anxiety to have an Austro-Russian army under his command, and though he made a mystery to me of his real opinion on that point when he first arrived at Feldkirch, yet he now never supposes the possibility of beating them by the Russians alone.

Your Lordship will observe that in his note to Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton, where he talks of driving them out of Switzerland with bladders, he supposes the operation to be performed by the Archduke, the Russian army acting only as auxiliaries.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton has mentioned to your Lordship the Marshall's declaration to him that 300,000 Russians would not be sufficient without the Austrians to drive the French out of Switzerland. He has spoken to me to the same effect, begging in the most earnest manner that I would write again both to Lord Minto and to Sir

Charles Whitworth to leave nothing undone to procure him again the command of an Austro-Russian army, and the Count de Stakelberg has told me in the strictest confidence that the Marshall had said exactly the same thing to him, and used every argument, and even some little artifices, to persuade him to write to the Emperor that the Russians alone were not competent to undertake the deliverance of Switzerland, admitting that he had not had courage to do so himself; and indeed I have reason to fear that he has not dared to speak his own opinion to his master on many other essential points. I know, indeed, that he has sent home a very pompous account of the exploits of his officers in the little Cantons, in which he speaks in the highest terms of some of his generals of whom he has the worst possible opinion, and to whom, I know, he would not trust the command of a regiment that was to march against the French, without an Austrian officer to direct it.

He is particularly irritated against the Archduke, on account of some marks of disrespect which H.R.H. has shown him, and which he considers as intentional, particularly his neglecting to give him the title of Highness and of Monseigneur; which he now expects from everybody, and his calling him *Russian* Field Marshall only, and not *Austrian* and *Russian*, as he had been hitherto styled. I am indeed inclined to fear that this latter omission was intentional on the part of H.R.H., who, as I have before had occasion to mention to your Lordship, seldom omits an opportunity of expressing the part which he takes in the extreme dissatisfaction which the Marshall's appointment to the command of the Austrian army has given to all the Austrian generals.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, My Lord, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

(No. 42.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

Augsburg: 31st October, 1799.

My Lord,—In my dispatches from Wangen, No. 37 and 39, I informed your Lordship of my intention to proceed to the Archduke's head quarters without loss of time.

On my arrival at Stockach on the 22nd inst., where I had hoped to have found H.R.H., who had given a rendezvous to Marshall Suworow in that town, I learnt that H.R.H. had proceeded towards Manheim, in consequence of the enemy having crossed the Middle Rhine in force; and that Marshall Suworow had refused to meet the Archduke either at Stockach or anywhere else. I was informed at the same time of all the unpleasant circumstances mentioned in my dispatch (No. 41), and in Colonel Clinton's of the 26th inst., and was earnestly requested by Count Stakelberg and Colonel Clinton to return to Lindau without a moment's loss of time, lest the Marshall should have marched with his whole army to his winter quarters before my arrival, no one there having the least influence over him but the persons who were advising him to this injudicious measure.

I waited on the Marshall immediately on my arrival, and was not only received by him with the greatest coolness, but at his own table, in presence of the Prince of Condé and several of his own officers, he spoke of my intended visit to the Archduke as a proof that I had been gained by H.R.H., who he said was no better than any other satellite of Thugut, adding that he and his army should not be treated as mercenaries, with many other expressions equally intemperate, and saying that he should certainly write to my Court to put his Majesty on his guard against the reports I should make on this occasion, which he knew were intended to be favourable to the Archduke.

It was impossible for me to remain silent under this very violent attack, which was evidently not the effect of

passion or resentment, but was deliberately made in the hope of preventing my speaking to him on the subject of his intended retreat; I had besides gained sufficient information of Marshall Suworow's real character to be persuaded that I risked nothing in speaking to him with firmness, provided I treated him with becoming respect. I therefore, after lamenting that he had forced me to speak to him on so very delicate a subject before so many persons, explained to him the motives that had induced me to undertake my journey to Stockach, and begged him to consider coolly and seriously whether they were in any respect deserving of the harsh expressions with which he had qualified them.

I then told him what was my real opinion of his intended retreat and the consequences by which it would be followed, which nothing that I had yet heard had induced me to change, and that my duty to my Sovereign, and the high sense I entertained of the trust reposed in me, would not permit me to remain silent on such an occasion, that I considered myself as fully authorized to lay my opinion directly and respectfully before him, leaving to his better judgment to act upon it as he might think proper, and that on this, as on all other occasions, he might be assured that I should make no representation nor offer any advice on the measures that were to be adopted in the course of this or a future campaign, without making at the same time a very full and faithful report *myself* of all that I should say or do, not only to the King my master, but to his Majesty's Minister at the Court of Petersburg, who in the course of his official duty would not fail to report the same to his Imperial Majesty.

I reminded the Marshall at the same time that he had himself by a note in writing formally declared that the engaging the Archduke to undertake offensive operations in Switzerland was exclusively my business, and that it was at his own express desire, frequently expressed to me at Feldkirch, that I had undertaken this journey, observ-

ing that it certainly could not be imputed to me as a fault if the Marshall had changed his opinion without giving me any notice of it, and I submitted to his better judgment whether he was not strengthening the hands of the Austrian Minister of whom he pretended to have such good reason to complain by thus doing everything in his power to irritate the Archduke and the whole Austrian army.

I have the satisfaction to add that the Marshall, though somewhat surprised at the first moment, received my observations with attention and with perfect good humour, and that as soon as dinner was over, he sent Colonel Koutschakoff (one of his great favourites, lately returned from Petersburg, where he had carried the intelligence of the battle of Novi) to assure me that he had no intention whatever to offend me in anything that he had said, to explain to me his reasons for persisting in going with his whole army into winter quarters (which turned entirely on the wretched state of the army and the opinion in favour of the measure expressed by all the officers, and nominally by the Grand Duke), and to say that he was ready to engage to go no further than the Leck, and to march immediately with his whole force should the enemy pass the Rhine, and that he would not leave his present position until the Archduke should have taken every necessary measure for securing the Vorarlberg. I received a second message nearly to the same effect in the course of the evening, through Count Stakelberg, who assured me besides that the Marshall was really concerned and sorry for what had passed.

I took this opportunity of saying everything that would tend to satisfy the Marshall, that in all that I had done, I had nothing in view but his own reputation and glory and the honour of the Russian arms, taking care however to reserve to myself distinctly the right of giving my opinion on any operation to be undertaken by the subsidiary army until the arrival of Lord Mulgrave, or

until his Majesty shall be pleased to send some other general officer charged with that mission. And before I left Lindau I had the satisfaction to find that his confidence in me was entirely restored, and his communications were as unreserved as they had been at Feldkirch; all that he asked was that I would not attempt to cross him where his resolution was finally taken, giving me clearly to understand that on this occasion he had not been the master, and that besides he considered the Archduke's conduct as bad as that of M. de Thugut, and he said *that he must be at liberty to tell him so.*

I readily gave up both these points, being thoroughly persuaded that any direct opposition on my part to either of them might do much mischief, but could not possibly be of any service. Besides, the intended re-embarkation of his Majesty's forces in Holland, of which we have been informed by the way of France, renders active operations on this side, as far *as respects his Majesty's more immediate interests*, now of much less importance, and must necessarily direct our attention here as much as possible to the preserving the Russian force for some better occasion, rather than to any immediate operations.

The Archduke has again written to the Marshall, protesting in the strongest terms against his intended retreat, pointing out to him all the misfortunes which will be the necessary consequence of it, and declaring that the Marshall alone will be responsible for them:—to this the Marshall has returned an answer if possible more violent, more injudicious, and more personally disrespectful to H.R.H. than his conversation with Count Colloredo, in which, after reproaching the Archduke with all the disasters of the campaign, and accusing H.R.H. of having *purposely* reduced the Russian army to such a state as to make its retreat a matter of necessity, not of choice, he signifies his firm resolution to canton the army immediately between the Iller and the Leck, with the head-quarters in this town, where the Marshall is expected on Sunday

next, the 3rd November, the whole army being already on its march.

I must not omit to mention to your Lordship that it was originally intended that the army should have been cantoned on the Danube with the head-quarters at Riedlingen, *i.e.*, directly between the Archduke's army and his magazines of every kind.

Whether this plan, as there is some reason to suspect, was maliciously contrived with the intent of vexing the Austrians and putting their patience to the severest test, I have not yet been able to learn with certainty; I am inclined to believe myself that it was framed in ignorance and adopted in malice. The Marshall however gave it up with a good grace as soon as he perceived that it was perfectly unmilitary. To other persons it was necessary to point out that the present quarters were further removed from the enemy.

Before the army marched from Lindau, application was made in writing to General Hiller, desiring that magazines might be prepared for the troops in different towns along the intended line of cantonment; to which the General returned for answer that it was not in his power to provide any magazines on those points, adding that he had received new orders from the Archduke to protest again in H.R.H.'s name against the Marshall's retreat, repeating the very words which H.R.H. had made use of in his letter.

What precautions have been taken, and what provisions made, in consequence of this answer of General Hiller, I am as yet ignorant. In truth, I found it absolutely necessary to leave Lindau without loss of time, that I might not be involved in disputes in which it did not become me to interfere, which I had not the most remote hope of pacifying, and where I could not see an Austrian officer without being suspected by the persons attached to the Marshall of listening favourably to the complaints and representations of the Archduke.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton will remain constantly at head-quarters, where by extraordinary circumspection he has contrived to regain entirely the Marshall's favour. He will keep me regularly informed of everything that shall happen until the Marshall's arrival here, before which I trust that the Marshall's violent anger against H.R.H. will have been so much appeased as that I may venture to hope for a few hours' reasonable conversation with him on the subject.

It is with infinite regret I find myself obliged to inform your Lordship that H.I.H. the Grand Duke Constantine is the most active cause of all this mischief.

His ascendancy over the Marshall is now so visible, as to be notorious to the whole army; a natural consequence of which has been that all applications for favour are now made to H.I.H. rather than to the Marshall, and every bad counsel which the Marshall receives either comes directly from H.I.H., or is sanctioned by his authority. H.I.H. takes no pains whatever to conceal his personal jealousy of the Archduke Charles, of whose character and military conduct he talks with the greatest contempt, even before the Austrian staff officers; and I am sorry to observe that this sort of conversation is repeated by the Russian officers, who hold a language on the occasion which leaves me no room to doubt but that H.I.H. aspires to the command of the army, and is taking measures to gain the voice of the army in his favour.

I am sorry to add that H.I.H.'s personal character and conduct is in many other respects such as to give the greatest pain to the friends of his illustrious House. Among many other unpleasant facts that are known to the whole Austrian army, and repeated on every occasion, I will only mention his having corporal punishment inflicted for the most trifling offences on the soldiers and on the peasants in his own presence, often in his own apartment, and not unfrequently with his own hand. [Here follows the account of the Grand Duke's conduct

to the Austrian staff officers at the ball, already given in Lieutenant-Colonel Clinton's letter of the 29th.]

The Count de Stakelberg has assured me that he would mention confidentially to the Count de Woronzow much of what I have been under the painful necessity of relating to your Lordship. I fear, however, from the extreme timidity of his character, that he will not speak fairly out with that manliness which his duty to his Sovereign requires from him. He left Lindau immediately after me, and arrived here to-day almost distracted with the recollection of the scenes to which he had been a witness, deeply penetrated with the dishonour and disgrace that has fallen on his countrymen, and the manner in which they are exposing themselves to the eyes of all Europe; and fully determined to press for his immediate recall, unless the Grand Duke be removed from the army, and the whole head-quarters assume a conduct and appearance more suited to the manners and usages of a civilised country.

I do not know an event more to be deprecated at this moment than the retreat of this young nobleman from his present situation. His mild and amiable manners, the discretion and judgment which he has manifested on every occasion, and the candour and impartiality with which he has conducted himself under such very trying circumstances, have gained him the good opinion and esteem of every one, so much so, that even the Austrians address themselves to him with confidence; and indeed without him I am persuaded that all communication between the two armies would before this have entirely ceased.

Under the present unfortunate circumstances, it is a great subject of consolation that the enemy's army, from the best information I can collect, does not appear to be in a situation to undertake anything of real importance. Your Lordship will find in the annexed paper a report of the state of the French armies (exclusive of what is called

the army of the interior) as they existed at the beginning of this month, which I believe to be exact; as exact, that is, as anything that can be procured in France, where the generals themselves are often ignorant of the real effective strength of their respective armies. If this statement be but tolerably correct, I do not think that the force assembled on these frontiers would be sufficient to give the Archduke any uneasiness, were the Russian army under his command, or if there existed any harmony between the two commanders.

The new levies will certainly be made with more success than heretofore, on account of the late extraordinary good fortune of the republican armies. I am inclined, however, to believe that the military conscription had been made with more effect, consequently that fewer men remain to be raised than has been generally supposed, as among the prisoners that have been made since I have been on this side of the country I have observed that the half at least of them were conscripts.

General Massena has been levying large contributions since the battle of Zurich, not only in Switzerland and the bishoprick of Basle, but in the neighbouring province of Franche Compté, which for political reasons he certainly would not have done, had he been able to subsist his army by any other means, and I am confident that all that he can collect in those countries will not be sufficient to enable him to undertake any great and decisive operation.

The weak points are the Grisons and the Vorarlberg, where should the Austrian generals misconduct themselves, and the Court take the alarm, as when Buonaparte penetrated into Styria, much mischief may certainly be done before the winter.

But the Allied forces, if well managed, are still very respectable.

The Russian army, notwithstanding its misfortunes and the disadvantages under which it labours, contains still a

solid mass of infantry which the enemy will not willingly encounter, and the Austrian army is certainly very superior to what it was at the period above mentioned. The troops are unquestionably better and animated by a very different spirit. The army is still miserably defective in generals, but the last years of the war have produced a set of staff officers whom I believe to be quite unequalled in Europe, and from whom it is more than probable that some of the first generals of modern times will spring. Having had opportunities of observing the character of the Austrian staff officers in the earlier part of the war, I am enabled to speak with less fear of being mistaken when I venture to compare them with their successors.

It is generally admitted that in science and military skill these latter are at least equal to those who have gone before them, and in point of activity, real courage, and the desire of distinguishing themselves there is certainly no comparison between the two. The marked character of the Austrian staff officers of any standing was (with some very few exceptions) a degree of caution approaching to timidity, whilst the present set of men seem disposed on every occasion to hazard everything rather than remain on the defensive, or submit to receive an affront from the enemy.

Such men as these render the ignorance of a general of much less consequence than it used to be; all that is required of him is to listen to advice, know how to manœuvre his troops well in the field of battle, and not to be deficient in personal courage. With those qualities alone, a commander-in-chief in the Austrian army may now purchase a high military reputation at a very cheap rate; and I observe that Marshall Suworow is fully sensible of the truth of this principle, which he applies very openly to the case of the Archduke, whilst he himself wishes in secret to take full advantage of it.

Upon the whole I am inclined to hope, from the state

of the French army, that time may be gained till the winter shall have rendered any serious or extensive operations impracticable.

Should I be deceived in the information that has been transmitted to me of the preparations of the enemy, there is no doubt but that the worst is to be apprehended, and at any rate unless strong reinforcements should speedily arrive from Vienna, it is in their power to drive the Archduke out of Swabia, and to establish themselves firmly in the Grisons and the Vorarlberg before the winter. I should not consider this latter event as of any real consequence provided the Archduke were enabled to open the campaign on this side with a sufficient force before the great passages into Italy were opened by the melting of the snows.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

The Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 43.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

Augsburg: 3rd Nov^r., 1799.

My Lord,—The Archduke, finding all remonstrances and protestations useless and that Marshall Suworow was determined to march with his whole army into winter quarters, has written again to the Marshall in a style more moderate than that which he had used in his preceding letters, taking no notice of the harsh expressions which the Marshall had lately used, saying everything that was most likely to flatter his vanity, and earnestly entreating him, as the means of saving Germany, to delay his departure only for a few days, and to leave one division of his troops in its present position until H.R.H. could send ten battalions more into the Vorarlberg and the Grisons, which are evidently menaced.

The letter reached the Marshall after the army had begun its march. He consented, however, to remain

himself till to-day at Memmingen, and to leave General Rosenberg's division near Lindau until the 6th inst.

This change in the Marshall's conduct has been brought about to a certain degree by the style of the Archduke's letter, but still more by the mission of Prince Esterhazy, who arrived a few days since at the Marshall's head-quarters, with the great order of Maria Theresa for the Grand Duke and for the Marshall, with the order of the second class for Prince Bagration, and with six orders of the third class to be distributed by the Marshall to such of his officers as he might think most deserving of them.

They were accompanied by very flattering letters in the Emperor's own hand, both to the Grand Duke and to the Marshall.

Those who have left the army since Prince Esterhazy's arrival, particularly General Hiller, who arrived here last night, say that the best effect has been produced by this well-timed mission.

The immediate cause of this mission of Prince Esterhazy is undoubtedly the firm language lately assumed by the Emperor of Russia and the leave of absence given to Count Rosamoffsky, his minister at the Court of Vienna; but I have strong reason to believe that it is occasioned still more by the very high tone lately assumed by France on the subject of Italy, and a refusal on her part to accede to any of the terms which the Court of Vienna proposes with respect to that country as the groundwork of a treaty of pacification.

The language holden by Prince Esterhazy is however of a very different nature.

He admits the faults that his Court has committed in the conduct of the campaign, particularly in forcing Marshall Suworow from Italy and in tying up the hands of the Archduke. He justifies, however, the conduct of M. de Thugut in Piedmont, saying that after the partition of Poland, the Russians have no right to make any comments on the views which the Court of Vienna may have

on that country; he makes at the same time no secret of the intention of creating an independent state in Italy for the Prince Palatine of Hungary. He endeavours to recriminate, accusing the Russians of incapacity in their conduct at Zurich, and of obstinacy and ill-humour in the Marshall's intended retreat; but he says that it is no longer time to talk of past faults and failings, but to endeavour by every possible means to make amends for them before it be too late; that the Emperor and the whole Court is now firmly persuaded that it is no longer time to trifle, that the situation of Europe in consequence of the late successes of the enemy is become once again very alarming, that the object of the French is the destruction of all the civilised states in Europe, that there cannot possibly be any safe peace with the Republic, and very many arguments of the same kind, to all of which the Court of Vienna has been lending a deaf ear for these six years past, and he declares that he has brought full powers and even positive orders to the Archduke to co-operate with the Marshall in offensive operations to the full extent of the force under his command.

Since writing the above I am truly sorry to say that I have learnt a new subject of dissension that has arisen between the Archduke and F. M. Suworow.

The letter from H.R.H. to the Field Marshall of which I have spoken in the early part of this dispatch contained an expression which Colonel Weyrother in reading it to the Marshall had entirely suppressed, knowing that it would give great offence. The Marshall cannot bear to hear the intended cantonment of his army qualified by the title either of *winter quarters* or of a *retreat*, and it is the fashion at head-quarters to say that the army is about to take *quarters of repose.*

The Archduke had unfortunately called it a *retrograde movement.*

The Marshall yesterday at Memmingen asked for the letter and had it read to him again by a Russian officer,

who had not wisdom enough to suppress this expression. The Marshall as soon as he heard it flew into a violent rage and immediately dictated a letter to the Archduke which, from what I have heard of its contents, is more injudicious and more offensive than any of his former ones. He sent it off immediately by an aide-de-camp with orders to deliver it into H.R.H.'s own hand.

It will arrive at an unfortunate moment and will probably find H.R.H. retiring before the enemy, as since the strong detachment which he has made to the Vorarlberg he has now only eighteen battalions with him at Donaueschingen.

I am sorry to add that the explanation of much of the Field Marshall's conduct may be found in the almost unanimous desire of the army to return to Russia and an evident dread of meeting the French, which I have observed increasing among every class of the officers since the unfortunate affair of Zurich.

Under these and the many unpleasant and unfortunate circumstances which I have been under the necessity of detailing to your Lordship, it is but too evident that all hope of engaging the Archduke and the Marshall ever to act together is entirely out of the case.

This circumstance makes the necessity of restoring to the Marshall his command in Italy still more urgent and more obvious.

The states of the Vorarlberg have sent a strong representation to Vienna on the subject of the disorderly conduct of the Russian army, dwelling in strong terms on the calamities to which the country would be exposed were they to return there, and the dangerous consequences that would ensue, as the militia of the country would unquestionably fall on them.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

The Right Honourable Lord GRENVILLE.

Mr. Wickham to Sir Charles Whitworth.

(Most confidential.)
(Draft.) Augsburg: 4th Nov^r., 1799.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the honour of your dispatch of the 23d Sept. by the Messenger Schaw, which was delivered to me at the Prince of Condé's headquarters at Langenargen on the 24th ult°. Its contents were particularly interesting and satisfactory to me personally, and I have to request that you will accept my best thanks for the obliging attention you have paid to this affair, which I own, considering the characters of the Emperor and of the Marshall, had not failed to give me some uneasiness.

His Imperial Majesty may rest safely assured, I will on no occasion advise any measure, without the entire persuasion that it will tend directly to his glory, and to the honour and reputation of the Russian army. This is the only return in my power to make for the confidence he is so graciously pleased to repose in me.

In compliance with Lord Grenville's direction to keep you fully and regularly informed of the true state of things on this side the country, I shall send off a messenger to-day to Petersburg, with copies of some of my late dispatches to the Office, from which you will learn the deplorable condition of the Russian army, and the fatal consequences that are likely to follow from the weak and wicked conduct of the Court of Vienna, and from the ignorance of the Russian commanders, and the ungovernable obstinacy and violence of the Grand Duke and the Marshall.

I have little to add to the picture I have there given, excepting the assurance that I have coloured no part of it too highly, and that I have suppressed many strong facts, highly dishonourable to the Grand Duke and many more, tending to throw ridicule on the Marshall, and I can only repeat what I have already said so often, and

put in so many different shapes; upon which I believe there are now not two opinions, either in the Russian or Austrian armies, that a Russian army is quite incompetent to the great objects it was proposed to attain, and that with its present organization and composition, it cannot meet the French on any terms of equality.

This is a fact that may most entirely be relied on, and must necessarily make the leading point to which in all future arrangements and negociations everything must be referred.

I remain still however of my first opinion that M. de Suworow were he trusted with the command of an Austro-Russian army in Italy, could do more, with all his faults, than even the Archduke himself, but unfortunately by the intemperance of his tongue, and the extravagance of his conduct, he is rendering the attainment of this desirable event every day more and more improbable.

It is really not to be expected that an Austrian officer of rank and talents, who has any sense of his own honour and dignity, should submit without the strongest repugnance to serve under a man, who conducts himself so strangely, who does not give himself the pains to examine any one position that his army is to attack or occupy, and who is notoriously ignorant of that part of his profession, without which it is impossible to make successful war against the enemy with whom we have now to contend.

There is however no middle line to be taken, either the command of an Austro-Russian army must be obtained for the Marshall, or he must retire from the service.

I most earnestly wish that Lord Minto, to whom I send this dispatch open, may be able to hold out any hope of such a command being given to him.

If he obtained it, supposing the whole Russian force to be 35,000 men, he might take with him the greater proportion of it, and leave us in full strength here.

If from fifteen to twenty battalions of Russian in-

fantry, I mean 15,000 effective men, were left under the command of the Archduke and timely measures taken for recruiting them during the campaign, such a reinforcement supported by 10,000 Bavarians, and by the Swiss levies, would enable his Royal Highness I am fully persuaded to carry on effective operations with success, and especially to effect the conquest of Switzerland early in the campaign, in spite of any force that the enemy could get together.

I beg you to be persuaded that the language I hold on this occasion, and on all others where I venture to speak of military operations with any confidence, is never my own, but the result of frequent communications with the best informed and most able of the Austrian officers.

I here necessarily suppose that the Austrian army will be at least, a nominal 100,000 men.

If prompt and vigorous measures for carrying this disposition into effect be taken the enemy will have little to rejoice at his late successes, and the Allies will have everything to hope for.

It is unnecessary for me to add that I am now speaking of the military operations only.

Unless the Emperor of Russia will consent to such a disposition of his army, and unless the Court of Vienna will abandon its crooked system of politics, and give to the Archduke, the full powers, and the confidence which he deserves, his Royal Highness can make no use of the means that will be put into his hands, and we shall again see the finest armies moulder away in inactivity, whilst the enemy is procuring the means of attacking them with effect, and collecting the resources of which activity on our part would have necessarily deprived him.

These are points of the practicability of which yourself and Lord Minto can alone form a competent judgment.

I have done my duty in representing the absolute necessity of insisting on them as a sine quâ non, if we mean that the war on the continent should not turn to

the utter defeat of all our projects, and to the disgrace, if not the ruin, of our Allies, as well as of ourselves.

I am very seriously afraid that the representations which have been made from head-quarters are of a nature to deceive the Emperor on many material points.

Unfortunately the Austrians, who are certainly the original authors of all the evil, have laid the ground for a statement of facts which will not only place them in the wrong, but justify in a great measure the whole conduct of the Russians, or at least cause all their faults to be overlooked or forgotten.

Unless Count Stakelberg has really had the courage to write fully to Count Woronzow, I have no hope that any part of the truth will reach Petersburg, but through you, and I really feel more than I can express for the delicacy of your situation.

Fortunately it cannot now be very long before you will receive from London such full instructions on that point, as will remove from you all responsibility. I sincerely wish and hope that in the meantime you may not be obliged to make use of any of the information I have given you, but should that be the case, I venture earnestly to request that you will have the goodness to give me early information of the extent to which you have used it, and the persons to whom it has been communicated, that I may regulate my conduct and language accordingly at head-quarters with due discretion, which as you will collect from my public dispatches is at no time a very easy matter to do.

Sir Charles Whitworth to Mr. Wickham.

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburg: Nov^{r}. 16th, 1799.

(Received at Augsburg, Dec^{r}. 12th at 8½ A.M.)

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th ult., and of its very interesting

inclosures. I will not attempt to describe to you the real grief I feel at the unfortunate turn which [affairs] seem at last to have taken. It is such as must be common to all those who wish well to the Cause, but perhaps the more distressing to me in proportion as I had reason to flatter myself with having rendered an essential service to that Cause by contributing to bring forward a Sovereign from whose brilliant outset so much was expected. Lord Minto will already, at my desire, have acquainted you with the determination of the Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding every argument which could be urged of the imminent danger to which Europe must be exposed, of withdrawing his co-operation entirely from the House of Austria. It cannot be denied that the conduct of the Court of Vienna has been in many respects such as to merit the worst which can befall it, were it possible to separate its welfare from that of Europe; but I confess that the resolution now adopted, confounding in so dangerous a manner his personal revenge against that Court and the Public Safety, is beyond every idea I could have conceived of imprudence and of impolicy.

His Imperial Majesty has written to the King, announcing his fixed resolution immediately to recall his troops from Switzerland. The motives assigned, are the suspicious and mysterious conduct of the Austrian Cabinet in general; its constant refusal to open itself to its allies either on the reestablishment of monarchy in France, or on its views of aggrandisement in Italy, more particularly with respect to the Dominions of the King of Sardinia; the want of support which his Generals have experienced; the neglect and disrespect with which they have been treated in defiance of every motive to gratitude; and finally the indifference with which his armies have been abandoned and left open to the attack of a superior enemy in a country for the defence of which they are perfectly inadequate.

Upon these motives the Emperor of Russia has actually

given orders to Marshall Souvorow to separate his army from that of H.R.H. the Archduke, and proceed as soon as the season will permit to the Russian Frontiers, leaving the Cause to its own defence, and to us the regret of having made a fruitless effort, and of having misapplied so considerable a portion of the resources of our country. These are melancholy reflections, but unfortunately they are such as are more than justified by the event.

I do not enter into a detail of the important topicks of your letter. But I will freely confess that knowing the character of this Sovereign and his extreme sensibility; and well aware of the danger to which I should expose the Cause, as far at least as its safety is connected with the continuance of his support, I do not feel myself justified in representing in their full force the facts with which you have furnished me; sensible that by so doing I should totally alienate the mind of the Emperor, and that without the smallest advantage, seeing that the resolution to recall those troops, of which there is so much reason to complain, is decidedly taken, and even carried into effect, as you will see by the copy of the official answer from Count Rostopsin to me which I now inclose.

There cannot be the smallest doubt of the existence of the evils which are complained of; they are, and always have been notorious; but such is the vanity of this Country, and particularly of his Imperial Majesty and those about him, that not a single word would be believed, and the whole would be laid to the account of jealousy and of a desire to attribute solely to him, that want of success with which our efforts have unfortunately been attended. The fact is that his army is no longer in a state of co-operation, that at this moment it is actually under orders to march homewards, and that therefore any representation of this kind would only be exposing ourselves to a certain loss without any prospect whatever of advantage.

Upon the strength of this reasoning I have felt it my duty to suppress any remarks, untill I shall be furnished with Lord Grenville's positive instructions for so doing, and even then I trust much will be left to the exercise of my own discretion. In the mean time I have only to observe that let what will be the event, to new model the Russian army will be perfectly impossible, since the evils of which we complain are the effect of the national character, and cannot be eradicated without going back to the very sources. It remains to be seen therefore whether it may be most advantageous to make what use of it we can, such as it is, or so far to disgust the Emperor, as to furnish him with the pretext, of which many about him would very willingly avail themselves, of withdrawing entirely from the conflict, and of leaving those who are considered as more immediately exposed to the danger to extricate themselves as well as they can.

Upon reflection I am persuaded you will agree with me on the impropriety of taking this moment to open the eyes of the Emperor to the fatal defects of an army which according to his conception is so perfect.

It is not possible to give you an adequate idea of the extreme discontent of this Court with that of Vienna. It manifests itself on every occasion. Under these circumstances it is natural to look for a remedy, and I confess I see none unless it be the removal of Baron Thugut from the efficient post he now fills. Such is the hatred of the Emperor towards this Minister, that I am convinced he will by degrees, and by very precipitate ones, drop all connection and communication whatever with the House of Austria, unless that satisfaction is afforded him, and even then I do not positively say that it would be a means of engaging him to co-operate in the war against France.

I need not say that amongst the heaviest charges laid to the account of Baron Thugut is that of his having decided the measure of the evacuation of Swisserland by

the Archduke, and consequently of having exposed the Russian army to the misfortunes which ensued. Could there possibly have existed the smallest doubt of our having ever advised the adoption, as has been so unjustly laid to our charge, of a measure so replete with danger, the language which Lord Minto has held at Vienna, strictly conformable to that which has marked all my Communications here, would be more than sufficient to remove it. The whole is attributed to Baron Thugut, and it rests solely with him to exculpate himself in the mind of the Emperor of Russia.

I wish most sincerely that I had anything more consolatory to offer you. Although unwelcome, it is necessary that you should be made acquainted with the true state of affairs, and for this purpose I dispatch the messenger Wagstaffe. He will at the same time return to you the drafts of your Dispatches to Lord Grenville, for the communication of which I am infinitely indebted to you. It is impossible to be more interesting, and to give a clearer and more concise account of the events which have taken place within your observation.

I take the liberty of inclosing copies of some of my late Dispatches, although in fact they contain little more than what you will find in this letter. You will observe undoubtedly the *style tranchant* of Count Rostopsin upon this occasion. It appears to be such as precludes all negotiations. My only hope is in the calm and friendly representations which I shall shortly receive from England, and if they are attended by a suitable conduct and language on the part of the Court of Vienna, I shall not utterly despair.

You will have heard long ere this that General Korsakow is dismissed the service. He is considered here as being absolutely mad. The person who succeeds him, Count Viosménil an Emigrant, is a man of character, and universally well spoken of. Would we were still in a situation to profit of his talents.

You will also receive amongst the other papers the official account published here of the events which have lately taken place in Swisserland. It comes from the Marshall, and is well worthy of observation.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient and most humble Servant,

CHAS. WHITWORTH.

P.S.—At the moment I was making up this packet, Lord Minto's letter of the 1st November is come to hand. The melancholy circumstances which it refers to are no more than what I expected from the spirit which prevails here, and which has already found its way to the army, although when the Marshall had determined to fall back as far the Leck, he did it on his own authority, not having yet been in possession of instructions from hence.

I avoid making any mention of the unfortunate business in Holland, which furnished the first pretext, and which I really believe was in fact the real motive of the Archduke's retreat from Swisserland. You will easily believe that the effect has been violent here. I trust however that the Emperor will leave us his troops, should we be disposed to employ them in the spring.

Mr. Wickham to Field Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Copy.)
(Very Confidential.) Augsburgh: 21 Nov., 1799.

Monseigneur,—Two days after the departure of your Highness from Feldkirch I informed my Court by a courier extraordinary of the very interesting conversation with which your Highness had honoured me in that town, writing at the same time to Sir Charles Whitworth as your Highness wished me to do. The King my master, as soon as he was made aware of the wishes of your Highness regarding the operations of the next campaign, did not hesitate to respond to them as soon as possible,

and to recommend your projects as his own to the two Imperial Courts, by couriers extraordinary sent from London on the 9th of this month. His Majesty, in acting thus, has intended to give the most unequivocal proof, both to their Imperial Majesties, and to your Highness, of his confidence in your Highness's talents, powers, and above all in the accuracy and integrity of your views. In consequence of these sentiments, His Majesty has specially insisted to the Court of Vienna that your Highness should be reinstated at the head of a combined Austro-Russian army. It seems as if the great services which your Highness did not cease to render to the House of Austria when you commanded an army thus composed, ought to ensure a favourable reception to such a request. But, in order to give H.M. the Emperor and King a more direct interest in granting it, H.B.M. will do in this event all that will depend upon him to reinforce the Austrian armies in Germany and in Italy with 80,000 men, (either Russians if it please your august Sovereign to grant a sufficient number) or Swiss and Germans, and still more to make arrangements at his own expense for the sustenance of this additional force, which will bring the greatest relief to the Court of Vienna, will at the same time facilitate the maintenance of the Russian troops, and will place both officers and soldiers in a most favourable position. The King my master has also demanded of the Court of Vienna their plan of operations for the next campaign, which ought to be submitted to the Court of St. Petersburg, and approved by it, and by your Highness as an express preliminary condition without which no engagement can be contracted. In order that I may bring all these things more in detail under the notice of your Highness, and communicate to you confidentially the contents of the dispatches which I have just received from my Court, I beg your Highness to consent to name a time in which I might have the honour of coming to you to converse with

you on this subject. You will have an especial pleasure in hearing that the strongest interest was shown in favour of his Sardinian Majesty, and that there is reason to hope no fresh obstacle will be raised against his return to Turin, and his re-entering into enjoyment of the greater part of his dominions and his right of Sovereignty, subject to the express conditions, to be settled afterwards, in virtue of which the Court of Vienna will abate its pretensions of wishing to keep the whole. For the rest, of all the propositions that the minister of H.B.M. is authorised to make at the Court of Vienna, he is not authorised to treat definitively of any without the consent and full approbation of the Court of St. Petersburg having been first obtained.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and most respectful attachment, Monseigneur, &c., &c., &c.

WM. WICKHAM.

To S. A. Monseigneur le Prince ITALISKY
COMTE SUWOROW RYMNIKSKY, &c. &c. &c.

The Emperor Francis to Field-Marshal Suworow.

(Translation of Copy.)

Dear Field-Marshal Prince Italisky Count Suworow Rimniksky,—I have been greatly shocked and surprised to learn from your letter of the 13th inst., that you with the Imperial Russian army which you command, are ordered to begin your march back to Russia, and that you contemplate doing so. How prejudicial this unexpected resolution will appear in the eyes of both friend and foe, how adverse to the good cause the impression which such an order must create, I need not dilate on to a man like the Field-Marshal Prince Italisky.

I think then that I may believe of you, dear Field-Marshal, that at least you will not willingly accelerate the execution of the command to return which you have received, all the more that owing to the explanations respecting various points received in the meanwhile, and to

the new phase of events, counter-orders may in all probability be looked for on the part of your Monarch. Should however his first resolution be unalterable, you will have to make arrangements for the provisions and other necessities of the march, with my well-beloved brother the Archduke, whom I will at once commission to set to work and make preparations, so that on the other hand the Imperial Russian troops may not suffer from want of food in all the inevitable hardships of their winter's march, and on the other that the people of the Country who have already endured so much throughout the war may not be completely exhausted by the pressure of such a formidable billet upon them and by providing relays of pack and baggage horses. As regards my Hereditary States in particular, I will, if circumstances should require, issue the necessary instructions to my Aulic Council of War; the day of crossing my frontiers should, however, be signified beforehand, and the necessary interval allowed, in order both to commence and carry out the many preparations which a march of troops involves, so that no fresh cause of dissatisfaction may arise out of it.

FRANZ.

Vienna: 28th Nov., 1799.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Draft.)
(Confidential.) Augsburg: Thursday, 28th Nov^r., 1799.

My dear Lord,—I take the opportunity of Prince Esterhazy's return to write your Lordship a few lines with a short statement of our situation here. I should have written sooner but I have been in hourly expectation of an answer to my dispatches by Herslet, and to those by Bosset. It is to Vienna that we must look for all that is good as well as for all that is evil; what passes in this quarter now that the campaign is closed, is but of a secondary consideration in the great scale of Politicks.

Your Lordship will have learnt from my dispatches by

Bosset all the injudicious and intemperate conduct of the Russians in their communications with the Austrian Generals, and the spirit of pillage and plunder by which their army was distinguished in its marches.

I am sorry to say that I have nothing more satisfactory to communicate to your Lordship on either of those subjects. The Russians are the dread and execration of every country where they come, and their residence here will be long and deeply remembered. What is worse, I fear from the conversations I had with Marshall Suworow, as well as from my own observations, that the evil is not to be remedied, certainly not without another chief. I will enter into more detail on this subject by another occasion, in the meantime I will only observe that on the arrival of the copies of Lord Grenville's dispatches to your Lordship No. 12 and 13, I had a long and full conversation with the Marshall on their subject which fully satisfied me, *first* that the Marshall himself felt the evil, and wished to remedy it, *secondly* that the persons interested to prevent any reform would always have sufficient power to prevent it. I am now writing home on the subject, and having two messengers here, I will send one of them to your Lordship in the course of a day or two with copies of my dispatches.

I am as yet unable to form any judgement as to the length of the march that the Russians will be obliged to make, having received nothing either from St. Petersburg or from your Lordship since the Marshall received orders to begin his march. The Marshall himself is certainly well disposed to remain, and only wishes for a pretext to put off his departure. Unfortunately he has committed himself so far that he cannot possibly retract, having declared to the Austrians as well as to his own people, that he would not delay his march unless he should receive a letter from the Emperor of Germany himself inviting him to take such a step. As he knows that his wishes and his determination in this respect have

been communicated officially at Vienna, he is beyond measure angry, and thinks himself slighted by the Emperor in a way that he is called upon to resent. In general the Officers are delighted with the idea of returning home, and make no secret of their sentiments.

I have had long and frequent conversations with Prince Esterhazy, in which I have never disguised my real sentiments. I have only expressed a strong wish that there may be nothing like recrimination, that everything that is passed may be forgotten, and that, admonished and made wise by past errors and past failings, we may all go hand and heart together to the same object, each making the sacrifice of so much of his interest and of his opinions as the good of the common cause and the advantage of the whole may require. I have in general found him very fair and sincere, (though, as he ought to be, perfectly Austrian,) and above all very desirous of conciliating all parties. His conduct with the Grand Duke has been above all praise.

I know not as yet nor can I pretend to anything like an opinion of what this Revolution at Paris will produce. Upon the whole I augur very well of it, though in the first moment it may possibly give a force to France that may intimidate, and an appearance of fairness and moderation that may seduce the Court of Vienna to the doing some act that Europe as well as the House of Austria may hereafter have cause to repent.

Certainly Buonaparte will offer terms of peace, but can he offer any which the Court of Vienna can accept without danger and dishonour? The enemy is weak, very weak, or he would before this have been master of Swabia and of the plain of Piedmont. The Austrians have nothing to fear even if the Russians retire, provided we do not abandon them, and another campaign in the opinion of all well-judging and well-informed people will (to say nothing more) place Austria in a situation to dictate terms of peace.

This is my firm opinion founded upon comparing the past with the present, and upon the most careful examination of the respective means of the contending parties during this campaign.

As things are now situated, I think it would be wise in us to ask for no more, and not to talk of Revolution, or counter-revolution, about which the more I see of them, the more I am persuaded the Austrians will hear nothing, until you show them the way to Paris actually open, and no army to oppose their march.

I am more than anxious to know from your Lordship what M. Thugut thinks of the last propositions, and still more whether if the Russians and the Austrians cannot be brought to act together, there exists any hope whatever of bringing the Courts of London and Vienna to contiuue the war by themselves. The purport of my next dispatches to London will be to point out the possibility of doing so. I earnestly hope that your Lordship will be able to prevent M. Thugut from coming to any *fatal resolution* before the opinion of our Court on that subject can be known. You will oblige me infinitely by letting me hear from you without delay on this subject, if it be but a line. Some information as to probabilities is necessary for my guidance in the new levies to prevent on the one hand my leading Government into large and unnecessary expense, on the other the losing means that may not be recovered of furnishing an assistance to the Austrian army that may determine the fate of the campaign.

It may be three or four days before I write by the messenger, therefore pray do not wait for his arrival before you write to me.

Believe me ever most truly and faithfully,

Your Lordship's, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 4th Dec^r., 1799.
(Received Dec^r. 8, at 11½ A.M.)

My dear Sir,—I have received your's of the 28th Nov^r. by Prince Esterhazy and should have answer'd it instantly if I had not been much engaged in dispatching a messenger to England. The views of Russian armies and Generals which your letters and dispatches have given me, have been matter of great surprise as well as concern. The impression which Lord Mulgrave brought away of Marshall Suwarow, and left with me, was very different indeed from the truth, which you have now taught us. Instead of a great general and a great man, I find an ignorant designing mountebank, besides being very mad and very mischievous as madmen generally are. If these are our opinions, you may imagine what the feelings of this Court and Cabinet are on the subject. You will learn the dispositions and intentions of Austria on the proposals for military concert as well as on some material political points, from the enclosed copies of my dispatches to Lord Grenville Nos. 43, 44, 45, which were sent from hence by the messenger Elsworth on the 2d inst. I shall only add that Baron Thugut repeated again today the Emperor's peremptory resolution not to suffer a Russian army in the Empire. The reasons he gives for this rejection of Russian aid might seem almost to be drawn from your letters, and are such as leave one without reply. His determination against any future connexion with Suwarow is if possible still more fixed, and this is a resolution also which it is hard to combat. I do not mean that I have not combated beth to the best of my abilities, as I thought it my duty to do, in compliance with my orders; but in truth I have felt that it was impossible for Baron Thugut to place confidence in Suwarow, or to feel any favour towards him; and the inconveniences attending the union of Austrian and Russian troops have long since, as I think you know, induced

me to wish for their separation. The great question, for the substantial interests of the cause, seems to be whether the Emperor is sufficiently strong, or can be made so by our assistance, without the addition of the proposed Russian army, to carry on the war successfully in Italy and Germany from end to end. On putting the question once more to Thugut to-day concerning the force which the Emperor can employ next campaign, he again assures me that he will bring into the field *at least* 200,000 *effective*, fighting men, without reckoning drivers and other retainers to an army. He wishes to reinforce this army as you will see in my dispatches, in the first place by a body of 12,000 or 15,000 Russian infantry, and for this purpose he wishes that such a body may be left in Germany when the remainder of Suwarow's army retires. In the next place he wishes England to subsidize as many German troops as possible to be added to the Imperial army. It cannot now be doubted that the money employ'd in subsidies would be disposed of more usefully in this way than in subsidizing Russian troops. The benefit to be derived from this plan is so manifest that it can be objected to only on two grounds. First, the unratified Convention, if the Emperor should still refuse to give us satisfaction on that point, as there is too much reason to apprehend he may. But where the interest depending is so great, would it not be wise to waive the point of honour, and find some way out of this difficulty? This might be done either by accepting the Emperor's last offer on this subject, which is to write with his own hand a letter to the King acknowledging the debt and obligation, and promising to ratify the original Convention in due form immediately after peace is made. I do not think by any means this is what we have a right to expect; but since it appears that there is some mysterious obstacle in the way of that satisfaction which is due to us, and if it be true that the subsistence of this ground of difference obstructs those exertions which

might promise us success in the war, is not this an expedient that may be reconciled with a true regard for the dignity, of our government, and perhaps with a higher sort of dignity than that of stickling for the clearest right? The other way of avoiding this difficulty on the present question is by not considering subsidies to other Princes, even where the subsidized troops are to serve with the Imperial army, as standing on the same footing with a subsidy granted to the Emperor himself. Another objection, however, to the furnishing troops to the Emperor at our expence may be, that we have not the same security for their being employ'd for the same purposes and to the same ends as if they were under our own direction or that of the Emperor of Russia. I feel the force of that observation, but at the same time I think it possible that this disadvantage might be balanced by a benefit which might result from this measure. The aid which we should in this manner furnish to Austria would give us a weight which we do not now possess in the discussion of questions which relate both to peace and war. I was struck with this idea in a conversation which I had with Baron Thugut to-day, in the course of which, talking of your negotiation with Bavaria, I said that if there was to be no Russian army to which the subsidized German troops could be attached, England would probably withdraw itself altogether from the continental war, and direct its efforts to the coasts of Holland, Flanders and France. On this he said, in that case there will be an end of our continuing the war on a common principle, such as that of restoring Monarchy in France, and we will make the war as well as we can till we can force the Republick to a reasonable peace. I do not say a subsidy, or a body of subsidized troops would give us a perfect security on this point; but it would certainly give us some weight in the decision of such questions, and it would give to the war a feature at least of concert and coalition, instead of the separate and insulated character which it will assume if

we contribute nothing to the war on the Continent. You will be glad to hear that Thugut to-day said of his own accord that I might be assured, England and Austria, if sincerely united, would at all times be an overmatch for France, even if Russia should withdraw entirely from the coalition. While you are turning your mind to this very question, I thought these considerations might not be unacceptable to you. I have done my best to ascertain the present intentions of this Cabinet concerning peace, and although the notion of their having listen'd to overtures has prevail'd even within the walls of the offices at Vienna, and rumours of actual negotiations come from every quarter, the assurances of the contrary are so explicit and bear the marks of sincerity so strongly that I cannot give credit to the reports which are in circulation, and I conceive that we are on the whole justified in acting on the supposition of Austria's continuing the war. You will see what I say on the desire express'd of late by this Cabinet for concert on this important point, in my dispatch No. 44.

I need hardly apprize you that the negotiations concerning Piedmont are secret and are not yet communicated to the King of Sardinia or his Ministers. I have refrain'd even from acquainting Mr. Jackson with them, a reserve, for which I feel some compunction; but in truth he is on so confidential a footing with the King and enters so exclusively into the views and interests of the unfortunate Prince to whom he is accredited, that I thought it my duty to leave this disclosure to be made by Lord Grenville when he thinks the matter sufficiently mature. I gained some ground to-day on the point of restoring the King of Sardinia in person to Turin, and Baron Thugut gave me reason to expect that after the cession to Austria is assented to, he may acquiesce entirely in our wishes on that subject.

I must request your attention more particularly to No. 45; to which I shall add, however, that Baron

Thugut would wish about 12,000 of the infantry to remain, at least till the Emperor of Russia has been applied to for such an auxiliary or contingent corps. I thought it due to Prince Esterhazy to acquaint Thugut with the good opinion you express of him and of his conduct, and your testimony can but be advantageous to him. I must tell you, however, that it is impossible for any man to hold another in greater contempt or to speak of him more scornfully than Thugut does of Prince Esterhazy. He says that he was sent on this occasion to the Grand Duke because he was a man of great rank, and had been the comrade of his pleasures at Vienna; but that he is perfectly ignorant of the intentions or sentiments of this Court on any subject, and is not fit for any sort of trust. He laughs at the way in which he treated with the Grand Duke *in writing* formally, and seems indeed dissatisfied with that part of his conduct as it drew from the Grand Duke a written answer that seems to give to Esterhazy's complimentary visit the air of an intrigue, and indeed the mission probably was so meant, and they think Esterhazy awkward for having discovered it. Notwithstanding all this it does not seem unlikely that he will go immediately to Petersburgh on another complimentary mission according to usage on the marriage. I don't know whether you know enough of Vienna secret history to have heard that Princess Esterhazy has long had a great regard for Mr. de Rosamowsky, and if the Prince goes to Russia it will be his wish to render some service to the friend of the house. I do not apprehend however that he will receive any political commission from his Court, beyond the general instruction which he carried to Suwarow's head-quarters to conciliate and cultivate a good understanding between the Courts if he has an opportunity of doing so. With regard to Rosamowsky I must fairly say that it is impossible not to applaud his removal. I never met with any one with whom it was so difficult to act, or who

seem'd to have so little notion or feeling of his real duty; but after all no positive offence can be imputed to him, and nothing would be more unjust than severity of any kind towards him. He has served the Emperor long in an eminent station, and I trust the generosity and justice of Paul will not leave him at the end of his career in distress. Indeed I am persuaded he will not. His absence from Vienna for a time is absolutely necessary; but a liberal provision should be made for him, with leave to live where he pleases, and at Vienna, if he desires it, some time hence. I feel real anxiety on this subject, as it is but too clear that the happiness of a whole family of most admirable women, I mean his wife's, and one or two of their lives probably depend on this arrangement. You have no idea of the complicated distress this event has occasioned in the particular situation of this family, the mother of which is dying and considers I believe this misfortune as having been her coup de grace. I must not quit this topick without saying that his successor Kalitchoff is excellent and that I have the greatest comfort and satisfaction in his frank and sincere character and manners. I live in habits of such friendship with the family of Madame Rosamowsky that it would give me the greatest pain to be quoted for any opinion disadvantageous to him, and I should be equally happy to be instrumental in the smallest degree in promoting the beneficial arrangement I have hinted at.

May I beg you to let me know what you have done with regard to the Bavarian troops?

Captain Forster, who was bringing dispatches to Lord Mulgrave and me, having been recall'd from Hamburgh to Cuxhaven by Lord Mulgrave, and Lord Mulgrave having in the meanwhile embark'd for England, Captain Forster sent my dispatches by another messenger, and carried Lord Mulgrave's to England after him. By this means I am deprived of the dispatch addressed to Lord Mulgrave to which my own refer and which is necessary

for understanding them. Observing that a copy of the dispatch to Lord Mulgrave has been sent to you, may I beg you to send me a copy, or to send it me that I may take a copy? It was enclosed in Lord Grenville's dispatch to you of 1st Nov., No. 9.

The siege of Coni is advancing and it is hoped that it will soon fall. Lord Elgin has arrived at Constantinople. Buonaparte open'd a negotiation with the Grand Vizier before his departure from Egypt, which has been carried on by Kleber, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French on condition of being transported to France. They took that opportunity to talk of peace to the Turks. It seems probable that the evacuation will be consented to, a proclamation of the Turkish Government having been long ago circulated in Egypt, and by Sir Sidney Smith, inviting something of that nature. In the meanwhile Sir Sidney is gone with about 5000 Turks on an expedition against Damietta, but not I think with very good hopes. He sailed from Rhodes on the 12th Oct^{r}. Nelson has return'd from Minorca to Palermo. Malta is at present his great object, for the purpose of restoring it to the order and to the Grand Master Paul the 1st. He had intelligence of some ships having sailed from Toulon with stores, as he supposed for Malta, and had taken measures for intercepting them. The Queen seems inclined to return to Naples. The King against it.

I beg your pardon for this volume, and that you will believe me ever, my dear Sir, your faithful and affectionate humble servant,

MINTO.

WM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Sir Charles Whitworth to Mr. Wickham.

St. Petersburg; Dec^{r}. 5th, 1799.
(Received December 27th, at 5 P.M.)

Sir,—For the favourable turn which affairs have taken at this Court since my last communication through Lord

Minto of the 28th ult., I beg leave to refer you to the inclosed Copy of my Dispatch to the office of this date. You will from it learn with the same satisfaction with which I announce it to you, the return of His Imperial Majesty to those principles and to that line of conduct which can alone save Europe and Himself; and I hope and trust that this return will be accompanied with an increase of zeal and energy for the Cause.

I have to acknowledge the honour of your letter of the 4th inst. by Mons. Bosset, with the accompanying drafts of your Dispatches to Lord Grenville No. 41, 42, 43, 44 and their inclosures, for all of which I return you my most sincere thanks. They contain such a mass of information as might indeed fully justify every measure in the way of representation on my part in the hope of finding a remedy, or at least some alleviation of the evils you so justly complain of—no one can feel them more forcibly than I do; but it certainly becomes a duty in me to judge whether by an exposure of facts however founded, the danger may not outweigh every possible advantage. I really believe this to be the case; for such is the national pride and the jealousy of foreign aid that no one circumstance would be attributed to its true motive; and seen through the medium of vanity and conceit, would serve only to furnish those who are adverse to the whole system of sending Russian troops so far, with such arguments, as would it is feared prove decisive in favour of a return to that deplorable policy from which we are but so lately recovered.

You will see from the copy of my Dispatch to the office of this date, on what conditions His Imperial Majesty now offers his co-operation, and that it depends on the conduct which the Court of Vienna may now adopt towards him. I should hope that the Austrian Cabinet will be so deeply impressed with a sense of the danger to which it is exposed, as no longer to hesitate at giving the satisfaction which the Emperor requires; and that a fair and candid

exposure of its views in Italy and on the other points which are required, will tend to the reestablishment of a more cordial consent and co-operation than we have witnessed at any former period. It is therefore from the conduct of the Court of Vienna that we are to look for this more favourable order of things, but with regard to the future efforts of the Emperor, to the plan of operations which will be pursued by him, it is unfortunately from Marshall Souvorow that we are to expect them. The Emperor in revoking the order lately transmitted to the Marshall to return in the spring with all the Russian troops under his command, has enjoined him to state to him his views, and *where* and *with whom he* imagines that the Russian troops may be employed to the best advantage.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that the plans which he may now propose should be under the controul, or subject at least to the approbation of yourself and of Lord Mulgrave; and it is to apprise you of this circumstance, and to prepare you to exert all your influence with the Marshall, that I think it my duty to give you this early intelligence. The confidence of the Emperor in the talents and discretion of this extraordinary man, (however unaccountable this may appear to you who are so well able to judge of his real merits) is unlimited; to endeavour to undervalue either would be dangerous, such is the enthusiasm which he has excited in his own Country. We must therefore, with respect to the Marshall, or to the Generalissimo, as he is now called, pursue the same conduct as with his master. If we cannot make him what we wish, we must at least endeavour to draw as much advantage from him as we can. I hope and trust that the great point of reestablishing confidence between the two Imperial Courts is in a fair way of being accomplished; it remains now to endeavour by every means in our power, that the projects recommended to the Emperor by the Marshall may not clash with those

which may be adopted at home; and it is highly fortunate that you should at this moment be near the person of the Marshall, fully apprised of His Imperial Majesty's intentions, and possessing, at least I most sincerely hope so, so much credit with him as may enable you in some degree to regulate the ideas he may suggest to the Emperor, and thus prevent a second misunderstanding amongst the Allies, more dangerous perhaps than that which [we] have so lately witnessed.

For the rest I beg leave to refer you to the accompanying Dispatch to the office; and as Mr. Casamajor, the Secretary of Legation attached to this Mission, is desirous to avail himself of this opportunity of visiting Vienna, and of paying his respects to you, and will make as expeditious a journey as a messenger, he will have the honour to deliver this, and of satisfying you on any points on which you may wish to receive information.

I wish it were in my power to afford you any well grounded hope of being able to give full effect to the Instructions which I am expecting, to endeavour to obtain an augmentation of force from this Country for the ensuing campaign. I have at least the satisfaction to assure you that the most effectual preparations are making for completing the several corps under the Marshall's command; for the rest, much, and indeed everything, will depend upon his representations.

Begging you once more to accept my sincere thanks for the very ample and satisfactory communications you have been pleased to make me, and trusting to a continuance of the same confidential intercourse, I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,

CHAS. WHITWORTH.

P.S.—May I beg you to present my compliments to my old friend Count Stakelberg? I am rejoiced, but by no means surprised at what you say of him; he certainly is

one of the most promising young men I have met with in this Country. I hear that he has written with great openness to Count Woronzow, but I doubt whether the latter will venture to make use of the information which he may receive from him.

P.S.—Since I wrote this letter a messenger is arrived from Monsieur de Kalitchoff with the communication of the views of the Court of Vienna with respect at least to Italy. They comprehend, as far as I am able to learn, the Novarais, all Lombardy, the Legations, the fortresses of Alexandria and Tortona, the Valteline, and the Swiss Baillages. In short, they include every thing which the Court of Vienna could ever be suspected of coveting. The demand is considered by the Emperor as inadmissible, but nevertheless as furnishing an object of negotiation; and I have the satisfaction to assure you that I am authorised to declare that it has occasioned no change in his disposition.

According to your desire, and upon the strength of the Credit with which you have furnished me, I have paid to Monsieur de Vauvilieres the sum of 200 Guineas, being the exact amount of his pension from the 1st December 1797 to the 1st January 1800, and I inclose you his receipt for the same.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 8th Dec^{r}., 1799.
(Received Dec^{r}. 12th, at 8½ A.M.)

My dear Sir,—The dispatches which I send you from Sir C. Whitworth will show you that we must no longer amuse ourselves with any plan which supposes concert between the two Emperors. We must hope however that his Majesty still preserves sufficient influence over the mind of the Emperor of Russia to keep him firm to his alliance and concert at least with England; and it becomes every day more important and urgent to settle some system of concert between England and Austria capable of encouraging the latter power to persevere in

the war, and of supplying the loss of force which the misunderstanding with Russia occasions. Since my last (by Sylvester) Baron Thugut has explained himself further on this subject. He proposes that we should procure by subsidy, 30,000 German troops, and attach them to the Emperor's Army. He then states his force at 230,000, not including Piedmontese, although some addition to his force may be expected from that country, if a reasonable settlement can be accomplished of the respective claims of the Emperor and King of Sardinia. His plan is to appropriate 100,000 men to the Emperor's Italian army, and the remainder to Swisserland and the Rhine. The distribution of the latter army (of 130,000) to be as follows; 40,000 towards Mayence—25,000 in the Grisons—the remaining 65,000 to deliver Swisserland, and attack France on that side. The plan, however, with regard to Swisserland is to take it in reverse, entering by Basle. It is intended to take Huningue, Brissac and Beffort as points d'appui, in case of any check in the attempt to penetrate into France. At the same time it is proposed that a body of 20,000 men should be detach'd from the Italian army to act in the Valláis, or towards Lucerne or Berne as circumstances may render most eligible. There would remain 80,000 men, which after providing for garrisons and detach'd corps in Italy it is thought would furnish an army capable of recovering Nice and Savoy, and entering France in Provence or Dauphiné. Powerful attacks on the coasts of Holland, Flanders and France, by English and Russian troops, enter also into this plan. All this seems tolerably smooth. But in addition to the troops which we are to subsidize in Germany, Baron Thugut has at length spoken out concerning subsidies or pecuniary aid to the Emperor himself. His proposal is that England should take on herself the loan of 1,600,000*l.* concerning which we have been so long disputing; and that we should enable the Emperor to raise a further loan of the same amount. He offers indeed to ratify the disputed

convention; but in circumstances, you see, which render that ratification nugatory. Here I conceive is a fatal obstacle to the whole plan, eligible as it might be thought in every other respect. You will, I am sure, give me credit for having done my utmost to obtain satisfaction on this point, and to remove this senseless as well as dishonourable impediment to every useful system of concert. But I have, hitherto, no reason to expect success. If the plan now proposed were thought admissible when separated from this difficulty concerning the convention, it will be for Government to determine whether the point of honour is such as to require the sacrifice of the invaluable objects which depend on the joint prosecution of this war. I say the point of honour, for if it was thought that the exertions of Austria would justify the remission of this debt, it would no longer be a question of pecuniary interest whether the ratification were conditional or unconditional, or whether it were given at all. On the point of honour, I must say that the whole of Baron Thugut's conduct on this subject inspires one with the most perfect scorn both for his character and his understanding; but I cannot help thinking it at least questionable whether the true point of dignity might not be found in treating this dirty impertinence with generous contempt, and going straight forward, in spite of it, to our own important purpose. If the terms mentioned in this letter are complied with, the Emperor will engage to continue the war against the Republican Government of France; to declare his object in the war to be the restoration of monarchy (without pledging himself to the present King Louis XVIII.), and to restore all the territory he may occupy within the former limits of France, I mean the limits before the revolution, as soon as a monarchy is established. With regard to Louis the XVIII., he desires to see in writing the declarations we wish to make in order to accommodate our ideas to each other if possible.

This is all that is very material that I need trouble

you with now. I dined to-day at Prince Esterhazy, and took an opportunity to tell him how kindly you spoke of him, and of my having reported your favourable testimony to M. Thugut. It does not appear to be settled that he is going to Russia, or even to meet the Arch Duke and his Bride. He proposes to write to you by this opportunity.

Believe me ever, my dear Sir, most sincerely and faithfully yours,

MINTO.

WILLM. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Draft.) Augsburg: 9th Decr. 1799.

My dear Lord,—I make haste to answer your Lordship's letter by Sylvester. In the first place let me tell you that I have never been at Munich (notwithstanding the testimony of the 'Augsburg Gazette'), and that I have entered into no treaty whatever with that Court. My instructions relating exclusively *to aid to be furnished to the* RUSSIAN ARMY, I have not considered myself at liberty without new authority to conclude anything in favour of the Austrians. I earnestly wish however that I may receive powers sufficiently extensive to enable me to act according to circumstances, as the Bavarian soldiers are yet to be taken from the plough. I have seen for some time the utter impossibility of employing a *Russian Army* in Germany, and if I could but persuade myself that your Lordship's dispatch by Elsworth would have the effect of strengthening our connection with Austria, I should not hesitate to go to Munich immediately and treat and conclude without waiting for further instructions, the whole at my own risk and peril.

Offers are also made here which I feel strongly disposed to accept, to raise from Fifteen to Twenty Thousand recruits for the Austrian Army, by the States of the Circle of Swabia. So cheap and easy a mode of procuring men

will not easily be found again, and upon the principle laid down by your Lordship, I am confident that our Government would do most wisely in promoting it.

I go to the full extent of all your Lordship's observations on Marshall Suworow, though I can scarcely believe that my dispatches, in which I endeavoured to give nothing but facts, and those softened down as much as possible, can alone have justified your Lordship in forming such an opinion of this extraordinary character. They certainly have not given that opinion of him at home, at least not those which I wrote after my first interview at Feldkirch, for in the answer to those dispatches, the Marshall is spoken of in terms which show that there was still a degree of confidence in him which he has certainly not merited, though in common with almost every other person who knew him only by what he had done, I fairly own that I was myself but two months since disposed to give him the same credit.

It is however impossible that this man should be employed again, and I therefore agree with your Lordship that the one great question now to be considered is whether the Emperor is sufficiently strong or can be made so by our assistance without the addition of a Russian Army to carry on the war successfully in Germany and Italy.

I am myself firmly persuaded that *with our assistance* Austria can not only bring a better and a more numerous Army than France into the field, but that in the course of the next campaign if this force be kept well together, placed under the command of good Generals, and sufficient power and authority civil as well as military given to the Archduke to whom the main army must necessarily be entrusted, a strong position may be taken on the frontier of France with three or four of the best frontier towns to cover and protect it. I do not think that more ought to be aimed at, and if I may be allowed to give an opinion, I think now as I have ever thought

on the same subject that more may be obtained by aiming at less.

All that I should ask would be that on entering the territory of France a proclamation should be given not in favour of Royalty, but renouncing all views of conquest and declaring that the Allied armies entered hostilely on the French territory with no other object than to secure themselves against the unjust aggression of an ambitious and turbulent government, and holding out the strongest hopes of peace, and of protection to the oppressed inhabitants who should demean themselves in a quiet and orderly manner. This proclamation should be formally and solemnly renewed on the acquisition of every frontier town with a declaration that the place was taken possession of and would be kept only as a security against hostile invasion, and as the means of compelling the French Government to accept reasonable terms of peace.

Behind such a line as this royalist troops might be formed, and the royalist party in the Interior might be encouraged to act with safety to themselves and with honour, credit, and confidence on the part of those who should encourage them.

On that subject I think you may with safety say to M. Thugut and without fear of committing yourself, that *at our expence* the instant the first frontier town shall have been taken in the manner above mentioned, a general attempt will be made in the rear of the Enemy's army to establish a party hostile to the existing Government, which will assume colours more or less purely royalist according to circumstances, not by any party of Emigrants of whom the Archduke as well as M. Thugut have so thorough a mistrust, but by Generals Pichegru, Willot, and De Preçy, who are at this moment labouring incessantly to procure themselves the means of establishing the standard of Royalty whenever the state of affairs shall render such a measure prudent and desirable.

Willot holds himself in readiness to set out for the

Southern Departments (where he intends to remain concealed till the first successes of the campaign), whenever it shall be thought advisable for him so to do. General Pichegru is in the same situation with respect to Franche Compté, but with this material difference, that as the country in which he is to act will be in the first instance occupied by the Enemy's army, it will be impossible for him to attempt to do anything there until the Enemy shall have been driven from a part at least of the Province.

To remove this insurmountable difficulty, and to enable him to take advantage of the first successes of the Austrians, he proposes, provided he can have the full and unequivocal consent and approbation of the Baron de Thugut, as well as of the Archduke, to undertake during the winter the formation of a corps of deserters in the rear of the Austrian army. The details of this plan, as well as its execution, must be left to us here. The following is the outline of it:—1st. That a depôt should be formed in the rear of the army, at which he would begin by placing some officers and serjeants, with whose principles he has been acquainted from the beginning of the war, whom he considers as personally devoted to him, and who will have the particular advantage of being thoroughly acquainted with the republican army in which some of them still serve, though ready to come away at a moment's warning.

The principal duty of these men will be, not to discipline soldiers who are already formed, but to try the principles and to procure information as to the conduct of each deserter as he arrives, by which means the General hopes to be able greatly to diminish, if not entirely to remove the objections that must at all times exist to a corps of this kind, and which he himself is very far from undervaluing.

2nd. If the project succeeds at all, as many of these troops as have gone through a sufficient trial will be formed into Companies and sent in succession to the

army, where they are to be at the entire disposal of the Archduke until His Royal Highness himself shall think the moment favourable to attempt a diversion in favour of the Austrian army by an incursion into France, in which case General Pichegru will engage to put himself at their head, and to act in such manner as H.R.H. shall wish, according to the circumstances of the moment.

But until they can be collected and formed into a corps, the General would not wish to appear, nor would he wish to use the King's name in the first instance, unless there should be anywhere *within reach* a royalist party under arms.

I wish you to submit this plan to M. de Thugut, and transmit the answer as soon as possible, because I am myself persuaded, if the objections to it be not insurmountable, that in the hands of such a man it will be well conducted, that in itself it is feasible, and that it may be the means of adding a considerable effective force to the Austrian army, at the same time that it tends in its very nature materially to affect the resources of the Enemy.

From what I have seen of the three men above-mentioned, I am persuaded that their principles and their views are perfectly pure, and that they are as steady friends of the House of Bourbon and of the antient Monarchy as any of the first Emigrants in France. I may add to your Lordship, though perhaps it might not be prudent to do so to M. de Thugut, that *Monsieur* has the most thorough confidence in them, and particularly wishes that they should be the persons chosen to prepare the way for his arrival, which they are all ready and anxious to do.

To come to another subject: your Lordship may be assured that some conversations respecting peace had certainly taken place before Buonaparte's return through the medium of the Spanish minister. I am at the same time persuaded that the pretensions of the French were

such as could not possibly be admitted. I read with more pleasure what your Lordship writes of the present opinion on that subject, because I am persuaded that the language on this occasion is sincere. I am happy to add that it is conformable to what is now said and thought at head quarters, where the language was very different on Buonaparte's first appointment.

I learn from a person on whom I can rely, and who has daily opportunities of seeing the Archduke on business, that the last revolution at Paris is seen and judged in its true light, that the high-sounding language about peace is considered as intended only to captivate the publick opinion, and that the measures of the new governors are spoken of as being to the full as *revolutionary* and their language as insolent as those of the last.

I can perceive too that Buonaparte's having sent his first mission to Berlin is a circumstance most favourable to our views and interests in this quarter.

Our Swiss corps go on very well, notwithstanding all our disasters and the difficulty of communication. What might not have been done had we been right in the beginning. As it is, I really believe we shall have six good battalions of 900 men each by the month of March. But they must not be hurried into action too soon, i.e. not before they have had time to be thoroughly formed and disciplined. I will write more fully on this subject by the next occasion.

I have done all that I can to prevent the departure of the Russians, but all in vain. A new attempt was made last night, not directly by me, but what was thought better, by Count Stakelberg in my name, and a messenger was sent off after the Marshall, who is by this time at Ratisbon.

Pray try, if you can, to procure a copy of the remonstrance or representation of the States of Vorarlberg to the Court of Vienna on the subject of the Russian army. I

dare not ask for it while a Russian remains in the country.

Had I sent my last letter by any person but Prince Esterhazy himself, I should perhaps have holden the same language as M. Thugut with respect to that gentleman. I must, however, even by this safer conveyance, do him the justice to say that I have exaggerated nothing in what I have said of his conduct with the Grand Duke.

I have communicated confidentially with Count Stakelberg on the subject of what you have written to me respecting the family of Razamousky. I really know not what influence he can have, but I am sure he will do everything in his power.

We have had a cruel loss, I should say an irreparable one, in the death of the Advoyer de Steiguer, who has fallen a Martyr to the affair of Zurich and to the last retreat from Switzerland.

I have nothing more to add but to thank your Lordship for all the intelligence you have had the goodness to send me, and to say that I agree most entirely in everything your Lordship has advanced in your late dispatches, and that I will do my utmost to second your views and wishes in every point.

I remain, my dear Lord, &c.

WM. WICKHAM.

The Right Hon. Lord MINTO.

(No. 49.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

Augsburg: 13th Dec^r. 1799.

My Lord,—I am sorry to have to inform your Lordship of the death of the Advoyer de Steiguer, which happened on the 3rd inst. after a lingering illness, the consequences of the battle of Zurich. That unfortunate affair made an impression on his body as well as his mind, from which he never recovered. He was interred on the 7th inst. with all possible honours in the Protestant burying ground of this city.

The Swiss regiment of Roverea and (by direction of) F.M. Prince Italisky) three Russian regiments, together with the British and Russian ministers to the Swiss Cantons, several Russian, Austrian, and Prussian staff officers, and a deputation from this city attended the corpse to the grave.

I passed an hour with him at his own desire three days before his death, when he was perfectly sensible (though for some time before he had not even known his own relations), and I had the satisfaction of hearing him, after recommending his country under God to his Majesty's special protection, pray most earnestly and devoutly for the blessings of God on his Majesty and on his subjects. I do not believe that he ever recovered his recollection afterwards.

He is an irreparable loss to Switzerland, I may add a very severe one to the common cause.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

My Lord, &c.

WM. WICKHAM.

Rt. Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

(No. 50.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

Augsburg : 13th Dec^r. 1799.

My Lord,—On the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch No. 12, inclosing copies of dispatches Nos. 12 and 13 to Lord Minto, I made two useless attempts to see Prince Italisky in private and communicate the contents of the whole to him according to his Majesty's commands. His nephews, the Princes Gortschakoff, have now obtained such entire control over him, that no person whatever is admitted to see him but in their presence.

At length I wrote him a letter, of which I send an extract (marked A) inclosed, marked 'très confidentielle.' As the Marshall never reads or writes a letter himself on any occasion whatever, I knew it was impossible to avoid

its being seen by his nephews, I therefore, making a virtue of necessity, gave it into the hands of the elder Prince Gortschakoff myself, recommending the strictest secrecy.

Within an hour afterwards, and before the Marshall had seen it, on entering a room where I was not expected, I had the mortification to find the Prince reading my letter and commenting on it to the Russian officers.

I afterwards passed three or four hours for two nights successively with Prince Italisky on the subject, and received from him two notes of which I send copies enclosed (marked B and C), which were dictated in my presence and professed to be answers to my letter. But I was at last obliged to leave him without having dared to treat the subject of the excesses of the Russian army as I ought to have done. Whenever I attempted to mention it, the nephew immediately interposed, speaking to the Marshall in Russian and changing the subject, so that it would have been as impossible for me to have resumed it without giving offence, as it would have been imprudent to have risked offending such a person without the most remote hope of gaining any one point, or doing any service to the common cause, or to his Majesty's interests. On every other subject the Marshall listened to me with the greatest attention, and on this, as on every other occasion since the violence which he manifested at Lindau, I have uniformly received from him every possible mark of friendship and consideration, nor do I doubt, could I have seen him alone, but that he would have spoken to me confidentially, even on the state of the army, but it would still have been to no good purpose, for if he will not give himself the pains even to read a letter, nor suffer anyone to approach to him in private but on some very extraordinary occasion, it becomes impossible to treat with him confidentially on any business of a nature to require continued attention.

I shall close this subject by observing as the only

remaining consolation, that if any thing could possibly have rendered a Russian army tolerable in these parts of Europe, the measures which his Majesty in his unbounded generosity and magnificence had been pleased to offer to the two Imperial Courts would have produced that effect. But it is now my firm persuasion that the thing is impracticable, and that his Majesty's expectations would all have been ultimately disappointed.

Were there nothing but ignorance in the army some hope might still be entertained; but there is a degree of corruption and want of principle among the officers of which I was ignorant when I last wrote, and so much private correspondance with the Court as will make it impossible to accomplish any real reform, but through the means of a young and active chief who can himself superintend the whole, and who to a great knowledge of his profession unites that firmness of character which I am truly sorry to say under the present sovereign is not to be found, and of which I have seen convincing proofs that the Marshall possesses as little as any officer in his army.

General Derfelden has retired from the service, after writing a letter to the Marshall full of the most cruel reproaches, which he concludes by saying that the honour of a soldier is contaminated by living with such a band of robbers as the troops whom the Marshall commands. The Marshall's nephews have taken care to suppress the letter.

The Marshall has at last left us, carrying with him (I do not use too strong an expression) the execration of the whole country. I believe more so than he and his army really deserve, and more than their excesses would have received but for the extreme ignorance and insolence of their officers, and their refusal to hear reasons or representations of any kind. For instance, in spite of every remonstrance, they placed the other day eight hundred men in a village which is usually occupied by a single

company, leaving three large villages in the immediate neighbourhood without a man.

Several strong representations on the subject of the Russian army have been sent to Vienna, amongst which that of the Vorarlberg is distinguished by the strength and boldness of its language. It calls on the Emperor to hear the complaints of his faithful subjects, and remove those robbers and plunderers for ever from them, and to protect them from the arrival of such another *flight* of barbarians which destroy the whole productions of every country where they light.

This representation has made the greatest effect as coming from a very brave people devoted to the good cause, and amongst the most faithful of H. I. Majesty's hereditary subjects.

It certainly was not obtained at the instigation of the Austrian ministry, as has been suspected, because it was written whilst I was at Lindau when the Court of Vienna could not even suspect that the Marshall intended to enter the Vorarlberg.

The French army continues perfectly inactive in Switzerland, nor has the enemy made any attempt whatever in the Grisons, which they have at length almost totally abandoned, all the affairs, of which your Lordship will have heard from the foreign gazettes, being nothing more than skirmishes of the advanced posts, and indeed little else has taken place on the middle Rhine.

The Archduke has rejected an offer of an armistice made by the French General Lacourbe which was confined to the middle Rhine. H.R.H. is still apprehensive of being attacked on the side of Basle, and on that account has made every possible attempt to detain a part of the Russian army, in which Count Stakelberg and myself have done everything in our power to second him, but without effect.

H.R.H. has received a reinforcement of 19,000 men

to supply the want of 26,000 which he has lost in the campaign.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
My Lord, &c.,
WM. WICKHAM.

Rt. Hon. Lord GRENVILLE.

Enclosure B in Mr. Wickham's dispatch.

Voici le seul plan du Général en gros, les détails dépendent des circonstances dont il doit être le maître. Les plans d'usage des Cabinets peuvent être pour la forme seule, puisqu' ils ne sont jamais accomplis, comme dernièrement la campagne devait se finir sur l'Adda et à son évènement on étoit à Milan.

Aussi Mars, guidé par son jugement, et non par le Cabinet enseveli dans son obscurité, répondra du Général que dans son essor la Providence le fera tout finir même dans une campagne.

Commencer par la Suisse au premier chemin de neige, pour nous rendre aussitôt prêt au printems à la grande opération: mais il ne faut que le Général seul à la tête des armées combinées, en cas qu'il ne marche pas sur la Vistule.

Enclosure C in Mr. Wickham's dispatch.

Détails sur les opérations. Cuneo doit être forcé au plutôt, et par Nice Gênes coupée. Frelich finit Ancone, se joindre à Kleinau, et marche dessus, Gevre (?) est peu de choses. Reste a nétoyer la riviére de Ponente. Après les dernières victoires de Melas, les Ennemis n'y pouvoit avoir au delà de 15,000 soldats, le reste est paysan, mais le sera vers le Printems.

De la une opération par le Dauphiné. Il faut rétablir un gros depôt a Turin ; beaucoup d'armes à feu pour une Contre-révolution, jadis des perches pointues suffisoient contre les lances.

Franche-Comté. Il faut commencer par délivrer la Suisse et au premier chemin de neige praticable: L'Archiduc Charles y suffiroit, vu qu'en dernier lieu à Zurich et ailleurs l'Ennemy a perdu trois 4 plusque les Autrichiens, même si on luy ajouteroit les Bavarois et les Suisses. Mais si le General y seroit destiné, il y agira ensemble en chef. . . . On armera la Suisse pour sa propre defense, et de ses Milices on poura tirer ce que l'on peut pour seconder la grande opération, qui aprés le repos dans les quartiers aura lieu au Printems il seroit bon de commencer par Mayence comme un poste de dépôt sûr. Du reste on y laissera un corps d'observation en proportion de la Garnison pour luy couper au moins les Vivres, quoique sans cela ils y seroit abondant. Vers Kehl il y aura un corps volant.

Les habitants armés des Grisons du Tyrol et je dirai même du Milanois commeAddo seront soutenus par quelques Détachemens encore come en tâchant de ne pas affaiblir les Armées. Ainsi-que le Romagne le Toscane, &c., contre des descentes ennemies qui sans cela seront toujours empêchés par vos flottes. Le Piedmont sera couvert par ses propres milices, et l'Armée coalisée du Roi poura se combiner pour entrer en France.

Si le Général sera destiné pour opérer en chef par ce côté, il faut qu'il s'y tourne à tems avec son Armée alors il n'est plus tems qu'il s'amuse pour la Suisse, d'ou il ne peut sortir que par un grand detour.

(No. 51.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Most secret and confidential.) Augsburg: 13th Dec^r., 1799.

My Lord,—I should have dispatched the messenger Dickens to your Lordship within a few days after the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clinton, as I had promised to do in my letter by that officer, had not a succession of new and interesting events, at the same time that they rendered useless all that I had prepared for your Lordship's consideration, made it necessary for me to take a careful and deliberate view of the new state of affairs, and to collect every possible information that was in any way connected with the subject, before I pre-

sumed to offer any opinion on the measures that yet remained to be taken for carrying on the war on this side of the country, and the hopes that might reasonably be entertained of success under a change of system.

In speaking of new events, I mean more particularly to allude to the late revolution at Paris and the firm and avowed determination of the Court of Vienna (of which Lord Minto will have informed your Lordship) not to suffer a Russian army in the Empire, or in Italy.

With respect to what has passed here under my own more immediate observation, your Lordship will find the only material facts detailed in my No. 50, the rest would be only a tiresome and disgusting history of new quarrels, new complaints, and new intrigues, of the same kind with those which I have already communicated, the whole of which it would be most desirable to suppress altogether. Unfortunately for the honour and interests of the common cause, but too much publicity has already been given to them.

With respect to the revolution at Paris, I have spared no pains to obtain such information as might enable me to form an opinion of its probable consequences, as well with respect to the duration of the continental war, as to the resources in men, money, and talents which it is likely to furnish to the Republic.

As to the first point, I have much satisfaction in informing your Lordship not only that there is every reason to believe that the pretensions of the Republic in Italy, if not quite so extravagant as they were under the Directory, are but ill suited to the numerous and successive defeats and disguises which the French armies have sustained in that country, and are such as Austria cannot accept with safety.

It is generally understood that Buonaparte, insisting on the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic, means at the same time to offer to confirm the treaty of Leoben (by which your Lordship will recollect that Mantua was

left in the possession of the House of Austria), with the addition of the Venetian territory to the east of the Mincio, and it is thought that to obtain any other great object he would sacrifice the country between the Mincio and the Adda, the possession of which is rendered insecure as long as the Austrians are in possession of Mantua.

I can not only assure your Lordship that intelligence to the same effect has been received by the Archduke, but that the opinions and language holden at head-quarters on the subject of peace and war, and of the late revolution, is such as his Majesty could most desire.

At first the name of Buonaparte produced the effect that under all the circumstances of the moment (particularly the departure of the Russians and the fear of being driven from Swabia), might naturally have been expected. But the reflection of a few days, the first measures of the Consular Government, and, perhaps more than all, the very feeble efforts made by the enemy to penetrate into Swabia (a convincing proof of their real weakness) have produced a total change, of which the proclamation of H.R.H. to the States of the Empire of the 4th inst. has been the first effect. H.R.H. has, besides, distinctly and repeatedly declared at his own table, and in conversation with his most confidential officers, who have not failed to repeat his language, 'that the late revolution at Paris ought to give no hopes whatever of peace; that every faction in succession has talked of peace, meaning nothing but war, in the hope of captivating the public opinion; that the new rulers are to the full as revolutionary, as ambitious, and as insolent as the last, and ought not to inspire any more confidence; that they owe their power to the existence of a state of war, and that the desire of continuing it appears already in all their writings and speeches as well as in their measures, notwithstanding their endeavours to conceal it.' The letters I have received from Lord Minto all

tend to show that the same sentiments prevail in the Austrian Cabinet, where I firmly believe that they will continue to prevail as long as the pretensions of the French in Italy shall continue the same, or until some great disaster shall befal their army.

As to the resources in money which the late revolution may probably produce to the Republic, all the accounts from Paris agree in saying that a certain sum that could not have been obtained under the old Government will be acquired by this. But the highest estimate that I have yet seen, I mean that of a Paris banker deeply interested in the rise of the French funds, estimates the whole of the extraordinary resources of the year that can be provided within the Republic at three millions, or three millions and a half sterling, making it consist of voluntary loans without interest, estimated at fifteen millions of livres, to be repaid from the arrears of taxes and from new contributions, the former of which are estimated at thirty millions, and the latter at about the same sum. But all the other accounts agree in saying that nothing like the sum of thirty millions can be produced by the new taxes, and that all resources arising from arrears must in the present state of things be illusory, as while one class of arrears is paid in, others are daily increasing.

And even the warmest friends of the Republic admit that if the war continues, the pecuniary resources necessary for carrying it on, on any very *extensive and formidable scale*, against the forces which the house of Austria will probably be able to bring into the field, can only be procured by powerful incursions into Germany and Italy, maintained for a considerable length of time.

What resources in men General Buonaparte may be able to derive from the Republic, no man is at present bold enough to conjecture. It seems generally admitted, however, that he will be able to procure some considerable reinforcements to the armies. But the most sanguine hopes of himself and his friends do not exceed the number

of from 50,000 to 80,000 men. Admitting, therefore, that the larger number of the two can be raised, it becomes material to consider to what mass of existing force these 80,000 men are to be added.

Subsequent information procured through the Archduke and through Generals Pichegru and Willot, has convinced me that the state of the French armies which I transmitted to your Lordship in my dispatch No. 42 (making the whole about 250,000 men), was, as far as relates to the armies of Italy, the Danube and the Rhine, correct, i.e. as to the returns on paper, though certainly exaggerated as to the effective force. I am now persuaded that Massena's army has at no one moment exceeded 50,000, and it is impossible to believe that with 30,000 men originally under his orders, General Lacourbe would not have penetrated much further than Heilbron, had he received any portion of the intended reinforcements, whilst the Archduke was obliged to keep his principal force concentrated to observe Massena, and to protect the Grisons and the Vorarlberg. I am very confident also that if the French had had 63,000 effective men in Italy, the Austrians would not have made the progress they have done since the departure of General Suworow.

Upon an attentive consideration of the whole, I think there is every reason to believe, judging from what we have seen of the different armies in the field, that the whole effective force of the Republic at this moment cannot possibly exceed 220,000 regular troops under arms. It will be necessary also to make very large deductions for the losses the enemy has sustained since the above note was made both in Italy and Germany, particularly in Italy, where, on the 4th of October alone, they lost in killed, prisoners, and disabled, not less than 6,000 or 7,000 men.

They have no longer their Italian allies to count among the auxiliary troops, but, I think, they may possibly raise

10,000 or 12,000 Swiss, from whom, however, they will derive no effectual service.

I trust, therefore, that I am warranted in saying, that it is not within human probability that the French should bring more than 300,000 men into the field for the next campaign. I am even myself thoroughly satisfied that they never have had 400,000 men in the field at any one epoch during the war, not even under Robespierre, and I have General Pichegru's authority for my opinion.

Of this force it is surely fair to estimate that not more than 220,000 men can be employed on this frontier from Mayence to Nice. The necessary protection of the coasts from Bayonne to Calais, particularly if menaced with invasion; the force which must be left in Holland and Flanders; the army constantly necessary to keep the royalists in check in the western provinces; the garrison of Paris and other towns and fortresses, and the troops dispersed through the interior, cannot altogether employ less than 80,000 men. Indeed, I do not myself believe it physically possible, in the present state of the French Republic, that 200,000 can be maintained, clothed, and fed, upon the line I have above pointed out, and I should allow them 150,000 or 180,000 men at the very utmost.

Upon the whole (without troubling your Lordship with copies of all the bulletines I have received or read), the sum of the information received from Paris on the subject of the late revolution may be reduced to this:—It seems probable that the war will be conducted with more talents and more energy than have lately been the case, and that additional resources, both in men and money, will be obtained, but that both the one and the other will be confined within limits the extreme extent of which may be easily and certainly calculated; that the Consuls will obtain for a given time a considerable share of public confidence, and consequently of public force; but that this revolution is in fact nothing more than one faction succeeding another, and acting on the same prin-

ciples with the persons it has displaced; that it will be difficult if not impossible for General Buonaparte to steer between the Royalists and the Jacobins, and that the fear of the former will induce him to take measures, which, from having the appearance of protection offered to the latter, will destroy all his popularity in the country; that the same effect will be inevitably produced if his effort to obtain peace should fail, and that he cannot possibly carry on the war without having recourse to revolutionary measures, without which he will be able to procure in the interior neither men nor money.

If these are the only real resources of the French Republic, and if the Russian army be suffered to remain in Germany, there can be no doubt but that the Allies will be able to bring an immense superiority into the field. But as it now seems more than doubtful whether this powerful assistance can be obtained, and still more doubtful to me whether it can *by any possible means* be rendered serviceable in this country, the great question that remains to be considered is, whether, if his Majesty be pleased to grant any pecuniary aid to the continental powers the Emperor can be made sufficiently strong, with his Majesty's assistance, to carry on the war successfully in Italy and Germany without the addition of a Russian army.

For myself, if I may presume to give an opinion, I can have no hesitation in saying (taking into consideration as before the comparative state of the Austrian and Republican armies, and the exertions of which we have seen them to be respectively capable), that if the forces of the Allies are properly applied, with his Majesty's assistance Austria can not only bring a better and more numerous army than France into the field, but that in the course of the next campaign a strong impression may be made on the French frontier, and some of the best places of the Republic secured as a barrier against fresh invasions into Germany and Italy.

The question, however, can best be answered by enumerating the different resources in men that Italy and Germany present, and which, by means of subsidies from his Majesty, may be added to the effective force which I understand from Lord Minto that Austria purposes to bring into the field.

1. The Swiss levies, which, notwithstanding our late disasters and all the disadvantages under which we labour, I have not the smallest doubt, since the new capitulation, of being able to carry before the middle of the month of March as far as six battalions of excellent regular infantry, commanded in general by officers of family as well as of real merit, which force may be recruited and its numbers doubled within three months after Switzerland shall have been reconquered. The battalions are of 920 men each. For the opening of the campaign therefore the whole must be taken at 5,520 men, and, with the emigrant troops of the contingents of the little Cantons, at . . .	6,000
2. The Bavarian levies, which I estimate at 12,000 men, being persuaded that the country will not furnish more. . .	12,000
3. Levies in the duchy of Wirtemberg, independent of the contingent of H.S.H. .	3,000
4. Levies in Swabia	10,000
5. Levies in Franconia	8,000
6. Levies in the Circle of the Upper Rhine .	6,000
	45,000
7. Levies in Piedmont, of the extent of which I can form no judgment, but they are estimated, I understand, at 20,000 . .	20,000
	65,000

With respect to the levies in Swabia, the Upper Rhine, and Franconia, it is necessary that I should inform your Lordship that the States of Swabia are now assembled to consider of the mode of furnishing their contingent to the army of the Archduke, and of finding the means of supporting the immense burthens to which they are exposed by the continuation of the war in their country and neighbourhood. They have made a formal application to me to desire that I would lay their situation before his Majesty, and implore his assistance to enable them to make those efforts in the common cause to which their inclination would lead them if they had the means.

They offer to raise a body of 10,000 men before the opening of the campaign, to be placed under the command of the Archduke, and to serve during the war. They estimate the expense of the levy at 150 florins a man, properly armed and clothed, or about 135,000*l.*, and the maintenance of each man during a year at 100 florins, or about 90,000*l.* in the whole.

The recruiting, supposing a fifth of the whole to be renewed during the campaign, at 27,000*l.*,—so that the whole annual expense of the corps of 10,000 men employed in an active campaign (Austria undertaking to find ammunition) would not exceed 252,000*l.* I believe that the Circles of the Upper Rhine and Franconia are ready to furnish respectively the number of men I have above mentioned, on the same terms.

These troops, however, would require much time to form and discipline, and, after all, they would be but badly officered.

To remedy this inconvenience, the Archduke has proposed that an equal number of recruits should be furnished to the Austrian army, and distributed among the different regiments, *each man being bound by his capitulation to serve only during the war against France.*

In this mode I believe that the whole expense of levy and maintenance would not exceed 150 florins a man,

and under the influence of his Majesty, I have no doubt of this proposal being accepted, though H.S.H. the Duke of Wirtemberg and the Prince Bishop of Constance oppose it. The objections of the former Sovereign might be removed, as I have reason to believe, by taking separately into pay the number of troops I have mentioned in the above list, and in that case the opposition of the Bishop of Constance would fall to the ground.

It is certain that this measure would greatly increase the power of Austria; but it would as unquestionably furnish in a much less time a much better and more effective force, and at an infinitely cheaper rate than any levy that ever yet was effected.

The States will be kept together by adjournment to wait his Majesty's answer, and in the mean time my language on the subject will be regulated by what I shall learn of his Majesty's disposition to form a closer connection with the Court of Vienna. In the mean time I may say with safety that there are scarcely any terms within their means to which the Circles will not readily submit rather than see a Russian army again in Germany.

Were any treaty concluded with this or any other Circle on these or similar terms, a stipulation might be made for raising 500 or 600 recruits for the Swiss levies on the same conditions, and for the liberty of recruiting in the Circles for all the Swiss regiments in his Majesty's service. In this case it would be necessary that the Court of Vienna by its minister to the Circles should be party to the treaty.

According to the best estimate I can make of the expense of all these levies for the first year, I conceive that the whole cannot well exceed the sum of 1,964,800*l.*, without the Piedmontese subsidy.

My estimate is made according to the following calculation:—1. The Swiss levies, when increased to twelve battalions, 30,000*l.* a month, or 360,000*l.* 2. The Bavarian levies estimated by the Hessian treaty, according

to which every expense of the campaign of every kind is defrayed by Great Britain, 800,000*l.*

But if his Majesty should not be averse to such a measure, I am persuaded—such are the necessities of the Court of Munich, and the greediness after money that prevails there—that were a large sum, say 100,000*l.*, to be given to the Elector, some individuals provided for who would lose their places in the army, and two or three regiments only taken into regular pay, and sent to the imperial army without any Bavarian staff, that H.S.H. would consent to furnish 6,000 or 8,000 recruits for the Imperial army, in the same manner and on the same terms as the Circle of Swabia, in which case the whole expense of the levy, calculated as follows, would not exceed 414,600*l.*

	£
Viz., 8,000 Recruits	201,600
Sum to the Elector	100,000
Ditto to provide for Officers	50,000
Ditto for three regiments of 1,000 men, each at 21,000*l.*	63,000
	£414,600

If his Majesty should approve of this plan, an article of guarantee of the Bavarian dominions might be introduced into the treaty (to which Austria must of course become a party) on the condition of the Elector's providing men on the above terms; or if his Majesty should not choose to take upon himself the burthen of a guarantee, an engagement to that effect might be required from Austria, which, though not given in direct terms, might yet be so framed as materially to tranquillize the Government and people of Bavaria, and to justify the Court in granting terms of so new and extraordinary a nature.

	£
3. Wirtemberg levies, on the principle of the Hessian treaty	200,000
4. Swabian levies	252,000
5. Franconian ditto	201,600
6. Upper Rhine ditto	151,200
7. Piedmontese ditto, supposing his Majesty to grant the ancient subsidy to the King of Sardinia	200,000

Recapitulation.

	£
1. Swiss levies	360,000
2. Bavarian ditto	800,000
3. Wirtemberg ditto	200,000
4. Swabian ditto	252,000
5. Franconian ditto	201,600
6. Upper Rhine ditto	151,200
7. Piedmontese subsidy	200,000
Total	£2,164,800
Without the Piedmontese subsidy	£1,964,800

Reduced Estimate.

	£
1. Swiss levies	360,000
2. Bavarian ditto	414,600
3. Wirtemberg ditto, reduced on the principle that with so small a force there is no occasion for a separate staff, &c.	160,000
4. Swabian levies at 150 florins a man	152,208
5. Franconian ditto at ditto	120,960
6. Upper Rhine ditto at ditto	90,720
7. Piedmontese subsidy	200,000
Total	£1,498,488
Without the Piedmontese subsidy	£1,298,488

To these resources offered by his Majesty to the House of Austria must be added another, which, if it be properly applied, may perhaps be found worth all the others. I mean the assistance furnished to the Royalists on the frontier, and particularly to *Monsieur*. Having considered this subject in a separate despatch, No. 48,* I only mention it here that I may add the expenses proposed to be incurred in carrying the project into execution to the above estimate.

	£
Subsidy to the Royalists, at 20,000*l.* a month	240,000
Sum paid in advance	100,000
Preliminary expenses	25,000
	£365,000

	£
Increased estimate of subsidies (Piedmont included)	2,164,800
Royalists	365,000
	£2,529,800

	£
Reduced estimate of subsidies (Piedmont included)	1,498,488
Royalists	365,000
	£1,863,488

If to this force could be added 12,000 or 15,000

* Generals Pichegru and Willot and Messrs. de Preçy and Dandré had frequently pressed Mr. Wickham to form a corps of French deserters and conscripts. Mr. Wickham at first resisted this plan for well-founded reasons; afterwards, circumstances being changed, Mr. Wickham assented to General Pichegru's plan, the outlines of which were as follows: —1. The formation of a depôt in the rear of the Austrian army, at which he would place some officers with whom he was well acquainted, not to discipline the soldiers, but to try their principles and procure information as to the conduct and character of each deserter and conscript. 2. If the project were to succeed at all, to form companies, to send them in succession to the army to be at the disposal of the Archduke until he thought the moment favourable for an invasion of France, and then the General undertook to place himself at their head.

Russians, it would on every account be extremely desirable, provided they were entirely under the command and control of the Austrian commander-in-chief. Not having the Russian subsidiary treaty here, I have not the means of calculating the proportional expense of such a number of troops, but I believe, upon a rough estimate, that the expense to his Majesty, were he to pay the difference of putting such a body of men in every respect on the Austrian establishment as to pay and rations, would be, as nearly as possible, 140,000*l.*, independent of the subsidy.

In favour of the above plan, it is most evident that it has the advantage of great simplicity, that it avoids all disputes about unsettled powers between rival commanders, and that no effective force of the same extent can possibly be brought into the field for the same sum of money; and even should it be found necessary or expedient to add a subsidy of a million or a million and a half to the Court of Vienna in consideration of the exertions which H.I.M. intends to make on his part, the whole would be very far below what the establishment of an army of the same number of men in British pay and provided with all the immense details of magazines, staff, hospitals, commissariat, cavalry, artillery, pontoons, &c., &c., at his Majesty's expense, would necessarily require, particularly in a country already exhausted, and where a competition with the Austrian army would greatly enhance the price of every article.

On the other hand, it is certainly throwing a great and formidable power into the hands of the House of Austria without any means whatever of controlling or directing it. Whether, under all the circumstances of the present alarming state of Europe, so extraordinary a measure ought to be resorted to as the lesser of two evils, and whether under any circumstances such a power ought to be trusted in such hands, are questions which the wisdom of his Majesty's councils can alone decide. I will only

presume, with the greatest deference, to observe that if given at all, as it will be impossible to direct it contrary to the will of the Court of Vienna by any talents or by any means, it may perhaps be worth consideration whether the most good may not be obtained by an *appearance* of implicit confidence and by instructing myself (if his Majesty should please to continue my service here), or any other person who may be employed in any way on the same service, to adopt the mode of attentive observation and frequent communication with your Lordship, rather than that of representation and remonstrance.

With respect to any means of ascertaining whether Austria really maintains the number of troops in the field which she engages to do, I am firmly persuaded that there exist none whatever but those of which no public advantage could be taken. I should, therefore, wish to recommend that the security required should be the word and solemn assurance of the commander-in-chief only.

I venture to make these observations as a consequence of the dear-bought experience I have acquired of the impossibility of forcing either the Court of Vienna or the Austrian generals to do what they do not like excepting at the risk of some mischief to the interests of the common cause greater than the evil it was intended to prevent.

As the present reputation of the Austrian troops must necessarily make a material part in every calculation of the respective forces of the contending armies, I have much satisfaction in assuring your Lordship that what I have communicated on the subject of the very improved state of the army of the Archduke appears from every account received here to be equally true of that of Italy, and I have at the same time the melancholy satisfaction of adding that the general voice of the army gives the whole credit of this improvement to H.S.H. the late lamented Prince Frederick of Orange, to whose zeal and

great military talents actively employed for some months before his untimely death, and particularly to the warlike energy and enthusiasm with which he had inspired the troops, the first successes in Italy are now attributed, rather than to any military skill of the commanders.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord, &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord GRENVILLE, &c., &c., &c.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 14th Decr. 1799.

My dear Sir,—The enclosed draughts and copies of my latest despatches to the Office will bring the affairs of Vienna down to the present hour. I am persuaded that you will share the satisfaction I feel in the termination of the old dispute concerning the Convention. The way is now clear before us, and the present disposition of this Court, both with regard to a prosecution of the war, and a closer connexion with us, on whatever motives it may be founded, seems very much to brighten the prospect, which the late disasters of the campaign and the rupture between Russia and Austria had so much darken'd. I think our object should be to turn this favourable disposition, founded no doubt on the occasion which is felt in the moment for our assistance, to a permanent advantage, by securing a strict and inviolable concert on the subject of peace, at least for a limited time which should not be less than for one year. It may be difficult to say what sort of engagement will bind Austria if her interest or convenience should tempt her to break it. Yet a strong and formal engagement, though not proof against all inducements, especially those of necessity or urgent danger, may resist many smaller motives that might otherwise determine her conduct. You are a much better judge than I of the comparative advantages of

the two modes which will now be under deliberation, of procuring the necessary reinforcement of German troops. I am aware of the general nature of the objections to each, but my experience does not enable me to strike the balance, and decide on which side the inconvenience is greatest. The Emperor may pocket the whole and raise no troops—or if he procures a certain number either by employing a part of the money he receives from us, or by exacting the contingents of the German states, he may reduce to the same amount his own army; or after making himself formidable by procuring or contracting for the stipulated reinforcement, he may use the advantage thus obtain'd to make an advantageous separate peace. On the other hand, if we undertake to raise troops by various subsidies, we shall be defrauded in detail, by each of the Princes with whom we deal, and realize a very small force compared with the means that we employ. If we procure the whole, the Emperor may still reduce his own army in proportion to the reinforcement we furnish; or he may employ the strength which he derives from us to obtain a separate peace. So that most of the objections are common to both. Perhaps a middle way might be thought of, and we should engage to pay the German Princes for troops procured by the Emperor, and this seems to provide best for a profitable employment of the money, as it becomes the Emperor's interest to procure the greatest number of troops possible and the best. This method of raising troops, together with an explicit and solemn engagement not to make a separate peace, seems to afford the most promising prospect of future success. But in the present situation of affairs the speediest decision will be the best, and if any thing should be thought at home to depend on local circumstances, so as to make an immediate decision impossible, the pressure for time is such, that it would be happy if they should entrust yourself and me to settle the affair to the best of our judgment, according to any

general instruction they might think proper to give us. I have not hazarded these reflexions to Lord Grenville from a consciousness that opinions and any thing like advice are beyond the strict line of official correspondence, and partly perhaps because I am also conscious of being sometimes more voluminous than can suit the convenience of my readers, who are not overburthen'd with leisure. It gives me the greatest satisfaction to perceive that my views and opinions coincide so much with yours. It increases the confidence with which I act, and adds materially to my own comfort.

I have open'd to Baron Thugut Pichegru's project. He likes the whole of your plan extremely well *except* that of the corps of Deserters, or indeed any other Royalist corps, in the rear of, or in previous connexion with the Austrian army. As much of that co-operation in the rear of the French army, or in the country when once the Austrians enter it, as possible. The more the better; and he does not by any means undervalue such means. But he has in the first place a general distrust of all *projects*, and in the next it is plain that he considers all mixture of foreign troops, as an adulteration of the Austrian army, and indeed as tending to relax its discipline, and diminish its perfection. In a word he declines this part of the plan, thinking highly, however, of the three men, and of their influence in the different provinces, as well as of their talents and character.

I have spoken to you alone with the entire freedom which you observe in my former letters concerning Suwarow; and I have not committed you for more than your dispatches themselves express'd. I am glad however to be assured that I have not overshot even this mark.

Thinking the speedy arrival of my last dispatch, No. 49, in London of great consequence, I have sent the messenger Dickens with it, and now send one of my servants to you.

Believe me ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and sincerely yours,

MINTO.

W. WICKHAM, Esq., &c. &c. &c.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Draft. Confidential.) Augsburg: 21st Dec^r., 1799.

My dear Lord,—Your Lordship's very interesting and satisfactory dispatches of the 4th instant were delivered to me on the 17th, in the afternoon, by your servant, whom I send back accompanied by Sylvester, the messenger, that you may have a person to send to me as soon as you shall have received anything certain from England as to future arrangements, for which, however, I am very apprehensive that your Lordship must wait some time longer, as there is every appearance of the Elbe being frozen up for some time to come.

I say nothing to your Lordship of the question of the Convention, as one which wiser and better informed heads than mine can alone determine; I only earnestly wish that in some shape or other it may finally be concluded by the return of your messenger from London.

As to the German levies, I am most clearly of opinion that that mode of settling the business, whatever it be, that shall be the least burthensome to Great Britain, will be found to be ultimately the best.

I have had frequent opportunities of learning myself, and of stating distinctly to Government, that there existed no means whatever of control over the Court of Vienna with respect to the number and nature of the troops she employs, or as to the manner in which she is to employ them, but in the first case, such as *we* can make no public use of, in the second, such as *she* may at all times find pretexts to defeat.

If I am right in this position the question becomes a very simple one, '*Will you, or will you not, enter into*

engagements with the Court of Vienna without the means of enforcing them?' and this question, in my opinion, can only be solved by a consideration of the wishes and views of the House of Austria on the one hand, and of your own interest in engaging her in the continuation of the war on the other.

If you have a deep interest in the continuation of the continental war, you must risk something to obtain it. If Austria has any views or wishes which lead her naturally to a continuation of the war, you must trust that she will continue it, on her own account, but certainly not on yours.

It appears to me that if you were to reason on the subject from this day to Doomsday you must ultimately stop here.

Your Lordship will collect from the inclosed copy of my dispatch, No. 51, to the Office, that my real opinion is the same as yours, though, perhaps, as I was not so directly called upon, I have not expressed it so clearly and strongly.

In the same dispatch your Lordship will also find some notions as to the resources of the Empire in men, and as to the money necessary to apply these resources to any good purpose, which may perhaps throw some light on M. de Thugut's pecuniary demands, particularly those stated in your dispatch No. 49. My calculation, founded on the best information I could collect from different quarters, and also on what I conceived to be the necessities of the Court of Vienna, produces within a trifle the same result as M. de Thugut's demand.

	£	£
M. Thugut's demand		2,400,000
Reduced estimate of subsidies and levies in Mr. Wickham's dispatch No. 51 . . .	1,498,488	
Deduct Piedmontese subsidy, for which I have no doubt that a demand will be made in another shape and from another quarter	200,000	
	1,298,488	
Deduct Swiss levies, which M. Thugut means to leave as a separate charge on Great Britain	360,000	
	938,488	
Add a loan or subsidy of a million and a half . .	1,500,000	
		2,438,488
Difference		38,488

The coincidence is so remarkable that I am almost afraid Mr. Pitt, like Marshall Suworow, will suspect, if not accuse me, of being really a satellite of Thugut's and bought by Austrian gold.

If your Lordship should at any time think it right to inform M. Thugut of this extraordinary coincidence, I have earnestly to request that he may not have the least notion of the basis on which my calculation was founded.

From a comparison of the two demands, your Lordship will observe that M. Thugut has asked for what will furnish him with a powerful and sufficient *reinforcement*, independent of the sum of a million and a half in relief of the finances of the Court of Vienna, so that if this money is faithfully and judiciously applied, it will not only be a very material service rendered to an ally, but will enable

him also to augment his means of carrying on the war in which we are jointly engaged to the extent we desire.

I am not at all surprised that M. de Thugut should wish to receive all that he is to receive from England in specie, as the course of exchange is now such as to make the loss on bills of exchange full seven per cent., and there is every reason to believe that foreign subsidies, to any extent, would increase the discount, as in the years 95 and 96, to a very alarming degree.

With respect to Switzerland, I always have been inclined to believe that M. de Thugut never meant to aim any direct blow at its independence, but that being as yet uncertain what use he could make of a country, about which I know that he understands nothing, and about which he never would inform himself but through the medium of interested or ambitious individuals, he wished to keep the way open to any scheme or speculation that may hereafter enter into his head, and above all would not preclude himself from taking advantage of any favourable circumstances, that the war or any treaty with France, or the unsettled state of the country, may hereafter present. This is the real history of his fear, lest the federative form of Government should be abandoned, and of his unwillingness at the same time to commit himself to any direct acknowledgment of the ancient Government in those Cantons where it was re-established during the summer, or to any measures tending to provoke or encourage its re-establishment.

As to the Valteline and the Italian *balliages*, I think in my conscience that Austria has acquired a right to ask them of the Swiss and Grisons. Without them the possession of the Milanese is insecure, and it has been proved that their late possessors have not the means of defending them against an enemy like France.

I am, therefore, very happy to hear that his Imperial Majesty talks of asking for them on terms which, what-

ever they be, he may be assured both Swiss and Grisons will thankfully accept.

With respect to M. de Thugut's military plans, before any opinion can be formed of them, it will be necessary to know what authority is to be vested in the Archduke. —If H.R.H. is to have the power of disposing of the whole force on this side the Alps without being bound down to the distribution mentioned in your Lordship's dispatch No. 48, there can be no doubt (making the ordinary allowance for the uncertainty of all human events) but that he will have the means in his hands of conquering Switzerland, and making a solid impression on the French frontier. It is equally certain that circumstances may exist which may render that distribution the best that can possibly be made, but in many other cases it would be found no less defective, and, generally speaking, if the sieges of Huningen and Beffort are to be undertaken immediately after the passage of the Rhine, 70,000 or 80,000 men in that quarter would be more desirable than 60,000.

All, therefore, that is to be desired is that sufficient authority should be given to the Archduke to employ the whole force as he shall think most proper according to circumstances and the views, projects, and conduct of the French generals, and the notions they may be supposed to have acquired of the intentions of the Allies.

This seems to me to be the point on which your Lordship ought to be instructed to insist as *that* without which it is more than probable that we shall make but a sorry figure this campaign.

I am aware that the jealousy entertained of the Archduke will be a serious obstacle in your way, and that it will require the utmost management to support or bring forward an opinion of the kind in such a manner as not to give serious offence and even to counteract our own object. But I trust that your Lordship, who has already gained so much, will not be too much alarmed at this

new difficulty, and that in some shape or other you will find means, if not to conquer it altogether, at least to remove its principal inconveniences.

Your Lordship will collect also from the inclosed dispatch that I have almost gone as far as M. de Thugut with respect to the language that I could wish the King's servants employed in these parts to hold. At the same time I do not mean to deny that I am one of the persons who, from long knowledge and experience of M. Thugut's tricks, shall have the most need of such instructions.

In one word, it is impossible that he should not know that I have been long in the habit of thinking ill of him, —I mean long before my present mission, and that I have occasionally not spared him in my conversation, particularly with the Archduke and at the army. I knew perfectly well what he meant, when he spoke to your Lordship some time since with so much warmth about aides-de-camp and conversations at head-quarters, having many anecdotes to tell your Lordship upon that subject, if it were now worth while, the sum of which would be that his *satellites*, who (particularly Bellegarde) always come to you with open arms, are sure to be so hampered in their own lies by any man who has the least discretion and discernment, and who lives with them only two or three days on a friendly footing, that M. de Thugut cannot bear that any such person should be with any mission about head-quarters. This is the real history of his refusing permission to Lord Mulgrave, and if ever he consents to my being there you may be assured that it will be only because he is aware that I know the worst, and that he would not wish to let another person acquire the same knowledge.

He may, however, remain perfectly at rest in future, as my language shall always be such as he could wish, excepting to the Archduke, to whom, having begun, I must go on to speak in confidence. If, however, you should perceive any really marked antipathy and dislike to me,

do not fail to let me know, as I am persuaded that it is very essential that at this moment there should be a person here of whom the Austrian Minister entertains no distrust. It would, even on the system I have built, be better that the Minister on this station should be his perfect dupe than his avowed enemy; and if I thought that he considered me at all in the latter light, much as I wish to set my foot again in Switzerland, I should not hesitate to ask for my recall as a measure essentially necessary for the public service and the real interests of the common cause. I shall rely, therefore, with confidence on your Lordship's friendship that you will inform me immediately if you perceive anything of the kind.

Upon the principle adopted by M. Thugut, that we are not to look back to past misconduct or past complaints, nothing will be more easy than to adopt a line of conduct which cannot fail to be agreeable to him; but I trust he has too good an opinion of me at the bottom to suppose me capable of retracting what I have said and thought of his conduct on former occasions.

He has two men about him—I mean Messrs. Pelin and Müller, who *know* that from my connections with their friends and my *knowledge* of the tricks in which they have been severally employed, I must ever entertain the worst possible opinion of them. Unfortunately, those two men are or were employed confidentially by him in the very two departments with which I have the most concern—I mean France and Switzerland.

I can give your Lordship but a very faint idea of the mischief these creatures have done at different times in their several ways and through the imprudence of others; they each of them know that in Switzerland I had communication of their confidential letters.

Pelin kept up a close correspondance formerly with all the constitutional party who haunted the frontiers of Switzerland, and gave them regular assurances *that they would not be abandoned, that the rightful heir to the Crown*

was odious at Vienna, that the whole Court was constitutional, &c., &c., and I have undoubted authority for saying that he was instructed by his party to *keep up* these principles at Vienna *as the only means of bringing the King to terms*, and above all, *to paint him as extremely unpopular in the interior.*

I could push this subject to a length that would astonish your Lordship in a private and confidential *conversation*, but I am afraid that I have *written* almost too much already.

What Pelin was with respect to France, Müller is with respect to Switzerland, only more dangerous as more able and more deceitful and treacherous. He is now moving heaven and earth to be sent with a mission to that country. He wrote to my unfortunate friends, Steiguer and Hotze, to desire they would write to Baron Thugut to say that his presence there was essentially necessary, and has tried many other tricks of the same kind, taking care, however, not to write to me. . . . . .

Whilst I am on the subject of Mr. Müller, do not let me forget to say that it never entered into the heads of any but some foolish schemers of no influence in their own country to give any other but their old Federal Government to Switzerland, and that my instructions as well as my whole language and conduct have been directly opposed to all sort of innovation. But all this M. Thugut knows as well as I do.

With respect to head-quarters, it is necessary that I should mention to your Lordship, that Colonel Dookat is considered by the whole army as the man who gives the worst counsels to the Archduke. He is unquestionably an able man, but timid and cautious in the extreme, and a great time-server. Whether he gives timid counsels because he knows that such alone will please M. Thugut, or whether, being naturally of a timid character, he communicates something of his own nature to M. Thugut, with whom he is directly or indirectly in correspondance, I cannot pretend to say, but certain it is that he does

great mischief at head-quarters, that he is odious to the whole army, and that his removal would be the greatest service you could render the Archduke, and the common cause. I need not say, however, that it is essential, *most essential*, that my opinion on this subject should not be known. Schmidt, Zag, and Weyrother are the men whom it would be desirable to see at the different head-quarters. Schmidt, I fear, will retire.

Your Lordship will not fail to observe upon the calculation I have given of the expence of the new levies, that Austria will not only receive from Great Britain (if M. Thugut obtains all he asks for) wherewithal to pay the full expence of the reinforcement she requires, but that she will obtain this reinforcement without any influence of ours over the Powers from whom it will be respectively obtained. It seems to me that this is a point which ought not to be lost sight of, and that Great Britain, in abandoning this influence, will have a right to stipulate for other points that it may be convenient to her to ask.

For instance, I consider some of the following as absolutely necessary, others as very essential;—

1. The power of recruiting the Swiss corps in Swabia; the extent of the recruiting to be limited either by the proportional number of Germans in a regiment, or by the quantity of bounty-money to be given.

2. That depôts, quarters, &c., in time of war and of peace, be granted the same as to the Austrian troops.

3. That a free passage be granted for Swiss recruits, through the Austrian dominions in Italy, and leave to embark in Austrian ports, particularly Genoa if ceded.

4. That the Swiss regiments serving with the Austrian army be considered in all treaties of exchange of prisoners, in every respect as Austrian soldiers, *i. e.* exchanged as Austrians, and treated as such by the enemy, to which they have certainly as good a claim as the Piedmontese. This last point, in my mind, *should be a sine quâ non*, and always treated and considered as such.

In return Great Britain may safely engage to maintain during the war, and employ with the Austrian army, eight battalions of excellent Swiss infantry, and to increase them to twelve if circumstances should permit, *i. e.* if Switzerland should be conquered.

Your Lordship may inform M. de Thugut that in spite of every difficulty, we shall now have six battalions of regular infantry of 920 men each ready to enter into service by the 15th March; and that I trust we shall have two battalions more by the first of April, provided he will have the goodness to give positive directions to the Austrian commanders in Italy to throw no obstacle in the way of M. de Courten's formation of a Valaisan regiment, M. de Courten engaging to take no recruits but real Swiss, Valaisans, and inhabitants of the Italian *baillages.*

I wish your Lordship would have the goodness to make a point of what I here ask, as equally advantageous to the Austrians as to us. This regiment, or as many companies as shall be formed at the opening of the campaign, will be found of most material service to the imperial army in the Valais.

Pray do not leave M. Thugut quiet till the letter shall have been written to General Melas.

Having now written enough, and almost everything that is material, I shall give your Lordship a little rest, entreating you to believe me to be with the truest regard ever, my dear Lord, &c.

WM. WICKHAM.

Right Hon. Lord MINTO.

The Duc d'Enghien to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) In the neighbourhood of Munich: 19th Xbre, 99.

In taking advantage, Sir, of the permission you gave me to direct to you my letters for England, I cannot help speaking to you again of a matter which interests me deeply. You know, Sir, of what I spoke to you with

regard to myself some time ago at Landsberg, in the event of the corps of my grandfather returning to Russia; but I fear I may not have made myself fully understood, and I ask pardon beforehand for the ennui which some details into which I am going to enter will give you; I venture to hope that my letter and my wishes will not go beyond yourself.

I have just received notice that the corps is to march to Lintz, where it has orders to remain for a fortnight. It is doubtless possible that this term may be prolonged, and that we may again march forward in the spring, but who also can foresee whether future political events will not render necessary the withdrawal of the Russian troops within their own frontiers? It is in this last case, Sir, that (deeply grieved at the prospect, at my age, with my health, and I may add, with the name I bear, of entering upon an inactive and obscure career), I should do my utmost to obtain from H.I.M. the Emperor of Russia a permission to continue, at least in my own person, to bear arms against the French republic. If H.I.M. were to deign to continue to me the pension he has deigned to grant me, I should be fortunate enough not to require any pecuniary assistance; but in the event of his seeing fit to withdraw it, on account of my absence from his dominions, may I not be permitted to hope that your government would grant me an allowance, not in the nature of a pension, but as a purely military provision to depend on the duration of the war? for at the peace, if it is not sufficiently favourable to allow us to re-enter our country, it would be my duty to join my grandfather, to minister to his old age, and to make it as happy as it may be in my power to do.

As no views of interest or ambition incite me to take this step, I have not yet reflected as to what rank or kind of service I might hold: in this scheme I have only consulted my zeal and my desire of continuing to serve against the traitors to my country, and a means of with-

drawing myself from the obscure life of a plain Colonel of Russian dragoons in a cantonment in Volhynia.

No doubt it would be highly agreeable to me to serve with the new Swiss corps in the pay of England; but should I again find myself a simple volunteer in the Austrian army, I should always be satisfied with whatever place might be assigned to me, provided it enabled me to risk my person, and to endeavour to distinguish myself in the military career, a thing become impossible for the present in the corps of Condé, in which our regiments, already organised in so defective a manner, are moreover much too weak in men to be able to be of use in future, unless at least they should be recruited to the extent of three-fourths.

I repeat my excuses, Sir, for the length of this letter; the uniform favour you have always shown me makes me think that you take some interest in what concerns me, and I fear to try your patience longer. Never doubt, I beg of you, Sir, the sentiments of high consideration with which I am

Your very humble and very affectionate Servant,

L. A. H. DE BOURBON.

The Archduke Charles to Mr. Wickham.

(Translation.) Head-quarters Donaueschingen: 22 December, 1799.

Sir,—I have received the note which you have been good enough to address to me, respecting some suitable place for assembling and forming the three Swiss regiments. You may be well assured, Sir, that I shall always entertain with lively interest the measures which you may think proper to take, for carrying out the generous views of H. B. M., and increasing the resources and the forces of the common cause. I know, however, of nothing more appropriate to the present state of affairs, and the position which the army under my orders occupies, than the proposition you make, of having recourse in this

matter to the method of negotiation with some imperial town situated on the rear of my army. I can assure you, Sir, that far from putting any obstacle in the way, I will on the contrary support this step by my intervention at the town which may appear to you the most likely to answer your purpose. If you think for example that the town of Augsburg or some other town in that neighbourhood, notwithstanding the numerous establishments we already have in it, may combine the advantages which you desire, for my part I am ready to address myself to that town, so as to further the steps you may have already taken for that purpose.

Major-General Baron de Hiller has informed me of the request which you had made to him, concerning the artillery which you might wish to draw from the Austrian arsenals. I cannot, Sir, make over to you these pieces of artillery, by taking them out of those supplied to my army, since their number is determined by the Council of War according to its wants. But I am going to apply to the Court as soon as possible on this subject; and, Sir, I shall on this as on every other occasion, omit none of the measures which can prove to you my sincere desire, to facilitate as far as depends on me, the execution of the views with which your zeal for the good cause inspires you.

CHARLES, F. M.

Mr. WM. WICKHAM, Minister Plenipotentiary of H. B. M. to the Helvetic Body and the Grisons.

Lord Minto to Mr. Wickham.

Vienna: 24th Dec^r., 1799.

My dear Sir,—After the account I sent you last of the disposition of this Court concerning Russian co-operation, I dare say that you will have felt the same uneasiness that I have done, since the Emperor of Russia's last intention to leave his troops and take a part in the next campaign has been known; for a refusal on the part of

Austria to accept his aid might be expected to produce at Petersburgh something still worse than neutrality. As soon as I learnt with certainty, from Baron Thugut and Mr. Kalitschow, this change in the Emperor of Russia's intentions, I set about persuading Baron Thugut to recede from his resolution of rejecting the troops that are now offer'd, and to suggest some plan for the employment of Marshall Suwarow and his army, which might gratify him, and at the same time contribute to the success of the war. My endeavours on this occasion were proportion'd to my opinion of its extreme importance; and although I had little reason to flatter myself with success in my first conferences on this subject, I am happy to say that I have in the end obtained all that is really wanting, if there is any temper or moderation at Petersburgh. The outline of Baron Thugut's plan is that we should procure a sufficient number of German troops, by subsidies, to make the Russian army under Suwarow about 45,000 strong. As he advises, or rather indeed requires, that the bulk of the Russian cavalry should be sent back as useless and burthensome, we cannot reckon the effective force that will remain under Suwarow's command at more than 20,000. We should, therefore, have to provide 25,000 troops in Germany. You best know whether the whole of this is practicable; but if it should prove otherwise, although the Emperor of Russia thinks himself unable at present to spare more troops, I am persuaded that he may be prevailed upon to furnish the little deficiency I now allude to. Indeed, although B^{n} Thugut is at this moment very firm in refusing any proportion of Austrian troops whatever to any army commanded by Suwarow, yet I do not despair of seeing that point carried also, at least to some small extent. To the application for an Austrian staff, he objects the mutual crimination and jealousy to which any mixture of Austrians and Russians has hitherto been found to lead; and he suggests the corps of Condé as affording a fund of good officers of all descriptions.

However, I consider this as a fit point also for further negotiation, and as pretty sure of being obtain'd. With regard to the employment of this army, he proposes that it should act altogether separately and independently; and for that purpose he would allot the country beyond the Necker as the Marshall's sole province. The Russian army would by this arrangement occupy the right of the Imperial army, and what we have been accustomed to call the Middle Rhine; that is to say, from Manheim downwards. If the Marshall is successful and pushes his conquests forward on the Enemy, it may give him an opportunity of co-operation or of connexion through the Low Countries, with any operations which we may have it in contemplation to undertake by sea. The Austrian army on the left, though acting independently, will still support essentially the Russians, and will undertake for that purpose to act vigorously on the upper Rhine,—I mean in the quarter of Basle, Huningue, &c. Such is the general notion of the plan which is to be submitted immediately to Suwarow; and I am induced to encourage this intention on the following grounds:—First, there is no time for deliberation, and this is the only plan that is at present in our option. Austria can never be prevail'd upon to let the Marshall again into Italy. The Russian troops have been already proved unfit for the war in Swisserland; if they were not, that is an object, the success of which must depend on the hearty and constant co-operation of Austria, and if we have learnt anything by the misfortunes of the last campaign, it must be to avoid a situation in which success depends on a cordial concert between those two nations. The last intimation I have of His Majesty's wishes is that the Emperor should suggest the mode which he judges most advantageous for the employment of the army intended for Suwarow, and it seems, therefore, agreeable to the general sense of our Government that we should support the plan which is adopted here. This particular plan seems also to fall in

with what we know of the original ideas entertained in England concerning the employment of the Russians, as you may remember Mayence was the point for which they were at first destined. Under this conviction it is my present intention (if any interposition on the part of England is found necessary or adviseable) to go to Prague and endeavour to reconcile Marshall Suwarow to this plan, being certain of its adoption at Petersburgh if it is approved by him, and so *vice versâ*. It was our first intention here to beg you to undertake this service, and for that purpose to pass a few days with us at Vienna before you should go to Prague; but on reflexion I am satisfied that you will think it more urgent to set about procuring the troops without a moment's delay, for there is otherwise a great risk of the spring coming round and finding us unprepared. This is a moment in which both you and I must take something on ourselves, for there is a great probability of our intercourse with England being suspended or much interrupted by the season. I must, therefore, mention an observation or two which B^n^ Thugut wish'd me to submit to you, on the supposition of your beginning immediately to treat for troops. First, he wishes you not to take any from Swabia, but to leave that field to the Emperor. With regard to Bavaria, he seem'd at first to desire that the contingent (of 3,000) should be furnish'd to the Imperial army, and that you should contract only for any surplus which the Elector could furnish. But I represented that the surplus would be very small; that it was of great moment to make up an army for Suwarow; and that our principal reliance was on Bavaria. I therefore suggested that although he refused Austrian troops, he might very properly consent to let the contingent of Bavaria serve with the Russians, and thus agree to your obtaining the greatest number possible from that Prince. To this I understand him to have assented. He says that the Elector will offer you a large number; but that in fact you will not

realize more than 8,000. B^{n} Thugut claims 6,000 troops from the Duke of Wirtemberg; but on representation that they could not be rais'd without our assistance, and that he would in fact deprive the cause of that force by persisting in his claim, he seems disposed also to concede that point; though I cannot yet speak so positively to it as to the former. He says you may obtain 3,000 from Hesse Darmstadt, 2,000 from the Bishop of Wurtzburg, the same number from the Elector of Mayence; and if the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel is assured of our Russo-German army acting in the quarter now proposed for it, in such a manner as to ensure support to his country, he is able and disposed to give you at least 10,000 good troops. The Swiss levies are not included in this computation, and they must probably be employ'd in the more immediate affairs of their own country, but my former notion is, if you can realize a corps of 5,000 Swiss, to negotiate for 5,000 Austrians in exchange for them, to be employ'd with Suwarow. In truth, looking forward to the prospect which I think now opening of better temper and more true cordiality amongst us than heretofore, I flatter myself with the hopes of seeing such subordinate objects as these granted on all hands with little difficulty. I may flatter myself with a real progress in the disposition which I have studied every means of promoting here towards a better understanding with us. I wish to encourage the same disposition towards Russia, and I do not despair of success. To qualify myself for doing good of any kind, I have in the first place aim'd at establishing in the mind of B^{n} Thugut a personal confidence in my own views and dispositions towards Austria, and in the sincerity of my communications with him. I appear to have succeeded entirely in this first step, and I really hope to derive from it some advantage to the publick service. Mr. Casamajor was to have carried Sir Charles Whitworth's dispatches forward to you, but as he had nothing very material to communicate, beyond the

contents of the dispatches, I have persuaded him to save himself the fatigue of another journey, and to remain here until your answers arrive.

I wrote last night, by a Russian messenger, to Sir Charles, to relieve him from the apprehension of the Russian troops being rejected, and to acquaint him with the outline of the plan which I have just described to you. I write by messenger to-morrow to London, to acquaint Lord Grenville with the purport of this letter.

I expect the return of my servant from you every moment, and beg you to believe me ever, my dear Sir, most faithfully and affect^y^ yours,

MINTO.

WILL^M^. WICKHAM, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

P.S.—L^d^ Minto was at Yarmouth the 1^st^ of this month, but is, I presume, detain'd by the easterly winds.

P.S.—I have this moment rec^d^ accounts from Consul Stanley at Trieste, that Malta has surrender'd to the English and Portuguese. He says this news was brought to Venice by an express from Naples. No particulars as to capitulation. I wish it may be true, but *consular* news always deserve *quarantine* especially from the Levant.

(No. 53.) *Mr. Wickham to Lord Grenville.*

(Copy.)
(Most secret and confidential.) Augsburg: 25th Dec^r^., 1799.

My Lord—Having submitted to the Court of Vienna, through Lord Minto, General Pichegru's plan for raising a corps of conscripts as communicated to your Lordship in my No. 48, I am sorry to learn from his Lordship that M. de Thugut wholly disapproves of it for reasons which I had foreseen would probably produce that effect, and which your Lordship will find explained in the enclosed extract of Lord Minto's dispatch.

I could much have wished that M. de Thugut had

weighed the arguments in favour of this plan with as much care and impartiality as those against it, being confident from better and later information that it would have met with full success, and been attended with few or none of the inconveniences foreseen at Vienna.

The Archduke would have secretly favoured it, though H.R.H. would not willingly have given it any direct encouragement without the consent of his Court.

But whatever the advantages of the plan, even supposing it to receive H.R.H.'s full support and protection, I am confident that it had better be abandoned altogether than that any risk should be incurred at this moment of giving offence or jealousy to the Austrian Minister, either by insisting on its being adopted with too much earnestness, or attempting to carry it into execution under the authority of the Archduke alone.

I have therefore given directions for putting a stop to the whole, excepting a small corps of light artillery which General Pichegru principally wishes to have at his disposition, and a corps of officers who in a limited number may be assembled and kept together against the moment of action, as staff officers attached to the Swiss army. The light artillery also may fairly be considered under the same point of view.

This project having failed, it has become necessary to direct the attention of the persons who were concerned in it to the means of supplying, as far as possible and in some other shape, all the different advantages it presented, and measures have already been taken to that effect, which, if I may judge from what has happened in other quarters, promise to be attended with full success.

That your Lordship may the better understand the state of the interior of France along the eastern frontier, I will mention at length the steps that have been taken to revive the Royalist party, which though discouraged and kept down, had never been totally suppressed or broken.

From the moment of the receipt of your Lordship's dispatch of July 30, No. 3, I had left nothing undone to re-establish my ancient correspondance with Lyons, Franche Compté, and the southern provinces, which the situation of the hostile armies had rendered infinitely more dangerous and difficult than when Switzerland was a neutral country. I had, however, by the assistance of General Pichegru, and Messrs. de Preçy and Dandré, and the obliging attention of the Archduke, so far succeeded as that a regular correspondance was established with Lyons, Marseilles, Besançon, and Paris, when the unfortunate affair of Zurich destroyed all our channels of communication, and obliged us to seek new means of carrying it on. Since my arrival here this object has been effectually accomplished, and though the Rhine often causes considerable delay, and renders the passage of individuals difficult, yet letters arrive a little sooner or a little later with the same regularity as in a neutral country, and as the greater part of the correspondance is communicated to the Archduke, H.R.H. gives every possible facility to my agents, and I have the satisfaction of observing that since he has received these communications, he has taken an interest in the affairs of the Royalists, and expressed an anxiety to render them service, which I never witnessed before in H.R.H., or any Austrian officer.

In the south of France the attention of the persons employed has been principally directed to the encouraging desertion in the Italian army, and to the receiving the deserters, and forming them into companies dispersed throughout the country, ready to be united, as soon as circumstances shall make it advisable either to excite a general insurrection, or for a large body to appear in arms with a general at their head.

General Willot, who is to take the direction and command of the whole, will leave this place for Turin in the beginning of February, and after having made all the

necessary arrangements for keeping up a correspondance with the Austrian generals in Piedmont (to whom he will have the strongest recommendations from the Archduke), he purposes being at Marseilles about the 1st of March, and ready to declare himself on or about the 15th or 20th of that month. In the meantime we are sending from hence several confidential officers one by one, who are to take the command of the different parties already formed and that are daily forming in the mountains of Provence, and keep them together until the General's arrival.

General Willot will be accompanied by M. Dandré, who has shown uncommon zeal, intelligence, and activity in preparing these materials at so short a notice, and after all communication with the interior had been for a time so thoroughly deranged.

On the side of Lyons measures of the same kind are taking, though to a less extent, and hitherto with less effect, owing in part to the extreme jealousy entertained of that place by the Government, but still more to a number of indiscreet emigrants, who have established themselves there with missions, or pretended missions, from the King, and who by their intrigues and indiscretion have defeated everything that had been concerted from hence. But an officer of rank, with superior authority, having now been sent there, I have every reason to hope that much of this mischief may be prevented in future, and that whenever General Willot shall be ready to declare himself, he will meet with powerful protection and assistance from that side of the country.

On account of the extreme jealousy entertained of the town of Lyons by the Republicans, and the constant attention paid by them to everything that passes there, it has been thought expedient to remove the point where operations are to commence as far as possible from the town, and to establish it in the mountains of Vivarais towards Mende, where all the deserters and conscripts

who are collected at Lyons are to be sent. This point will be supported by a party now forming in the Forest to the south of Moulins acting under the same direction. M. de Precy will take the command of the whole as soon as a sufficient force shall have been collected to justify his risking such a measure.

On the side of Franche Compté it has been found hitherto impossible to make any progress. The unfortunate affair of Zurich, followed by the arrival of Buonaparte, and the subsequent events at Paris, had made such an impression on that frontier, that all the agents had absconded, together with many of the inhabitants who had promised assistance to General Pichegru, and all the channels of correspondance had been entirely destroyed. Besides, the whole country is occupied by the republican army, and as it is crossed by great roads in every direction, even in the most mountainous parts, the establishing or forming any parties there had been found impossible from the beginning. This was the principal reason for adopting the plan above mentioned of forming a corps behind the Austrian army, and the only means that have occurred of supplying the want of this plan are those which have been employed with so much success in the south, viz., encouraging deserters as much as possible, and collecting the conscripts and deserters in small parties at a distance from the army.

The points chosen are Savoy and the Vosges, and proper officers are to set out immediately to take the direction of the different parties that can be formed on those points.

It is scarcely possible, however, unless some unforeseen event should happen, that these measures should take effect in time to support General Willot so early as the month of March, nor has General Pichegru any hope of doing anything before the Archduke shall have commenced his operations with success.

General Willot has expressed a wish that he may re-

ceive every possible assistance from his Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean, particularly arms and ammunition, and for that purpose he is now preparing a memoire, describing the different points at which descents may be effected with the greatest security, according to the nature and extent of the assistance meant to be conveyed to the insurgents, pointing out the objects which will be most wanted, and containing signals and other means of distinguishing the Royalists from their enemies, which I shall take the liberty of transmitting to the commander of his Majesty's fleet, that he may be able to make immediate use of it, in case his Majesty should think proper to give any directions to that effect.

I am not without hopes that circumstances may arise early in the campaign which may make it possible for the Swiss troops alone to penetrate in a point where they may afford essential assistance and protection to the Royalists, in which case it would be very material that *Monsieur* should be in a situation to place himself at their head, and that H.R.H. from the beginning of the campaign should hold himself in readiness to set out at a moment's warning.

Generals Pichegru and Willot are equally desirous that a member of the Royal Family should take the command of the Royalists in the southern provinces, and that *Monsieur* should be the Prince appointed for that purpose.

With respect to the proclamation which it would be expedient for the Allies to make on entering the French territory, those officers are of opinion that it is not necessary (though it would be certainly desirable) to speak of the King and the restoration of monarchy *in the first instance*, provided they are authorized to assure their adherents that the moment any one province or any considerable extent of territory shall be entrusted in the hands of a royalist army, and a Prince of the blood at its head, the Allies will treat with that Prince as making

a part of the monarchy, and will then directly acknowledge the lawful king.

They desire that the proclamation (distinctly renouncing all views of conquest) may declare the intentions of the Allies on entering the French territory to be no other than to secure themselves against the unjust aggression of an ambitious and turbulent government, to give peace to Europe, and to the people of France the means of declaring their real sentiments with respect to the present usurpers. They further desire that the proclamation should hold out offers of protection to all the well disposed inhabitants, and that it should be solemnly renewed on the acquisition of every frontier town, with an additional declaration that that particular place is taken possession of and would be kept only till the peace, as a security against hostile invasion, and as the means of compelling the present government to abandon its ambitious projects, and to leave the rest of Europe, and particularly the German Empire, in peace. Most fortunately there is little or nothing in this proclamation to which M. Thugut now objects, and if I might venture to give an opinion, I should not hesitate to say, that it is more likely to produce the effect desired before a French province be conquered than an open declaration in favour of royalty, which will always have more or less the appearance of dictating to France the form of government she is to adopt.

I have given your Lordship only a summary account of the state of affairs here, presuming that it would be sufficient for your Lordship to be informed *generally* of what assistance and co-operation might be expected by the Royalists in the west, and by the Allies from the efforts that can be made in the interior of France on the eastern frontier. I trust your Lordship will be persuaded that nothing has been neglected, and that everything has been done that the shortness of the time,

and the various obstacles, defeats, and disappointments we have met with could possibly admit of.

With respect to the expenses attending the execution of these different projects, it is impossible to reduce it to anything like a certainty; all that I have been able to do is to give a *maximum* which is in no case to be exceeded, and which your Lordship will find in my No. 51.

It is necessary, however, that your Lordship should have the goodness to point to me from what fund it is to be taken. There seems no objection to the expense incurred here for the formation of corps and the support of officers being taken from the Swiss fund, as the two services are so intimately connected, nor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay in his quality of his Majesty's Military Commissary for the levy of the Swiss corps paying the expenses of the regular corps formed on the French territory, or to his paying the subsidy or other pecuniary assistance to be given to a French Prince or general at the head of an armed royalist party acting in the name of the King and in concert with the generals of the Allies as soon as the frontier shall be open and a communication established.

Till then it should seem that all expenses incurred in the interior must be paid from secret service money, and I shall make provision to that effect unless your Lordship should send me instructions to the contrary.

No events of any consequence have taken place in this country since my last. The French army still threatens a passage of the Rhine; an event to be desired were it not that even a temporary occupation of Swabia would deprive the Archduke of some of his best resources for the ensuing campaign.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay has been indefatigably employed in the formation of the Swiss corps. I trust that in the course of a few days we shall be able to send your Lordship a satisfactory account of our past labours. In the mean time, I can say with confidence, that at the

opening of the campaign his Majesty will be in possession of a body of 5,400 as fine infantry as any in Europe, maintained at a very moderate expense, as the whole fourteen battalions to which it is proposed to carry the troops, including the staff officers, commissariat, recruiting service, &c., &c., will not reach the sum originally proposed of 30,000*l.* a month, and yet considerable assistance is given to the magistrates and other principal inhabitants who have been forced to fly the country, and to many others who still remain there; corn is given to the distressed inhabitants of the little Cantons, and officers and men of the regular regiments are equally attached to the service, and satisfied with their condition.

Mr. Wickham to Lord Minto.

(Draft.) Augsburg: Dec^r. 28th, 1799.

. . . . To resume the subject of your Lordship's dispatch: *first*, I confess, notwithstanding the great addition of force which the Allies will receive from the return of the Russian army, that I have not seen this measure without pain and apprehension.

Considering the war alone, *without any reference to political objects*, of the nature and value of which his Majesty alone can determine, I am satisfied that the Austrians would have had a force sufficient to beat the enemy on every point, and therefore I cannot persuade myself that 20,000 men more (the number of Russians which your Lordship supposes M. de Suworow to retain) will be an adequate compensation to Great Britain, either for the immense additional expense their return, *in the shape of an army*, will occasion, or that they will at all counterbalance the advantage that would have accrued to the cause of the Allies in general, in point of secrecy, promptitude, and wise and able combination from their whole force on this side being placed under one command and one direction.

Secondly. It is now admitted on all hands that the Russian army is incompetent to act by itself against the French, and we cannot, I fear, indulge a hope that the addition of any given number of German troops, subjects of different Princes and States, the greater part new levies, carrying with them no general system of their own, can contribute any part of what is wanting to enable the Russians to undertake the conduct of a campaign throughout its various complicated and extensive departments, *all of which* must be well conducted, or no great and permanent good can be hoped for. I am so persuaded of this truth that nothing can ever induce me to place the smallest confidence in an army so composed, or remove my fear that soon after the opening of the campaign, it would meet with some serious and irreparable disaster, the consequence of which would probably be the retreat of the Archduke, whose force, as your Lordship will recollect, will be diminished by the whole of the German levies which M. Thugut proposes to transfer to the Russians, and his right consequently uncovered by any army capable of stopping the progress of a victorious enemy.

Thirdly. Under Marshall Suworow, *in his present state of existence*, I mean, surrounded by the persons at present attached to him who are unfortunately his nearest relations, I am firmly persuaded that no effectual reform can be effected in the Russian army by any possible means.

Your Lordship may be persuaded that my opinion on these two last points is not founded on Austrian prejudice, but is the result of information collected from various quarters, and the natural inference drawn from facts, many of which have happened within my own observation and under my own eyes, and from the repeated admission of M. de Suworow himself, that a Russian army supported only by German levies is not competent to make war against France.

Fourthly. To enable M. de Suworow to act with effect

on the point to which he is now destined, it is necessary that he should pass the Rhine in its broadest part in the face of an enemy; an operation to which, without very considerable assistance of many kinds from the Austrian army, he will be totally incompetent.

When he shall have passed the Rhine, unless he means to remain with his back to the river in the plain of the Palatinate (not above six or seven miles broad), he will find himself engaged in a mountainous country, of which the French have the most accurate knowledge, and know by experience the nature and value of every one of its positions. I think I shall not be contradicted by military men when I say that the Hundsruck is to the full as difficult a country for a Russian army as that part of Switzerland in which M. de Suworow would have been engaged had he made his attack from the side of Germany.

The conclusions I mean to draw from the above observations are these:—1. If M. de Suworow remains in the command of the army, it is *a matter of necessity*, not of choice, that his staff should be Austrian, that his magazines, pontoons, &c. &c. should be furnished by the Austrians, and that a large proportion of his army should be Austrian also, and that the German levies should be given to the Archduke in exchange for the reinforcement he should send to M. de Suworow.

2. That if by any possible means the nephews of M. de Suworow could be taken from the Russian army, and proper persons placed about the Marshall, the greatest advantage would result to the operations of the campaign, and to the interests of the common cause.

3. If these arrangements cannot be made, and if political reasons render it expedient (notwithstanding all the evident disadvantages and danger, and the enormous expenses attending such a measure) to form a force on the Middle Rhine, composed of Russians and German levies, means must be found of employing it in such a way as to occupy the greatest possible force of the enemy, and to

threaten the greatest extent of the French frontier possible, without committing the safety or reputation of the army.

How this is best to be done, must be left to military men to determine, but I believe that I am not mistaken in the principle I have laid down.

I cannot, however, disguise from your Lordship my fear not only that M. de Suworow will not submit to be employed in that manner, but that he will not act at all with an army of the force in question, nor with anything less than 70,000 or 80,000 men on any point whatever. So that after reasoning so long in vain, we *must* return at last to the point I have more than once ventured to lay down in other dispatches, viz., either that M. de Suworow must retire, or that he must have an Austro-Russian army. I cannot help adding my own most earnest hope and prayer that he may retire, and that by the joint efforts of your Lordship and Sir Charles Whitworth, you may obtain your 20,000 men without the General.

An acquisition of this sort could not be paid too dear, and if anything human can in any case be considered as certain, you might then indeed consider the success of this campaign as already determined.

Prince Alexis Gottschakoff to Mr. Wickham.*

(Translation.)

Sir,—The Prince Generalissimo, having had the pleasure of securing Lord Minto for some days at Prague, and having conferred with him on all the articles important to keep in view for the opening of the approaching campaign, was very sorry that your presence, so necessary at this interesting moment, was wanting to determine finally

* Memorandum endorsed on this letter by Mr. Wickham. 'Le lendemain matin du jour que je reçus cette lettre, au moment même que je partois pour Prague sur l'invitation du Feldt Marechal, arrive un courier avec la nouvelle de son depart subit de cette ville pour St. Petersbourg.'

the propositions under discussion; he, therefore, commands me to send you this express with all speed, to beg you as a favour to come to Prague before going to Vienna. You are certainly aware of the views of the Generalissimo, and we are fully persuaded of the zeal which you display for the common cause, we are sure that you will not refuse us this visit, of such importance to the general good. I give you no particulars of all which is in question at this moment, as Lord Minto tells me he has written to you of everything at length. I reserve to myself the satisfaction of repeating to you by word of mouth how happy I should consider myself in contributing to the common cause, and how sincere is the assurance of the most distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be, Sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,

ALEXIS PRINCE DE GORTSCHAKOFF.

Prague: 28 December 1799,
7 January 1800.

APPENDIX.

1797.

Mons. Imbert-Colomès to the Duc de la Vauguyon (p. 1).

(Copy.)

C'EST avec beaucoup de peine que je me détermine à vous rendre compte d'une conversation que j'ai eue avec Mr. Wickham, et qui m'a navré le cœur, mais je crois que je le dois aux intérêts de Sa Majesté. Après m'avoir fait lire un article du *Journal Général de France* du 10 décre 1796, aux nouvelles étrangères, qui est une diatribe contre les Puissances Etrangères, il m'a ajouté avec sensibilité : 'Si des personnes d'un rang supérieur n'avaient pas conçu et manifesté de telles idées, ce journaliste *royaliste* ne s'exprimerait pas ainsi. Mon Gouvernement m'a fait quitter une place importante pour m'envoyer ici, parce qu'on savait quels étaient mes principes, et qu'étant connu de zélés partisans du Roi, on devait espérer que j'obtiendrais une confiance entière dans ma mission. Mais depuis longtems je m'aperçois du contraire. On croit plus volontiers ce que rapportent des agents subalternes, que ce que dit un galant homme qui n'a pour guide que l'honneur. C'est ce qui m'a engagé à solliciter mon rappel, ce que je fais encore plus vivement que jamais. J'ai nombre de preuves des soupçons qu'on jette sur ma Cour, et conséquemment sur moi. On a poussé la chose jusquà' affirmer dans le journal le plus royaliste—*La Quotidienne*—que M. Pitt était complice de l'assassinat du Roi. L'armée de Condé et la France entière retentissent de clameurs de cette espèce. Vous savez que je n'ai jamais rien eu de caché pour vous. Je vous ai toujours fait part de mes craintes comme de mes espérances. Ma franchise et ma loyauté ne méritaient pas un pareil retour.' Mr. Wickham m'a communiqué aussi, deux Lettres interceptées par Buonaparte et insérées dans *la Sentinelle*, n° 540, du 19 décre 1796. Il a été

bien étonné de voir qu'on confiait à la Poste des Lettres qui s'expliquent aussi clairement et sans chiffre, d'autant plus qu'il est de notoriété publique que les Lettres pour Gênes sont décachetées en passant à Milan; et ce n'est pas la première fois que Mr. Wickham a eu connaissance par d'autres voies de pareils accidents. Il est certain, Monsieur, que des découvertes de cette espèce donnent de terribles armes au Directoire, et font redoubler la surveillance de l'intérieur, ce qui rend le travail de plus en plus difficile et périlleux. J'ai combattu autant qu'il m'a été possible les impressions de Mr. Wickham, mais je ne l'ai pas dissuadé. Cependant, comme je rends justice à son caractère, je suis très-certain qu'il agira comme par le passé. Dieu veuille qu'il ne soit pas rappellé comme il le désire!

Mr. Wickham to General Pichegru (p. 4).

(Draft.) 9 Jan. 1797.

Je vous ai envoyé par Coco [Badouville] 2,000 Louis. Vous en aurez davantage si vous le souhaitez. Je vous demande seulement de me faire sçavoir la nature de l'emploie que vous en voulez faire, sans entrer en trop de détails. Le Major [Rousillon] à qui du reste je n'ai rien dit encore, sera notre intermédiaire pour faire passer notre correspondance et nos fonds (il est moins suspect qu'un autre), toujours bien entendu que vous avez en lui la même confiance que moi.

Note sur Pichegru (p. 4).

Pichegru est né à Arbois; il est fils d'un pauvre vigneron. Ayant montré dans son enfance des dispositions pour l'étude, plusieurs personnes s'intéressèrent à lui et lui firent faire ses classes. Elles lui facilitèrent ensuite le moyen d'entrer comme novice chez les Minimes d'Arbois, d'où il fut envoyé à l'école militaire établie chez les Minimes de Brienne, pour professer les mathématiques. Ensuite, s'étant dégoûté de cet état, il s'engagea dans l'Artillerie, où ses connoissances en mathématiques le firent élever au grade de Sergent-Major, puis à celui de Lieutenant en troisième, qu'il venoit d'obtenir à l'époque de la révolution.

Pichegru a toujours témoigné de la reconnoissance à ses bienfaiteurs. Il étoit fort aimé de feu Monsr. Demont, ancien

Capitaine Commandant au régiment d'Enghien, chez qui il étoit habituellement dans ses semestres.

Il est âgé d'environ 40 ans, et beaucoup mieux élevé que sa naissance ne sembleroit l'annoncer. Depuis son élévation au Généralat il a passé à Arbois, et s'y est fort bien conduit envers tous les honnêtes gens qui lui avoient rendu service. Il a même employé son crédit pour empêcher que le district, alors Jacobin, n'en vexât plusieurs. Jamais il ne s'est montré *enragé*; et peut-être eût-il été facile dans le temps d'en tirer parti; du moins bien des choses qu'il a dit en confidence pouvoient l'annoncer.

Pichegru n'a plus à Arbois qu'une sœur nommée Toinette, qui au troisième enfant qu'elle avoit fait, étant fille, a été nourrice domestique chez Mr. Doussière, Conseiller honoraire au parlement de Metz, à Arbois; elle est mariée aujourd'hui à un pauvre manœuvre d'Arbois. Pichegru lui a donné des secours, ainsi qu'à une fille qui avoit été sa maîtresse, et dont il avoit eu un enfant.

On peut dire que, sauf qu'il sert une détestable cause, Pichegru, par ses talents, sa conduite, et son humanité, mérite d'être distingué des misérables polissons qui ont fait une fortune momentanée sous les Drapeaux Tricolores.

Son premier avancement dans le Militaire révolutionnaire, fut d'être Commandant d'un Bataillon de Volontaires, qui fut stationné pendant quelques mois en quatrevingt-douze dans le Baillage de Pontarlier.

Pichegru logeoit à Jougne chez le Citoyen Vincent, honnête homme de ce pays-là et Colonel de la garde Nationale de ce Canton, que j'ai eu hier au soir à souper et coucher chez moi, revenant de la foire de Morges. Nous bûmes à la santé du Général Pichegru, que nous avons toujours connu l'un et l'autre comme méritant l'estime des honnêtes gens auxquels il osoit confier ses sentimens et sa façon de penser d'alors.

The Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham (p. 8).

(Extract.) A Mülheim, ce 9 février 1797.

Je suis très-reconnoissant, Monsieur, de la marque de confiance que vous me donnez, de me communiquer la lettre que vous avez écrite à Baptiste [Pichegru]; elle est assurément bien propre à lever tous ses doutes, s'il lui en reste encore; quant à la méfiance dont vous vous plaignez, loin de prendre pour moi, un reproche que j'aurois si peu mérité par la fran-

chise, la loyauté, la confiance que je vous ai témoigné en toute occasion, je vous rappellerai, (et vous avez pu *le voir* et le savoir) qu'il n'y a rien au monde que je n'aye fait pour la vaincre, cette méfiance, je crois qu'elle n'existe pas, au point, où vous la supposez, mais vous devez sentir que je ne puis répondre que de moi-même; il seroit donc parfaitement injuste, (et je ne vous en soupçonne pas,) de me savoir mauvais gré des inquiétudes de quelques particuliers, et de ne pas rendre justice à *la délicatesse* de ma position, comme à celle de mes sentiments; un Ministre éclairé *comme vous*, doit sentir l'une, un homme honnête, *comme vous*, et qui me connoît, ne me soupçonne sûrement pas, de manquer à l'autre.

J'ai été assez heureux, pour que mon idée se rencontrât avec la vôtre; je n'ai cessé de demander à Baptiste [Pichegru], et je le lui demande encore tout récemment, par celui qui vous a parlé, de m'envoyer un homme *à luy*, avec qui je pusse causer directement, et sans intermédiaire *à nous*; c'est le seul moyen de faire cesser les méfiances réciproques, les indiscrétions, les légèretés qu'on se permet peut-être, et par lesquelles je peux me trouver compromis, sans y avoir donné lieu; c'est ce qui m'eût fait désirer, je vous l'avoue, que Coco [Badouville] dans son voyage, fût venu jusqu'à moi; et si cette occasion se représente, comme je l'espère d'après ce que nous avons fait dire, vous et moi, je vous demande avec instance de m'amener l'homme, ou de me l'envoyer, attendu que si mon Corps entre pour quelque chose dans les projets, il est de toute nécessité, que j'en sois instruit d'avance, pour pouvoir juger les bases, promettre l'exécution, et préparer les moyens.

C'est avec beaucoup de peine, que j'apprens de vous, que vous avez demandé votre rappel, je vous aurois cru plus attaché à finir une besogne que vous aviez si bien commencée, et dont le succès vous eût immortalisé; mais j'espère bien que votre Gouvernement vous servira mieux, que vous ne vous servez vous-même, qu'il sentira qu'il n'y a que vous, qui puissiez amener à une heureuse fin, cette importante affaire, dont dépend le salut de l'Europe, et dont vous tenez dans votre main tous les fils; souvenez-vous donc de ce que vous m'avez dit vous-même, sur le dégoût que m'inspiroient toutes les contrariétés, que nous éprouvions; vous avez consolidé mon courage, par ce seul mot; *notre métier seroit trop aisé, si tout alloit tout seul*; et vous vous décourageriez! . . . non, je ne puis le croire; il est trop

beau, de servir à la fois, son pays, la justice, et le malheur, pour se priver soy-même de cette honorable fonction, la plus douce des jouissances, d'une âme forte, d'un cœur sensible, et d'un esprit éclairé.

LOUIS-JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

The Prince de Condé to Mr. Wickham (p. 12).

A Mülheim, ce 28 février 1797.

J'ai reçu hier au soir, Monsieur, une lettre de la Marquise [King Louis XVIII.] qui vraisemblablement ne savoit pas encore tout ce qui s'est passé, car elle ni ses amis ne m'en disent pas un mot; cette lettre est cependant du 14; on s'attend, dans le lieu qu'elle habite, à une insurrection très-prochaine dans sa patrie, et surtout dans le chef-lieu; en conséquence, on me recommande, de tout faire pour que *la Mariée* [General Moreau] *soit prête à se déclarer, et à faire déclarer sa famille*; comme je n'ai aucune connexion avec cette Mariée [General Moreau], comme j'ignore même où elle est actuellement, il n'y a que vous qui puissiez me procurer un ami commun, et *les moyens* indispensables, pour arriver jusqu'à elle; on m'envoye d'ailleurs toutes les promesses qu'il faut, pour la déterminer, et de ce côté-là toute la famille n'aura rien à désirer; je vous prie donc, Monsieur, de me mander *tout de suite* ce que vous pouvez faire, et dans le cas, où, comme je me plais à l'espérer, vous voudriez bien vous charger *des moyens*, de m'envoyer cet ami commun, qui puisse aller trouver la Mariée [General Moreau], et lui remettre ce dont je suis chargé pour elle; comme j'ai mandé à la Marquise [King Louis XVIII.], que je ne pouvois faire ce qu'elle désire, que *par vous*, je vous demande avec instance, pour que je ne puisse pas être accusé de négligence, de ne pas perdre un moment, à me faire une réponse, dont je puisse rendre compte à la Marquise [King Louis XVIII.], qui l'attendra sûrement, avec une impatience que vous pouvez aisément imaginer; j'espère n'avoir pas besoin, Monsieur, de vous réitérer les assurances, de tous les sentiments de considération, de confiance, d'estime, et d'amitié que je me flatte que vous me connoissez pour vous.

LOUIS-JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

Note of Mengaud to the Government of Berne (p. 44).

(Copie.)

Égalité. Liberté.

Extrait

Des Registres des Délibérations du Directoire exécutif.

Paris, le vingt-neuf fructidor, l'an 5 de la République françoise, une et indivisible.

Le Directoire Exécutif, convaincu que la mission de Wickam près les Cantons helvétiques n'a aucun rapport aux intérêts respectifs de l'Angleterre et de la Suisse, et que son seul objet est d'exciter et de favoriser des Complots contre la sûreté intérieure de la République françoise, charge le Citoyen Mengaud d'inviter et requérir le Gouvernement du Canton de Berne et, au besoin, le Gouvernement des autres Cantons helvétiques de donner ordre à Wickam de sortir sans délai de la Suisse.

Pour Expédition conforme :

Le Président du Directoire Exécutif.

Sceau de la République françoise.

Signé à l'original, T. M. Revellièrelepeaux.

Par le Directoire Exécutif :

Le Secrétaire-Général.

Signé à l'original, La Garde.

Pour copie conforme à l'original. Berne, le 16 vendemiaire, l'an 6 de la République françoise; 7, 8bre vieux style.

(Signé) T. Mengaud.

King Louis XVIII. to Mr. Wickham (p. 45).

A Blankenburg, ce 11 octobre 1797.

J'ai pensé, Monsieur, que le meilleur moyen de réparer l'échec que vient de souffrir une entreprise à laquelle votre gouvernement a si puissamment contribué par ses généreux secours, mais surtout en vous confiant la direction de leur emploi, était de nous concerter de nouveau avec plus d'accord que jamais. En conséquence, je charge M. de Cazalès, qui vous remettra cette lettre, de conférer avec vous sur les mesures qui devront être prises dans cette circonstance et de communiquer celles qu'il me paraîtroit avantageux de mettre en exécution. Ma grande et assurément bien juste confiance en lui, celle que votre gouvernement a plusieurs fois témoignée et

celle que je vous prie de lui accorder, me dispense d'entrer dans de grands détails, ce sera moi-même qui vous parlerai par sa bouche, et je n'y perdrai que le plaisir de m'entretenir avec vous.

L'évènement est cruel, mais les ressources sont grandes, et je connois trop le *true British spirit* dont vous êtes animé pour craindre que votre courage soit plus abattu que le mien. Nous sortirons avec honneur de ce pas difficile, et les triumvirs qui ont cru vous compromettre en vous nommant avec tant d'éclat, n'auront fait que vous faire jouir un peu plus tôt de la gloire qu'un si bel ouvrage, heureusement achevé, doit attacher à votre nom.

Soyez bien persuadé, Monsieur, de mon estime et de tous mes autres sentimens pour vous.

LOUIS.

MR. WICKHAM.

M. Mallet du Pan to Mr. Wickham (p. 65).

(Extract.)

C'est très-sincèrement que je vous félicite d'avoir quitté la Suisse, si la saison ne dérange point trop Madame Wickam. Ce pays-là me paraît mûr ; le parti qu'ils ont pris à votre égard est une suite de l'erreur permanente où ils sont, qu'ils se sauveront à force de condescendance. Lorsqu'on ne peut plus défendre chez soi le droit des gens, on n'est plus un État. On m'avait prévenu à Zurich qu'il éclaterait des accusations personnelles contre certains membres du gouvernement de Berne, et spécialement contre le Banneret F. Ce que vous m'avez insinué à ce sujet prouve que cette rumeur n'était pas sans fondement ; mais le projet de cette mesure, comme celui de votre éloignement, ont été, je n'en doute pas, conçus à Berne même, et concertés par quelques Meneurs avec Paris. Peu avant mon départ je lus la copie d'une lettre écrite par le Colonel Weiss à Buonaparte, où il lui offrait de sacrifier ceux des Magistrats qui s'étaient montrés défavorables à la Révolution.

Quoi qu'il en soit, votre conduite dans cette affaire a été très-honorable, et vous a conquis une grande estime. Mr de Gumeran et le Comte de la Tour, à qui j'en ai parlé ici, m'avaient chargé de vous témoigner leur sentiment à cet égard.

The Avoyer de Steiguer to Mr. Wickham (p. 66).

(Extract.) Berne, le 18 X^bre 1797.

Monsieur,—C'est avec la plus vive douleur que j'ai appris la Résolution de S. M. B. de *rappeler* Sa légation pour la Suisse.

J'ay néanmoins senti parfaitement la force des motifs qui ont dû amener cette mesure si affligeante pour ma Patrie, et nous y reconnoissons avec la plus respectueuse gratitude combien l'intérêt que S. M. daigne prendre à notre Tranquillité y a eu de part. Mais je ne puis, Monsieur, vous le dissimuler, le rappel de M. Talbot a renouvellé tous ces sentiments déchirants qu'avoit excitté chez moy votre départ. Il me paroît bien dur que des Rewbels, des Merlins, &c. ayent pu éloigner de la Suisse un Ministre Britannique cher à tous les Honnêtes Gens du Pays et à la nation entière.

La Bienveillance avec laquelle S. M. daigne assurer à ma Patrie la continuation de Sa Haute Protection, et la Bonté avec laquelle vous me promettez, Monsieur, de suivre avec vous la correspondance que les Circonstances exigeroient, peuvent seules nous donner des Consolations.

Et, jamais Monsieur, Elles ne nous furent plus nécessaires que dans le moment actuel.

Les suittes désastreuses de la Paix d'Udine commencent à se développer d'une manière à nous laisser prévoir la désorganisation et la destruction prochaine de la Suisse.

The Comte d'Artois to Mr. Wickham (p. 69).

Edinbourgh, ce 15 Avril 1798.

Monsieur,—Je profite avec empressement du depart du Baron de Roll, pour vous exprimer directement toute ma reconnoissance des soins et du zele avec lesquels vous avés servi la cause generale et celle du Roi mon frere en particulier, dans l'importante mission que votre Gouvernement vous avait confié. Je regrette vivement sous tous les rapports, que les circonstances vous ayent ecarté momentanement des affaires que vous aviés suivi avec tant de soin; mais je . . . l'espoir que vous en seriés rapproché de nouveau, et je regarderai cet evenement comme un des plus heureux qui puissent nous arriver.

Le B^on de Roll et le Ch^er de Lugeaud qui accompagnent mon fils le Duc de Berri à Londres, vous instruiront en detail de la demande que je fais aujourd'hui aupres de S. M. B^que et des

Ministres. Je sollicite avec ardeur ainsy que mes loyaux compatriotes, de remplir un devoir bien doux a nos cœurs puisqu'il est dicté par le sentiment de la reconnaissance.

Si comme j'osé l'esperer, notre offre est acceptée, la place que vous occuppés vous donnera surement de grands rapports avec l'affaire qui m'interesse aujourd'hui, et je vous demande avec confiance de porter votre interêt a la faire reussir de la maniere la plus conforme a mes justes dessins.

Recevés Monsieur la ferme assurance de tous mes sentiments d'estime, et d'affection particuliere.

CHARLES PHILIPPE.

MONSIEUR WICKAM.

Mons. Malouet to Mr. Wickham (p. 75).

Je sais que je vous dois des remercimens que vous ayés parlé de moi à M. le duc de Portland, qui, malgré ses préventions, m'a fait dire par M. King que le gouvernement ne m'abandonneroit pas et me feroit un traitement. Dieu soit loué et vous aussi pour l'intérêt que vous accordés aux honnêtes gens, du nombre desquels je ne me lasse point d'être, quoique cette profession ait aussi ses dégoûts.

Avés-vous des nouvelles de notre bon jeune homme? J'en suis bien inquiet; je n'ai point de réponses aux lettres dont il s'étoit chargé pour ma famille. Voulés-vous me donner un rendezvous et m'entendre sur le texte que je joins ici? S'il y a quelque chose à faire de Pichegru, comme je le crois, il faut prendre garde au début.

No. 15 Spring Street 20. 7^{bre}.

Enclosure in M. Malouet's Letter (p. 75).

L'arrivée en Angleterre de Pichegru et de Willot est un évènement dont il est possible de tirer parti; mais il seroit encor plus facile d'annuller à jamais les deux généraux. Si l'Angleterre ou Loüis dix-huit les employoient ostensiblement, ils seroient bientôt sur la ligne de Dumourier s'ils paroissent s'écarter de celle qu'ils ont suivi l'année dernière dans l'assemblée.

Si Loüis dix-huit avoit une armée, je voudrois que Pichegru Willot et tous les Déportés ne s'y réunissent qu'après avoir

grossi leur parti de tous les mécontens du gouvernement actuel, car s'ils n'ont point de parti en France, s'ils ne comptent que comme des unités, une cinquantaine d'hommes de plus ou de moins ne signifient rien ; mais s'ils ont un parti, s'ils peuvent en former un, il est expédient de s'en servir contre l'ennemi commun ; et la tyrannie une fois détruite ou fortement attaquée, il y aura place alors et liberté d'opinions pour les honnêtes gens. Ceux qui veulent un roi pourront se faire entendre, et Pichegru, ainsi que les chefs de son parti, ne seront pas les derniers à faire leurs propositions : il sera même sage de ne pas les attendre, de leur donner toutes les garanties de leur assurer tous les avantages qu'ils peuvent désirer ; c'est la seule ouverture qu'il importe de leur faire secrètement, en leur laissant toutte liberté de paroles et d'actions dans l'organisation de leur parti.

Je voudrois donc que les deux hommes arrivés à Londres fissent un acte publique, une espèce d'addresse dans le sens de Camille Jourdan, et qu'en demandant au gouvernement la liberté de passer sur le Continent pour se rapprocher de leurs compatriotes et de leurs collègues, ils déclarassent *qu'ils entendent se rallier au vœu national et lui obéir.*

Je voudrois qu'après s'être concertés avec les autres Déportés, ils agissent pour convoquer et se faire envoyer de l'intérieur un certain nombre de Députés, qu'ils se tinssent à portée des armées républicaines pour en recevoir les déserteurs, qu'on les mît en état d'employer près des chefs et des corps militaires des moyens de séduction, qu'aussitôt qu'ils auroient un noyeau d'armée et de représentation nationale, protégés, mais séparés des forces étrangères, ils se bornassent à demander une assemblée libre et la punition du Directoire.

Je voudrois qu'à cette époque seulement Loüis dix-huit parût précédé de touttes les conventions de sûreté qui auroient été arrêtées secrètement, et qui seroient alors publiées, et qu'alors on proclamât une cessation d'hostilités entre la France et les puissances étrangères, qu'on indiquât un nouveau congrès pour une paix générale sur des bases équitables, qu'une armée levée en Suisse entrât comme auxiliaire de Loüis 18 sous le commandement de Pichegru. C'est à ces conditions seulement que j'espérerois de voir la fin de la révolution, le rétablissement de la monarchie françoise et de l'ordre publique en Europe après une guerre civile probablement sanglante mais de courte durée.

General Pichegru to Mr. Wickham (p. 80).

Sheernesse, 4 X^bre.

Je ne comptais pas de vous interrompre sitôt, mais un incident qui met un peu notre discrétion en défaut me met dans ce cas. Je suis arrivé ici à midi. Descendu à l'Auberge, un sergent est venu me prendre de la part du Commandant, pour me conduire chez lui: Nous l'avons rencontré sur le rempart, et aussitôt je lui ai mis mon passeport entre les mains; à peine avait-il commencé à le lire, qu'un officier de marine qui faisait partie de la flotte avec laquelle je suis venu, et qui m'avait vu à bord de *l'Aimable*, est venu à moi d'un air affectueux, et non content de m'appeler de mon nom, a eu l'attention d'observer au Commandant qu'il avait fait route avec moi, &c. Jugez de mon embarras, mais ce n'est pas tout, le Commandant a chargé cet officier de m'accompagner chez M^r l'amiral, j'ai eu soin de le prévenir que j'étais là incognito et sous un autre nom, mais n'entendant pas le français, il a continué de me donner le même, et il a jugé à propos d'en instruire et les officiers que nous avons rencontrés et à l'Amiral lui-même. D'après ceci je m'attends que mon départ sera bientôt connu, et je commence à croire qu'il faudra changer de traits quand on change de nom. A quelque chose malheur est bon, puisque celui-ci me fournit l'occasion de vous renouveler tous mes sentiments. Adieu, mes respects, je vous prie, à vos Dames.

Devant embarquer sur-le-champ, j'ai pris le parti d'envoyer la lettre pour M^r Graham par mon domestique, qui me rapporte à l'instant celle de M^r Flint pour me demander un Reçu; permettez qu'il le trouve ci-joint avec des témoignages d'amitié. Adieu.

The Baron de Roll to Mr. Wickham (p. 97).

Edimburgh, ce 21 Avrill 1799.

Mon cher Wickham,—Il faut absolument, que je m'entretienne un instant avec vous, et j'espere que vous pourez me donner un moment d'attention, sans que je vous sois importun.

Je suis premierement chargé de vous repetter de la part de S: M: B: Monsieur, ce que vous scavez si bien, de son extrême desir, d'etre mis en activité. Vous vous imaginez bien que le renouvellement des Hostilités sur le Continent, a augmenté son impatience et lui rend de jour en jour sa situation plus penible.

Mais, il espere que les evenements qui vienent de se passer, pourroient determiner votre gouvernement, à saisir ce moment, pour relever avec vigeur le parti des royalistes, de l'interieur, les lettres que *Monsieur* recoit des provinces de Bretagne, de Normandie et de la Vendée, s'accordent toutes pour presser et solliciter instament de profitter du moment actuelle. Il en est à peu près de même des provinces du Midy. Les dispositions, doivent naturellement s'enflammer de plus en plus à mesure, que les Armées republicaines, eprouveront des revers sur le Continent. Si par touttes ces Considerations reunies, vous croyiez apercevoir, que le Ministère seroit disposé, à s'occupper incessament d'un plan relatif aux royalistes de l'interieur, *Monsieur*, espere, que vous vous interesseriez, à faire valoir auprès des Ministres, tout l'avantage, qu'ils peuvent tirer de sa personne, et toute la confiance, qu'il meritte de leur part. Enfin, mon cher Wickham, comme vous etes du petit nombre des personnes de ce pays-cy, qui ont etté à même, d'apprendre à connoittre plus particulierement, le caractere de ce Prince, que vous scavez tout le parti, qu'on peut en tirer, que vous connoissez sa position, et que vous pouvez repondre de sa franchise et de sa loyauté dans les affaires, nous comptons sur vous, pour vous occupper de lui, dans toutes les occasions, dans toutes les circonstances, qui se presenteront, en vous rappellant, que le plus grand, le plus signalé service, que vous puissiez rendre à ce Prince, c'est de contribuer à le mettre en activité.

Je me flatte aussi, mon cher Wickham, que vous ne m'avez pas oublié, et que vous vous rappellerez, que le sang qui coule dans mes veines est suisse, de la bonne ancienne Suisse, touts mes vœux et toute mon ambition dans ce moment se tournent vers ma malheureuse patrie, c'est là ou je voudrois deja estre, mais je ne puis aller, comme je le desire, pour y estre veritablement utile, que par vous, et je m'en rapporte toujours à vous, pour disposer de mon sort, à cette egard.

Les dernieres lettres, que j'ay recû m'apprennent, que M^r^ de Rovera est à la tete d'un corps suisse, et qu'un M^r^ de Courten, Cap^t^ reformé de mon regiment, en est L^t^ Colonel. C'est un jeune Homme, dont je fais beaucoup de cas; je ne scais pas ce que sera Devenû le General de Salis, vous me ferez plaisir, de me faire scavoir, ou il est, et s'il est employé à quelque chose.

Si vous n'avez pas le tems de me repondre faites moi ecrire par M^r^ Flint.

Adieu, conservez moi souvenir et amittié et croyez moi bien sincerement, de cœur pour la vie, votre tout devoué servitteur,

LE BARON DE ROLL.

P: S. Je vous prie de me rappeller au souvenir de Madame Wickham, en lui presentant mes Homages respectueux. Le pauvre Baron de Castelnau me prie sans cesse de vous dire mille choses sinceres de sa part.

Mr. Wickham to Major Perou [Pichegru] (p. 99).

(Copy.) Londres, ce 21 Mai 1799.

Mon cher Major,—Votre lettre du 23 Mars m'est parvenue très-exactement: mais malheureusement il n'y a guères huit jours que j'ai sçu la déchiffrer. La lettre de votre Compagnon de voyage à Monsieur Dutheil du 20 du mois passé m'a encouragé à faire de nouveaux efforts, et enfin ils ont été heureux.

Je ne peux pas me pardonner d'avoir été la cause involontaire de tous les désagrémens que ce retard doit vous avoir causé.

Votre lettre lue, mon premier soin a été de la communiquer à qui de droit. Le style tant soit peu énigmatique qui y domine nous a empêché de deviner vos vues et vos intentions. On croit cependant avoir trouvé remède à tout.

Il faut de toute nécessité que vous ayez eu en vue soit la Suisse soit les Pays-Bas. Dans l'un et l'autre de ces deux cas vous trouverez actuellement sur le Continent deux Personnes jouissant l'un et l'autre de la confiance de ce Gouvernement, et également instruites de la Justice qu'on vous rend ici, de la confiance qu'on vous accorde et de l'envie qu'on a que vos Conseils soient suivis en tout ce que regarde votre infortunée Patrie. Elles recevront l'une et l'autre par ce même Courrier les Instructions nécessaires pour se concerter avec vous sur tout ce que vous serez à même de leur communiquer ou de leur proposer.

On a adopté ce moyen de correspondre avec vous *d'abord*, parce qu'il a été trouvé absolument impossible de laisser partir F—— même pour quelques jours; ensuite parce que dans ce moment de crise le plan le plus sagement combiné dans ce Païs pourroit devenir impossible à exécuter avant que le Courrier chargé de vous l'apporter ne fût débarqué à Cuxhaven.

Dans le cas donc que vos vues se portent sur les Païs-Bas, vous irez à Berlin, où vous trouverez Monsieur Grenville prêt à vous recevoir, après avoir communiqué si vous le jugerez convenable avec celui dont vous vous vantez d'avoir été si bien accueilli. Si vous croyez votre présence plus nécessaire du côté de la Suisse, le Colonel R. Craufurd, qui doit y être à l'heure qu'il est, et qui vous connoît déjà, sera charmé de vous recevoir.

Partout où vous irez, comptez que vous recevrez l'accueil que vous méritez à tant de titres. Je ne m'engagerai pas dans des raisonnemens oiseux sur l'état actuel des choses et les Assurances qui doivent en naître. Vous êtes sur les lieux; vous devez connoître les moyens qu'on doit employer pour en profiter mieux que Personne. Je ne puis cependant m'empêcher, en appellant votre attention sur la Suisse, de vous prier de vous mettre le plutôt possible en rapport confidentiel avec Monsieur de Steiguer, l'ancien Advoyer de Berne, dont vous connoissez déjà la réputation. C'est le seul homme qui pourra vous donner des notions sûres et exactes sur cet intéressant Païs, et vous aider en même tems utilement à porter vos efforts sur les Provinces frontières avec effet.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que la dissolution de l'agence de Souabe n'a été causé que par des intrigues qu'il n'a pas été possible de débrouiller d'ici. Les Pouvoirs qu'a Monsieur le Colonel R. Craufurd le mettront à même d'opérer le même bien que pouvoit faire cette Agence sans être exposé aux mêmes inconvéniens.

Croyez, mon cher Major, à l'Amitié et à l'attachement inviolable que je vous ai voué pour la vie.

W. WICKHAM.

Comte de Prëçy to Mr. Wickham (p. 101).

Ce 24 May 1799.

J'ai reçu, Monsieur, avec un bien vif interet la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'amitié de m'écrire, je n'ai jamais douté de vos sentiments pour moi, mais l'assurance que j'en reçois m'était necessaire et me fait du bien, je voulais répondre sur le champ à votre interessante lettre et j'esperais que Mr. de Talbot serait le porteur de ma réponse, mais je crains que son départ ne soit encore différé et je ne puis reculer plus longtems le moment de vous renouveller l'assurance de mes sentiments et de vous protester que je ne puis oublier vos procédés, que je

devine parfaitement à qui je dois ceux que j'éprouve de la part de votre gouvernement et de la Confiance que m'a témoigné Mr. le Colonel Crawfurt votre ami; depuis son départ de Londres les évenements ont été couronnés d'un tel succès que votre présence ici pourrait en ranimant tout, terminer aujourd'huy en un instant les malheurs de ma patrie. C'est moins ici, votre ami qui vous parle, que l'homme guidé par l'habitude de l'experience et de l'impartialité, je ne crains pas de vous dire Monsieur, que si votre gouvernement continue de s'intéresser au retour du roi en France, il ne peut y parvenir qu'en employant une personne qui comme vous réunit au tour d'elle toute la Confiance, et qui investi des plus grands pouvoirs, a l'habitude de saisir les Circonstances qui dans le moment actuel échappent si on ne sait en profiter sur le champ, un commissaire attaché aux armées ne peut suffire pour le travail de l'interieur qui demande à etre servi uniquement.

Veuillez je vous prie me rappeller au bon souvenir de M^dme^ Wicham, et luy présenter mes respectueux hommages.

Adieu Monsieur, venez à nous, et vous comblerai les vœux de célui qui vous a voué une amitié franche et loyale, et qui a pour vous les sentiments les plus distingués et qui ne cessera de vous rappeller vos bons procédés pour

MILIASKI.

Lord Grenville to the Avoyer de Steiguer (p. 107).

(Copy.) (Private.) à Londres ce 5 Juin 1799.

Monsieur,—Je sais bien Monsieur avec quel plaisir vous reverrez Monsieur Wickham—Le Roi ne pouvoit donner à vos Compatriotes une meilleure preuve de Son desir de contribuer au retablissement de leur ancienne prosperité et bonheur, qu'en munissant de Ses Pouvoirs à cet effet celui qui par sa conduite s'étoit dejà concilié leur estime. Il n'aura rien de plus pressé que de vous voir, sachant que vous pouvez mieux que toute autre personne, l'aider dans cette glorieuse mais difficile besogne —et je l'ai prié de vouloir bien être l'interprête des sentiments de la plus haute et sincère estime que votre caractère m'a inspiré depuis longtems, et qui ont été comme de raison bien augmenté par toute votre conduite dans la penible crise où vous vous êtes trouvés.

C'est avec ces sentimens que je serai toujours Monsieur &c.,

GRENVILLE.

M. DE STEIGUER.

The Comte de Précy to Mr. Wickham (p. 109).

Augsbourg le 17 juin 1799.

Monsieur,—Je profite avec un vrai plaisir du départ de M. de Talbot pour me rappeller a votre amitié, et vous assurer que les sentiments que je vous est voué, ainci qu'a Madame Wicham restent profondement gravés dans mon cœur.

Je dois croire que M. de Talbot aura avec vous des Conférences sur son travail de cet hÿver. Je regrette vivement qu'il soit arrêté, car l'on pouvait raisonablement en attendre les résultats les plus heureux; et la maniere dont il a été supprimé a jetté le découragement et l'inquietude parmis les personnes de l'interieur avec les quels l'on etoit en rapport, et qui, je puis le dire, etoient bien choisies par leurs talents, et leur moralité.

Ma confiance en vous, et votre amitié pour moi, me permettent d'entrer dans les détails et même de vous exposer toute la delicatesse de ma position, puisque mon travail doit se faire avec le roi par son agence et que la confiance dont votre gouvernement daigne m'honorer en me mettant en rapport avec M. Crawfurd, doit m'attirer beaucoup de tracasseries suites necessaires de l'envie et de la jalousie, ce qui ne sera point une raison pour moi de ralentir mon zele pour le service de mon roi, et de me livrer avec la plus grande sécurité a toute espece de travail avec les Ministres d'une Nation aussi noble que généreuse et dont quatre ans d'expérience m'ont assez fait connoitre les procédés et les principes.

M. de Talbot pourra vous satisfaire sur tous les détails que vous pouvez desirer.

Je connois, Monsieur, vos importantes occupations, je desirerez cependant bien vivement qu'elles ne me privassent pas entierement de votre correspondance, qui dans le moment me serait bien utile, je vous parlerai toujours avec le même epanchement que lorsque j'etais reçu chez vous avec cette amitié qui faisait ma sécurité et mon bonheur, et qui sera toujours un bien precieux pour moi. C'est avec ses sentiments que j'ai l'honneur d'être Monsieur, votre tres-obeissant et tres-dévoué Serviteur,

MILIASKI.

M. Imbert Colomès to Mr. Wickham (p. 118).

Monsieur,—Lorsque je vous ecrivois au mois de mai passé et que je déplorois le malheur qu'on avoit eu de vous perdre, il ne venoit seulement pas a ma pensée que notre perte seroit si promptement réparée. Quel heureux présage monsieur que votre retour! Je m'empresse a vous témoigner la joie que j'en ressens. Après toutes les peines que vous a donné votre première mission, il est bien juste que vous veniés en recueillir le fruit en etant le temoin de la délivrance de notre malheureuse patrie; car aujourd'hui j'y Crois fermement. Mais avant de me livrer a une aussi douce pensée, permettés moi, monsieur, de vous Remercier de tout Ce que vous avés fait pour mon Neveu. Vous lui avés fourni les moyens de me rejoindre et je l'attends sous 8 ou 9 jours. Mais j'espère que vous lui destinés quelque occupation. Vous sçavés qu'il en a besoin, et au 1er signe que vous ferés, il ira où vous ordonnerés. Conservés lui je vous prie vos Bontés. Avant votre retour j'avois formé le projet d'aller en Piémont pour être plus prés de mes Compatriotes. J'y trouverois peut-être le moyen de Correspondre avec eux, Ce qui pourroit être utile; et je serois a portée d'entrer avec l'armée de ——, si Comme je le présume, son dessein est de pénétrer. Aujourd'hui que vous êtes présent je ne veux rien faire sans vous Consulter. Je vous serai obligé de me faire Donner une prompte réponse pour régler ma Conduite. En attendant si d'ici la je recevois de votre part un avis de me rapprocher je le ferois aussitot, je suis Bien impatient d'avoir le plaisir de vous Voir. Mon ami M. D'Arletti attend aussi a Augsbourg vos ordres. Je suis avec Respect, de Votre excellence, le tres humble et tres obéissant serviteur,

DURAND.

a Nuremberg le 2. juillet 1799.

Je ne sçais si madame Wickam est auprès de vous, si Cela est présentés lui J. V. P. mes hommages respectueux.

M. Dandré to Mr. Wickham (p. 119).

Monsieur,—De tout ce qui pouvoit m'arriver d'agréable, rien ne pouvait l'être davantage, que vôtre lettre du 22 mai, qui, par un accident extraordinaire, ne m'a été envoyée de Zurich

que le 26 juillet, et ne m'est parvenu que hier au soir. Le prix extrême que j'attache à votre amitié, est seul la mesure du plaisir qu'elle m'a fait. Ce prix est tel, que le chagrin de l'avoir perdue a pu seul m'entrainer à ce que vous appellés un enfantillage.

Si j'avais sçu précisément où vous trouver, je serais parti sur le champ, pour vous témoigner ma vive reconnaissance. J'attendai vos ordres pour aller vous remercier, et concerter avec vous les moiens de réparer le mal qu'ont fait, une fausse interprétation des ordres de vôtre Gouvernement, et une foule de mal entendus plus inexplicables les uns que les autres.

Veuillés cependant me rendre la justice de ne pas attribuer seulement ma satisfaction a ce que vous me dites relativement aux affaires, mais surtout au retour ou plutôt à la continuation de vos sentimens pour moi.

J'espère, quand j'aurai l'honneur de vous voir, que vous serés convaincu que nous avons fait tout ce qui dépendait de nous, pour ne laisser détruire aucun des établissemens que nous avions formés (quoique quelques uns aient souffert de la suspension qui règne depuis trois mois) et que je suis toujours le même, absolument dévoué à vos ordres, et prêt à vous donner en toutes les occasions, les preuves les plus irrécusables de ma gratitude, et du respectueux attachement avec lequel je suis, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

A. MAYOR.

Augsbourg le 3 juillet 1799.

The Comte d'Artois to Mr. Wickham (p. 135).

Edinburgh, ce 18 Juillet 1799.

Monsieur,—Je profite avec empressement du depart du B^{on} de Roll, pour vous parler de la vive satisfaction que j'eprouve de voir enfin arriver le moment, ou grace a l'interet de votre Gouvernement, je vais me trouver a portée de servir les causes unies de S. M. B^{que} et du Roi mon frere.

Ma confiance dans le B^{on} de Roll vous est trop bien connue, pour que j'aie besoin de rien ajouter ici, aux commissions verbales dont je l'ai chargé pour vous; je veux seulement vous assurer, que d'apres l'opinion que j'ai conçue des principes de votre Gouvernement, et de votre caractere personnel, j'ai prescrit avant tout au B^{on} de Roll, de s'entendre et d'agir toujours de concert avec vous.

Cette marche est celle que je me propose de suivre moi même, aussitot que je vous aurai rejoint. Croïés Monsieur qu'il me sera particulierement agreable de me trouver en relations suivies avec vous, et de vous avoir de grandes obligations.

C'est toujours avec le meme plaisir que je vous renouvelle, Monsieur, l'assurance de tous les sentiments de haute estime, et de veritable affection que vous m'avés inspiré pour la vie.

CHARLES PHILIPPE.

Soïés asses aimable je vous en prie pour etre aupres de M^de^ Wickam l'organe de tous mes sentiments.

MONSIEUR WICKAM.

Mr. Wickham to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 165).

Confidentielle. Zurich, ce 22 d'Aoust 1799.

Monsieur le Marechal,—Les evenements qui se passent dans ce pays ci sont tellement extraordinaires et affligeans que je croirois manquer à mon devoir si je n'en faisois part directement à votre Excellence.

Elle ne peut pas ignorer que depuis le 6 juin jusqu'au 15 de ce mois ci une des plus belles armées que la maison d'Autriche ait jamais eues en campagne, commandée par l'Archiduc Charles en personne est restée sur la ligne d'où j'ai l'honneur d'ecrire à votre Excellence sans rien entreprendre contre la position de l'ennemi. Votre Excellence doit de meme avoir appris avec peine, sinon avec surprise, que le 15 de ce mois à la vue de quarante-six forts battalions campés entre Zurich et le Rhin, l'Ennemi a detaché une force trés considerable vers notre gauche, forcé tous les postes Autrichiennes dans les petits Cantons, coupé toutes les communications avec l'Italie, penetré dans les Grizons, où il se maintient, et qu'il s'est même rendu maitre de la position importante et presque inexpugnable du Mont St. Gothard.

Le jour même que ce malheureux evenement est arrivé, et pendant que l'affaire se passe en partie sous nos yeux, j'apprends pour la premiere fois, et de la bouche de l'Archiduc que Son Altesse Royale venoit de recevoir l'ordre positif de se retirer de la Suisse avec son armée, et de ne pas laisser un seul Autrichien dans le pays dont il devoit ceder toutes les positions a Monsieur de Korsakoff. Son Altesse Royale m'assura de plus

qu'elle etoit resolu d'obeir litteralement et sur le champ aux ordres qu'elle avoit reçues.

J'avois beau representer 'qu'un plan de campagne quelconque devoit nécessairement etre subordonné aux evenemens de la guerre, qu'en demandant que l'armée de Mons^r^ de Korsakoff s'appuyât contre celle que commande Votre Excellence, les Cours de Petersburgh et de Londres avoient toujours supposé qu'elle seroit assez forte pour pouvoir agir independamment de toute secours etranger, et qu'elle seroit pourvue de tout ce qu'il falloit pour fair la guerre dans un pays coupé par de hautes montagnes et de grandes riviéres, lequel ne fournit pas à beaucoup prés de quoi nourrir ses propres habitans.'

Je rappellai inutilement à Son Altesse Royale 'que Mons^r^ de Korsakoff ne pouvant pas avec trente mille hommes se maintenir en Suisse, l'armée Autrichienne par là même seroit forcée d'abandonner le Rhin, et que l'ennemi ne manqueroit pas de profiter de cet etat de choses pour penetrer dans le Tyrol, prendre le Milanois et le Piemont de revers, arreter votre armée dans sa carriere victorieuse et mettre en danger les conquêtes que votre Excellence vient de faire pour la Maison d'Autriche.'

Les representations de Mons^r^ de Korsakoff ayant eté aussi infructueuses que les miennes, tout etoit preparé pour l'évacuation de la Suisse, lorsque Son Altesse Royale sentant tout le danger de sa position et la terrible responsabilité qui lui pesoit sur la tête prend sur lui d'attaquer l'ennemi, les preparatifs sont faits sur le champ, les Russes font une marche vraiment incroyable pour se joindre aux Autrichiens; mais tout se termine par la tentative infructueuse d'etablir un pont sur l'Aar, dont votre Excellence recevra sans doute les details de la part de Mons^r^ de Korsakoff ou de Monsieur le Comte de Tolstoi.

Les affaires allant de mal en pire dans les petits Cantons, et les Grizons, on se prepare pour une nouvelle attaque sur la Limmat lorsque l'Archiduc à mon trés grand etonnement me fit dire par une personne de confiance, que les ordres que Votre Excellence avoit envoyés a M^r^ de Korsakoff de faire passer encore dix mille hommes en Italie avoit mis l'armée Autrichienne dans l'impossibilité d'agir, qu'il se preparoit de se retirer en Allemagne jettant une force dans le Tyrol capable d'en defendre les passages, et laissant Mons^r^ de Korsakoff avec

ses vingt-trois mille hommes pour faire en Suisse ce que les circonstances lui permettroient.

Avoir mis sous les yeux de Son Altesse Royale le tableau de ses propres forces eut été faire la censure la plus amére de sa conduite antecedente, ce qu'il ne me convenoit nullement de faire—je ne pouvois donc que deplorer la resolution fatale que Son Altesse Royale avoit prise.

L'on me pressa ensuite de faire quelque tentative au *nom de ma Cour* pour arreter ou du moins suspendre le depart de la Colonne Russe que Votre Excellence avoit demandée—a quoi je repondis trés clairement 'qu'ignorant absolument les derniers arrangemens des deux Cours je n'osois rien faire de semblable, etant au surplus intimement persuadé que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ne voudroit rien faire qui fut contraire à ses engagemens, et que Votre Excellence n'auroit jamais fait une telle demarche sans l'aveu de son Souverain.' Mais effrayé des suites terribles que la retraite des Autrichiens doit avoir soit pour eux-mêmes, et pour le malheureux pays où je me trouve, soit pour l'Europe entiére et specialement pour les deux augustes Souverains que nous avons l'honneur de servir, connoissant de plus les Autrichiens assez pour les croire capables de tenir leur parole et de se retirer tout de bon, je pris sur moi d'exhorter trés fortement Monsieur de Korsakoff à faire marcher le renfort pour Votre Excellence d'aussi pres que possible du Mont St. Gothard d'ou en satisfaisant aux demandes des Autrichiens, et leur otant ainsi tout pretexte de se retirer, il pourroit etre à portée d'appuyer les operations de Son Altesse Royale dans les petits Cantons, de marcher droit vers Votre Excellence par cette Montagne (le chemin le plus court) au cas de succés, et de passer par la vallée du Rhin vers le lac de Côme si les Autrichiens aprés toutes leurs promesses refusoient de reprendre l'offensive.

Mons^r^ de Korsakoff ayant trouvé cette mesure infiniment preferable à celle qu'il avoit d'abord cru devoir adopter, c. a. d. de faire à ses troupes le detour du Tyrol, j'ai insisté aupres de l'Archiduc au nom de ma Cour comme une condition expresse, non seulement que Son Altesse Royale attaquat l'Ennemi sur le champ, mais qu'elle l'attaquat avec toute sa force, le forçat de sa position, le poursuivit de prés au cas de succés, et qu'elle ne cessat pas de le pousser jusqu'a ce qu'au moins les premiers

grands passages de l'Italie et nommément celui du St. Gothard fussent entierement libres.

Tel est l'Etat des choses dans ce pays ci, où je me trouve sans autre moyen pour remplir les ordres de *mon* Souverain que beaucoup de zéle et de bonne volonté—Vous etes bien heureux, Monsieur le Marechal, d'avoir entre vos mains les moyens de faire observer la volonté du *Votre.*

Je n'ai pas besoin de faire sentir à Votre Excellence tout ce qu'il y aura d'affligeant dans notre position si les Autrichiens manquent à leur parole, je me contente de vous prier de vouloir bien m'honorer de vos conseils et de vos ordres, si par mes foibles efforts je puis contribuer en rien à un meilleur ordre de choses. J'ai l'honneur d'etre avec respect, Monsieur le Marechal, De Votre Excellence, le tres humble et tres obeissant serviteur

WM. WICKHAM,

Ministre Plenipotentiaire de Sa Maj: Britannique en Suisse.

A Son Excellence Monsieur
le COMTE DE SUWOROW, &c. &c. &c.

General Hotze to Mr. Wickham (p. 186).

Excellence!—Les Suites de notre retraitte de Lachen, dont je n'ose penetrer les raisons, encore moins discuter celles, qui l'ont occasionnées—sont si funestes, qu'hier le 29 l'Enemie attaquant l'aile gauche de ma position penetra dans le Canton Glarus Et s'est rendu maitre du chef lieu—un renfort, qui arriva encore à tems fut assez heureux de chasser l'Enemie de Glarus Et le repousser dans les gorges du Muttenthal—mais il me sera impossible de la deloger des hauteurs dont il est maitre Et qui dominent le Canton d'autant plus, que le detachement du Colonel Strauch à Bellinzone est trop foible pour cooperer avec moi—cette situation augmente le nombre des Emigrés Et il est bien douloureux de rencontrer nombre de ces malheureux Peres—femmes Et Enfans sur la Route—mendiant le pain—Vous avez eu la generosité d'offrir du Secours à Eux Et monsieur le Colonel comte Pluncket m'a reiteré vos Sentiments magnanimes vers ces malheureux—

Je Supplie donc Votre Excellence de vouloir m'assigner une

modique Somme d'argent ou de la Confier à l'officier qui vous presente cette Lettre—

Vous avez en toute Occasion daigné proteger la Suisse. Et je me persuade, que Votre Excellence me pardone ma Sollicitation, qui regarde une infortunée classe des habitans—victime d'une guerre, qui leur etoit entierement etrangere.

Agrées mes respectueux homages à Madame de Wyckham Et La haute Estime Et devouement distingué, dont j'ai l'honneur d'Etre, de Votre Excellence, le très humble et très Obeisst. Servr.,

HOTZE, Lt.-gnl.

Schoenis, le 30 aout, 799,
à 9 heures du Soir.

Field-Marshal Suvorow to Mr. Wickham (p. 187).

Monsieur,—J'ai été d'autant plus surpris de l'intention de S. A. Royale M. l'Archiduc Charles dont Vous venez de me faire part, Monsieur, de vouloir incessamment retirer l'armée Imp^le^ et Royale de la Suisse, inondée dans ce moment ci par l'ennemi, jusqu'en Suabe pour en abandonner toute la défense aux forces insuffisantes du Général Korsakow, que j'ai jugé indispensablement nécessaire de remettre l'exécution de l'ordre qui m'est parvenu également de me rendre en Suisse avec les trouppes russes, encore à deux mois, pour prendre avant toute chose les forteresses de Tortone et de Cuneo, seul moyen propre à assurer nos heureux progrès fait jusqu'ici en Italie. La retraite des trouppes Autrichiennes de la Suisse est selon moi d'autant moins faisable qu'elle mettroit au succès des opérations futures, des obstacles dès lors prèsqu'impossibles à surmonter.

En donnant part aussi à S. A. R. de pareils sentimens, j'ai pris à tâche de rendre et ses connoissances militaires et sa bonté de cœur en même tems attentives à l'urgence de la conservation des forces en Suisse, et aux suites à resulter d'une diminution quelconque. Ayant enjoint depuis au Général Korsakow de ne pas faire quitter la Suisse au 10,000 hoñes demandés, je dois espérer d'apprendre en peu une tournure plus avantageuse dans les affaires.

Au reste je n'ai pas tardé de porter tout ceci à la connoissance des deux Cours Imp^les^, persuadé que la bonne cause y gagnera certainement.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la considération la plus distinguée, Monsieur, Votre très humble et très obeiss[t] serviteur,

C. ALEXANDRE SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI.

ce $\frac{19}{30}$ Août 1799.

à MR. DE WICKHAM à Zurich.

Mr. Wickham to General Hotze (p. 194).

(Draft.)

Mons[r] le Baron de Hotze, Feld-Mar[l] Lieut[t] de l'armée Imp[le] & Royale, &c. &c.

Schaffhausen 2 Août 1799.

Mon Général,—J'ai reçû la lettre que Vôtre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire, sur la malheureuse position des Braves Gens de Schweitz & de Glaris.—Je m'empresse de vous faire passer la somme de 300 Louïs d'or, que M[r] de Werdt vous remettra en vous priant de les employer au nom de S. M. B. au secours des malheureux habitants de ce Pays.

Je vous autorise, mon Général, en même tems, de tirer sur moi pour pareille somme sans autre avis si vous le trouvés nécéssaire. On ne peut pas mettre son argent a meilleur profit.

Le départ de M[r] de Werdt m'oblige de me borner a l'assurance de la haute consideration et du respectueux attachem[t] avec lequel, j'ai l'honneur d'être &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

Field-Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham (p. 195).

Monsieur,—À la suite du plan des opérations futures concerté entre Leurs Majestés les deux Empereurs et le Roi de la Grande Brétagne, il m'a été enjoint par mes Cours de quitter incessamment l'Italie, et de me rendre à la tête des trouppes russes en Suisse, auxquelles doivent se joindre sur les lieux un *Corps de trouppes bavaroises et des milices Suisses.* Vous connoissez, Monsieur, trop bien Vous-même l'état des choses pour ne pas sentir toute l'importance de la prompte apparition de ces trouppes dictée par l'urgence des circonstances; Veuillez donc, Monsieur, accélérer *l'arrivée des premières, et l'enrôlement et l'organisation des dernieres* qui doivent être poussés avec la plus grande activité pour faire augmenter leur nombre autant que possible.

C'est immédiatement après la reddition de la Citadelle de Tortone, que je compte sous la bénédiction du Ciel me mettre

le $\frac{8 \text{ Septembre}}{28 \text{ Août}}$ en marche avec la division du Général Derfelden ainsi qu'avec celle du Général Rosenberg, toutes les deux ensemble au nombre de 30,433 hommes.—J'espère qu'on ne manquera pas de concerter avec les differentes Cantons sur les mesures les plus propres pour l'approvisionnement suffisant des trouppes de mon Souverain, pour quel objet je me suis adressé directement au Commissaire-Général des vivres.

Les trouppes sous mes ordres passeront par Casale, Vercelli, Novarre, Airolla pour attaquer l'ennemi dans sa position sur le mont S^{t} Gothard, et l'ayant repoussé et battu, feront dès lors leur jonction au Corps du Lieut.-Général de Korsakow et à celui du Général Hotze, tandis que le Général Autrichien Haddeck attaquera en même tems l'ennemi qui se trouve posté à S^{t} Bernhard.

En vous faisant, Monsieur, l'ouverture confidentielle de mon plan d'operations, je vous repête mes plus vives instances de vouloir m'accorder dans tous les cas de besoin Vos bons offices, et de contribuer par là aux succès des efforts communs de nos Souverains respectifs.

Je serai charmé de faire Votre connaissance personelle et de Vous assurer de bouche les sentimens de la plus parfaite estime et de la consideration très distinguée avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obeissant serviteur,

Asti ce — 1799. A. Suworow Rymnikski.

à M^{r} de Wickham
Ministre de S. M. Brit: en Suisse.

Mr. Wickham to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 199).

(Draft.) Schaffhausen, 9 Sept., 1799.

Monsieur le Maréchal,—La lettre que V. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 3 du mois cour^{t} dans laquelle elle m'annonce ses intentions de venir dans ce Pays-ci après avoir attaqué et forcé l'ennemi dans sa position sur le M^{t} S^{t} Gothard, ne m'a été remise qu'aujourd'hui.

Votre Exc^{ce} doit être persuadée que je ferai tout ce qui dépendra de moi, pour contribuer au succès des efforts communs de nos deux Souverains. Mais je croirais manquer à mon devoir si je ne mettais pas de suite le vrai tableau des ressources de ce Pays-ci sous les yeux de V. E. V. E. le trouvera triste &

stérile, mais il est essentiel qu'elle sache au vrai sur quoi elle doit compter. Des treize Cantons qui formaient ensemble le Corps Helvétique deux seuls sont occupés en entier par les Alliés. Dix sont entre les mains de l'ennemi, et le treizième (Zurich) est partagé entre les deux Armées Belligerantes.

Les deux Cantons que nous tenons (Appenzell et Schaffhausen) sont des plus petits de la Confederation et des plus faibles. Zurich avec plus de ressources est pour la plupart mal pensant.

Les Alliés occupent de plus quelques petits Pays sujets ou Alliés des Cantons, tels que la Turgovie et le Toggenburg, où l'esprit est en général assez mauvais.

Toutes les ressources de la Suisse soit en hommes, soit en esprit public, se trouvent dans les Cantons occupés par l'ennemi et surtout dans celui de Berne.

L'inaction de l'Armée Autrichienne nous ayant fermé l'accès de ces Cantons, nous n'avons pû recruter que dans les parties de la Suisse où l'on avait le moins d'espérance de réussir; de sorte que les Levées après les pertes qu'elles ont essuyées dernièrement, se réduirent à peu près à deux mille Hommes dont la plus grande partie n'est pas encore assez disciplinée et instruite pour faire la guerre avec les Trouppes de V. E.

Les Petits Cantons de Schweitz Uri et Glaris, lorsqu'ils se trouvaient occupés par les Autrichiens, voyant l'ennemi à leurs portes, répugnaient à servir dans les trouppes reglées. Leur population d'ailleurs est très faible et l'élite de leurs jeunes gens a péri dans la guerre cruelle que les Français leur ont fait, et dans les diverses tentatives infructueuses qu'ils firent ce Printems pour secouer le joug avant l'arrivée des Autrichiens.

Les Milices de ces Cantons sont cependant en grande partie avec le Général Hotze au nombre peut-être de mille hommes et pourraient être de quelque utilité pour aller à la découverte et pour faire le service de Chasseurs. Pour les Troupes reglées, comme je suis persuadé que V. E. ne borne pas ses vues à la Campagne présente, j'ose hardiment lui conseiller de renoncer entierement à les employer avant le Printems. Elles ne rendent que peu de services à l'heure qu'il est, mais elles peuvent être regardées comme le noyeau d'un Corps considérable. Qu'on les tienne sur les derrières cet hyver et j'ose répondre à V. E. que nous aurons un corps de dix à douze mille

hommes de bonne Infanterie, bien formés et bien disciplinés avant l'ouverture de la Campagne, *pourvu qu'on se rende Maître de Berne pendant l'Automne.*

J'ai envoyé à Mons^r^ le Col^l^ de Wymmer Commiss^re^ Général des vivres, la lettre que V. E. m'a envoyé incluse à son adresse; je ne manquerai pas de le voir demain, de me concerter avec lui, et de l'aider autant que je le pourrai à trouver moyen de pourvoir aux besoins de l'armée, dans un pays qui manque absolument de tout. Car je ne dois pas cacher à V. E. qu'en fait de vivres, le Pays n'offre *aucunes* ressources. Dans les meilleurs tems, il ne suffisait pas à la nourriture de ses propres habitants; il ne peut prévoir pour cet hyver, quelle que soit la Puissance qui le possède, que la faim et la misère.

Pour les Trouppes Bavaroises j'écris de suite à Munich, pour m'informer en quel état elles sont. Mais je suis fâché de dire à V. E. que jusqu'ici je n'ai pas reçu d'instructions de ma Cour à cet égard, et qu'on ne m'a pas annoncé leur arrivée, ni de Londres ni de Munich.

Je suis vraiment fâché d'avoir un si triste compte à rendre à V. E. Heureusement elle est accoutumée à lutter avec les difficultés et à les vaincre.

Pour moi je suis très flatté Mons^r^ le Maréchal de ce que vous me permettés de vous communiquer mes notions sur le plan de campagne proposé. Vous pouvés être persuadé que je ne négligerai rien pour meriter votre confiance et votre estime.

J'ai l'honneur d'être &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

a Son Excellence Mon^r^
le Maréchal C^te^ DE SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI,
&c. &c. &c.

Memorandum written by Mr. Wickham on the margin of the preceding Draft (p. 202).

N. B. Le Marechal Soult m'a dit, après avoir lu et même relu plus d'une fois cette depeche avec une attention soutenue (pour ainsi dire concentrée) 'que le Marechal Suworow n'auroit jamais pu se tromper sur son veritable objet, d'autant moins que le General Korsakoff en entrant et s'etablissant en Suisse a la place de l'Archiduc Charles n'avoit avec lui que 30,000 hommes' en effet il n'avoit que 28,000 et cela pour occuper une position dont, selon l'Archiduc la defense demandoit 50,000 hommes au moins, avec tous les accessoires necessaires pour

constituer *une armée* et dont chaque une des deux armées Russes etoient egalement dépourvu. J'aurois dû parler au Marechal Suworow de cette foiblesse comparative, et je l'aurois fait un peu plus tard, mais je n'ai pas voulu surcharger mon tableau dans le commencement de notre correspondance d'un fait qu'il ne devoit pas ignorer, et que je ne pouvois presenter a un esprit penetrant et fin comme le sien sans paroitre vouloir faire une reproche a la Cour de S^{t} Petersburg d'avoir manqué a ses engagements en envoyant *une telle force* pour entrer en Suisse au lieu d'une armée de 45,000 hommes *avec tout ce qui etoit necessaire pour le service effectif d'une telle armée.* L'état de denuement dans lequel le corps de Korsakoff est arrivé a Schaffhausen se trouve amplement detaille dans mes depeches officielles.

Mr. Wickham to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 203).

(Draft.) Schaffhausen 10 Sept: 1799.

Monsieur le Maréchal,—Monsieur Le Lieut^{t}-Col^{l} Clinton m'a remis la lettre que V. E. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 30 Août. Il m'a rendu compte en même tems de la conversation intéressante dont V. E. a bien voulu l'honorer.

V. E. aura appris depuis, que le projet d'attaque dont je lui faisais part dans ma lettre du 22^{e} Ult^{o} n'avait pas été mis à exécution, pour des raisons qu'il ne convient qu'à un militaire éclairé d'apprécier, et que l'Archiduc a quitté la Suisse avec toute son armée, abbandonnant la défense de la Limmat et de l'Aar aux Russes, et laissant le Général Hotze avec à peu près 20 Bataillons, dans une position évidemment choisie pour protéger les Grisons et le Vorarlberg, plustôt que pour coopérer avec Mons^{r} de Korsakow.

Du reste, avec la confiance la plus entière dans les moyens de V. E. je suis persuadé que la tentative louable d'interesser les connaissances militaires et le bon cœur de S. A. R. à la conservation de ce malheureux Païs, n'eut changé en rien la determination qu'Elle avait prise de l'abandonner.

Le cœur de S. A. R. avait déjà assez souffert des maux qui devaient nécessairement suivre sa retraite; et dans les différentes conversations que j'ai eu avec S. A. R. à ce sujet, Elle n'a jamais manqué d'appuyer sur les suites fatales que cette mesure devait avoir, pour les opérations de la campagne en Italie

comme en Allemagne, de même que pour la réputation et l'honneur des armes Impériales.

Mais je dois à la confiance qui regne entre nos deux Augustes Souverains, comme à celle dont V. E. m'a honoré, de lui dire que depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire, il m'a été constaté que S. A. R. avait les ordres les plus positifs de se retirer dès que les Russes seraient arrivés, et que depuis très longtems il ne lui était plus libre d'agir offensivement en Suisse.

Je m'empresse d'autant plus de communiquer ce fait à V. E. qu'elle pourrait peut-être croire d'après quelques passages de ma lettre du 22, que j'avais voulu insinuer que c'était à S. A. R. même, qu'on devait attribuer l'inaction de son armée, ce qui était le plus loin de mon intention.

Tous les militaires éclairés avec lesquels j'ai eu l'avantage de parler, me paraissent ne pas douter que l'armée de S. A. R. soutenue par trente-mille Russes, eût suffit au moins pour conquérir la Suisse et s'établir sur la première frontière de la France avant l'hyver ; et je suis persuadé que S. A. R. brûlait d'envie de mettre un tel projet à exécution.

J'ignore l'objet auquel on a sacrifié ces belles espérances ; j'ignore celui qui a donné le conseil de se retirer ; mais qui qu'il soit il n'en est pas moins vrai que sans le vouloir, il a ranimé le courage et l'espérance de l'ennemi, et mis de nouveau, non seulement l'Italie et la Suisse, mais l'Europe entière en danger. Je pourrais ajouter qu'il a fait le tort le plus sensible à la réputation de l'armée Autrichienne, et à la gloire personnelle de l'Archiduc.

Dans ces circonstances malheureuses je vois avec peine qu'il n'est pas possible à V. E. de venir encore à notre secours, quoique je ne peux qu'approuver le parti qu'Elle a pris ; je dois même avouer que pendant que la force et les positions des Armées belligérantes dans ces contrées resteront les mêmes, je ne souhaiterais pas voir V. E. s'engager dans les Alpes avec moins *qu'une armée.*

Je n'entre pas avec V. E. dans de plus grands *détails* sur notre position ; comme le Major Général Lord *Mulgrave*, qui est spécialement chargé par ma Cour, de *concerter* avec V. E. les opérations de la Campagne, aura eu à *l'heure* qu'il est l'honneur de s'expliquer verbalement avec Elle là dessus : Je me borne donc à me recommander au souvenir de V. E. et à la prier d'agréer l'assurance de la haute considération et du

respectueux dévouement avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être, &c. &c. &c.,

Wm. Wickham.

A Son Excellence Monsieur le
Marechal de Suworow Rymnikski, &c. &c. &c.

Field-Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham (p. 217).

Votre Excellence,—J'ai l'honneur de donner part a Votre Excellence, que les Trouppes russes de l'Armée d'Italie se trouve rassemblé dans ce moment ci, parti à Bellinzone, et parti à Taverni; deja depuis le 15 nous nous trouvons ici et les operations seroient deja commencé, s'il n'y avoit pas eu tant des Difficultés à cause des Mulets necessaire pour le transport des Vivres; on les attendoit de jour en jour, et quand une partie arrivé, la moitié en deserté; je me trouvois dans des circonstances pareilles, et pour ne pas tarder encore plus long-tems à entreprendre les operations, qui de jour en jour devenoient naturelement, tant pour les subsistances que pour le tems, qu'on procure a l'ennemi a se preparer, plus inquietant, obligé de me servir des chevaux de Cosaques pour porter les vivres, afin par cet expedient me trouver en etat de commencer demain le 21 les operations; voila l'etat des chosses que je me fais une plaisir de communiquer à Votre Excellence.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute Consideration, Votre Excellence, Votre très humble et très obeissant Serviteur,

Prince Italique comte Alexandre
Suworow Rymnikski.

Taverni ce 20 Septembre 799.

Major-General Titof to Mr. Wickham (p. 223).

Monsieur,—Le corps de trouppes que j'ai rammené d'Utznach après y avoir combattu se trouvant dépourvu de vivres et cet objet ainsi que les autres besoins qu'il peut avoir exigeant absolument des fonds, je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien m'avancer une somme de deux cent louis que notre Général Commandant vous remettra le plustôt possible. Cette complaisance de votre part sera pour moi dans les circonstances actuelles du plus grand prix.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec un très profond respect, de Votre Excellence, le très humble et très obeissant Serviteur,

Général-Major de Titof.

à Constance ce 29 7^{me} 1799.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 252).

(Copy.)
à Monsieur le Maréchal
PRINCE SUWAROW. Donaueschingen ce 9 Oct. 1799.

J'apprends dans ce moment, par une annonce du Lieutenant Général Petrasch, que Monsieur le Maréchal prend avec ses troupes la Position entre Coire et Mayenfeld. Je me trouve dans la nécessité de mettre sous les yeux du Prince la Situation des troupes Russes sous le Commandement du Lieut^{t} Général Comte de Korsakoff et du Prince de Condé. Ces troupes ont entièrement abandonné la rive gauche du Rhin, celles du Prince de Condé, sans y être forcées, ont même évacué l'Abbaÿe de Petershausen en face de Constance, de manière que je me suis trouvé obligé d'occuper ce poste important avec mes troupes, et d'y détacher 7 Bataillons et 12 Escadrons, sous le Commandement du Lieut^{t} Général Comte de Nauendorf.

Les troupes sous les ordres du Lieut^{t} Général Comte de Korsakoff occupent le terrain depuis Eglisau jusqu'à Stein ; et d'après mes dispositions d'aujourd'hui, le corps de Condé devroit occuper celui du lac de Constance depuis Hernadingen jusqu'à Buchhorn.

D'après la disposition des choses, Monsieur le Maréchal pourra mieux juger quel est celui des deux Corps qui sera le plus utile pour ses opérations, et je le prie en conséquence de m'instruire de ses intentions par la voie de mon Adjudant d'Aile, Comte de Bubna, d'autant plus que je m'engage derechef d'employer tous mes moyens pour faciliter Son entreprise sur la Suisse et c'est pour cette raison que je désire être informé de Ses projets.

A l'egard des Vivres et Munitions, dont Votre Excellence exige une avance, j'ai dejà donné l'ordre au Lieutenant Général Baron de Petrasch d'employer tous ses moyens à ce sujet et l'ordre en a été de même donné à ma direction des Vivres. Quant à la Munition, Mons^{r} le Lieut^{t} Général a l'ordre de la fournir de son magazin de Bregenz autant que cela sera praticable eu égard au calibre.

Enfin je me trouve forcé de prier Monsieur le Maréchal pour la défense rigoureuse du Haut Grisons, parceque ce Débouché nonseulement expose les Passages qui conduisent au Tyrol, les Pays héréditaires et l'Italie, mais menace encore la Position des deux armées, d'autant plus que d'après la manière dont l'ennemi fait la guerre, il n'aura pas échappé à la Sagesse de Votre Excellence qu'au milieu de l'opération principale, il sait profiter des moindres facilités qu'on lui donne.

Field-Marshal Suworow to the Archduke Charles (p. 254).

(Copy.)
à Son Altesse Royale
L'Archiduc Charles. Balzers le 11 Oct^bre 799.

La lettre de Votre Altesse Royale en date du 9 du courant, qui m'a été remise par le Comte de Bubna, m'a entièrement tranquillisé sur l'annonce d'hier de la perte de Constance. Son Altesse Royale voulant bien recevoir mes remerciements, reçoit en même temps, par la persuasion d'avoir travaillé pour le bien général la plus belle récompense des mesures qu'elle a prises pour la deffense et la conservation de Petershausen.

Instruit par votre dernière dépêche de la position des corps de Korsakow et du Prince de Condé; bien persuadé que V. A. R. voudra bien avoir la bonté d'assister ces deux corps de ses conseils et de son soutien, je me suis décidé d'agir le plutôt possible sur l'offensif, pour forcer par S^t Gall, Wyl, la riviere de Töss et operer ma jonction avec les corps de Korsakow et de Condé.

Je ne cache pas à votre Altesse Royale que j'espere par cette manœuvre couvrir davantage les Grisons et le Vorarlberg, que par une deffensive étendue. Comme il est de toute necessité que l'on employe toutes les forces pour l'offensif, mon opinion seroit de ne rien laisser en arrière, parceque non seulement ces troupes deviennent inutiles mais encore affoiblissent le corps agissant.

L'ennemi etant deja maitre de Dissentis et de Ravis, malgré les postes qu'on avoit placé pour couvrir ces endroits, je crois, que pour le moment, il faudroit mettre des entraves à l'ennemi sur la rive droite du Rhin par la manœuvre sur S^t Gall, la démolition des ponts de la *Feldberg* et de *Zollbrücke*, finalement par l'occupation des retranchements sur la rive gauche de l'Ill près de Feldkirch; jusqu'au moment où la bataille sur la rive gauche du Rhin etant gagnée, notre approche vers la riviere de Töss force ces casse-cols à se retirer.

En laissant 3,000 hommes pres de Feldkirch, il nous reste 16,000 hommes des troupes Autrichiennes qui ajoutés aux Russes forment un corps de 25,000 hommes dont nous avons nécessairement besoin jusqu'au moment de notre jonction à la riviere de Töss.

Comptant arriver demain a Feldkirch, j'arrangerai le reste avec le lieutenant général Baron de Petrasch: quant au passage du Rhin, il ne pourra s'effectuer tout au plus le 15 eu égard au temps qu'il faut pour le rassemblement des troupes Autri-

chiennes. En me reservant de déterminer la manière et le jour de l'attaque, dont j'instruirai plus tard Son Altesse Royale, je me trouve obligé de la prier de vouloir accorder, dans le temps, à ces deux corps, les officiers de son etat général, et de leur fournir un soutien suffisant de troupes Autrichiennes.

La manière de penser de S. A. R. pour la bonne cause, de même que ses lumieres, lui feront appercevoir, que non seulement l'opération projettée doit amener avec elle, la delivrance entiére de la Suisse; mais encore sa réussite donnera beaucoup de facilités aux opérations que l'on entreprendra dans la suite sur l'Empire, de sorte j'espere que Son Altesse Royale employera de son coté tous ses moyens pour la faire réussir pleinement.*

General Korsakoff to Mr. Wickham (p. 263).

Monsieur,—J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de Votre Excellence dattée du 8 de Wangen, avec une notte jointe de la part des états du Cercle de Souabe au sujet du payement pour le transport des munitions du laboratoire de Moesbourg à Memingen et Pfullendorf pour les trouppes Russes. Je trouve, Votre Excellence, la demande des états du Cercle de Souabe est bien juste. Assurément ils doivent être dédommagés pour l'embaras et les peines avec quelques du moins petites sommes d'argent mais comme je ne sais pas encore si cette depense me regarde car d'après l'arrangement entre les deux cours impériales je dois recevoir les munitions de guerre toute faite et donner des quittances ce que j'en recevrais, mais si cette premiere

* L'Archiduc Charles non seulement accepta l'offre de Monsr de Suworow de reprendre l'offensive, mais il envoya son adjudant Colloredo a Feldkirch pour concerter un plan d'operations basé sur le passage du Rhin de coté de Constance et de Schaffausen par toute l'armée Autrichienne arrivée de Manheim. La conduite du Marechal Suworow a cette occasion a paru aussi extraordinaire, (pour ne rien dire de plus fort) que celle de Monsr de Korsakoff a Zurich. Les causes secretes de cette conduite me sont connues, ayant été l'intermediaire entre lui et l'Archiduc.—Il me suffit de dire que l'Archiduc s'est conduit a cette occasion avec franchise et loyauté, se pretant a toutes les tergiversations et caprices du Marechal, lui fournissant de plus tout ce que lui manquoit de pontons, artillerie de position, officiers d'etat major, &c. &c. &c., et que c'est au Marechal seul qu'on doit attribuer le manquement de cette operation.

WM. WICKHAM.

arrangement a eu quelques changemens et que je dois deja entrer dans les depenses de transport du laboratoire, j'enverai d'abord de l'argent pour contenter au prix désiré par le Cercle de Souabe pour les chariots employés pour cet effet.

Je supplie Votre Excellence de me faire savoir si Monsieur le Colonel Ramsay est avec vous à Wangen ou dans un autre endroit, car j'aurai besoin de lui écrire par rapport des affaires d'argent, et vous m'obligerez Monsieur à lui faire mes Complimens.

Agréez l'homage de la Consideration très distinguée avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être Monsieur de votre Excellence le trés humble et trés obeissant Serviteur,

RIMSKOY KORSAKOFF.

ce 13 d'Oct.
1799
du camp près du village
de Benzingen.

à S: Ex.: Monsieur DE WICKHAM.

The Archduke Charles to General Korsakoff (p. 264).

(Copy.) Donaueschingen le 14 oct^bre 799.

A Monsieur le Général Russe
RIMSKOY KORSAKOFF.

J'apprends par une lettre du Maréchal Prince Suwarow qui m'est parvenu ce matin par un courier qu'il est d'une necessité urgente pour le bien général qu'on lui envoye un soutien considérable a Feldkirch.

Comme je n'ai pas un nombre suffisant de troupes Autrichiennes dans les environs de Schaffhausen et de Singen pour lui envoyer ce renfort comme je le desirais, et que l'infanterie de M^r le lieut^t Général ne peut pas être partagée, je ne trouve d'autre moyen que celui de vous proposer de vous rendre avec tout votre corps et les troupes Palatines auprés du Maréchal Suwarow et de diriger votre marche de la maniére suivante. Demain 15 Oct^bre à Stockach; 16 Oct^bre à Sallmannsweiler; 17 Oct^bre à Buchhorn; 18 Oct^bre à Lindau, à Lindau le Maréchal vous donnera les autres instructions necessaires.

Le corps peut, demain, prendre à Stockach dans le magazin imperial du foin et de l'avoine pour trois jours, et s'il est possible aussi pour 3 jours de pain, sinon pour deux jours.

Les troupes doivent porter leur nourriture, et il n'est permis à qui que ce soit et sous aucun prétexte de prendre les voitures de Paysan, parce que cela rendroit impossible le transport de vivres pour l'armée.

Le corps peut derechef à Lindau prendre du fourage et du pain pour trois jours dans le magazin imperial.

Il est de toute necessité que l'on envoye aux bagages toutes les personnes dont on ne se sert pas devant l'ennemi, parcequ'elles rendent plus difficile la subsistance de l'armée.

Je doute que le Maréchal ait besoin de plus de cavalerie qu'il en a deja pour ses opérations, je crois donc qu'il vaudroit mieux que vous renvoyiassiés toute la votre dans les environs du Danube entre Riedlingen, Mengen, &c. où l'on pourvoiera à sa nourriture et d'où, après que le Maréchal Suwarow aura penetré dans la Suisse, il pourra facilement la faire rejoindre. Si vous voulés prendre votre cavalerie avec vous jusqu'a Lindau, cela est a votre disposition, seulement il la faudra laisser entre Lindau et Buchhorn, parcequ'outre que je suis assuré que le Maréchal n'a pas besoin de tant de Cavalerie pour ses opérations, je suis persuadé qu'il ne faut pas même penser à pouvoir la nourir dans le Vorarlberg.

Il est seulement nécessaire que le lieutenant général me fasse instruire d'abord duquel de ces deux endroits il a dessein d'envoyer sa cavalerie.

Voila ce que j'ai à vous proposer pour le bien du service et vous prie de le mettre sans difficulté en exécution.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 265).

(Copy.) Donaueschingen le 14 Oct^bre 799.

à Monsieur le
Maréchal Prince Suwarow.

Je viens de recevoir aujourdhuy matin, par le Capitaine Mayer, la lettre que M. le Maréchal m'a adressée en dâte du 12^e courant.

Je vois par les dispositions que vous avés la bonté de me communiquer, la maniére dont le Prince se propose de faire l'attaque projettée, en consequence, je prends la resolution de vous faire mes remarques sur lesdittes dispositions.

L'ennemi, d'après toutes les nouvelles a dans ce moment une armée d'environ 30,000 hoñes dans les environs de S^t Gall et le lac de Wallenstadt; il a partagé le reste de ses forces, et en a destiné une partie pour couvrir son flanc gauche depuis Constance jusqu'a Bâle, et l'autre partie il l'a portée dans le Canton d'Uri et le pays du Valais pour menacer l'aile gauche de l'armée combinée en Suisse, de même que les derriéres de l'armée d'Italie.

L'ennemi occupe Sargans, et de là la rive gauche du Rhin jusqu'à la mer.

D'après ma maniére de voir, cette position de l'ennemi rend très difficile un passage du Rhin dans cette partie, et lui donne le tems de s'assembler aux points les plus favorables, pour venir avec avantage au devant de la colonne.

Nos troupes abandonnant Coire, Ragatz, et Mayenfeld, il n'y a aucun doute que l'ennemi n'occupe ces endroits, et ne fasse d'abord réparer tous les ponts de bois.

Tout ceci pourroit bien arriver avant que vous commenciés vos opérations, et entraineroit avec soi la suite malheureuse que le même jour où le Prince entreprendroit de forcer le passage du Rhin, l'ennemi poussa de Sargans et de Grabs du coté de Hirschensprung et Altstätten et causa par cette manœuvre aux troupes qui auroient deja passées le Rhin de grandes difficultés à surmonter pour pouvoir se tenir sur la rive gauche du Rhin.

A tout ceci il faut encore ajouter qu'il est necessaire que non seulement l'ennemi soit chassé de la Suisse par vos opérations, mais encore que le Vorarlberg et les Etats héréditaires de S. M. l'Empereur et Roi soient en cas d'un malheur imprévu préservés pour le premier moment d'une irruption ennemie.

Je croïs donc que, pour allier ces deux objets importants et pour pouvoir les mettre en exécution à la fois, il seroit important que M. le Prince ait la bonté de commencer ses opérations par attaquer l'ennemi près de Sargans, et pendant qu'une partie de nos troupes le poursuivrait par Wallenstadt, l'autre pousseroit en avant du coté de Grabs, en même tems qu'on le menace plus bas d'un passage du Rhin, jusqu'au moment favorable pour effectuer un passage véritable.

D'après mon opinion, voila le seul moyen avec lequel M. le Maréchal peut entreprendre ses opérations sur S^{t} Gall avec quelque sureté.

Je trouve aussi, comme M. le Maréchal a eu la bonté de me le fair remarquer dans sa lettre de Balzers, que vous avés trop peu de troupes pour une entreprise de cette importance; par cette raison je me fais le devoir le plus sacré de mettre tout en exécution pour le renforcer.

J'aurois desiré pouvoir vous envoyer ce refort tout de troupes Autrichiennes, mais leur eloignment, sans perdre un tems infini, rend l'accomplissement de ce desir impossible. En conséquence j'ai prié aujourdhuy M. le lieut^{t} Général Korsakoff de se

mettre en marche avec son corps pour aller vous rejoindre. Monsieur le Maréchal verra dans la piece cy-jointe ce que je lui ai ecrit à ce sujet, ainsi que la maniere dont ses marches sont distribuées et celles dont ses troupes seront nourries.

Je suis persuadé de la necessité que nous devons tout employer pour chasser l'ennemi de la Suisse, et Monsieur le Prince peut être assuré que j'employerai tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir pour l'exécution de ce projet.

J'ai de même prié le P^ce^ de Condé de rester à Petershausen avec son corps. Ce corps est si foible en infanterie, que j'ai trouvé plus à propos de le laisser où il se trouve actuellement.

Je suis très fâché que par ces circonstances M. le Maréchal soit obligé de remettre le commencement de ses opérations au-delà du 20 du courant. Bien que le moindre tems perdu puisse être très nuisible, je crois necessaire de faire à la sécurité de nos opérations le sacrifice de ce retard.

Aussitôt que M. le Maréchal me fera instruire du jour qu'il entreprendra ses opérations, j'employerai tout de mon coté pour détacher un corps considérable au-delà du Rhin soit du coté de Biessingen ou plus bas, afin de donner à l'ennemi toutes les inquietudes possibles pour ses derrières. Le Prince de Condé ne pourra rejoindre M. le Prince que lorsqu'il sera arrivé dans les environs de Wyl, et qu'il aura poussé une colonne contre Pfyn.

J'aurai soin que M. le Maréchal ne manque ni de pontons, ni ponts volants, ni de munitions jusqu'à ce que M. le Prince se trouve en etat de s'en fournir lui même.

Le général Autrichien Baron de Hiller va avec le corps d'armée Russe. C'est un homme de talents et qui connoît parfaitement le pays jusqu'à Zurich. Je vous le recommande comme un très honnête homme et comme quelqu'un de très instruit; il pourra rendre à M. le Maréchal de très grands services s'il a la bonté de l'employer.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suwarow (p. 268).

(Copy.)

a Monsieur le Maréchal PRINCE ITALISKY COMTE SUWAROW RIMNIKSKY. Donaueschingen le 15 Oct. 799.

Je reçois dans l'instant la lettre du Prince en date du 14 du courant dans laquelle je vois avec un grand étonnement le changement subit de votre plan, de même que le dessein que

vous avés de vous mettre en marche par la Souabe avec le corps d'armée Russe pour rejoindre le lieut^{t} général Korsakow.

Ce mouvement est le plus nuisible de tous pour les operations, parce qu'il m'obligera de mon coté d'abandonner l'empire et qu'il vous mettra dans la position de ne pouvoir en aucun maniere faire subsister l'armée Russe et vous pourvoir des choses les plus nécessaires, dont vous avés un très grand besoin.

J'espere encore que Monsieur le Maréchal accordera la plus mure réflexion au mouvement qu'il a projetté, puisque de sa résolution peuvent résulter les plus grands malheurs.

Dans le cas que vous ne trouviés pas convenable ce que j'ai eut l'honneur de vous répresenter dans ma lettre précedente je vous engage de rester avec votre armée dans le Vorarlberg, jusqu'à ce que j'aie envoyé les troupes necessaire au Lieut^{t} général Baron de Petrasch pour la defense de ce pays.

Je prie Monsieur le Prince de me faire parvenir sa reponse le plus vite possible, pour que je puisse d'après elle prendre mes mesures.

The Archduke Charles to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 269).

A Monsieur le
Maréchal PRINCE SUWAROW. Donaueschingen le 18^{me} Octobre 799.

Je viens de reçevoir dans le moment par mon adjudant d'aile major comte Bubna, la lettre que Votre Excellence m'addressa hier, par laquelle je vois, que Votre Excellence est entierement persuadé, que l'armée russe se trouve dans l'impossibilité de continuer les opérations, par cette raison obligé de lui donner le tems necessaire pour se remettre en etât, que malgré cela elle placera et tiendra prêt son infanterie entre Lindau et Hohen Ems, sa cavallerie entre Lindau et Buchhorn. Je ne puis regarder ses dispositions, telles nécessaires qu'elles soïent, que comme trés nuisibles pour l'avenir.

Je dois donc prié, Votre Excellence, de soigner pour la surété et la plus rigoureuse defense avec son armée du pays entre Lindau jusqu'à Hohen Ems, pour que le Lieutenant Général Baron de Petrasch soit dans le cas de pouvoir détacher des troupes de son aile droite du côté des Grisons afin de defendre tout le pays en avant de Feldkirchen, parceque non seulement on perdroit les Grisons et le Vorarlberg et votre position seroit menacée, mais ce que je serois forcé d'abandonner le terrain que j'occupe, pour me retirer, par quoi le fruit de la campagne

seroit perdu et les suites en deviendroient très malheureuses pour les operations en Italie.

Tout ceci est d'une si grande importance pour le bien-être commun, que je desirerais avoir l'honneur de parler personnellement sur cette article avec Votre Excellence. Stockach pourroit être pour cette entrevue le lieu le plus convenable. Je prie en consequence Votre Excellence, si elle est du même avis, de me fair instruire du jour où elle s'y transportera, pour que je me trouve dans la possibilité de m'y trouver.

CARL.

Field-Marshal Suworow to Mr. Wickham (p. 298).

Lindau le $\frac{9}{20}$ 8^{bre} 799.

Monsieur,—L'enrolement de la Milice Suisse dont il n'y a qu'un Bataillon ici et l'arrivée des 10,000 Bavarois étant des objets qui me tiennent fortement à Cœur, je prends la Liberté de vous réitérer, Monsieur, mes instances pour en effectuer l'un et l'autre. Le zèle infatigable que je vous connois, Monsieur, pour la Cause commune m'est le plus sur garant que vous y travaillerez sans relâche. Dans l'esperance agréable de vous revoir bientôt ainsi que M^{r} le Comte de Stakelberg, je vous prie d'agréer les assurances de mon attachement et de la considération distinguée avec lesquels j'ai l'honneur d'être, Votre très humble Serviteur et sincère ami,

PR. ITALIISKI CT. A. SUWOROW RYMNIKSKI.

Mr. Wickham to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 333).

(Copy.)
(Très confidentielle.) Augsbourg le 21 : Nov. 1799.

Monseigneur,—Deux jours après le départ de Votre Altesse de Feldkirch je fis part a ma Cour par un courier extraordinaire de la conversation très interessante dont Votre Altesse m'avait honoré dans cette ville, écrivant en meme tems au Chev^{r} Whitworth de la maniere que Votre Altesse desirerait que je le fisse.

Le Roi mon maître, dès qu'il a été instruit des vœux réels de Votre Altesse pour ce qui regarde les opérations de la campagne prochaine, n'a pas hésité d'y répondre avec empressement et de recommander vos projets comme les siens aux deux Cours Imperiales par des couriers extraordinaires expédiés de Londres

le 9 de ce mois. Sa Majesté en agissant ainsi, a cru donner la preuve la moins équivoque, soit a Leurs Majestés Impériales, soit a Votre Altesse même, de sa confiance dans les talents, dans les moyens, et surtout dans la justesse et la droiture de vuës de Votre Altesse.

Par suite de ces sentiments, Sa Majesté a surtout insisté auprès de la Cour de Vienne pour que Votre Altesse soit remise a la tête d'une armée combinée *Austro-Russe.* Il semble que les grands services que Votre Altesse, lorsqu'elle commandait une armée ainsi composée, ne cessait de rendre a la Maison d'Autriche, doivent assurer a une telle demande une réception favorable. Mais pour que Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi ait un interêt plus direct a l'accorder, Sa Majesté Britannique fera dans ce cas tout ce qui dépendra d'elle pour renforcer les armées Autrichiennes en Allemagne et en Italie de 80,000 hommes, soit Russes (s'il plait a votre auguste Souverain d'en accorder un nombre suffisant) soit Suisses et Allemands, et de plus de faire a ses frais des arrangements pour l'approvisionnement de cette force additionelle qui apporteront le plus grand soulagement a la Cour de Vienne, faciliteront en même tems la subsistance de Trouppes Russes, et mettront les officiers et les soldats dans la position la plus favorable.

Le Roi mon maitre a encore demandé a la cour de Vienne son plan d'opérations pour la campagne prochaine, lequel doit être soumis a la Cour de Petersbourg et approuvé par elle et par Votre Altesse comme condition préalable sans laquelle on ne peut contracter aucune engagement.

C'est pour que je puisse mettre toutes ces choses plus en détail sous les yeux de Votre Altesse et lui communiquer confidentiellement le contenue de depêches que je viens de recevoir de ma Cour, que je prie Votre Altesse de vouloir bien me donner une heure a laquelle je pourrai avoir l'honneur de me rendre chez elle, pour l'entretenir a ce sujet. Elle apprendra surtout avec un véritable plaisir qu'on s'est interessé de la maniere la plus forte en faveur de Sa Majesté Sarde, et qu'il y a lieu d'esperer qu'on ne mettra plus d'obstacle a son retour à Turin, et a ce qu'elle rentre en jouissance de la plus grande partie de ses Etats et de son droit de Souveraineté; sauf a régler après les conditions définitives, moyenant lesquelles la Cour de Vienne se desistera de ses prétentions à vouloir tout garder.

Du reste, de toutes les propositions que le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique est autorisé à faire a la Cour de Vienne, il m'est autorisé a traiter définitivement sur aucune, sans le consentement et l'entiere approbation de la Cour de Petersbourg préalablement obtenue.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus haute considération et le plus respectueux attachement, Monseigneur, de Votre Altesse, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. WICKHAM.

A: S: A: Monseigneur le
PRINCE ITALISKY COMTE SUWOROW
RYMNIKSKI, &c. &c. &c.

The Emperor Francis to Field-Marshal Suworow (p. 335).

(Copy.)

Lieber Feld-Marschall Fürst Italiskÿ Graf Suworow Rimniksky!—Mit bedauerlicher Befremdung habe ich aus ihrem Schreiben vom 13ten dieses ersehen müssen, dasz Sie mit Ihrer unterhabenden Kayserlich-Russischen Armee, den Rückmarsch nach Russland in Kurzem auszutretten beordert und gesinnet seÿen. Wie nachtheilig in den Augen von Freund und Feind dieser unerwartete Entschluss erscheinen wird, wie gemeinschädlich für die gute Sache der aus dieser Maszregel anstehende Eindruck seÿn muszte; brauche Ich einem Manne wie der Feld-Marschall Fürst Italiskÿ ist, nicht zu berühren!

Ich glaube also von Ihnen, werther Feld-Marschall, erwarten zu können, dasz Sie wenigstens nicht aus eigenem Antriebe die Ausübung der erhaltenen Marsch-Befehle beschleunigen werden, um so mehr als, bey inzwischen erhaltenen Aufklärung mehrerer Dinge, und der neu eingetrettenen Lage der Umstände, Gegenbefehlen von Seite Ihres Monarchen mit Wahrscheinlichkeit anzuhoffen seÿn dörften. Sollte jedoch es bey dem ersten Entschluss sein unabweichliches Bewenden behalten, so werden Sie in Ansehung der nöthigen Verpflegs- und anderen Marsch-Dispositionen, mit meines Bruders des Erzherzogs Liebden, welcher von Mir unter einstens hiezu beauftraget wird, sich einzuvernehmen und einzuverstehen belieben, damit einer Seits die Kayserlich-Russischen Truppen bey der mit allen Winter-Märschen verbundenen Beschwerlichkeit nicht auch Nahrungs-Mangel erleiden, und anderer Seits, der Landmann durch den Druck einer zu beträchtlichen Quartiers-Last und überhäuften

Vorspanns-Abreichung, nicht nach Allem was er schon durch den Krieg ausgestanden hat, zu empfindlich mitgenommen werde. Was Meine Erbstaaten insbesondere betrifft, werde Ich wenn es doch dazu kommen sollte, Meinem Hofkriegs-Rathe die nöthigen Weisungen ertheilen; jedoch müszte in Zeiten der Tag der Eintreffung an Meinen Gränzen bekannt gemacht, und ihm die erforderliche Zeit gelassen werden, um die vielfältigen Vorkehrungen, die dieser Truppen Marsch heischet, ins Werk setzen und vollenden zu können, damit nicht neuer Anlasz zu Beschwerden daraus entstehe.

FRANZ.

Wien: den 28ten Nov: 1799.

The Duc d'Enghien to Mr. Wickham (p. 392).

Aux environs de Munich ce 19 Xbre 99.

En profitant, Monsieur, de la permission que vous m'avez donnée de vous adresser mes lettres pour l'Angleterre, je ne puis m'empecher de vous reparler d'une chose qui m'interesse vivement. Vous scavez monsieur ce dont je vous parlai il y a quelque temps a Landsberg relativement a moi dans le cas ou le corps de mon grandpere rentreroit en Russie; mais je crains de ne m'etre pas fait bien comprendre, et je vous demande pardon d'avance de l'ennui que vont vous causer quelques détails dans lesquels je vais entrer; j'ose esperer que ma lettre et mes desirs ne seront connus que de vous seul.

Je viens de recevoir l'avis que le corps marchoit jusques a Lintz ou il a ordre de stattioner une quinzaine de jours; il est possible sans doute que ce terme se prolonge et que nous remarchions en avant au printems mais qui peut aussi prévoir si les événements politiques a venir ne nécessiteront point la rentrée des trouppes Russes dans leurs frontieres? C'est dans ce dernier cas, monsieur, (que vivement peiné a mon age, avec ma santé, et j'ôse ajouter, le nom que je porte, de commencer une cariere inactive et obscure), je ferois mon possible pour obtenir de S. M. I. l'Empereur de Russie un congé pour continuer du moins de ma personne à porter les armes contre la republique Françoise, si S. M. I. daignoit me conserver la pension qu'elle a daigné m'accorder, je me trouverois assez heureux pour n'avoir besoin d'aucun secours pécuniaire; mais dans le cas où elle jugeroit apropos de me la retirer, vu mon absence de ses états, ne me seroit-il pas permis d'esperer que

votre gouvernement m'accorderoit un traitement, non a titre de pension, mais des apointments purement militaires et bornés a la durée de la guerre? car a la paix, il est de mon devoir si elle n'est pas assez heureuse pour nous permettre de rentrer dans notre patrie, d'aller auprés de mon grandpere soigner sa vieillesse, et la rendre aussi heureuse qu'il dependra de moi.

Aucun vue d'interêt ou d'ambition ne me portant a faire cette démarche, je n'ai point encore songé au rang ou l'espece de service que je pourois remplir: dans cette suposition je n'ai consulté que mon ardeur et mon desir de continuer a servir contre les rebelles de ma patrie, et un moyen de me tirer de la vie obscure d'un simple colonel de dragons Russes dans un cantonnement en Volhinie.

Sans doute il me seroit trés agréable de servir avec les nouveaux corps Suisses a la solde de l'Angleterre, mais dussois je me retrouver simple volontaire dans l'armée Autrichienne je serois toujours content de la place qui me seroit assignée pourvu qu'elle me mit a même de payer de ma personne et de chercher a me distinguer dans la cariere militaire, chose devenue impossible aujourd'hui dans le corps de Condé, où nos regiments organisés déja d'une maniere si fautive, sont d'ailleur beaucoup trop faibles en hommes pour pouvoir etre utile desormais, a moins qu'ils ne soient recrutés des trois quarts.

Je vous renouvelle mes excuses, Monsieur, de la longueur de cette lettre; la grace soutenue que vous avez toujours eue pour moi m'a fait penser que vous preniez quelqu'interêt a ce que me regarde, et je crains d'abuser plus longtems de votre complaisance. Ne doutez jamais, je vous prie, Monsieur, des sentiments de haute considération avec lesquels je suis, votre trés humble et trés affectionné serviteur,

L. A. H. DE BOURBON.

The Archduke Charles to Mr. Wickham (p. 394).

A Monsieur W^m^ WICKHAM
ministre plénipotentiaire de
S. M. B^que^ près le corps Helvetic
et les Ligues Grises,
au quar^r^ g^al^ de Donau-eschingen
le 22 décembre 1799.

Monsieur,—J'ai reçu la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser au sujet d'un emplacement convenable au rassemblement et à la formation des trois regiments Suisses. Vous

pouvez être bien assuré, Monsieur, que j'accueillerai toujours avec un vif intérêt les mesures que vous croirez devoir prendre, pour développer les vues généreuses de Sa Majesté Brittannique, et augmenter les ressources et les forces de la cause commune. Je ne trouve cependant rien de plus analogue aux conjonctures actuelles, et la position qu'occupe l'armée sous mes ordres, que la proposition que vous faites, d'employer à cet egard la voie des négociations auprès de quelque ville imperial située sur les derrières de mon armée. Je puis vous donner l'assurance, Monsieur, que loin d'y mettre obstacle, j'appuyerai au contraire cette démarche par mon intervention auprès de la ville qui vous paroitra la plus propre à répondre à vos desseins. Si vous croyez, par exemple, que la ville d'Augsbourg, ou quelqu'autre ville dans cette partie, malgré les nombreux etablissements que nous y avons, pût réunir les avantages que vous desirez, je suis prêt à m'adresser de mon côté à cette ville, pour venir à l'appui des démarches que vous auriez faites sur cet objet.

M^r^ le Général-Major Baron de Hiller m'a communiqué la demande que vous lui avez adressée, au sujet de l'artillerie que vous désireriez tirer des arsenaux Autrichiens. Je ne puis, Monsieur, vous faire remettre ces pièces d'artillerie, en les prenant dans celles dont mon armée est dotée, puisque leur nombre est calculé par le Conseil de guerre sur ses besoins. Mais je vais m'adresser au plutôt à ce sujet à la Cour; et je n'omettrai, Monsieur, dans cette occasion comme dans toute autre, aucune des démarches qui pourroient vous prouver mon desir sincère de faciliter en tout ce que dépendra de moi l'exécution des vues que vous inspire votre zèle pour la bonne cause.

CHARLES, F.-M.

THE END.

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